Bolen C (Page 2)

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump may have had discussions about ending the conflict in Ukraine, but it seems like there is already a bit of a standoff.

Russia’s stated objectives of holding on to five regions of Ukraine ( including Crimea ), as well as ensuring Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, is unlikely to be acceptable to Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky. However, Zelensky and Trump had a very common falling away, with the US president calling Zelensky a “dictator”.

Now that the two parties appear to have reached an agreement allowing the US to jointly produce Ukraine’s material resources, this seems to have been fairly resolved. However, whether the key people may trust each other and whether Zelensky believes what Putin and Trump have to say is credible will determine whether there will be serious negotiations to end the war.

In general, trust and its development between leaders provide a possible means of resolving global conflict and facilitating diplomatic agreement. However, a minimum level of trust is needed to allow states to job together.

How the relation between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev developed as an example of this.

Possibly, it was regular&nbsp, face-to-face interactions&nbsp, between Gorbachev and Reagan ( four conferences in really over three decades ), which allowed them to create a level of understanding and improve confidence, allowing them to reduce&nbsp, atomic weapons supplies. However, it also took time to develop their confidence and this remained unstable.

How is faith fought?

Trust is a crucial component of effective negotiations, and it can affect how they turn out and determine whether peace talks are powerful. In every historical context, there is evidence of the value of respect in a dialogue.

]embedded material]

Even if confidence has probably developed between leaders, if another individual decision-makers, such as martial leaders, do not communicate that trust, it can severely damage negotiations. The Sultanate peace approach between India and Pakistan in 1999 was hampered by Muslim military action as an example of this.

General Pervez Musharraf, mind of the armed forces, conducted a military invasion into the Jammu and Kashmir place, violating the agreement between the two states and leading to a breakdown in confidence, undermining the peace deal signed before that year between the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, and his American counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee

Who do you trust?

In international relations terms the key factors that create trust are considered by scholars to be capacity, peaceful intention, integrity and predictability. Trump’s desire for peace comes naturally to Putin’s conviction that he is a trustworthy negotiating partner. This view is not shared by Zelensky, who questions Putin’s sincerity, intentions and integrity.

Zelensky suggests that Putin’s past actions ( including leading a full-scale invasion of Ukraine ) point toward his future untrustworthiness. This may be highlighted by Russia’s rejection of the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements, which were used to reach a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine but were never properly implemented. Instead of pursuing implementation, Russia chose further military action against Ukraine in 2022.

To advance with the talks, Zelensky will need to be persuaded that Putin is serious about his intentions and ready to act honestly. The Ukrainian leader will also need to be persuaded that Trump is trustworthy and that he can rely on the US to ensure that Putin adheres to any agreements.

Trump will need to address this lack of trust if he wants to put an end to the war. There may be temptations to simply outstay Zelensky from face-to-face meetings ( to completely avoid the problem ), but there are also the potential risks of leaders not speaking with their opponents.

The then-Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, regretted not meeting the PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, before coming to terms with them on the framework for the Oslo Accords because he would have better understood how Arafat saw the negotiations. Rabin might have done things differently if he had been more aware of Arafat.

Alternately, Trump might use his own relationship with Putin to “encourage” the Russian leader to act in ways that demonstrate to Zelensky that he is a trustworthy negotiating partner. Putin will need to demonstrate his sincerity and seriousness in the face of fruitful discussions and a peaceful resolution. The key might be found in the gestures of reconciliation.

An example of this is when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat traveled to Jerusalem in 1978, becoming the first Arab leader to address the Israeli parliament. This was deemed necessary for peace negotiations between the two nations, which led to the 1979 Camp David Accords.

Putin and Zelensky could have face-to-face conversations with the Ukrainian leader to calm him down. However, much more is needed to demonstrate that a person or even a state is trustworthy than not.

People believe that a good person will never do anything wrong, while a bad person may occasionally do good deeds as well as bad ones, according to Deborah Larson, a professor of political science at the University of California. As a result, just one misdeed indicates that an actor is immoral, whereas one good act does not demonstrate much”.

A much lower level and higher-level negotiation would be a better place to start Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, or at least in parallel to higher-level ones. Working out how to bridge the gaps between the various leaders, individuals who represent the key decision-makers could create their own interpersonal relationships.

In the end, those two states and their leaders will have the final say in any negotiations to put an end to the war. Any agreement almost impossible because of interpersonal relationships and a lack of trust between the two parties who will sign off on any agreement.

David J Wilcox is part-time teaching fellow, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Birmingham

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Eight years ago, the United States had a new president, Donald Trump. This writer wrote some advice for the then-new ambassador headed to Japan – and then, four years later, sent more suggestions for President Biden’s then-unnamed top envoy to Tokyo.

Now President Trump is back and a new ambassador, George Glass, will likely be confirmed and sent to Tokyo.

In the spirit of foisting off – on a bipartisan basis – unasked-for advice, I offer my counsel again. And if past is prologue, it won’t be the first time this writer’s advice has been ignored.

February 27, 2025

Dear Ambassador ……..,

You will no doubt study up on the issues and receive more briefings than you can absorb, but here is some unsolicited advice anyway:

You’ll hear that the US-Japan relationship is the “most important bilateral relationship, bar none.” It is.  You’ll also hear that “it has never been stronger.” You might ask, “Compared with what?” 

Strong doesn’t mean it’s strong enough. 

Is it deterring the PRC?  Not if you consider aggressive Chinese behavior. And if it’s not deterring, can we fight together and defeat the People’s Liberation Army? Maybe not, even though the Japan-US defense alliance is 65 years old.

The US-Japan relationship is an old one and we get along well enough. But Japan’s longstanding pathologic dependence on the United States for its defense weakens the entire structure.

There is of course more to the relationship than the military angle, but that is the most important part. Here are a few things to consider.

Don’t pick a fight with Japan over host nation support funding – as your boss, Mr. Trump, has in the past suggested he would  — even if Japan can afford to pay ten times more. Tell Japan to keep its money and spend it on Japan Self Defense Force training and decent housing for the troops.

Most of all, America needs a Japan that can fight. That means more combat power from the JSDF, and it needs to better align and integrate this combat power with US forces. The JSDF needs to improve and it needs to be able to operate much better with US forces.

Just because things are better than they were ten years ago – when even saying the JSDF might need to fight a war gave too many alliance managers on both sides the vapors – doesn’t mean things are anywhere near where they need to be.

The JSDF and Japan itself are not ready to fight a war – no matter what you are told.  A few good niche capabilities (submarines, anti-submarine warfare, missile defense and outer space) aren’t enough.

A more capable and powerful military reduces Japan’s dependence on the US military, relieves the burden on US forces defending Japanese interests farther afield and potentially augments overstretched US forces in the region.

And don’t forget the political knock-on effects of more effective Japanese forces, solidly linked and able to operate with US forces. China was counting on splitting the US and Japan alliance. American and Japanese forces operating together makes this much harder to do.

Less than the sum of its parts

The Japanese military looks impressive on paper, but is less than the sum of its parts. A main problem is that the three Japanese services are mostly incapable of operating together. 

The JSDF is standing up a Joint Operational Headquarters in March 2025.  Finally.  But this is at least 25 years late and it will take time for it to get its footing.

There is also the problem of the MSDF and ASDF being about half the size they need to be to accomplish required missions.

The JSDF missed recruitment targets by 50% last year (yes, 50%) and routinely misses them by 20%.  That tells you all is not well.

Can US and Japanese forces do real-world, short-notice operations? You ought to ask.

You might also ask why US forces often have to leave Japan in order to train to defend Japan?

So when you hear that “the relationship has never been stronger” – don’t think it’s strong enough.

‘It’s too difficult’

In response to the above need for a more capable JSDF, expect to hear that “it’s too difficult.”  In fact, you’ll hear this in response to many suggestions you might make – and not just about defense.

“Too difficult” means that a Japanese person somewhere (or the Asahi Shimbun newspaper) might complain. You might point out to the Japanese government that explaining to US voters why American servicemen must die for a Japan that won’t do its share is also “too difficult.”

Be prepared for some of your embassy staff to make the “too difficult” case on Japan’s behalf. There are several sub-themes of “too difficult” that you should be aware of:

• “Japan’s Constitution won’t allow (fill in the blank).” Read the Constitution – and article 9 in particular.) Yes, read it. It’s long since been re-interpreted out of any connection to its plain meaning, but it has become Japan’s go-to excuse when it doesn’t want to do something. Sort of like a Monopoly ‘get out of jail free’ card. Japanese are not snowflakes and can and will do whatever they need to do.
• “Japanese are pacifist.” If so, it’s a curious form of pacifism that is happy to have Americans exterminate Japan’s enemies – and insist the US use nuclear weapons if necessary.  So much for Japan’s “nuclear allergy.” And, yes, the Japan Self Defense Force is indeed a military – despite having “self-defense” in its name
• “There’s a Japanese election coming.” Japanese claims of “too difficult” are often made with a request to help out the government just the one time, since “there’s an election coming.” The bait is that after the election the Japanese will do whatever it is that is too difficult just now. However, there’s always an election coming – and there’s always help needed, just this one time.  This bait and switch racket has been going on for decades. Why? Because it works.

A big pile of money

Here’s some good news.  Japan announced a couple years ago that it would double defense spending over the next five years or so. That’s good – though the yen is worth much less now than when the increase was announced. That’s a challenge.

For decades Japan spent about half of what it needed to spend on defense – assuming that the Americans would fill in the gaps.

So the promise to double defense spending is good – though remember that  this doesn’t make up for the years of underfunding (and lack of political support) that left the JSDF a stunted force.

One retired Japanese admiral refers to the “new” money as a big pile of sugar that will attract ants (defense contractors), who will make it disappear.

Japan’s got money but doesn’t know what to spend it on. Officials can rattle off a list of equipment and hardware they’re buying or building – but can’t explain how it fits into a coherent defense scheme.

Give them some advice. The Japanese are not mind readers, and knowing what you need to fight a war isn’t intuitive – especially for a JSDF that wasn’t allowed to think clearly about warfighting for decades.

‘Severe fiscal condition’

This is a standard Japanese excuse for being unable to budget more for defense. You’ll hear it still – despite the promise to spend more. 

Don’t fall for it. 

Insist that Japan spend what is necessary. And that especially includes money for JSDF training  and exercises and improved terms of service for JSDF personnel. The aforementioned “jointness” costs nothing – only requiring doctrine, practice and a changed mindset.

Japan has plenty of money, even if its credit card is maxed out. Just like the United States, when it needs cash for things other than defense it finds it. 

Bottom line: the world’s third largest economy has money – but the Japanese government fears the Ministry of Finance more than it fears the US government.

‘But China will complain’

You’ll hear this a lot and from your own people as well, especially if the “it’s too difficult” line isn’t persuading you. The point is, China will complain about anything that Japan (and the US) might do short of surrendering.  

Japan has been a model of responsible international behavior and consensual government for 70 years now. Japan is a threat to nobody. It lacks the manpower, hardware, know-how and, most importantly, the desire to threaten its neighbors.

And there’s more to Asia than China and Korea. Get around the region a bit and you will find that the Japanese are well regarded just about everywhere else in the region. A billion plus Indians well disposed toward Japan ought to count for something.

If you hear “it’s too difficult” or “but China will complain” from your staff, I think you’ve found just the right Foreign Service officers to put on “walking the Ambassador’s dog” detail or planning the embassy Christmas party.

One more thing: When it comes to China you’ll find that Japan has, in its ruling class, just as many people as the US has who think the PRC will become a friend if we just accommodate them. Many of those people make money from the PRC, and a few of them really believe it.

Abe was good but he’s gone

Shinzo Abe was a once-in-a-generation Japanese statesman. He may not have liked the US all that much, but he wisely kept quiet and looked after Japan’s broader interest – in staying close to the United States and under the US defense umbrella. He also started reshaping Japan’s attitudes towards defense – and even fighting.

Now we’re back to the days when Japanese prime ministers come and go in quick succession, and after a few months it’s hard to remember they were even there. PM Shigeru Ishiba may not even be there by the time you arrive.

So don’t make the prime minister your sole focus. A lot can be done via other channels.

A word about gaiatsu (foreign pressure): This usually applies to trade matters, but it works just as well with defense policy – and Japanese reformers who want the JSDF to be a better ally will appreciate the help.

However, if you or the US government will be talking tough to the Japanese – and you might need to, given the tenacity of the “too difficult” and “severe fiscal condition” crowd – do it quietly. Be prepared for the Japanese to shop around for somebody in the US government who will take up their arguments. So a united front on your side is important.

And remember then-PM Kakuei Tanaka’s advice in 1970 when the Americans were hemming and hawing about asking to put an aircraft carrier in Yokosuka: “Tell us what you want, and don’t back down.”

That was sound advice. The Americans promptly forgot it.

Linking Japan and US forces

Except for the shining example of the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), American and Japanese forces still don’t operate well together and would be hard pressed if they had to fight a war together.

Go down to Yokosuka Naval Base at your first opportunity and see what the two navies have quietly accomplished. Apply what you see to the overall defense relationship.

The Japan-US Defense Guidelines were revised a few years ago (by Prime Minister Abe) and allow Japan and the US to do whatever is necessary to establish genuine operational linkages. For example, the guidelines call for an “alliance coordination mechanism” – aka the ACM.  

The ACM is not an actual place where US and Japanese officers sit side-by-side coordinating activities necessary for the defense of Japan and surrounding areas.  Really.

So ask what concrete progress has been made to link US and Japanese forces. Is a standing, permanently staffed joint headquarters in the works? If you hear it is being discussed – ask ‘by when’.  If it is more than six months away…and you’re told  “it’s too difficult,” blow a gasket. 

When will USFJ become a real joint operational HQ instead of being the guys who apologize whenever there’s a flap with Japan? This is being discussed, but it needs to happen soon. You might ask.

The hotel taxi

The idea that the US might actually have to fight to defend Japan was mostly an academic exercise until late 2008, when China started throwing its weight around in the East China Sea.

Fighting and dying on Japan’s behalf, especially “over some rocks” (the Senkaku Islands), is not a vote getter in Washington, DC. And the parents of the American servicemen who are expected to offer up their young men and women to die for Japan will be outraged – not least, once they hear young Japanese are not joining up to serve and fight. 

Both governments must defang, in advance, the argument that the China lobbyists will make – that Japan thinks it can call up US forces to die for it just the way it would whistle up a taxi outside a hotel.

Japan needs to show in every possible way that it’s pulling its weight. Otherwise, expect serious political opposition in Washington when push comes to shove. “Japan is doing everything it possibly can” will not persuade many Americans outside the State Department or the Pentagon.

Be prepared for a surprise as you may sometimes get the impression from Japanese officials that they are doing the US a favor by allowing Americans to fight (and die) on Japan’s behalf.

Does Japan have any good defense options that don’t involve close ties with the US?  No.  And it has no options at all that don’t involve nuclear weapons. You will need to make your case clearly and often.

And a word about Taiwan:

You will hear Japanese say, “Taiwan’s defense is Japan’s defense.” That’s true. But ask what Japan actually plans to do to defend Taiwan or to help the American forces? If the plan is to wing it when the time comes – or to leave it up to the Americans – recall the earlier advice about blowing a gasket.

Which Japanese?

Japanese do not all think alike. Among Japanese officials, politicians, and the media there is a range of opinions about defense and the US-Japan defense relationship – just as there is in the United States.

Get out and talk to as many Japanese as possible – not just the usual suspects deemed suitable to talk to an ambassador.

Alliance managers – Japanese and American? Some are good. Some are not. And some (on both sides) aim to keep you on a leash. They consider avoiding trouble – not making things better – the only thing on their job description.

Probably the larger number of Japanese recognize the need for an improved military capability, much bigger defense budgets and seamless ties to the US forces.

Others see no need to do more, viewing the Americans as “guard dogs” (yes, the term slips out now and then with older pols when in their cups late at night) who just need to be given some water and a bone and set loose in the front yard. A smaller number are reflexively anti-military, and some are resentful of the US presence – a reminder of how World War II ended.

If you need a break from the Tokyo elite, get out and meet younger Japanese military officers and jieikan (regular troops). Even most Japanese know little about these people. Japan’s service members are some of the most impressive Japanese. Get to know them.

Fortunately, the Japanese public is intelligent (and still reads newspapers) – and when things are explained to them, they understand and support Japan’s defense requirements better than many Tokyo politicians and bureaucrats do.

Regarding Okinawa

Okinawa is not a seething hotbed of anti-militarism and anti-Americanism that requires us to walk on eggshells.  Every elected mayor on Okinawa is considered “pro-military.” That tells you a lot.

US handling of Okinawa issues has been largely incoherent for the last 30 years. That’s another matter, however.

Okinawa is Japanese territory and the Japanese central government is responsible for doing what is necessary to ensure US operations on the island. The government’s failure to take on a small but noisy Okinawan opposition – one that is raking in huge amounts of money in central government payouts (have your staff do the math to calculate the jaw-dropping amounts) – is the ultimate problem. Okinawa is not America’s fault.

Have your staff count the number of times the government has promised to keep its promise (to keep its promise to keep its promise) to build a replacement for Futenma Air Station.

As for the Henoko solution being the only possible solution: Don’t be afraid to ask why this is so – and even better, ask how the decision to build a really long heliport to replace the functions of Futenma’s 10,000-foot runway was arrived at?

One wishes a fraction of the effort that’s gone into solving (or not solving) the Okinawa real estate problem over the last 30 years had been applied to creating a competent Japanese military fully linked to US forces. It’s never too late to start.  

The Marines have finally begun moving from Okinawa to Guam under the Defense Policy Review Initiative.

Rethink this. 

The people who are happiest about US forces leaving Okinawa are in Beijing.

DPRI was agreed to in 2006. Northeast Asia was a very different place then. The PRC wasn’t nearly the military threat it is today – and the China threat was little considered, if at all, when DPRI was decided.

As you can see, it wasn’t chiseled in stone atop Mount Sinai.

Best wishes  Mr. Ambassador. 

You will watch history being made, and indeed, might even make it yourself. If at the end of your assignment things are in as good shape as when you began, you will earn a gentleman’s C.  

Your predecessor did well. Perhaps he took more credit than he should have for things the Japanese did on their own accord. And he squandered goodwill pushing social justice theories on a Japan that wasn’t interested. But he deserves at least a B, maybe a B+.  That’s not bad.

Unfortunately, the People’s Republic of China’s military build-up during the last four years deserves an A+. The Chinese smell blood.

A grade of C this time around will just be a gentleman’s F. But if the JSDF is better able to fight a war, including being able to  conduct joint operations, and if it really can operate with US forces, you’ll have done something good and will be remembered for a good long while.

Colonel Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer whose decades of experience in the
Indo-Pacific include serving as reserve head of intelligence for Marine Forces
Pacific. As the first Marine advisor to the Japan Self-Defense Force, he helped to
create Japan’s amphibious force. He is the author of the 2023 book When China Attacks: A Warning to America.

Continue Reading

Donald Trump’s followers, who criticized Joe Biden’s unwavering support for Ukraine, may see the country’s reportedly willingness to signal a deal granting the US shared development right to its nutrients as a means of a potential safety assurance. After all, it’s unclear whether or not such a deal may stop Ukraine from continuing to be a victim of Russian hostility.

Despite the US government’s numerous boasts that he is a learn, Kyiv may be aware that Trump’s monitor record as a global offer broker is subpar.

Trump’s self-belief was encapsulated in his written memoir, The Art of the Deal, which laid out his approaches to discuss business dealings. The best thing you can do is offer from power, and leverage is the biggest power you can have, according to one essential advice.

When Trump cut Zelensky and other Western countries out of talks with Russia over the conflict in Ukraine, they were left reeling. In doing so, the leader had probably forgotten his personal advice: to deal from power and to use leverage in negotiations.

Trump may have negotiated a deal with Ukraine through the metal offer, which was significantly less than the US$$ 500 billion in revenue he had initially requested, but in doing so considerably weakened the US position toward Russia.

Trump unilaterally ended Russia’s three-year confinement without seeking any agreements from the Kremlin before bringing them to the table for negotiations, breaking not just the western position on Ukraine.

Rather, it was the US that gave utilize aside by sidelining Ukraine from the discussions, rejecting the government’s desire for Nato participation and conceding that Ukraine was doubtful to recover its pre-2014 edges.

Trump more denigrated Zelensky by making up the myth that Ukraine was the start of the war and labeling him a “dictator.” The US and China voted on the issue at the UN Security Council this year.

Trump’s condemnation of an alliance and friendly relations with a nation that invaded its neighbor represents a serious change in US policy. While imposing sanctions on Russia, the previous US management gave Ukraine military and diplomatic help.

What more Trump will accept in Kyiv and the northern capital is a crucial question being asked in Kyiv and the northern capital to secure a offer with the Kremlin. Although the US’s participation in Afghanistan and support for Ukraine differ significantly, Trump’s first approach to the latter exhibits some of the cornerstones of the country’s fatal agreement with the Taliban.

Trump’s cope with the Taliban

In response to the 9/11 criminal attacks, a US-led partnership invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. The Taliban’s authoritarian government was quickly replaced by the allies, who also established a government supported by Westerners.

But by the day that Trump came to office in 2017, the battle was at a deadlock. To make matters worse for the leader, the US was spending US$ 27 billion annually on defense costs. Given this, Trump’s reaction was to retreat from Afghanistan as quickly as possible.

However, the government’s national surveillance team persuaded him to raise the US dedication to Afghanistan, which was mostly made up of former and present defense generals who did not owe Trump any specific loyalty. Additionally, the novel approach established the circumstances for a Taliban-mediated negotiated resolution.

The next year, angered by the lack of advancement, Trump argued that the US does “get out” of Afghanistan as the plan had been a” full loss”.

By this time, the US had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/asia/us-taliban-afghanistan-talks.html”>talked directly to the Taliban, without the Armenian government in the room – a crucial Taliban need. While the conversations were designed to lead to intra-Afghan discussions, it resulted in the Afghan state being sidelined from the procedure.

Throughout these discussions, Trump often threatened to retreat from Afghanistan. The leader would post every day that the US was leaving Afghanistan, according to US officials, who called it the” Tweet of Damocles.”

Mike Pompeo, the director of state at the time and a die-hard Trump supporter, was aware that the president could halt the discussions at any time. He therefore instructed head US mediator, Zalmay Khalilzad, to secure a bargain at all costs.

It became evident to me that Pompeo and Khalilzad had” no dark lines,” as a former top Pentagon official who was present at the deals said, because they both believed that “any package was better than no deal.”

Khalilzad worked to stable an agreement with the Taliban, which eventually sparked outrage within the neglected Afghan government, abandoning the original Afghan-led procedure. Trump also generally refused to discuss the Armenian president, Ashraf Ghani, about his intentions.

The US leader made a number of public remarks about his desire to remove US forces from Afghanistan, complicating matters further. This weakened Khalilzad’s status and encouraged the Taliban to be decisive in conversations.

The US-Taliban deal, which was signed in Doha in February 2020, favored the militants and damaged the Armenian government. Khalilzad had conceded to the Taliban’s vital need: the removal of all US and alliance forces from the land, which was scheduled over 14 weeks.

In exchange, the Taliban agreed to hold discussions with the Armenian government and made a promise to stop criminal organizations from establishing themselves in Afghanistan. If the Taliban did not adhere to these parameters, the US had – in principle – end reducing its army figures.

” This was a bad bargain. It was greatly hurtful to US interests, allow only ruinous to Armenian passions”, the former Pentagon official told me.

In the end, the Taliban failed to honor its counterterrorism commitments, and only half-heartedly pursued intra-Afghan talks.

The deal set the conditions for the insurgents to retake Kabul by force, although the disastrous withdrawal overseen by the administration of Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, in 2021 proved fatal for the Afghan government.

Trump’s Taliban deal excluded the United States ‘ allies, gave too much to an adversary, and was in part motivated by the idea that American dollars were being wasted in a remote area. Unfortunately, these hallmarks are all too evident in the president’s stance on Ukraine.

The first signs of Trump’s plan of action against Russia do not look good for Ukraine or the Western Alliance. Not only will Ukraine lose out, but Russia may be encouraged to once more pursue its expansionist agenda if Trump does secure a peace deal with Russia that mirrors the agreement reached with the Taliban.

Philip A. Berry is a visiting research fellow at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Deterrence has been a basic rule underpinning peace between world powers since the Cold War. The idea is that the consequences of using nuclear weapons by both sides mean the option not presses.

However, the plan extends beyond the nations that possess the arms. In training, for example, most of Europe relies on the US for a nuclear “umbrella” of punishment. Additionally, any nation that has nuclear weapons may offer guarantees of peace to other nations.

In exchange for a pledge to “respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and the existing territories of Ukraine,” Russia, the UK, and the US signed the Budapest document in which Ukraine renounced its nuclear weapons from the Soviet era.

This was commonly accepted as a wise move for Ukraine and the rest of the world, reducing the chance of a nuclear injury.

But that memo hasn’t been helpful to Ukraine also. As North Korea, India, Pakistan or Israel know, owning nuclear weapons– perhaps against international treaties – ensures your safety. A piece of paper does no.

And now it is no longer possible to offer different states the equivalent of a Budapest document. A significant portion of the idea that led to a powerful atomic deterrent has vanished.

This is referred to as the idea of a” credible dedication” in game theory, which is the scientific study of corporate interactions. The nation providing safety must be prepared to engage in a military invasion that would harm its own interests.

In the case of Ukraine, this has so far involved supporters sending expensive military gear, financial assistance, and the risk of the conflict escalating even further. Being a reliable surety depends on one’s global reputation: a nation that delivers is regarded as trustworthy. However, no one will believe a guarantor if it disobeys its terms.

And while reputable retaliation is crucial, so too is avoiding increase. For reducing the likelihood of a fatal outcome is also in everyone’s best interests.

Over the years, the small number of countries with internationally accepted nuclear arsenals ( the US, UK, France, Russia and China ) have developed atomic beliefs. These are advanced and frequently illogical increase and de-escalation laws.

The Nobel prize-winning scholar, Thomas Schelling, argues that the confusion around these principles is what makes them so successful. It strengthens a system that allows other nations to receive security in trade for preventing them from developing their own nuclear weapons.

War sports

Research in game theory has also revealed how complicated these rules of engagement ( or non-engagement ), such as the requirement for credible retaliation in response to an attack.

Imagine, for instance, that China launches a nuclear explosive that totally destroys Manchester. An unbiased British prime minister might want to put an end to hostilities and accept the destruction of a significant city over retaliation and risking the entire destruction of human life.

However, they may react in order for the deterrent to work, or Birmingham and London will vanish.

Finding the appropriate answer to varying degrees of provocation is another challenge. When Russian-affiliated men were found guilty by Dutch authorities of downing a Malaysian Airlines human journey with 298 people ashore, including 196 French nationals, there was no speak of equal retaliation. No single really considered bombing or shooting down a Russian aircraft.

There was no retaliation for Russian interference in Western elections, the damage of infrastructure in European states, or the murders and attempted murders on Western soil.

And the west’s response to the full-scale conquest of Ukraine in February 2022 was in line with guidelines intended to prevent increase. Restrictions were imposed on Russia, martial assistance was sent to Ukraine.

But to leave Ukraine today, forcing it to lose country after three years of fighting, dying, and death, would be a major shift. It would be a clear and deliberate rejection of the guarantees that Ukraine claimed to have in the global community.

Stockpiles and agreements

According to match theory, no nation did ever commit to abandoning those commitments in the same way that it did with Ukraine. No nation would want to place its confidence in unsatisfactory allies, either.

Europe for example, may aim to develop its own nuclear overcoat, probably combining French and British features. Additionally, it may make it easier to include the upcoming most likely targets for Moscow’s military interests.

This will include the elements of Ukraine no seized by Russia, but even Georgia, now invaded by Russia in 2008, and Moldova, primarily occupied by Russia.

The West will no longer have a compelling argument to persuade nations to leave their nuclear interests as a result. That leaves North Korea with no solid agreement, no persuading offer to Iran, and even fewer opportunities to put an end to Pakistan, India, or Israel’s nuclear programs.

Some nations will come to the conclusion that a nuclear weapons is a better way to assure protection than any piece of paper by looking at the ruin of Mariupol or Gaza City and comparing them to those in Pyongyang, Tel Aviv, or Tehran.

But, game theory suggests that the world should anticipate a development of nuclear power if the West does leave Ukraine. Each will need to know, as Russia and the US have, to sit on the level of diastrous fight. However, research indicates that it takes time to create a condition of reduced threat.

And that could be the occasion of a more likely scenario indicative of the Cuban missile crisis as well as a growing consensus that a nuclear war is unavoidable.

Renaud Foucart is senior teacher in finance, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Continue Reading