Jeongjo the Great: S Korea’s new destroyer bristles with missiles – Asia Times

A crucial component of South Korea’s marine modernization strategy to advance standard deterrent against North Korea and other regional threats has been completed.

The Korean ROKS Jeongjo the Great battleship was commissioned in November at the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries factory in Ulsan, according to The War Zone’s report this quarter.

The ship, the first among three KDX-II I Batch 2 destroyers to be delivered, showcases the sophisticated Korean Vertical Launch System ( KVLS-II ) for ballistic missiles, indicating South Korea’s increasing focus on missile defense.

The destroyer measures 558 feet in length, displaces around 12, 000 tons and is equipped with the latest Foundation 9 Aegis fight program, which enhances its tracking, hit and anti-submarine war capabilities.

The KVLS-II is a major upgrade, allowing for the implementation of larger weapons, including the Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM ) and possibly ballistic weapons, which are essential for countering North Korean challenges.

The development comes as a result of South Korea’s decision to lift its missile collection limits in 2021, which will enable it to increase its missile arsenal.

Naval News reported in March 2024 that South Korea had initiated the development of a new ship-launched ballistic missile, known as the” Ship-to-surface Ballistic Missile” or Hyunmoo-IV-2, following approval by the Defense Program Promotion Committee.

The Agency for Defense Development ( ADD)-managed program will skip the research phase and move to system development, with detailed design work anticipated to be finished by 2028, according to the Naval News report.

The missile, designed for precision attacks on major enemy targets over long distances, will be integrated into KVLS-II and deployed on three types of Republic of Korea Navy ( ROKN) ships: the KDX-II I Batch-II Aegis destroyers, the future Korean Next-Generation Destroyer ( KDDX ) and the future Arsenal ship.

In April 2023, Asia Times reported that South Korea had introduced plans for an “arsenal ship”, a missile-equipped vehicle for land-attack activities targeting important goals like command centers, transportation hubs, air defense deployments and military facilities.

The ROKN plans to purchase three vessels by the end of the 2020s as a result of Daewoo Shipbuilding &amp, Marine Engineering ( DSME) as the company’s joint firepower ship concept.

In the event of an imminent missile threat, each vessel is designed to carry 80 missiles for preemptive strikes against North Korean military installations. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration ( DAPA ) will invest US$ 467 million between 2024 and 2036 to develop a new ship-to-surface ballistic missile for these ships.

The ships ‘ development may align with&nbsp, South Korea’s” Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation ( KMPR )” strategy as outlined in its 2022 Defense White Paper. The only way to deter North Korea is to threaten the Kim dynasty and its nuclear arsenal, according to KMPR, which is based on the idea that since it is not deterred by military action or economic sanctions.

The plan emphasizes deterrence by denying and punishing both, and hopes to cast doubt on North Korean leaders regarding the success of an attack and the possibility of severe retaliation. It includes a damage-limitation aspect, intending to minimize the impact of any North Korean nuclear attack. It is intended for preventive action, recommending quick strikes on nuclear targets if a North Korean attack appears on the horizon.

However, South Korea’s ballistic missile-carrying warships may be vulnerable to a multitude of North Korean asymmetric threats, which include submarines, special operations forces, fast attack craft swarms, naval mines, drone swarms, suicide attacks and anti-ship missiles.

Despite having no nuclear weapons, South Korea may have a limited ability to threaten North Korea, which may limit its conventional deterrence posture.

In an article published in the peer-reviewed International Security journal in January 2021, Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim claim that South Korea must face significant difficulties in keeping a credible conventional deterrence posture in order to combat North Korea’s nuclear threat.

To counter this, Bowers and Hiim mention that South Korea has developed an independent counterforce and countervalue strategy that relies heavily on advanced conventional capabilities, such as high-precision ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated missile defense systems and sophisticated ISR ( intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ) technologies.

However, Bowers and Hiim point out that this strategy presents several dilemmas. They claim that South Korea must quickly identify, track, and neutralize North Korean missile threats, which is extremely difficult given North Korea’s extensive use of hardened underground facilities and mobile missile launchers.

Additionally, they note that South Korea’s strategy must continually adapt to North Korea’s advancements in survivability and penetration capabilities, giving rise to high financial and technological demands. They claim that this strategy causes crisis instability strategically, and that counterforce threats could prompt North Korea to launch a first strike in a crisis.

Countervalue threats directed at North Korea’s leaders may encourage centralized or unauthorized nuclear use, further destabilizing the area. Additionally, South Korea may have to reevaluate its strategic approach to its long-time rival North Korea as a second Trump administration is under way.

During his first presidency, US President-elect Donald Trump favored re-engagement with North Korea, meeting Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in June 2018, and pledged to halt US-South Korea military exercises at the possible expense of downgrading Seoul’s deterrence capabilities. &nbsp,

Further, Trump’s transition team is discussing the possibility of direct talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un, with re-engagement apparently being the second Trump administration’s goal, though no final decision, dates or timetables have been confirmed. Trump may also choose to put Middle Eastern conflicts and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine before the Korean Peninsula.

Trump may also ask South Korea to pay more in cash for the service it provides. The first Trump Administration demanded$ 5 billion to help pay for the costs of hosting 28,500 US troops stationed on South Korean soil. A second Trump administration could bring on this demand, which would increase Seoul’s potential high new defense costs.

The incoming Trump administration will most likely carry on its previous hawkish stance toward China. The previous position demanded the creation of a 350-ship US Navy, large-scale arms shipments to Taiwan, and the promotion of anti-China blocs like the Quad. It also advocated for withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty.

These indicate potential differences between the US and South Korean approaches to China. Because China is Pyongyang’s primary economic and diplomatic lifeline, South Korea believes its relationship with China is crucial in shaping its decisions.

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Russia-Iran-Assad ‘axis of the vulnerable’ cracking in Syria – Asia Times

The so-called” shaft of the prone” is breaking in Syria. Starting in 2016, Russia and Iran, propping up the routine of Bashar al-Assad, needed more than a year of bombing, ground rapes and battle to break the rebel criticism in the south of Syria’s largest city, Aleppo.

Then, in 2024, the insurgents needed less than four days to conquer the town and most of Aleppo state. Before the Assad regime established defense lines, they also reclaimed place from the neighboring Idlib province and expanded north into northern Hama.

Soviet troops remained in their foundations on the Mediterranean. Additionally, the insurgent improve seized Iran and its Lebanon-based ally Hezbollah from their positions in north-western Syria. Before at least two officers were killed, they abandoned them.

Assad has presided over a divided nation in his name since 2020, after Russia and Iran assisted his troops in bringing the antagonism to a majority in Syria.

He and his friends held most of the largest towns, including Aleppo and the money Damascus, while Turkish-backed opposition parties controlled most of north-west Syria and US-backed Kurdish groups had freedom in the north-east.

Currently, Assad does not even take over the partition’s presidency. And his Russian and Persian supporters are unable to reinstitute his papers rule because they are so stretched and dispersed by the rest of the world.

Propping up Assad

From the start of Syria’s rebellion against the longstanding principle of the Assads in March 2011, Russia and Iran provided political, administrative, knowledge and misinformation assistance to the Assad regime.

Since September 2012, Iran has essentially taken control of the Assad defense, training tens of thousands of militia to load emptied forces. Hezbollah sent in its soldiers from 2013 to save the Assad regime near Lebanon’s borders. And starting in September 2015, Russia joined special causes and the air force.

Many of Assad and his friends ‘ success came from their ability to crush the international community. The Kremlin disseminated vicious propaganda to cover up the regime’s dangerous substance attacks and disparage opposition activists and Syria’s White Helmets legal defense.

The Obama administration, rather than holding the government to accounts, was led by the head into useless conversations of a peace. The EU was sidelined, the UN rendered helpless, and Arab governments later sat on their arms.

The government’s greatest glory was perhaps the description of the anti-Assad group’s death as remarkable. In December 2016, East Aleppo was reclaimed.

Daraa state, the original site of the demonstrations, and the rest of southern Syria succumbed in 2018. Additionally, an 11-month unpleasant reoccupied Hama state and pieces of Idlib before a peace, brokered by Russia and Turkey, in March 2020.

A city street that has been ruined by war.
Aleppo has suffered significant damage as a result of the fight. Photo: Vagabjorn / Shutterstock via The Talk

That description, however, was also a hoax that concealed weakness. Despite Russia’s bombing and skirmishes leveling and putting an end to a large portion of the nation, Moscow, Iran, and Hezbollah still lacked the resources to assist the government in capturing the rest of north-west Syria or removing the Kurds in the north-east.

” Reconstruction” was a false brand in regions retaken by the government. Between 2010 and 2020, the Arab business lost more than half of its GDP due to the plutocracy of the Assad aristocracy.

The Arab pound, which was valued at 47 to the US dollars in 2011, has then collapsed to 13, 000 to the US dollars and is formally much weaker. And international restrictions, imposed because of the government’s size killing and persecution, are still in place.

While the program may depend on outside support, it was maintain the illusion of power. However, Vladimir Putin, the leader of Russia, threw his weight on his invasion of Ukraine in 2022. He has invested the majority of Russia’s assets into operations there about three years later and has put the nation under pressure from the world’s economy.

Iran’s management has been stricken by widespread protests over interpersonal issues, including women’s rights. Between incompetence and sanctions, the economy is also astounding. Additionally, the government has been weakened by secret operations and assassinations carried out by Israel and the US.

In the past three weeks, Israel’s attacks have decimated Hezbollah, from bombing pagers to killing commanders like general head Hassan Nasrallah. Fighters are still frightened of Jewish airstrikes and surface assaults despite a weak ceasefire.

But, when the rebels attacked next year, they were not facing a lauded shaft of opposition. They saw only the fading ghost of Assad’s supposed expert.

Turkey’s important function

Where next for Assad and his sponsors? The truth may then lie with Turkey president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Erdogan is the benefactor of the outcome, even though he may never have initiated the rebel rude – sources claim that Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the head of the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, made the decision. Turkey’s political and economic approach in north-west Syria has expanded since 2016 to include the country’s largest area.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, in a photograph. Photo: Asia Times Files / Vladimir Smirnov / Pool / Sputnik

Ankara has utilize over the term of conversations. It has the power to encourage and even provide the rebels to advance, or it can call for a stop and convergence in order to get ready for a meeting with the Russians and Iranians. The Greek foreign secretary, Hakan Fidan, has previously hosted his Persian equivalent in a display of diplomacy.

But that raises additional questions. Erdogan’s main rival in Syria is no Assad but the Kurdish government, whom he views as part of the Turkish-Kurdish rebellion party, the Kurdistan Workers ‘ Party.

So far, the Turkish-backed separatists have not had significant conflicts with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF). officially, the SDF and Kurdish authorities have withdrawn from Aleppo state and are now resuming operations in north-east Syria.

But did Turkey embrace this or, as in 2019, does it do an assault on the north-east? Apparently, Ankara has started discussions with the Assad government over a “buffer area” well inside the frontier.

That brings in the US, which has been a major supporter of the SDF and the Kurds. For today, Washington is likely to keep that commitment. However, Donald Trump’s resumption in January will make all of your options invalid.

Trump attempted to remove all of the US forces from Syria after a phone call with Erdoan in late 2018. He was outmaneuvered by the Pentagon, but another visit with Erdogan in October 2019 green-lit a Greek cross-border war.

The shaft of the resilient is breaking, but Syria’s period of doubt continues. Syrians have to expect that it won’t be as deadly or dangerous as it is now.

Scott Lucas is professor of global politicians, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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No reason to fear Putin’s tired nuclear bluff – Asia Times

The incoming Biden administration most just lifted a ban on Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles to attack targets inside Russia. Out of concern that Russia might use nuclear weapons, the White House had put a stop to the issue and had been observed by Washington’s friends.

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, responded by signing into rules changes to Russia’s nuclear theory, lowering the level for the use of nuclear arms. Russia next struck Ukraine with an obviously new, nuclear-capable intermediate-range weapon, the Oreshnik. Putin finally made the announcement that Russia had the right to strike the military deployments of the nations that permit Ukraine to strike Russia with their weapons, or, to put it another way, the US and UK.

Around the world, concern was raised by Putin’s nuclear risks and his use of the Oreshnik weapon. In the UK, journalists questioned Putin’s readiness to “push for the atomic option” and made reference to World War Three.

In gloating Soviet media reports, gloating stories about how Putin’s challenges were amplified in details were covered in UK and US information. The number of the 60 Minutes system on the Russia 1 tv channel, who reported a report in the Guardian that suggested Putin was instantly threatening London and Washington, said,” they understand us properly.

Since Russia started the war against Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s involvement in British and US press coverage shows something crucial about its attitude toward the east.

The Kremlin has made it increasingly obvious that it views Russia as the primary philosophical threat. This is not just because the West has allowed Ukraine to continue fighting on the front lines, or because significant American sanctions have put Russia in a precarious position of dependence on China.

One of the main ideological pillars of Putin’s president is now opposition to the worldwide influence of Western states, especially the US, and the multiply of liberal values.

However, Russia does not have the resources or desire to engage in primary military hostility with NATO. That’s a fight that it would gain if it were normal, while all – including Russia – may lose it if it went nuclear.

The Kremlin also rely on other means to stifle support for Ukraine, tamp down American nations, and fract Western cultures. These include intervention in local politics of its rivals and the damage of important infrastructure.

Culture of fear

The attempt to manipulate public opinion, mainly by creating a environment of fear, is an important tool. The Kremlin would benefit greatly from safely shaping the home environment in which Western governments decide their positions on Ukraine and Russia.

This is a variation of an ancient Soviet-era military practice: spontaneous control. An player can use spontaneous control to influence the choices the Kremlin wants them to make by giving specific information away.

This is what we can tell right then. The transfer of Russia’s new nuclear philosophy, Putin’s nuclear risks, and the synthesis of American media concern is intended to cause UK and other European decision-makers to reevaluate support for Ukraine because of public concerns. This has been obvious right away since the start of the conflict.

However, it dramatically increased once the Biden administration made the decision to allow long-range missile attacks on Russia.

The Russian government has attempted to impose pressure on Western governments by frightening citizens since the start of the war. The Kremlin warned Russia of a wintertime shutdown of its gas pipeline to western Europe in October 2022.

The goal was to persuade the governments of Europe to alter their positions on sanctions and Ukraine. Russia has successfully used this tactic for decades to put pressure on its less developed post-Soviet neighbors. However, it turned out against itself when many nations that had previously switched to other energy sources after purchasing gas from Russia.

Of course, using public concern about Russian threats to alter Western policy to undermine the Kremlin’s credibility is unsuccessful if the threats are neutralized or ignored.

Despite the alarmism, Putin has yet to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere, and the EU and other Western European nations have not experienced catastrophic energy failures. Russia’s relationship to both its adversaries and the rest of the world is weaker as a result. Putin is in a dangerous position for himself.

This recent round of threats and Russia’s amplification of Western media coverage are a result of the Biden administration’s decision to finally call Putin’s nuclear bluff. They show that nuclear weapons use, as well as other significant responses, are not as likely as they once were.

However, as Trump resigns as president, Russian attempts to influence the UK and other European countries through public opinion manipulation, sabotage, and other means may grow even though it is still highly unlikely that Russia will use nuclear weapons. A Russia-friendly White House will make the whole world less secure.

Ruth Deyermond is senior lecturer in post-Soviet security, King’s College London

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Ruble volatility exposes Russia’s emerging economic crisis – Asia Times

On November 28, the Russian ruble dropped to 113 against the US dollars, which is its lowest level since the start of the conflict in Ukraine.

The ruble has since risen a little to 105 on December 4, but it has fallen back to 105 in the last quarter, or about 8 %, against the dollar. This is not a one-off function, it is part of a developing issue that is affecting Russia’s market.

Since its army invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s money has experienced extreme volatility. The ruble’s original decline, which saw it lose one-third of its value by March compared to the start of the year, was the result of the nation’s exodus of capital following the enactment of Western sanctions.

The ruble’s worth decreased as a result of money flowing out of Russia, which made it more readily accessible on the foreign exchange market.

In answer, Russia’s central banks implemented strict capital-control steps to maintain its currency. The measures included requiring manufacturers to exchange 80 % of their international currency profits for francs and imposing a US$ 10,000 maximum for individual foreign currency withdrawals.

Russia had discovered a way to evade sanctions by exporting a lot of its oil and gas to nations like China and India by the middle of 2022, when electricity prices were rising.

The Russian benefited from robust export earnings, and the ruble’s price was briefly revived. The money controls deliberately increased the demand for the rubles, making it one of the year’s best-performing assets.

But, falling energy costs and tighter sanctions in 2023 caused a decline in Russia’s trade income. The G7 nations, the EU, and Australia placed a cover on the price of Russian crude, which resulted in a drop in foreign currency flows and a decline in the value of the rubles.

The November 2024 collapse is, at least in part, also the result of these factors. The main problems are the ongoing reduction in export earnings brought on by sanctions and the G7 oil price cover, as well as the looming end of the pipeline gas supply to Europe via Ukraine in 2025.

But new US restrictions, which came into effect on November 21, have worsened the position. Gazprombank, one of the few big Russian loans that had yet to be targeted, as well as 50 tiny- to medium-sized Russian businesses, 40 regional Russian clerks and some Russian central bank officials have all now been cut off from doing business with the US and its allies.

Customers of Russian oil and gas will once more have to find new ways to conduct company, as they did in 2022 due to this restriction. The business anticipates that these sanctions will lessen the flow of foreign money to Russia, leading to a decline in the rouble.

The Bank of Russia has taken an action by halting all private dollar payments through the end of the year. This will maintain the exchange level, albeit intentionally. However, trading may remain on the black business.

Signboard with the logo of Gazprombank against a blue sky.
The US has imposed sweeping sanctions on the Russian economic market, including on Gazprombank. Photo: FotograFFF / Shutterstock via The Talk

More instability away

Domestic and international funding will be stifled by a dangerous and weak franc, as investors prefer to trade in a robust and predictable currency.

The central bank will also be forced to use its reserves to support the franc because it encourages people to relocate their money out of the country, as it has since the start of the war. Russia’s current constraints are limited international money inflows and higher spending demands, creating a vicious cycle that will undermine its currency even more.

A poor franc even raises the cost of importing products or materials. If import-dependent businesses don’t pass the higher costs on to consumers, which is fairly simple in Russia, where there is little market competition, their profit margins may be slashed.

This drives prices for imported items like food, medical supplies, equipment and strength. Russia imported over$ 81 million price of energy in 2022, mostly from Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Azerbaijan and Mongolia.

And it imports specific refined petroleum products, also. Russia’s annual inflation rate was estimated at 8.4 % in October, which is twice the goal of the central bank, and it is not anticipated to increase until the year’s end.

Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, and his economy minister, Maxim Reshetnikov, say there is no need for emergency measures to help the rubles. Reshetnikov has stated that the volatility of the ruble is brought on by the US dollar’s power globally, and that market concerns following the most recent sanctions should immediately settle.

However, failing to take a decisive course of action could lead to more depreciation, which will only increase investor confidence in the franc. According to experts, the main company’s current interest rate of 21 % is expected to rise in order to maintain the ruble and reduce inflation. However, raising the rates will definitely decrease the market.

There is a lot of things that concern Putin. Falling export earnings, prices and strained resources all weaken Russia’s macroeconomic stability. And it appears as though Western sanctions are now having a major impact on Russia’s ability to deal with its financial troubles.

The Putin’s regime’s administrators may say that a weaker franc will be more advantageous to them during the conflict. The Kremlin will have more local currency to help cover the government’s growing deficit if foreign currencies are converted to stronger ones from energy exports.

Despite this, Russia’s currency crises has exposed heavy issues in the economy. It has a poor economic sector, has limited economic expansion, and relies heavily on power exports.

Putin may have no choice but to conduct business with a few trading partners, including China and India, because sanctions will likewise isolate Russia more and entail its financial freedom.

Nasir Aminu is older teacher in economics and finance, Cardiff Metropolitan University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Asia Times Editor’s note: Franc charges were updated for latest available information.

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COP29’s new climate finance deal: Will India and China step up? – Asia Times

India and China, the country’s two most popular nations, are key to international environment efforts. They make up over a third of the international community as a whole, and they tremendously increase global pollution. As significant economies and emerging market leaders, their actions may have a significant impact on achieving or preventing international climate goals.

This reality was highlighted by the recent 29th Conference of the Parties ( COP29 ) in Azerbaijan, which was a significant advance in the global climate agenda. Countries converged to set a more ambitious climate finance target, which would accelerate action on pollution and adaptation, after key agreements were reached to promote climate action at the summit, known as the” climate finance COP.”

The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), which will remove the US$ 100 billion goal that is pending, and commit to organizing US$ 300 billion yearly for developing nations by 2035, was a crucial result.

Nevertheless, the NCQG falls little of the US$ 1.3 trillion goal that developing nations had advocated for, and even that figure may not be sufficient to meet their climate financing needs.

Important questions remain: Who will make the expenses? Does the money remain in the form of grants, concessional funding, or private field loans? And, crucially, how will these tools be allocated and distributed? For the NCQG to really work, these difficulties must get addressed.

Major effects will be had by the new agreement for both China and India. As main players in this environment financing commitment, their contributions, alongside international support, may be crucial in determining whether the world can match its climate objectives.

India is a key emerging economy that struggles to strike a balance between achieving climate goals and achieving financial growth and reducing poverty. India’s need for more climate finance was highlighted by current COP29 discussions as a result of its need for a low-carbon business.

New Delhi has much argued that developed countries, which account for the majority of traditional pollution and have experienced higher levels of economic growth, may bear a larger share of the fiscal load. India has made significant progress in renewable energy, setting a lofty goal of 500 gigawatts ( GW ) of non-fossil fuel-based energy by 2030, but it still faces significant challenges in implementing these initiatives without substantial financial and technological support.

Hope is provided by the NCQG’s commitment to raising US$ 300 billion annually for developing nations. However, India’s request for more significant climate fund is still unheeded.

India’s strategy to weather motion is essentially linked to its growth priorities. India is ranked 10th in the most recent Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), with a relatively low per capita emissions of 2.9 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2 ), which is significantly lower than the global average of 6.6 tCO2. This ranking reflects India’s vigilant climate policies, which demonstrate that green growth is possible even for developing nations.

India has, however, constantly emphasized that climate finance should not have constrained by factors like green standards or policy restrictions that might impair its ability to grow economically. The important issue facing New Delhi may be balancing its development needs with its commitments to the environment, making sure that financial aid is both fair and clear.

China, for its part, has also faced investigation. China’s inappropriate contributions to climate financing at COP29 were subject to intense scrutiny. Its monetary commitment to international climate action is increasingly seen as a decisive test of its authority on the international level because it is the world’s largest emission.

Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, weather fund responsibility falls on developed countries due to their historical pollution. But, negotiators are increasingly urging China to play a bigger economic part.

China maintains its position as a developing nation and opposes mandated contributions, but its deliberate pledges have raised questions about their commitment, setting the stage for further discussion of China’s financial responsibility in international climate actions.

Critics argue that China’s rising world influence, its powerful technological capacity and its reputation as the country’s largest greenhouse gas emitter&nbsp, involve greater role in addressing climate change. China’s position in climate finance will be under increased scrutiny as the pressure mounts against it, especially if Beijing wants to exert greater influence in shaping international climate politics.

Since 2016, China has committed over US$ 24.5 billion in climate financing to developing countries, according to Chinese leaders. Monthly efforts are thought to be around US$ 4 billion, which is around 5 % of what developed nations contribute. While important, it also falls short of the US$ 100 billion annual goal for developed countries, a duty China has yet to join.

China has emerged as a significant person in climate financing, but it does so on its own terms and outside the conventional United Nations construction. Importantly, a significant portion of its monetary contributions are in the form of loans rather than grants, which raises questions about the potential debt burdens of the recipient countries over the long term and the potential viability of the project.

As China’s geopolitical and economic power grows, its climate finance plan will be under increasing pressure, especially as demands for greater accountability and stronger commitments grow.

COP29 set a crucial step with the NCQG. The meeting made clear that India and China are crucial in funding international climate action. Both nations may then set the example. After all, their actions may shape the future of climate politics and international conservation.

Neeraj Singh Manhas is the Republic of Korea’s Parley Policy Initiative’s special assistant for South Asia. He recently held the position of Research Director for the Indo-Pacific Consortium at Raisina House in New Delhi.

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Fake story, fake photo of alleged North Korean women in Kursk – Asia Times

A photo that the Daily Mail claimed two North Korean military females were present in Kursk was published. The picture is a phony. Some thanks to Levan Gudadze and his&nbsp, Telegram channel&nbsp, for pointing this out.

Zhenya and Sasha, the baby aunts, are depicted in the original picture. In 2023, they served as pond providers in the Donetsk People’s Republic Armed Forces system” Oplot”. The&nbsp, Oplot Brigade&nbsp, was a system of the Donetsk People’s Militia and after the Russian army. Oplot means Bastion.

The Russian propaganda mill most good sent the fake photo and story to The Daily Mail.

A Russian defense owner’s declaration, which was cited as a picture shared online, was supported by the image’s author as follows:” Daughters from Korea Wei and Lin– we call them Vera and Lida – have been serving with us for two months now. Why the Russians changed their names is questionable.

I can’t prove it but I don’t think any Russian military” trainer” said any such thing. I don’t believe the North Koreans are somewhere near Kursk. They’re definitely really teaching anywhere else in Russia.

Zhenya and Sasha, the baby daughters, were first seen in the original image.

Beware of what you read and see these times.

The Daily Mail has yet to retract its statement. No surprising.

The Daily Mail publishes a continuous supply of anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian advertising, much of it drivel. Given the caliber of news these days and the determination of readers and publishers to use their products as propaganda outlets, it isn’t surprising.

This content was first published in Stephen Bryen’s Weapons and Strategy email on Substacks. It is republished with authority.

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Yoon’s thwarted martial law grab shows Korean democracy at work – Asia Times

Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, addressed the UK parliament only a year ago with a speech praising the nation as the birth of liberal democracy. He vowed that South Korea may work with the UK to advance freedom, peace, and success for the world community.

Yoon reportedly turned around this week and called for an end to the country’s support for democracy. In a televised address to the nation, he claimed there was a need to protect the country from” brazen, pro-North Asian, anti-state” forces. He added that South Korea needs to “rebuild and guard it from “falling into ruin.”

Within a few hours, Yoon’s determination was swiftly and decisively reversed by politicians inside the National Assembly room and by residents in the roads outside. South Korea’s politics at labor was clearly demonstrated.

It served as a reminder that this is a really unique Korea from the one that emerged from the hand of prolonged military dictators and numerous enactments of martial law in the late 1980s.

Members of the National Assembly, some of whom had climbed fences and pushed past martial walls to get into the room, voted overwhelmingly against Yoon’s dramatic order, declaring it unlawful. Yoon’s individual People Power party members claimed that he had gone very far. After the ballot, politicians sat outside the National Assembly tower and firmly and politely criticized the constitutionality of the phone for martial law.

Since becoming a lame duck leader in April of this year’s legislative elections, Yoon has faced growing hardships since winning the opposition’s flood victory. Having just won the presidency in 2022 by a small percentage, Yoon’s approval score had been weakened by frequent crises.

Public opinion surveys revealed that six out of ten South Koreans believed their republic was on a downward trend within Yoon’s first time. By 2024, Yoon had successfully pushed through unpopular policies like Japan’s maximum working days and international policy. Just 32.7 % of South Koreans reported being satisfied with the caliber of their democracy as a result of this.

Yoon has attracted the ire of the people by using his presidential filibuster to obstruct legislation being passed by the opposition since losing command of the National Assembly, more frequently than any other president since democratization. Additionally, Yoon vetoed separate inquiries into his wife’s alleged involvement with election candidate rigging, share manipulation, and other alleged ties to accepting lavish gifts.

The majority opposition’s efforts this week, which falls outside the purview of a political veto, were likely the breaking point.

Yoon resorted to a theme not well known to some on the straight of Korean politics after failing to get his way on the finances. He blatantly accused the liberal opposition of conspiring with North Korea to destroy his leadership.

These are dangerous says, with no foundation in modern North Korean politics. Similar allegations of North Korean involvement in southern private affairs in the 1980s led to the military massacre of residents in Gwangju, a city in the south. The protesters had been calling for Chun Doo-hwan’s then-president to abolish military rules.

Faith in politics

Although the South Korean public frequently harbors concerns about political backsliding, despite the fact that dictatorship is firmly established in the country’s past.

In 2017 thousands of protest took to the streets, later ousting the then-president, Park Geun-hye, following allegations of corruption and restrictions on freedom of conversation. Especially unhappy was her administration’s decision to blacklist hundreds of designers and performers from receiving political money.

Despite these instances, 80 % of South Koreans now claim to be proud of the efforts made by political movements to institutional advancement. It demonstrates South Korea’s belief in the people’s capacity to hold their officials accountable.

People of Yoon’s inner group must have known what was going to happen, even though Yoon’s unique party president quickly condemned his steps. In light of the immediate mass reaction, rumors are rife that those who supported the decision are miserably out of touch with the public.

It is likely that Yoon has has made his own destruction by calling for military rules in a very different Korea of the twenty-first century. By using such a drastic measure, he was putting himself at risk for both South Korea’s and the region’s economic and political balance.

Had the circumstance persisted, a state of martial law would have wreaked havoc on hard-won progress in Korea’s interest as a page of foreign investment, high-tech business collaboration, tourism and popular culture.

In the days and weeks ahead, Yoon will have many things to answer for, and the progressive opposition has already started the process. His political career is unlikely to survive the repercussions of this grave error of judgment.

Sarah A Son is senior lecturer in Korean Studies, University of Sheffield

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Russia rears its head vis-a-vis Philippines in South China Sea – Asia Times

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has described the presence of a Russian attack submarine in his nation’s exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) in the South China Sea as “very worrisome” in a potential escalation of great power rivalry there.

On November 28, a&nbsp, &nbsp, Russian Kilo-class underwater was sighted just 80 coastal miles off the eastern Spanish territory of Occidental Mindoro. &nbsp,

” That’s very concerning. Any intrusion into the West Philippine Sea, of our EEZ, of our baselines, is very worrisome”, the Filipino president told reporters on Monday ( December 2 ).

The Russian underwater soon became known as UFA 490 and clarified its non-lethal purpose when the Philippine military fleet Jose Rizal made radio contact with it in response to the incursion.

Without providing any further details, Philippine Navy spokesman Roy Vincent Trinidad stated in a speech that the Soviet vehicle” stated it was awaiting improved weather conditions before going to Vladivostok, Russia.” &nbsp,

Admiral Trinidad tried to downplay the incident as” not alarming”, in apparent contradiction to Marcos Jr’s statement, but underscored how the Philippines was” surprised because this is a very unique submarine” .&nbsp,

Russia’s official in Manila did no comment on the matter despite press inquiries. Is it still unclear whether the Russian submarine was the updated version of the Kilo II ( Project 636.3 ) submarine from 2014 to 2016?

However, according to Russian media outlets, the 74-meter ( 243-foot ) long marine asset is armed with a missile system with a range of 12, 000 kilometers (7, 450 miles ). &nbsp,

Following a combined practice with the Malay army, the Russian submarine was headed back to Vladivostok, Russia’s east town, according to Philippine National Security Council official Jonathan Malaya. The practice came on the feet of historic&nbsp, Indonesia-Russia marine drills&nbsp, in the area last month.

Spanish authorities, following contact with the ship’s crew and appropriate Russian counterparts, reported that the submarine surfaced according to weather-related conditions. &nbsp,

Judicial intrusion

Major local experts are perplexed by the incident, and the legal context surrounding the Russian vessel’s presence in Philippine waters has also raised questions. &nbsp,

An attack underwater managing clearly and clearly in the high seas ( this is outside the territorial sea ) is not much of a threat, according to the report. Channels are for cunning and walk problems, not sailing on the surface”, Jay Batongbacal, a leading sea rules analyst based in Manila, &nbsp, wrote on his&nbsp, X accounts. &nbsp,

Foreign militaries are entitled to “innocent passage” across the Exclusive Economic Zone of coastal states under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS), but doing so should not be done in vain.

And any military deployment across another state’s EEZ is no longer considered&nbsp, &nbsp, “innocent” if it represents “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State” .&nbsp,

The UNCLOS has a special for submarines&nbsp, ( Article 20 ), which are required to ascertain their ‘ innocent passage’ by temporarily “navigat]ing ] on the surface…to show their flag”. The majority of UNCLOS members grant their 12 nautical miles of territorial waters the right to free section.

However, major countries such as India, China and Iran have imposed&nbsp, limits on the tuberculous presence&nbsp, of extraregional power perhaps across their EEZs. &nbsp,

For two main reasons, the Philippines is especially troubling by Russia. For one, Moscow and Beijing have declared a&nbsp,” no limits” partnership&nbsp, and simultaneously called for a’ new world order’, a strong alliance that has gained greater intensity following Russia’s war of Ukraine in 2022. &nbsp,

The two nations have also stepped up their&nbsp, defense cooperation&nbsp, in East Asia, including in fiercely disputed and geopolitically delicate waters. In July of this year, they&nbsp, conducted live-fire&nbsp, marine tasks in the South China Sea.

For the Philippines, Russia could possibly strengthen China’s growing military supremacy in the region, if never directly help the Asiatic power in the event of a disaster, including over Taiwan.

The Philippines is also concerned about Marcos Jr.’s deteriorating path of diplomatic ties. Recently, then-President Rodrigo Duterte made several trips to both Beijing and Moscow in a bid to build a new proper position.

The former Filipino president even described his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, as&nbsp, his&nbsp, “favorite hero” &nbsp, and&nbsp, “idol”, &nbsp, underscoring the depth of their personal and friendly relations.

Encouraged by Duterte’s manner and sensing, Russia quickly stepped up defence cooperation with the Philippines, America’s only full-fledged common defense treaty ally in Southeast Asia.

Consequently, Russian&nbsp, vessels docked in Manila Bay for the first time in past. Duterte individually boarded one of the visiting Russian warships, where he&nbsp, called upon his friends from Moscow to remain “our ally to protect us “—yet another thinly veiled shot at the US, which was often the goal of Duterte’s criticism, sending diplomatic relations into a tailspin.

In another first, Russia also deployed&nbsp, a defense attaché&nbsp, to Manila to explore big-ticket defense deals, including&nbsp, the potential purchase&nbsp, of submarines. The strategic flirtation&nbsp, culminated in Russia’s delivery of firearms to the Philippine National Police ( PNP ), which Washington sanctioned over its human rights record, and a&nbsp, record$ 227 deal for acquisition of Russian helicopters.

However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Duterte’s subsequent exit from office ushered in a new era of tensions between Manila and Moscow. While Duterte&nbsp, distanced himself&nbsp, from Putin’s war of aggression, his successor Marcos Jr punitively nixed a Russian Mi-17 helicopter deal in favor of American kit. &nbsp,

Throughout the ongoing war, the Philippines has also repeatedly voted in favor of Ukraine on important UN resolutions, much to Russia’s chagrin. Additionally, Marcos Jr. accepted an invitation to a Western-backed” Peace Summit” earlier this year in order to gain international support for Kyiv and was one of the few regional leaders to personally host Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. &nbsp,

The Ukrainian leader thanked the Philippine leadership for its” clear position” on Russia’s “occupation of our territories” and&nbsp, sought non-lethal assistance&nbsp, from the Philippines, especially in terms of healthcare professionals and post-war recovery.

Indeed, in many ways, Marcos Jr has positioned the Philippines as a core member of an emerging “alliance of democracies” facing off against the non-Western powers of Moscow and Beijing. &nbsp,

Russia flexing regional muscles

Putin’s Russia has withstanded a first round of Western sanctions and battlefield assaults, as evidenced by his earlier this year visits to Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam.

Russia is also determined to keep its footing in the regional defense markets while increasing joint exercises and military exports to numerous Asian nations, including Southeast Asia. &nbsp,

Russia and the Philippines may be on a collision course with the deployment of advanced missile systems in the future, especially as Washington makes preparations for possible conflicts with China over Taiwan.

In response to the Philippines ‘&nbsp, decision to semi-permanently host, &nbsp, if not purchase, the much-vaunted&nbsp, US Typhon missile system in its northern bases, China’s defense spokesperson, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, accused Manila of “intensif]ying ] geopolitical confrontation and escalat]ing ] tensions in the region”.

The Philippines should reconsider hosting American weapons systems, which have the capability to target southern Chinese military bases, has been reiterated by China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ).

This week saw a full display of geopolitical tensions when the Philippine and the Chinese maritime forces engaged in yet another incident close to the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, with each side giving contradictory accounts of the near-clash.

Earlier this year, Russia warned Japan against deploying US-made missile units to&nbsp, Japan’s southwestern Kagoshima and Okinawa prefectures, which are close to Taiwan. Russia will consider deploying short- and intermediate-range missiles on its eastern borders in response to any significant US-backed missile buildup, according to deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov. &nbsp,

Earlier this year, the Russian president also warned America’s” satellite state” allies to reconsider hosting any major American missile system. It is well known that the United States produces these missile systems and has already tested them in Denmark and Europe for exercises. Quite recently, it was announced that they are in the Philippines” .&nbsp,

The Philippines ‘ decision to host the US Typhon missile system and possibly even acquire it will likely stoke a tussle with Beijing as well as Moscow, which is averse to any significant US buildup on its eastern and western flanks.

The Philippines is suddenly at the center of a new Cold War conflict between China, Russia, and its authoritarian allies on one side and the US and its democratic allies on the other.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Rich Heydarian

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China, Pakistan flexing military muscle at anti-BRI militants – Asia Times

China’s joint, three-week anti-terrorism exercise in Pakistan from November 20-December 11 aims to help defend Beijing’s$ 70 billion Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) projects against deadly anti-Chinese insurgents in Baluchistan province.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ), which includes upgrading Pakistan’s north-south roads and Karakoram Highway to link Kashgar in China’s landlocked Xinjiang province directly to Pakistan’s hammerhead-shaped peninsula and port of Gwadar in Baluchistan on the Arabian Sea, close to the Persian Gulf, is under threat.

Big Chinese vessels does have a much shorter road for shipping gas from the Persian Gulf to oil-hungry China because of the CPEC’s expansion of Gwadar’s deep-water slot. Oil-laden ships already heading for China cross the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea, wrap up in India, and head south toward Singapore.

To achieve China’s west coast ports, those boats must go through the crowded Malacca Strait, where US-backed Singapore monitors its small waters. They must then ship up the South China Sea, which is racked by local rivalries and US-China to maintain its delivery lanes, islands, and underwater resources.

However, the CPEC do allow oil arteries from the Persian Gulf to remain in the Arabian Sea and unload their goods at Gwadar for overland vehicle transportation north to Xinjiang, China.

Washington-based Newlines Institute reported on November 14 that the deepening relationship between China and Pakistan through CPEC was pressure US-Pakistani relationships and bring Islamabad closer to Beijing.

In addition to a sleek 1, 860-mile (3, 000-kilometer ) highway and upgraded port, the CPEC projects at Gwadar include construction of a new Gwadar International Airport, a desalination plant, a coal-fired power plant, container berths and terminals for bulk cargo, grain, oil and liquified natural gas.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) sent more than 300 special operations, army aviation and logistic support troops from its Western Theater Command to the Pakistan-China Joint Exercise, Warrior VIII, which ends on December 11, China Military online reported.

The Press Trust of India news agency reported on November 19 that China’s Western Command “guards the Line of Actual Control ( LAC ) with India and the China-Pakistan border.”

Lin Jian, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated on November 20 that” China strongly supports Pakistan’s effort to combat terrorism.” Special Operations Forces from the Pakistan Army’s Special Service Group ( SSG) were sent by the 300 Chinese soldiers.

” The training will focus on shared counter-terrorism clean-up and strike functions”, China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency reported. The two sides will conduct multi-level and mingled training across a range of specialties, and conduct live army drills in accordance with the actual combat procedure, according to Xinhua.

China’s Ministry of Defense said,” This training aims to strengthen and develop practical markets and cooperation between the two forces, as well as to improve their joint anti-terrorism abilities”.

The training began at Pakistan’s National Counter-Terrorism Center in Pabbi, in rocky north Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which borders Afghanistan near the Khyber Pass valley, Radio Pakistan reported.

According to online media videos, the Chinese troops and their products arrived in batches on Y-20 transport plane and marched onto Pakistan’s road in plain fight camouflage, including steel helmets topped with what appeared to be camera and telescopic lenses.

They joined bearded Muslim forces, equally armed, at a joint flag-raising service before implementation, field surveys and setting up a command post.

” Significantly, the military drills, the eighth edition between the all-weather friends, are being held amid reports that China is pressing Pakistan to permit its forces to provide security for hundreds of Chinese personnel working in the$ 70 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”, reported India-based Raksha Anirveda magazine, which monitors defense and aerospace industries.

The magazine reported that the Baluch Liberation Army ( BLA ) and the Islamic militant group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP ) increased attacks on Chinese citizens and the Pakistani military in Baluchistan and the neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that are bordering the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

Rebels have been fighting for years for underprivileged Baluchistan’s freedom or freedom. They claim that Pakistan exploits the state’s natural resources while neglecting to modernize, and undertakes extrajudicial murders and enforced disappearances in Baluchistan.

They became anti-Chinese during the past 10 times amid allegations that the state and Gwadar interface will gain Beijing and Islamabad, but no Baluchistan. Gwadar’s slot is administrated by Pakistan’s Maritime Secretary, and operated by the China Overseas Port Holding Co.

In south Afghanistan and south Iran, hot, arid Baluchistan borders also dry, bleak, and undeveloped regions. That Muslim-dominated square types a Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran conflagration of competing rivalries by tribes and governments.

“CPEC will not only gain China and Pakistan but will have beneficial effects on Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asian states, and the place”, said the Pakistan administration’s CPEC Secretariat on its site.

Pakistan promised to improve security, but Beijing officially requested that Islamabad permit China’s security forces to place boots on the ground to protect Foreign staff.

” Pakistan has decided to launch a comprehensive military operation to suppress active criminal organizations in the country’s southwest Baluchistan state, the]Pakistani] Prime Minister’s Office said in a assertion”, Xinhua reported on November 21.

But, Pakistan and China are expected to have trouble upgrading Gwadar and the CPEC roadway while dealing with vicious attack by cultural Baluch and other secessionists.

In October, the separatist Baluch Liberation Army ( BLA ) claimed a suicide bombing, which killed two Chinese engineers outside Karachi’s international airport, 240 miles ( 380 kilometers ) east of Gwadar.

After the attack, scarlet Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong officially declared,” It is unethical for us to be attacked double in just six months.”

Five Chinese specialists were killed in a previous strike in March when a suicide bomber rammed their fleet in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated at the time,” We are good in our devotion to the safety and security of Chinese citizens, organizations, and initiatives abroad.”

According to the ministry’s spokesman Lin,” China and Pakistan have the resolve and capability to force the terrorists to pay the price.”

Additionally, in March, security personnel shot eight armed insurgents who were attempting to enter the Gwadar Port Authority complex.

The Baluchistan Liberation Army, the Baluchistan Liberation Front, and other Baluchi insurgents have been labeled terrorist organizations by Pakistan.

Baluchistan’s untapped deposits of gold, meanwhile, have attracted China Metallurgical Group Corp (MCC), which opened gold mining sites in 2023 under Beijing’s Copper-Gold Project in Baluchistan’s Saindak region and nearby locations.

Baluchistan’s natural resources also include oil, coal and natural gas.

Baluchistan’s insurgents “perceive Chinese investments – the CPEC, in this case– as exploitative, on the grounds that the Baluchi people allegedly have not benefitted from socioeconomic development or improvement in their living conditions”, Newlines Institute said.

” In response, Beijing has demanded the Pakistani government conduct thorough investigations and increase security measures”, it said.

Pakistan said CPEC, which began construction in 2015, will streamline Baluchistan’s road, rail, port, air and data communication systems, attract industries and agricultural development, improve medical facilities, vocational training and tourism, and create jobs.

The US Embassy in Islamabad stated in a statement at the time that US Ambassador to Pakistan Donald Blome “visited Gwadar’s port and met with Chairman Pasand Khan Buledi to learn about port operations and development plans, Gwadar’s potential as a regional trans-shipment hub, and ways to connect with Pakistan’s largest export market: the United States.”

Ambassador Blome and Pakistan Naval West Command spoke about regional issues and emphasized a continued partnership in the days to come, according to the embassy.

Pakistan has made an effort to keep Gwadar open and commercial, as evidenced by Pakistan.

Richard S. Ehrlich is a Bangkok-based American foreign correspondent reporting from Asia since 1978, and winner of Columbia University’s Foreign Correspondents ‘ Award. Excerpts from his two new nonfiction books,” Rituals. Killers. Wars. &amp, Sex. — Tibet, India, Nepal, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka &amp, New York” and” Apocalyptic Tribes, Smugglers &amp, Freaks” are available here.

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Syria’s largely forgotten civil war flaring up again – Asia Times

With the amazing record of Aleppo by opposition troops, the forgotten Syrian civil war has once more erupted. A complicated set of circumstances set the scene for rebels to launch an offensive, causing uncertainty in Syria and igniting wonder in President Bashar al-Assad.

In a fresh earth with the Covid crisis, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Gaza issue, the Syrian civil war has been largely forgotten. It is now strongly revolving around the world.

Status quo prior to the Aleppo harm

Let’s consider what was happening in Syria before the new rebellion.

Russia and Iran had backed the Assad government, and its forces were in strong command of Syria’s largest towns, Aleppo ( the commercial hub and Syria’s second-largest area, with a population of 2 million ), Damascus, Homs and Latakia, among others.

After the fall of Islamic State ( IS ) in 2019, IS remnants and just about all jihadist groups and rebels, together with their families, gathered in the northwestern city of Idlib. This doubled its inhabitants to 2.7 million, making it Syria’s largest area.

Significantly, Idlib stock a huge border with Turkey. Turkey has a military presence in northern Syria, and it has ruled a sizable area during three military functions in the years of 2017 and 2018.

The Kurdish People’s Protection Products ( YPG), which has US assistance, are generally in charge of northern Syria, as well as the Kurdish and Arab majority populations south of the Euphrates River. This area includes many of Syria’s fuel and wheat production.

A 2020 peace agreement that Russia and Turkey brokered strengthened the status quo. A surprise attack by a partnership of insurgents and criticism makes has now slowed this down.

Why did the rebels harm Aleppo?

A partnership of several rebels and anti-Assad opposition groups with an Idlib focus form the forces that took part in the Aleppo rude. The biggest block is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS), which splintered from Al-Qaeda in 2016.

The Syrian National Army ( SNA ), a rebel organization that Turkey supports, is a second significant group. Within the Units and SNA alliances, there are a lot of smaller armed groups.

A mediator is necessary to unite for different groups into a alliance. Turkey appears to have fulfilled this position. Turkey had the opportunity to provide the go-ahead to the Aleppo offensive by taking advantage of the caretaker position of US politicians following the elections.

Former President Joe Biden is rarely in a position to focus on Syria and is politically fragile. President-elect Donald Trump’s past Syria policy suggests he did not much worry who controls Aleppo.

Another contributing factor is Russia’s concern with the expensive war in Ukraine. For about three years, Russia has struggled to win the war, seeing an increase in deaths and costs. Russia is a significant Assad government provider of weapons. However, almost all of the Russian military staff and, most importantly, their weapons were concentrated on the Ukraine before.

Russia’s diversion, and weakening support for the Assad state, partially explains the possibility seized by the Units and SNA alliances.

Iran is yet another significant admirer of the Assad administration. Since October 7th, Israel and the US have been putting strain on it by backing Hamas and another anti-Israel political groups like Kuwait and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel has accused Iran of providing Hezbollah with arms.

Added to this, Iran has had a series of social losses. Ebrahim Raisi, Iran’s chairman, died in a plane crash in May 2024. Ismail Haniyeh, the president of Hamas political parties, was killed in Tehran in July 2024. Most recently there have been rumors that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is critically ill.

Iran’s interest may have been diverted from Syria due to these elements, which could have weakened its help for the Assad government.

Hamas ‘ wonder assault on Israel on October 7 appears to be the true driving force behind the Aleppo unpleasant. That attack demonstrated how a well-planned, coordinated wonder operation was defeat a much more powerful force militarily.

Opposition parties in Syria good used October 7 as a unit and banded together to achieve the same goal: the capture of Aleppo. They struck when it was least expected as a result of the important people in the Arab fight being distracted.

What may happen then?

After their magnificent achievement in capturing Aleppo, the anti-Assad makes ‘ morale is high. They will strengthen their keep in Aleppo. Rebels may even go back and attack Hama, the next big area south of Idlib.

Turkey may continue to provide social support and resources to the rebels. Turkey aims to expand its influence in northeastern Syria through Sunni Muslim vassals, which is Turkey’s mainstay. Its main purpose is to reduce and, if possible, decrease areas controlled by Kurdish YPG. A crucial stage in this endeavor is the capture of Aleppo from the Assad government.

Kurds may prefer to deal with Units than the Assad state, even though they are unhappy with Turkey’s growing role in the Syrian civil war. Kurdish militias have already announced that they are leaving Aleppo and won’t fight insurgents there.

Assad continues to receive essential, albeit weakened, help from Russia and Iran. Domestically, Assad enjoys backing from important districts, including the Shiite-Alawite people and secular-minded Syria who oppose the creation of a totalitarian state. These organizations give Assad a crucial source of support, which strengthens his administration’s resilience in the face of criticism advances.

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad ( R ) meets with Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi ( L), in Damascus after the rebel attacks. &nbsp, Photo: Iranian Foreign Ministry flyer via The Talk

Assad is anticipated to enhance his efforts to retake Aleppo. He may use the conflict as an opportunity to strengthen his position in the areas also under his control and consolidate his hold on other important regions even if he unfortunately loses the city.

The Syrian civil war remains unsettled as the land bones into three areas: Turkey-backed Sunni forces in the northeast, US-supported Kurdish troops in the east, and the Shiite-backed Assad state controlling the west and south.

Each party, driven by international and local passions, continues to establish its keep, deepening the divide and complicating hopes for peace.

Mehmet Ozalp is Charles Sturt University’s executive part of people and cultural religion, director of the Center for Islamic Studies and Civilization, and associate professor of Islamic research.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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