China’s air-sea drone could rewrite the rules of naval warfare – Asia Times

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According to researchers at Northwestern Polytechnical University ( NWPU) and the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center ( CARDC ), which are cited in a South China Morning Post report, China has created the first drone that can launch from a submarine from the water, loop repeatedly between the sea and the sky, and eventually return to the same&nbsp, sub.

China has already developed this capability and potentially more than the Pentagon envisions for its own forces, according to the SCMP report, while the US military is considering sending submarines close to the Chinese coast to detach drones that swarm in the air and launch attacks on the People’s Liberation Army’s ( PLA ) fleet during a potential conflict over Taiwan.

The new Chinese air-to-sea aircraft, known as Feiyi, features a unique portable aircraft style that apparently enhances its concealment and life abilities. The Feiyi may manage marine quickly and do high-agility maneuvers in the air, making it suitable for sea reconnaissance, surveillance and strike missions, the SCMP report said.

Feiyi’s cutting-edge features, bolstered by China’s unparalleled aircraft production system and its growing skill in cross-media ammunition, signal a possible edge for China in future maritime conflicts involving drones with the US.

Also, the US Navy is testing the Naviator helicopter, an autonomous vehicle capable of flying and underground operations. The Naviator can seamlessly transition between air and water, which increases its deployment flexibility, and is designed for autonomous launch and recovery from unmanned underwater vehicles ( UUV).

The Naviator has more accurate GPS and physical position keep, a power-saving boat sentry mode, the ability to transport numerous sensors and payloads, and a quicker deployment than conventional underwater vehicles. The US Navy’s Orca Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) could be a member for the Naviator’s probable start system.

Its length and load volume surpass those of the majority of the current marine vehicles, making it suitable for a variety of mission types besides minelaying operations. Its diesel-electric engine system enables automatic operations for up to 30 days and 6, 000 nautical miles, although operational assessment is continuing to develop these capabilities, according to The War Zone.

These cross-media robots can destroy the enemy by launching swarm problems from a variety of domains and directions, probably overcoming the limitations of conventional and fast weapons.

Further, these developments may tie into the more prominent “dronification” of undersea tensions in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and Indian Ocean.

Exploring the role of UUVs in the Taiwan Strait, the Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ) mentions in a June 2024 report that UUVs play a vital role in enhancing China’s maritime surveillance and anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) capabilities.

These UUVs conduct covert intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ) operations, monitor naval activities, map the seabed and locate critical undersea infrastructure. Their independent operations also lower the risk of detection, which makes them successful in tense waters.

China is creating a multidomain surveillance network by integrating UUVs into its larger drone fleet, which increases its ability to disrupt communications and halt foreign intrusions. This action is in line with China’s plan to overcome its own shortcomings and strengthen its standing in a potential Taiwan conflict.

In the 2024 book” Navigating East Asian Maritime Conflicts: Technological Change, Environmental Challenges, Global and Regional Responses”, Henrik Hiim mentions that UUVs and Unmanned Surface Vehicles ( USV ) play a nuanced role in US-China undersea competition in the South China Sea.

In line with its efforts to make the South China Sea a protected base for its nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN), China uses UUVs to counter US nuclear attack submarines ( SSN) by raising maritime domain awareness.

The US uses Unmanned Maritime Systems ( UMS ) to support strategic anti-submarine warfare ( ASW) operations in the South China Sea, but its ability to do so is limited by China’s A2/AD environment’s endurance and vulnerability.

However, Hiim argues that while UMSs may not decisively alter the undersea power balance, they exacerbate maritime disputes, fueling US-China rivalry and intensifying the regional security dilemma.

In the Indian Ocean, the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank mentions in a January 2024 report that China’s operations in the area are characterized by extensive dual-use research activities, blending scientific and military objectives.

The PLA leverages a vast fleet of civilian research vessels to gather critical data on water conditions, currents, and the seafloor, thereby enhancing its naval capabilities. These vessels, often owned by state-affiliated organizations with military ties, conduct surveys that support China’s strategic ambitions.

Notably, Chinese ships have engaged in active operations in the Indian Ocean, using cutting-edge underwater gliders and profiling floats to create a real-time ocean observation network. This information could be used to support the PLA Navy’s ( PLAN ) submarine operations there to counter India’s Bay of Bengal for its SSBNs.

In the wake of India’s ongoing border dispute with China in the Himalayas, analysts have suggested that the country could use its undersea nuclear deterrent as a backstop if its conventional military capabilities are undermined.

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Trump’s Paris Agreement withdrawal not such a bad thing – Asia Times

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On his first time back in business as United States president, Donald Trump gave official notice of his nation’s return from the Paris Agreement – a crucial global treaty seeking to rein in climate change.

Before signing the attempt, Trump declared his causes to an area of cheering followers, describing the international agreement as an “unfair, one-sided Paris weather authority rip-off. ”

Of course, this is not the first day Trump has withdrawn the US from the Paris deal – he did it in 2017, during his first term in office.

On one hand, Trump’s shift is a huge punch to work to global climate action. The US is the world’s second-biggest emission of greenhouse gas waste, after China. The state is vital to the international effort to curb climate change.

But given Trump’s weather for, it ’s actually better that the US excluded itself from international climate conversations while he is in power. That means, the rest of the world can get on with the task without Trump’s caustic effect.

This is not the first day Trump has withdrawn the US from the Paris offer.   Photo: Ben Curtis / AP via The Talk

A quick recap on the Paris Agreement

Signed by 196 countries in 2015, the Paris Agreement is the first comprehensive international agreement to combat climate change.

Its overall purpose is to maintain the increase of global heat to well below 2°C above pre-industrial ranges and undertake efforts to control the raise to 1. 5°C.

Experts say meeting the more optimistic 1. 5°C goal is important because crossing that threshold risks unleashing catastrophic climate change effects, for as more frequent and severe drought and wildfires.

Under the deal, each state may produce national plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to help achieve the global temperatures goals. These programs are known as “nationally determined contributions”.

What Trump’s removal methods

Under Trump’s next administration, the US was only out of the Paris package for four weeks, due to the time it took for the surrender to take effect. President Joe Biden rejoined the contract in early 2021.

This day, the US withdrawal may be established more immediately – after a year. Finally, the US will add Iran, Libya and Yemen as the only United Nations states no party to the contract.

The US is preserve participating as a celebration to the Paris deal until January 2026. That means it does try to negotiate at the COP30 climate change event in Brazil this time.

COP30 is a big deal. It is when each region is due to current its innovative nationally determined efforts. The US removal means it is unlikely to provide a new input to the conference – if it attends at all.

If the US display up, its presence would probably destabilize negotiations. That’s why removing Trump-backed diplomats from the climate talks going forwards is a good result.

If the US stayed in the camp under Trump, its diplomats may, for example, agitate to diminish any talks struck at the conference. We saw quite techniques from Saudi Arabia at COP29 in Baku. The fuel state constantly disrupted the talks and in one example, sought to change critical text in the agreement without full consultation.

With the US out of the way, the other parties to the Paris Agreement have a better chance of progressing climate negotiations.

At this stage, it does n’t appear other countries are preparing to follow Trump out the door. This is despite controversy at the COP29 talks when Argentinian president Javier Milei ordered his negotiators to withdraw only a few days in. Milei had previously described the climate emergency as a “socialist lie. ”

At this stage, Trump has not withdrawn from the Paris Agreement’s parent convention, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. So after it withdraws from the Paris deal, the US can still attend COP meetings, but only as an observer.

With the US out of the way, other parties to the Paris agreement have a better chance of progress. Pictured: COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev, left, with an unnamed woman, listens during a closing session.   Photo: Rafiq Maqbool / AP via The Conversation

Onwards and upwards

Of course, there are downsides to the US withdrawal from the Paris deal.

Leaving the Paris Agreement means the US is no longer required to provide annual updates on its greenhouse gas emissions. This lack of transparency makes it harder to determine how the world is tracking on emissions reduction overall.

Under the Biden administration, the US contributed funding to help developing nations adopt clean energy and cope with climate change ( albeit delivering less than it promised ). Trump is expected to slash this funding. That will leave vulnerable nation-states in an even more precarious position.

While the US was technically only out of the Paris deal for a short period last time, the process was destabilizing. It weakened what was an unprecedented show of international solidarity and sent a damaging message about the importance of climate action.

Trump’s latest withdrawal is a similar blow to morale. It’s particularly galling for Americans fighting for climate action, and those struggling with its devastating effects – most recently, the unthinkable fires in Los Angeles.

But Trump’s withdrawal can easily be reversed by a new US president. And we can expect other parties to Paris, such as China and the European Union, to continue to play a leadership role, and others to fill the vacuum.

What’s more, as others have noted, Trump cannot derail global climate action. Investment in clean energy is now greater than in fossil fuels. When Trump last pulled out of Paris, many US state and local governments pressed ahead with climate policy; we can expect the same this time around.

And the vast majority of the rest of the world is still pursuing emissions reduction efforts.

So overall, the US exit from Paris is probably the best of a bunch of bad options. It mutes Trump’s capacity to destabilize international climate action, allowing others to step into the breach.

Rebekkah Markey-Towler is PhD Candidate, Melbourne Law School, and research fellow, Melbourne Climate Futures, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Trump’s Stargate a bold reach for AI’s next frontier – Asia Times

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In one of his first moves as the 47th President of the United States, Donald Trump announced a new US$ 500 billion project called Stargate to accelerate the development of artificial intelligence ( AI ) in the US.

The job is a collaboration between three big tech companies – OpenAI, SoftBank and Oracle. Trump called it “the largest AI infrastructure project by far in history” and said it would help keep “the future of technology ” in the US.

Tech businessman Elon Musk, however, had a different take, claiming without evidence on his system X that the project’s donors “don’t really have the money. ” X, which is not included in Stargate, is even working on developing AI and Musk is a foe to OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.

Alongside announcing Stargate, Trump even revoked an executive order signed by his father Joe Biden that was aimed at addressing and controlling AI challenges.

Seen together, these two techniques embody a culture prevalent in software development that can best be summed up by the word: “move fast and break things. ”

What is Stargate?

The US is now the world’s pioneer when it comes to AI advancement. The Stargate task will considerably extend this guide over different nations.

It will see a system of data centres built across the US. These centres will building massive computer machines required for running AI applications such as ChatGPT. These machines will operate 24/7 and may require significant amounts of electricity and water to work.

According to a speech by OpenAI, construction of new data locations as part of Stargate is currently underway in the US state of Texas:

[ W]e are evaluating potential sites across the country for more campuses as we finalise definitive agreements.

US President Donald Trump speaking at the White House alongside Softbank CEO Masayoshi Son, Oracle chief technology officer Larry Ellison and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.   Photo: Julia Demaree Nikhinson

An inadequate – but encouraging – order

The increased funding into AI growth by Trump is encouraging. It may help improve the many possible benefits of AI. For instance, AI may increase cancer patients ’ prognosis by quickly analyzing clinical information and detecting early signs of illness.

But Trump’s continuous renewal of Biden’s professional get on the “safe, safe and reliable development and use of AI” is deeply concerning. It could mean that any potential gains of Stargate are immediately trumped by its potential to exacerbate the existing affects of AI systems.

Yes, Biden’s get lacked critical technical details. But it was a tempting start towards developing safer and more responsible AI techniques. One big problem it was meant to address was tech firms collecting personal information for AI education without second obtaining acceptance.

AI techniques collect information from all over the internet. Even if data are readily available on the internet for individual use, it does not imply AI systems may use them for training. Moreover, when a picture or word is fed into an AI unit, it cannot be removed. There have been many instances of  artists suing Artificial craft generators  for  the unauthorised use  of their labor.

Another problem Biden’s get aimed to address was the risk of harm – especially to people from minority areas.

Most Artificial devices aim to increase accuracy for the majority. Without proper pattern, they can make really dangerous choices for a few.

For instance, in 2015, an image-recognition algorithm developed by Google immediately tagged pics of black individuals as “gorillas. ” This equal concern was later found in AI techniques of other organizations such as Yahoo and Apple, and remains unanswered a century later because these methods are so often incomprehensible actually to their creators.

This opacity makes it crucial to design AI systems correctly from the start. Problems can be deeply embedded in the AI system itself, worsening over time and becoming nearly impossible to fix.

As AI tools increasingly make important decisions, such as résumé screening, minorities are being even more disproportionately affected. For example, AI-powered face recognition software more commonly misidentifies black people and other people of color, which has led to false arrests and imprisonment.

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Faster, more powerful AI systems

Trump’s twin AI announcements in the first days of his second term as US president show his main focus in terms of AI – and that of the biggest tech companies in the world – is on developing ever faster, more powerful AI systems.

If we compare an AI system with a car, this is like developing the fastest car possible while ignoring crucial safety features like seat belts or airbags in order to keep it lighter and thus faster.

For both cars and AI, this approach could mean putting very dangerous machines into the hands of billions of people around the world.

Armin Chitizadeh is lecturer, School of Computer Science, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Trump uncertainty and its measurement – Asia Times

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Subscribe now  with a one-month trial for only$ 1, then enjoy the first year at an exclusive rate of just$ 99.

Trump confusion and its dimension

David Goldman features stresses around the US budget deficit, rising true produces, and uncertainty surrounding President Trump’s proposed guidelines. Market uncertainty remains subdued, except in silver, which serves as a hedge against inflation and money volatility.

Trump’s tax order was force Europe into a lose-lose choice

Diego Faßnacht outlines the essential dilemma Europe may face under a minute Trump administration, where violent US trade policies may force the EU to choose between decoupling from China and coordinating with Washington or facing punishing tariffs.

Contradictory US messaging sky Ukraine harmony work

James Davis observes that while the new US leadership has expressed interest in ending the war in Ukraine, its approach lacks quality, with Moscow wary of contradictory information combining negotiation efforts with threats of harsher sanctions.

Movie changes the AI scenery

Scott Foster highlights the announcement of the$ 500 billion Stargate AI infrastructure project. With a finances roughly 10 times the CHIPS Act ’s$ 52. 7 billion, the initiative aims to develop 20 data centers over four years in a strong drive to cement US authority in AI.

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Trump’s China trade war plan keeps markets guessing – Asia Times

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Your shift, President Xi. This may be the important information from Donald Trump’s amazing reversal on large “day one ” tariffs on China.

The reprieve Trump appears to have granted  Asia’s biggest economy  is one Xi Jinping’s Communist Party certainly did n’t see coming. For weeks now, Trump and the gang of anti-China advisers he’s named to his new administration promised immediate 60 % tariffs as the centerpiece of a “shock-and-awe ” trade war.

No so quickly, it turns out. Taxes on Chinese goods are somewhat excluded from the storm of first-week executive orders. When pressed, Trump actually lowered his places. Whereas Canada and Mexico face 25 % levies by February 1, China might suffer a mere 10 %.

Chances are, this is Trump’s means of cajoling Xi to the dealing stand for a large Group of Two  business deal. To be sure, slow-walking China levies are aimed primarily at the share market.

Though Trump was n’t worry less about laws, standards or political politeness, he cares a great deal about Wall Street. Stories about stocks tumbling this year are the last thing the new US senator wants.

But Trump is also spoiling for an incredible clash with China, particularly once he realizes that Xi is n’t Shinzo Abe.

Beginning in December 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Abe pledged to revive an market hard being eclipsed by China. In the years that followed, Abe empowered the  Bank of Japan  to force its ultraloose guidelines into unknown territory and took steps to improve corporate governance.

Next came the Trump 1. 0 age, threatening trade war the likes of which Asia had never seen. Instantly, Abe snapped to focus to attempt to protect Asia’s No. 2 business from Trump’s taxes.

Following Trump’s impact vote win in November 2016, Abe made a run for New York. He was the first earth leader to visit Trump Tower to thank the man.

Abe did more than that, vouching for the “America First” leader in flowing words. “ I am convinced Mr. Trump is a leader in whom I may have great confidence ” and “a relationship of trust, ” Abe told investigators that day.

In the months and years that followed, Abe made a world splash  wining and dining  with Trump’s second White House group— including at Trump’s Florida sport team. On top of throwing praise, He gifted him premium golf equipment, including a US$ 3,755 motorist, among other extravagant gifts.

Abe was feted as a political Trump vehicle, credited for protecting Japan from the worst of the business conflict. One method Abe tamed Trump was acquiescing to a diplomatic trade deal in 2019. Abe’s genuine success was in running out the time on Trump 1. 0. By slow-walking on negotiations, Tokyo managed to achieve a “draw ” between the two nations.

At the end of the process, Japan effectively agreed to the same market-opening steps it had under the Barack Obama-led Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) pact that Trump scrapped.

Group Abe distracted Trump with greater market exposure for US meat, pork, and maize exporters. But the offer clearly did n’t include electrical products. Tokyo rejoiced.

“With typical hyperbole, President Trump declared the deal phenomenal, ” notes Matthew Goodman, who at the time led economic policy for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “ But once again, President Trump … settled for a simple package. ”

You Xi pull off a comparable rearranging-of-the-deckchairs US business deal? The question is whether Xi’s group may even care.

After all, some earth leaders had a worse  2024  than Xi. China ’s home issue, weak home need, near-record youth unemployment and aging people have produced negative forces for seven consecutive rooms now.

The second-biggest market also saw an alarming increase in in-person demonstrations. And  China Inc.   is also dealing with the fallout from Xi’s tech-sector onslaught.

Xi, in other words, has some issues for which to reply. It is questionable his group would be glad to see the most prominent Chinese leader since Mao Zedong appearing to lose ground to Trump — or appearing to bow to Washington on the world stage.

But Xi even definitely knows that after a period of quiet, Trump will almost certainly purchase up the taxes he’s threatened — and perhaps even bigger types than he’s telegraphed. Trump’s leading patron, Tesla businessman Elon Musk, last month talked about the  needed for tariffs on Chinese energy cars.

“The Taiwanese car companies are the most economical car companies in the world, ” Musk told investors. “So, I think they will have major success outside of China depending on what kind of taxes or business restrictions are established. ” Musk has since walked backwards these remarks, but China has every reason to worry Trump might come after China ’s car market.

For today, Trump claims to have commissioned a broad overview of Washington ’s trade ties with China and other vital trading lovers. The White House, Team Trump says, will “investigate and treatment consistent trade deficits that damage our business and safety. ”

Such evaluations take occasion, of course. Times, in some cases. But Trump’s US Trade Representative company almost needs satellites to know that his 2018 cope with Xi was a failure. To Chad Bown at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the way in which the second Trump-Xi trade deal “fell little ” is the “anatomy of a dud. ”

As Bown sees it, “attempting to  maintain trade  — to join Trump’s goal of reducing the diplomatic trade imbalance— was self-defeating from the  begin. It did not help that neither China nor the United States was eager to de-escalate their painful price war. ”

Nor does that seem the path now as Trump surrounds himself with China secularists. They include assistant Peter Navarro, who co-wrote a text titled  “Death By China. ” And deal king Robert  Lighthizer, who’s signaled that Trump 2. 0 is considering a  currency devaluation ploy.

Yet US Treasury Secretary-nominee Scott Bessent, who’s considered less MAGA-ish than most Trump government takes, has taken to discussing China in dark conditions. During his subsequent confirmation reading, Bessent  said China had “the most uneven business in the history of the world ” and that it might be suffering a “severe recession/depression. ”

Bessent even segued to MAGA talking factors about Beijing’s presumably flooding the world with cheap products to finance its military passions. Commenting on Trump’s earlier deal, Bessent argued that “China has not made good on their [agriculture ] purchases ” and that the US will push Beijing to resume those purchases and perhaps add a “make-up provision. ”

But all this speaks to the great odds that Trump’s industry war may reemerge sooner rather than later. “If there’s any training for US-China ties from Trump 1. 0, it is that he is a fluctuation system and predicting what he will do is a sucker’s game, ” says lifelong China watcher  Bill  Bishop, who writes the Sinocism email.

Bishop notes that investors “had found some comfort in the fact that President Trump did not impose more tariffs on [ China ] on his first day in office, but they forget his earlier promise to impose 10 % tariffs, in addition to any other tariffs that may come on, because of fentanyl. He reiterated the 10 % tax hazard Tuesday. ”

The wait does purchase Xi a huge opportunity. While Trump is distracted with local exploits – from avenging his critics to overseeing a large imprisonment system for illegal residents to devising tax cuts – Xi’s team may expand efforts to reduce its trade surplus the natural way by increasing regional demand as a means of boosting import activity.

On the one hand, China ’s nearly US$ 1 trillion trade surplus proves that efforts by Trump 1. 0 and the West in general to alter the mechanics of world trade came up short. China ’s global manufacturing dominance has only grown since 2017, a fact Trump 2. 0 can verify with a mere Google search. Yet Xi has the power to alter these  global dynamics.

A vital first step would be to end the property crisis once and for all. The drip, drip, drip of bad news about housing demand and prices is deflating consumer prices and confidence simultaneously. Beijing’s slow response continues to inspire “Japanification ” chatter and have some on Wall Street debating if China is “uninvestable. ”

On Monday, Fitch Ratings downgraded homebuilder  China Vanke Co. , a reminder that default risks continue to hover over the sector. The move “reflects a deterioration in China Vanke’s sales and cash generation, which is eroding its liquidity buffer against large capital market debt maturities in 2025,” says Fitch analyst  Rebecca Tang.

Trouble is, Vanke’s challenges are hardly unique. The extreme downward  pressure on the yuan, meantime ,  could increase default risks as offshore debt payments become harder to make. This tug of war is limiting the People’s Bank of China ’s latitude to cut interest rates.

Xi could take steps to accelerate China ’s pivot toward increased domestic demand-led growth, reducing Trump 2. 0’s argument that Beijing is n’t sharing its 5 % rate of annual output globally.

At the moment, “China’s  economy is showing signs of revival, led by industrial output and exports, ” says Frederic Neumann, chief Asia  economist at  HSBC.

Yet a trade war would put these drivers in harm’s way. What’s needed are large and robust social safety nets to encourage  households  to spend more and save less. Xi and Premier Li Qiang talk often about doing so, but little has been achieved to transform China ’s consumption dynamics.

The drop in “spending on property by roughly half since the peak in 2021 represents a huge drop in  domestic demand, which cannot be easily replaced by more spending on consumer goods or government investment, ” says economist Duncan Wrigley at Pantheon Macroeconomics.

Only top-down policy shifts in Beijing could jumpstart household demand and halt the deflationary pressures making headlines. At the same time, international funds are still waiting on moves to strengthen capital markets, improve corporate transparency, reduce the dominance of state-owned enterprises and make more space for startups to disrupt the economy.

This will require considerable political will in Beijing – and patience on the part of investors. Though markets crave major retooling, they don’t often afford Team Xi the space and time needed to execute them.

Moves to repair, change or tweak China ’s engines are certain to depress growth somewhat. Markets, though, tend to react badly when upgrades soften growth.

This paradox has carried over into 2025. The slow pace of reform in recent years is catching up with Xi’s government, and markets are reacting badly. Mainland stocks began 2025 with their  weakest start since 2016. That has Beijing rolling out measures to stabilize equities.

Among them is boosting how much pensions can invest in listed Chinese companies as investors brace for the second Trump administration. It’s part of a Beijing directive is to “steady the stock market, and clear bottlenecks for the introduction of mid-to-long-term capital, ” according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

Yet nothing might steady Chinese markets faster than knowing how or when Trump might tax Beijing– and by how much. Until traders get an answer, 2025 is sure to make market volatility great again.  

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Snakebit UN: What happens after the US leaves the WHO? – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s plan to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization ( WHO ) has been met with dismay in the public health field. Some have called one of the US president ’s first executive orders “a grave error ” and “absolutely bad news. ”

The WHO is a United Nations agency that aims to expand universal health coverage, coordinates actions to health emergencies such as epidemics, and has a large emphasis on healthy life. It does not have the power to enforce heath plan but influences plan worldwide, especially in low-income places.

The WHO plays an important coordinating position in surveillance, reaction and policy for communicable and non-infectious illnesses. In reality, infectious diseases have the most pressing need for international cooperation.

Unlike non-communicable illnesses, diseases can spread quickly from one state to another, just as Covid spread to trigger a crisis.

T. Schneider/Shutterstock

We have much to thank the WHO for, including the eradication of smallpox, a miracle which could not have been achieved without international cooperation and authority. It has also played a major role in control of influenza and HIV.

Why does the US want to remove?

The causes for receiving include:

mishandling of the Covid-19 epidemic … and other global wellbeing crises, its failing to follow urgently needed reforms, and its ability to show independence from the improper political influence of WHO member states.

The professional buy also cites the wealthier higher bills the US makes to the WHO compared to China. In 2024-25, the US contributed 22 % of the organization’s mandatory funding from member states compared to approximately 15 % for China.

President Trump initiated departure from the WHO over related problems in 2020. But this was reversed by President Biden in 2021.

What happens future?

The departure may take a year to come into effect, and may require approval by the US Congress. How this will play out is vague, but it seems plausible the WHO will reduce US money.

The US removal may also be the final nail in the coffin for the WHO Pandemic Agreement, which faltered in 2024 when member state may not agree on the final document.

Trump’s professional order states all conversations around the epidemic agreement will continue. However, the buy clues that the US will look at working with global partners to address global health.

The US Centers for Disease and Control ( CDC ) already has such international partners and could feasibly do this. It now convenes a global system of teaching in pandemic response, which could provide a model. But to move in this direction needs finessing, as another target of the fresh US state is to reduce or stop foreign aid.

The WHO likewise convenes a range of professional commissions and network of research facilities. One among many sites of lab is for virus, comprising more than 50 laboratories in 41 member says. This includes five “super labs”, one of which is at the CDC. It’s questionable what may happen to like networks, many of which have significant US components.

With the threat of bird flu mutating to become a people crisis these international systems are critical for monitoring of pandemic risks.

Flock of chicks
Global networks are needed to keep an eye on pandemic threats, including the spread of bird flu. Photo: riza korhan oztunc / Shutterstock via The Conversation

WHO expert committees also drive global health policy on a range of issues. It is possible for the WHO to accredit labs in non-member countries, or for experts from non-member countries to be on WHO expert committees. But how this will unfold, especially for US government-funded labs or experts who are US government employees, is unclear.

Another potential impact of a US withdrawal is the opportunity for other powerful member nations to become more influential once the US leaves. This may lead to restrictions on US experts sitting on WHO committees or working with the organization in other ways.

While the US withdrawal will see the WHO lose funding, member states contribute about 20 % of the WHO budget. The organization relies on donations from other organizations ( including private companies and philanthropic organizations ), which make up the remaining  80 %.

So the US withdrawal may increase the influence of these other organizations.

A chance for reform

The Trump administration is not alone in its criticism of how the WHO handled COVID and other infectious disease outbreaks.

For example, the WHO agreed with Chinese authorities in early January 2020 there was no evidence the “mystery pneumonia” in Wuhan was contagious, while in reality, it was likely already spreading for months. This was a costly mistake.

There was criticism over WHO’s delay in declaring the pandemic, stating Covid was not airborne ( despite evidence otherwise ). There was also criticism about its investigation into the origins of Covid, including conflicts of interest in the investigating team.

The WHO was also criticized for its handling of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a decade ago. Eventually, this led to a series of reforms, but arguably not enough.

Old sign in French warning about Ebola
Reforms followed the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a decade ago. But were they enough? Photo: Sergey Uryadnikov / Shutterstock

More changes needed

US public health expert Ashish Jha argues for reform at WHO. Jha, who is the dean of the Brown University School of Public Health and former White House COVID response coordinator, argues the organization has an unclear mission, too broad a remit, poor governance and often prioritizes political sensitivities of member states.

He proposes the WHO should narrow its focus to fewer areas, with outbreak response key. This would allow reduced funding to be used more efficiently.

Rather than the US withdrawing from the WHO, he argues the US would be better to remain a member and leverage such reform.

Without reform, there is a possibility other countries may follow the US, especially if governments are pressured by their electorates to increase spending on domestic needs.

The WHO has asked the US to reconsider withdrawing. But the organization may need to look at further reforms for any possibility of future negotiations. This is the best path toward a solution.

C Raina MacIntyre is professor of global biosecurity, NHMRC L3 research fellow, head, biosecurity program, Kirby Institute, UNSW Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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How Trump could stay on beyond his second term – Asia Times

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Think Donald Trump can’t become president after his second word is up in January 2029? Consider afterwards.

When President-elect Donald Trump met with congressional Republicans shortly after his November 2024 election victory, he floated the idea of another term: “ I suspect I won’t be running again unless you say, ‘ He’s so good we’ve got to figure something else out. ’ ”

At first glance, this seems like an apparent prank. The 22nd Amendment to the Constitution is evident that Trump can’t been elected again. The words of the article states:

“No man shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no man who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two decades of a name to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. ”

That amendment was passed in response to Franklin Roosevelt’s four elections to the president. Since George Washington had stepped down at the end of his next word, no leader had sought a second word, much less a third. The act was evidently meant to prevent leaders from serving more than two terms in office.

A man stands on the balcony of a large white building speaking to a crowd.
Franklin D. Roosevelt delivers his third annual solve on Jan. 20, 1945. Photo: Abbie Rowe, National Archives and Records Administration. Office of National Library. Harry S. Truman Library, via Wikimedia Commons

Because Trump has been elected leader twice now, the ordinary language of the article bars him from being elected a second time. Some have argued that since Trump’s words were nonconsecutive, the article does n’t use to him. But the article makes no distinction between subsequent and nonconsecutive terms in office.

Though the 22nd Amendment prohibits Trump from being elected chairman again, it does not prevent him from serving as president beyond Jan. 20, 2029. The reason for this is that the 22nd Amendment only prohibits someone from being “elected ” more than twice. It says nothing about one becoming president in some other means than being elected to the office.

Skirting the laws

There are a few possible alternative situations. Under typical circumstances, they would be next to impossible. But Donald Trump has never been a regular leader.

On topic after matter, Trump has pushed the outer parameters of political power. Most important, he has already shown his eagerness to stretch or actually break the law to stay in business. And while Trump claims he’s only joking when he floats the idea of a third term, he has a long history of using “jokes ” as a way of floating trial balloons.

However, once he leaves business, Trump could once again face the possibility of criminal prosecution and perhaps prison time, further motivating him to stay in power. As Trump’s next word advances, don’t be surprised if American hear more about how he may try to stay in business. Here is what the Constitution says about that possibility.

Nine citizens have served as president without first being elected to that business. John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford were all vice president who stepped into the office when their forebears either died or resigned.

The 22nd Amendment does no bar a term-limited senator from being elected vice president. On the other hand, the 12th Amendment does position that “no people lawfully unsuitable to the office of the President shall be eligible to that of the Vice-President of the United States. ”

It’s not clear whether this limitation applies to a two-term leader who is unsuitable for a second term because of the 22nd Amendment – or whether it only imposes on the vice president the Constitution’s different criteria for political eligibility, namely that they be a natural-born citizen of the United States, at least 35 years of age and have lived in the US for at least 14 years.

That issue would have to be decided by the US Supreme Court. If the justices decide in Trump’s prefer – as they have just on questions regarding the 14th Amendment’s rebellion section and political immunity – then the 2024 ticket of Trump-Vance could become the 2028 Vance-Trump ticket. If elected, Vance was therefore retire, making Trump leader afterwards.

But Vance would not even have to retire in order for a Vice President Trump to exercise the power of the administration. The 25th Amendment to the Constitution declares that if a leader declares that “he is unable to transfer the rights and responsibilities of the company … such rights and obligations may be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. ”

In fact, the US has had three such acting presidents – George H W Bush, Dick Cheney and Kamala Harris. All of them held presidential power for a brief period when the sitting president underwent anesthesia during medical procedures; Cheney did it twice.

In this scenario, shortly after taking office on January 20, 2029, President Vance could invoke the 25th Amendment by notifying the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate that he is unable to discharge the duties of president. He would not need to give any reason or proof of this incapacity.

Vice President Trump would then become acting president and assume the powers of the presidency until such time as President Vance issued a new notification indicating that he was able to resume his duties as president.

‘Tandemocracy’

But exercising the power of the presidency does n’t even necessarily require being president or acting president.

Trump has repeatedly expressed his admiration for autocratic Russian President Vladimir Putin, so he might want to follow the example of the Medvedev-Putin “tandemocracy. ”

Two men in suits stand in an open area.
Russian leaders Vladimir Putin, left, and Dmitry Medvedev have collaborated to hold power for more than a quarter-century, despite laws imposing term limits or other restrictions. Photo: Mikhail Svetlov / Getty Images via The Conversation

In 2008, term limits in the Russian constitution prevented Putin from running for president after two consecutive terms. Instead, he selected a loyal subordinate, Dmitry Medvedev, to run for president.

When elected, Medvedev appointed Putin as his prime minister. By most accounts, Putin remained firmly in power and made most of the important decisions. Following this example, a future Republican president could appoint Trump to an executive branch position from which he could still exercise power.

In 2012, Putin was able to run for president again, and he and Medvedev once again swapped roles. Since then, Putin has succeeded in amending the Russian Constitution to effectively allow him to remain president for the rest of his life.

Using a figurehead

Then again, Trump might just want to avoid all of these legal subterfuges by following the example of George and Lurleen Wallace. In 1966, the Alabama Constitution prevented Wallace from running for a third consecutive term as governor.

Still immensely popular and unwilling to give up power, Wallace chose to have his wife, Lurleen, run for governor. It was clear from the beginning that Lurleen was just a figurehead for George, who promised to be an adviser to his wife, at a salary of US$ 1 a year.

The campaign’s slogan of “Two Governors, One Cause, ” made it clear that a vote for Lurleen was really a vote for George. Lurleen won in a landslide.

According to one account of her time in office, the Wallaces had “something of a Queen-Prime Minister relationship: Mrs. Wallace handles the ceremonial and formal duties of state. Mr. Wallace draws the grand outlines of state policy and sees that it is carried out. ”

Trump’s wife was not born a US citizen and therefore is n’t eligible to be president. But as the head of the Republican Party, Trump could ensure that the next GOP presidential candidate was a member of his family or some other person who would be absolutely loyal and obedient to him.

If that person went on to win the White House in 2028, Trump could serve as an unofficial adviser, allowing him to continue to wield the power of the presidency without the actual title.

Philip Klinkner is James S Sherman professor of government, Hamilton College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China’s air-to-air hypersonic US B-21 bomber’s kryptonite – Asia Times

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China ’s fast air-to-air weapons, designed especially to shoot down US stealth bombers, indicate a potential seismic shift in the future of heat battle, one that could drastically alter the Indo-Pacific’s balance of power.

Chinese scientists have confirmed the existence of a new hypersonic air-to-air weapon, which has reportedly suffered serious heat-resistance tests to join the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s strict performance requirements, according to a new South China Morning Post (SCMP ) report.

Developed by the China Airborne Missile Academy ( CAMA ) in Luoyang, Henan province, the new missile poses a significant threat to US military aircraft, including the B-21 stealth bomber.

According to SCMP, the last assessments of full-scale weapon designs were conducted in an arc-heated weather hole capable of generating warm air flows reaching tens of thousands of degree Fahrenheit.

This approach ensures the missile may endure prolonged exposure to temperatures exceeding 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit, equal to flying at Mach 9 for an extended period. The wind tunnel, primarily used for challenging space missions, operates continuously for an hour or more, though its enormous power consumption makes it costly.

The missile’s high speed and heat endurance make it a formidable weapon capable of outmaneuvering current US military aircraft. Highlighting its capabilities, SCMP noted that, in a simulated war game, China ’s hypersonic air-to-air missiles capable of reaching Mach 6 shot down a target resembling a US B-21 bomber and its companion drone.

The missiles used a solid fuel “pulse engine ” for adjustable power output, enabling them to ascend to near space and descend unpredictably along a “Qian Xuesen trajectory. ” This capability surpasses the capabilities of current hypersonic weapons, which struggle to maintain control at high speeds.

The B-21 is critical for countering a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, leveraging its stealth, range, and payload capabilities to operate in highly contested areas.

A March 2023 report by Mark Gunzinger for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies notes that the B-21 would target essential objectives in the initial phases of a conflict, such as People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) amphibious assault ships, missile launchers and airbases.

These targets, crucial for China ’s offensive actions, likely fall under the PLA’s anti-access/area-denial ( A2/AD ) framework, underscoring the importance of the B-21’s stealth for its effectiveness.

Gunzinger also highlights the B-21’s ability to carry various munitions, including small precision-guided bombs, to strike mobile and well-defended targets effectively. Its long-range capability allows operation from distant bases like Guam and Australia, reducing dependence on forward-deployed forces vulnerable to PLA attacks.

Given the B-21’s critical role, China ’s stealth fighters, equipped with hypersonic air-to-air missiles, could significantly threaten its operations. The J-20’s large internal capacity, long range, and supercruise capability suggest it is designed as a long-range interceptor and air-to-surface attack platform.

Similarly, the new-generation J-36, a tailless delta-shaped stealth aircraft, combines high speed, long range, heavy payload capabilities and advanced sensors. These features enable it to deploy long-range air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles against enemy bases, ships and critical support units while maintaining stealth, according to Bill Sweetman for The Strategist.

While the US F-22 and F-35 may rival China ’s J-20 and J-36, their performance comparison remains speculative due to limited information. Kris Osborn, writing for 1945 in November 2024, suggests that any contest between these aircraft would likely hinge on the quality of their mission systems, sensor fidelity, computing power, weapon range and fire control capabilities.

China ’s apparent successful development of hypersonic air-to-air missiles and advanced fighters contrasts sharply with the troubled progress of the US Next Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) fighter program. The NGAD’s future remains uncertain as the US Air Force paused its contract award due to escalating costs, now estimated at US$ 300 million per aircraft.

Additional challenges include budgetary competition with the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) and B-21 programs, debates over prioritizing manned fighters or distributed platforms with unmanned assets, and whether to produce lower-cost, upgradeable aircraft instead of singular expensive fighters.

China ’s simulation of hypersonic air-to-air missile capabilities, including a simulated B-21 shootdown, also underscores the impact of beyond-visual-range ( BVR ) capabilities.

These advancements shift air-to-air engagements from close-range dogfights to long-distance precision strikes. Stealth, advanced radars and long-range missiles allow aircraft to detect and engage opponents without being detected themselves.

The China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI) emphasized in a July 2024 report that China ’s development of long-range air-to-air missiles aligns with its focus on countering US and allied air dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

Missiles such as the PL-15 and PL-17 are designed to outrange US counterparts like the AIM-120, targeting critical enablers such as tankers and airborne early warning and control systems ( AWACS) to degrade adversary power projection.

According to CASI, the PLAAF integrates these advanced weapons with aircraft like the J-16 and J-20, enhancing their reach and effectiveness. This capability supports China ’s broader A2/AD strategy to neutralize aerial threats and establish local air superiority over contested regions, including the Taiwan Strait and the First Island Chain.

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‘Europe Last’: How von der Leyen’s China policy traps the EU – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s returning to the White House has exposed Europe’s proper paralysis in impressive fashion. For all their lauded vision, replete with disaster programs, location papers and closed-door sessions entertainment out a second Trump administration, EU leaders find themselves now exactly where they were four years ago: ready and knocked out.

More than two months after Trump’s success, Brussels’ response has been limited to clear reassurances, dismissing his proposals as bare hypotheticals, including his very severe claims to Greenland, which threaten a member state’s regional integrity. Instead of taking important action, the EU has resorted to political hand-wringing and repurposed platitudes about atlantic unification.

However, Europe’s right-wing officials have planted their colors in the Oval Office; Italy ’s Giorgia Meloni and Hungary’s Viktor Orban have now secured their bright cards, while the EU’s conventional power brokers—Germany and France—remain sidelined. Brussels ’ humiliation was complete when the inauguration invitations went out: the EU’s institutional leadership did n’t even make the B-list.

This cracking of Western unity may not appear at a worse instant. Europe faces a delicate balancing act between its Chinese economic pursuits and American protection relationships. Some states are now positioning themselves closer to Trump, eyeing security from taxes, while others remain tied to Chinese markets, their industries greatly intertwined with Beijing’s business.

In this scenario, Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission is stubbornly sticking to its hawkish stance on China, unaware of the mounting repercussions. All the while, Washington and Beijing could be moving toward their own détente. Trump, ever the dealmaker, might forge an early accommodation with Chinese Xi Jinping—leaving Europe isolated in a confrontation that neither America nor China desires.

In what may become a case study in diplomatic self-sabotage, Brussels has maneuvered itself into a geopolitical dead end, trapped between two colliding giants with neither the tools nor the unity to protect its interests.

The Commission has doubled down on this misguided path, firing off China-focused measures—de-risking policies, economic security frameworks, trade investigations and relentless critiques of China ’s political system—with the fervor of a convert at a revival.

Meanwhile, European industry depends increasingly on Chinese capital goods. According to Eurostat, “ When it comes to the most imported products from China, Telecommunications equipment was the first, although it went down from €63. 1 billion ( US$ 65. 6 billion ) in 2022 to €56. 3 billion in 2023. Electrical machinery and apparatus ( €36. 5 billion ) and automatic data processing machines ( €36 billion ) were the second and third most imported goods respectively. ”

Autos and other consumer goods comprise a small portion of EU imports from China and the political attention given to the automotive sector is in inverse proportion to its economic weight. Paradoxically, after years of American lobbying with European governments to exclude Chinese telecom infrastructure, it has become Europe’s single largest import from China.

Europe-China trade rose modestly in 2024. The Chinese state-run website Global Times reported on January 13, “China’s exports to the EU totaled 3,675. 1 billion yuan, a year-on-year growth of 4. 3 percent, reflecting strong European demand for Chinese goods. Imports from the EU reached 1,916. 4 billion yuan, which is down 3. 3 percent decrease from a year earlier. ”

European industry is already fully integrated into China ’s supply chains. The European Commission ’s talk about “de-risking ” belies the economic reality. Decoupling Europe from China would be like separating conjoined twins with a meat cleaver.

Despite securing her position with just 54 % support, Von der Leyen has cast China as Europe’s strategic nemesis, mirroring Washington ’s stance while disregarding the economic realities facing European businesses and undermining the continent’s geopolitical interests.

This predicament is the result of mistaking submission for strategy. Under Joe Biden, Brussels eagerly auditioned for the role of America’s most compliant ally, parroting tough talk on Beijing while neglecting to build real strategic autonomy.

The real problem is not merely following Biden—it’s the delusion that his policies should endure beyond his tenure. Under MAGA 2. 0, Europe clings to a plan that ’s bound to backfire. The 47th president is not exactly extending an olive branch to Europe, yet, inexplicably, its leaders have operated pretending otherwise.

Now, as Trump’s “America First ” doctrine roars back to life, Europe is about to learn a costly lesson: In the world of great power politics, there are no points for loyalty, only consequences for naivete.

China: Partly Malign, Security Threat, Systemic Threat

In 2024, a year when China and Europe’s institutional leadership failed to meet even once, the US-EU operation to escalate tensions with Beijing appeared meticulously choreographed.

This combative stance found its perfect expression in October, when Europe’s High Representative, Kaja Kallas, took EU diplomacy to new self-destructive heights by inventing a new category, labeling China as “partly malign”—whatever that means.

It was n’t a slip of the tongue but rather a carefully crafted written response that manages to be both inflammatory and meaningless. The same statement anointed Washington as the EU’s “most consequential partner and ally ” while ignoring the looming shadow of Trump 2. 0.

Leading EU-US-aligned think tanks proposed adding a “fourth category ” to the tripartite framework—partner, competitor, systemic rival—labeling China a “security threat ” for its alleged “support ” for Russia in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s refusal to supply lethal weapons. The move prioritized US demands over European interests, reducing complex geopolitics to simplistic binaries while villainizing China without fitting evidence.

In September, a China hawk misquoted von der Leyen to claim she viewed China as a “systemic threat ” requiring “closer transatlantic cooperation. ” Facts did n’t matter—it fit the mainstream narrative.

This rhetoric from prominent leaders and influential advisors signals a hardening stance that heightens tensions without providing viable paths for engagement or resolution. It’s a posture fit for a true military and political superpower—something Europe, under its current leadership, is far from being or achieving.

Let’s be clear about what’s really at stake. Europe’s legitimate grievances with China—the massive trade imbalance, market access restrictions, excessive dependencies, asymmetric competition with Chinese state-owned enterprises—have been buried under an avalanche of ideological posturing. Instead of addressing these concrete issues through pragmatic negotiation, Brussels opted for hostility, torching bridges that took decades to build.

By hitching its wagon to Washington ’s confrontational approach, the bloc forgot a fundamental rule of geopolitics—when two elephants clash, the grass agonizes. And in this case, Europe has enthusiastically volunteered to be the grass.

Today, the EU’s “China abandoned agenda ” collides with the “Trump factor, ” exposing a glaring tactical misstep. Trump’s first term made it crystal clear: he views the EU as an economic rival, not an ally. “The EU is possibly as bad as China, just smaller. It is terrible what they do to us, ” Trump said this week after his inauguration.

And Brussels has resolutely behaved as if this reality could be ignored. Regrettably, five years after the self-proclaimed “Geopolitical Commission ” vowed to restore Europe’s faded glory, the continent is more irrelevant than ever. Washington and Beijing dominate the global stage, while Brussels —stripped of strategy —has played the role of America’s most enthusiastic cheerleader.

The consequences of this negligence are already unfolding. Firstly, Europe has exposed itself to economic and trading pressure from both sides while gaining nothing in return, with limited leverage to negotiate favorable terms with either power.

Moreover, its blind alignment with Biden’s agenda has gutted its ability to forge an independent foreign policy—a reliance that becomes more problematic as Trump’s policies diverge sharply from European interests.

Most critically, by choosing sides in the US-China rivalry rather than maintaining strategic ambiguity, the EU has sacrificed its potential role as a political bridge-builder.

The supreme irony? When Trump starts slapping tariffs on European goods —and he will—Brussels will come crawling back to the East for relief. China, ever the pragmatist, stands ready to rescue Europe from irrelevance—certainly not out of altruism, but calculated realpolitik.

The 50th anniversary of the EU-China diplomatic association in 2025 offered a perfect opportunity for a pivot. Beijing signaled its openness to reset relations. Instead, Von der Leyen swept it under the rug, as if ignoring it might make it irrelevant. It took Xi’s call with European Council President António Costa to remind everyone that this diplomatic milestone even existed.

Brussels, therefore, faces a stark choice: continue its march toward geopolitical irrelevance or chart an independent course. The EU must confront reality. In the great power game, there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Until Brussels grasps this fundamental truth, it will continue to play checkers while Beijing and Washington play chess.

All in all, if Europe envisions itself as more than a collection of states, it must adopt the tenacity of a “Europe First ” strategy. It is not about rivalry or mimicry; it ’s about evolution. Trump’s “America First ” was about unapologetic leverage. When it comes to angling for America’s vantage, Trump negotiates hard with friend and foe alike.  

Likewise, from dependency to agency, Europe should frame itself as a balancing force: neither submissive nor aggressive, but a power that asserts its autonomy and compels respect from both allies and adversaries.

Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa is a Hong Kong-based geopolitics strategist with a focus on Europe-Asia relations.

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Trump rekindles hope for a US-China trade deal – Asia Times

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Some were bracing for an instant and terrible increase of US-China industry conflicts upon Donald Trump’s returning to the White House on January 20.  

For decades, his campaign rhetoric had hinted at violent actions targeting Chinese imports, with some fearing taxes as high as 60 % on goods flowing from the world’s second-largest market into American businesses.  

But his starting moves, though destructive, were not the sledgehammer some had anticipated. Rather, they signaled a potential way toward dialogue, leaving space for cautious optimism in Beijing and among specific industry observers.

The initial volley—a 10 % tariff threat linked to China ’s role in America’s opioid crisis, particularly in relation to fentanyl—was enough to rattle markets.   The CSI 300 index fell by 1 %, Hong Kong ’s Hang Seng slid 1. 6 %, and the onshore yen weakened somewhat against the dollar.

However, the threatened methods paled in comparison to the blanket 25 % taxes Trump announced for Mexico and Canada.   For Beijing, it seems that this caution is a sign that the door to discourse remains available, at least for today.

Strategic beginning strategy

Trump’s original techniques suggest a calculated plan. By pairing the tax risk with an exploration into China ’s broader business procedures, he has given both flanks room to maneuver.  

While this method is doubtful to remove the deep trust that has built up over years of economic opposition, it does create an opening for creative deals. Beijing, accustomed to Trump’s chaotic fashion, is no fear taking note of this recorded preface.

China ’s management appears to know that Trump’s transactional approach to international relations usually leaves space for bargains. His hinted connection of business taxes to the future of TikTok—a Chinese-controlled social media platform that has drawn scrutiny from US protection eagles —underscores this place.

A package that addresses Washington ’s safety concerns while preserving some financial ties may serve as a model for broader contracts. The Chinese authorities, now faced with a slowing economy, entrenched home problems and mounting debts forces, has little taste for a full-scale trade conflict with the US.  

The consequences from the last round of US-China price wars, which strained supply chains and weighed on development, may be new in politicians ’ thoughts. With international demand uncertain and local challenges piling up, Beijing possible sees negotiations as a way to maintain its economic perspective.

For Trump, a package with China represents a major political option. While his foundation generally celebrates his aggressive stance, it also values outcomes. A trade deal that delivers agreements on issues like intellectual property theft, morphine exports or market exposure for US firms may help Trump to claim victory without tipping the global market into conflict.

At the same time, Trump’s tendency to view economic policy through the lens of personal branding complicates the picture. His willingness to reverse course or shift priorities based on perceived political gains could undermine the consistency needed for successful negotiations.  

Yet, this unpredictability may also work in his favor, creating opportunities to extract concessions from Beijing in exchange for scaling back his more extreme threats. The critical question now is what kind of deal would satisfy both sides.  

For the US, a meaningful agreement would need to address longstanding grievances such as forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft and the two sides ’ yawning trade imbalance. For China, the priority will be securing relief from tariffs while preserving its sovereign control over key industries and technologies.

One possible area of compromise could be technology regulation.   If Beijing agrees to stricter controls on data security, Washington might ease restrictions on Chinese tech companies now operating in the US, not least TikTok. Another potential avenue is joint commitments to supply chain resilience, which could help both economies weather future disruptions while fostering a sense of mutual benefit.

Risks to optimism

Of course, the risks to a potential deal remain significant. Trump’s unpredictability and penchant for last-minute demands could derail progress, as could hardliners on both sides who view compromise as weakness. Additionally, any agreement would need to address deep-seated structural issues, a task that may prove too complex for short-term diplomacy.

There is also the matter of trust—or the lack thereof. Years of tension have left both sides wary of each other’s intentions. And any agreement would likely face scrutiny from domestic constituencies eager to portray the other side as an unreliable partner.

Still, the mere possibility of negotiations has provided a glimmer of hope in an otherwise fraught relationship. For markets, Trump’s softer-than-expected opening has already delivered a sense of relief, even as uncertainty lingers. For businesses, it suggests that a return to the trade chaos of years past is not yet a done deal.

Ultimately, the road to a deal will be fraught with challenges. But the fact that both sides appear willing to engage in dialogue is a positive sign. Trump’s approach, while far from conciliatory, leaves room for pragmatism.  

For Beijing, the focus will be on crafting a deal that stabilizes its economy without conceding too much ground. For Washington, the challenge will be to balance toughness with the need for tangible results.

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