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China’s failures to reform its army may be rooted in a military skepticism that does n’t fit with contemporary needs.

Can the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) fight? In that case, how do they battle? They were in Korea under the individual waves, and they gave Taiwanese guerrilla warfare advice, but how would they fare in a contemporary war? &nbsp,

Officially, General He Weidong, the second-ranked vice president of the Central Military Commission, denounced “fake fight capabilities” in&nbsp, the defense, which experts believe are related to the current corruption investigation involving weapons purchasing.

But, Kenneth Allen and other foreign experts think that staff is the PLA’s weak link. His key results are the following:

• The PLA has made significant changes to its joined power since 1999. These include creating a 30-year joined power, enlisting college students and graduates as two-year conscripts, switching from a one-cycle to a two-cycle per year recruitment system in 2021, and hiring immediately personnel with specific technical skills as NCOs.

• The turnover of conscripts each month affects the yearly training period, for that units are missing a considerable number of personnel for months at a time.

• The officer regiment has also undergone significant changes, including the elimination of the National Defense Student plan, which started in 1999, a 34-year reduction in the number of officer educational institutions, and a direct recruitment of college graduates as officers.

• When addressing personnel issues, one must examine each service, force, and branch because they do n’t have equal conscript and NCO percentages and officers ‘ annual turnover.

• Males may get married until they are 25 and girls until they are 23, but the soldier power consists almost wholly of young personnel”.

Given the issues that were identified in each of these initiatives, the PLA will most likely make more significant adjustments over the coming generation. [i]ii ]

These are present issues, however they may include complicated and serious cultural roots.

Administrative legislation is opposed in Analects 2. 3 as Moss Roberts pointed out. Legge translated zheng ( make it right with a cudgel ) into law. Confucius sees zheng, along with punishment, as external force, arguing rather for de- virtuous officials who, as role models, keep conscience/sense of shame&nbsp, chi&nbsp, 恥&nbsp, ( things like having an ear to the brain ) alive in the people — a more dependable foundation of social order.

Mozi disagrees and contends that external influence on behavior is necessary, and that virtue and conscience alone are insufficient. The internal factors are forcefully recovered in Mencius ‘ theory of xing ( the personal character, what is engendered from the heart ) as inherently good. Then, Xunzi admits the existence of xing but argues that it is evil which brings us back to the need for external force pushing people to comply.

The proverb from chapter 112.5,” All men are brothers,’ makes the same point. We discover a significant correlation between li and de in chapter 2 and 3. 3. Lead the people with law/governmental administration and keep order with punishments, then they will act so as to evade punishment, losing their sense of shame. If you lead them with virtue ( de ) and maintain Ritual, the people will maintain their sense of shame and observe discipline as well. iii]ii ]]ii ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ]

Rituals like brotherhood have a hierarchy. Although classes are not universally accepted, not everyone is equal. However, there are xiao ren, little people, and junzi, lords who give orders. Ren仁” benevolence, “respect among equals holds the ranks.

Mozi replaced ren with jianai jianai ( comprehensive love ), which redefined filial service by saying that you should serve other people’s parents so that they will serve yours. iv. That is, &nbsp, jian ai &nbsp, ( jian= two hands holding tight a grain stalk, and ai sentiments between a claw and a cudgel, indicate feelings strongly controlled and held together ) has no hierarchy.

There are no differences in the way people are treated. People must come together as a single entity that respects their masters ( shang tong ), adheres to rules above, and does n’t coerce others ( xia dang ). This gradual social transformation was the premise of how Levy saw the army as a perfect projection of society as a whole ]v].

This situation is criticized by Albert Gavalny in a critical manner. A precise economic dimension to war exists. Conflict is not profitable, it’s wasteful, and it puts its survival at stake

Any military expenditure equals the equivalent of ten annual harvests in terms of waste and losses. Few states are able to form and take part in a military coalition because of the possibility of similar expenditures. ” ( Zhanguo ce 12: 672 ). Plus, incorporating new people and land within the current state was not a carefree exercise.

Greek armies made different movements. They pillaged the land, divided the spoils among the victors, and imposed a’ command’ empire on the” victi” who paid taxes, tributes to Rome but famously kept their laws and religions.

We are in completely different circumstances in ancient China because war is viewed as risky, expensive, and less than it could possibly bring. It is waged to ensure one’s political future, but not to ensure the economic growth of the Greek-Roman armies.

The generals and the strategists become very important.

What matters now are abilities demonstrated in acurate assessment of the circumstances and the circumstances of combat, accurate identification of enemy forces, the creation of plans, the development of intelligent strategies adapted to the needs of the adversary, and so on…
The soldier, an unidentified member of a large army, must follow the commander’s orders, making sure that his body consistently performs the automatic movements that are required of him. What is demanded of him is not so much bravery as docility.

In this novel theory of war, mechanical passive subservience emerges as the ineluctable prerequisite for victory as well as being able to compete for it. The main goal of the art of warfare is to remove from each soldier a docile, obedient, and useful submission through the persistent, constant, analytical, and thorough application of a tenacious disciplinary technique that is intended to completely neutralize any resistance these individuals might initially harbor.

Strictly speaking, the meaning of war no longer pertains to the person who wages it, to the person whose blood is spilled in the heat of combat. Human nature itself is the determining force of discipline. [vii ]]vii]

Here, the primary tool of control of the soldier is fear. Fighting a war in Greece involves greed and self-preservation of the “polis,” the” res publica” to which each soldier feels he belongs. Then, it is about his friends, agape, brotherly love, which he created by standing next to each other while wearing a spear or shield.

Conversely, in ancient China, we have this:

The masses are typically just manipulable, objects, unable to resist or oppose, as they are known to be. Although human beings are living organisms governed by natural laws, they automatically recoil from any situation in which they might lose their lives and would therefore put up the utmost resistance against going to battle on the battlefield if these strategic and authoritarian thinkers are correct and that humans do indeed have a natural inclination to desire with all of his might something that might benefit him, and to avoid by every means possible anything that might adversely affect him, the theory appears to hit a major stumbling block or

The survival instinct, these authoritarian and military thinkers managed to invert and capitalize on the situation by making fear of death their best ally. Fear at the idea that losing one’s life would offer or at least serve as the foundation for two different kinds of solutions. The first was straightforward coercion, meaning that any commander who attempted to flee would simply face execution ( Shangjunshu 10: 70 ) and those who were not bellicose or otherwise in the mood would be punished. ” &nbsp, ]viii ] &nbsp,

The Chinese capitalized on the familial vibe to accomplish that. The family will be compensated if a soldier, a member of a large family with many children, passes away. If one shrinks duties, the family will be punished.

losing men to defeat the king

The new peasant-soldier, who has lost the heroic, virile qualities of the traditional warrior and has no chance of acting as a free agent, is transformed into a simple disciplined object act, which is an inherent logic of the interchangeability of soldiers in mass-based warfare, the introduction of a logic of “replacements” as an axiom of the new way of conceiving the military arts, which connotes the abandonment of initiative in favor of passivity, calm, and ” ]ix ]

On the other hand. Everything develops differently if it is not about losing one or a few men but rather putting the country’s survival at risk:

” Because war is extremely expensive and wastes much more than it gains,” Ideally, at least, the perfect military action is that which, so to speak, has zero energy cost ( Billeter 1984: 49 ) … Ideally, at least, the perfect military action is that which, so to speak, has zero energy cost ( Billeter 1984: 49 ) … The confrontation is not, for Chinese strategic thinking, anything but the consequence of symmetry or, at least, an insignificant difference between the warring factions because, otherwise, there would be a manifest, irreversible imbalance between the two camps, which would give rise to two possibilities. First, when the conflict finally occurs, it would be an unfair fight between a strong side and a weak side, which would quickly end in favor of the latter to avoid the undesirable effects of a drawn-out battle.

The weak side might abandon its aggressive plans and concede defeat as a result of the dissuasive nature of the conflict between the strong and weak sides. In both cases, confrontation, understood as a process of reciprocal wear and tear, is ruled out…it is necessary to extend the logic of war to other human activities, including the ostensibly peaceful ones. Politics, economics, and diplomacy become the ideal extension of war, which is no longer viewed as a conflict or conflict but rather as a domination process.

Therefore, it would seem logical to include a chapter titled” Civil Offensives” ( wenfa ), which describes up to twelve non-violent subversion strategies that can be used, among others, to sabotage social cohesion by inciting insurrection, discredit him in the international sphere, bribe his officials, etc., in order to ensure his complete submission ( Taigong Liutao 14: 88–93 ). ” ]x ]

If it is about projecting fear and intimidation, it is crucial to “keep moving and continue to advance through the “empty” points, or the gaps in the enemy’s ground ( xu), while avoiding his stronger, more consistent, or “full” areas ( shi), as well. xi]

Controlling the light

Keeping the enemy too bright or too dark is still a two-way method of blinding it, though. Because one loses sight, being too bright makes it more effective. The West then has a strategic advantage here.

Everything is constantly changing, and it keeps everything in flux. Consider the 2024 drama about President Joe Biden for instance. In early July 2024, nobody knows for sure if he will keep running for president or if he will win or lose.

China, on the other hand, casts everything into the distance. Although blinding, light gives a sense of freedom that darkness does not.

Moreover, present US military actions are limited ( not an all- out war ) and frequent. They do n’t pose a threat to life and aim to balance advantages with costs. Similar to Greek-Roman customs, their soldiers are not passive instruments but increasingly active, entrepreneurial players looking for their gain.

The recognition of private property fits this. The advantages derived from war ca n’t be challenged or taken advantage of by anyone. The cultural pillar of this conflict is Achilles turning against Agamemnon and refusing to fight after Agamemnon, the Greeks ‘ commander, seizes Achilles ‘ spoils of war.

This memory may have been set aside for a while, as we had Napoleonic armies with large masses of disposable people. However, in contemporary wars, significant battles are no longer fought by closed-rank armies but by units led by superiority, which have a high degree of independent judgment of shifting circumstances.

The initiative left to individual units, or operatives is held together by a shared sense of purpose, which includes a desire not to be a single man but to a cultural-ideal project, polis as a physical space, and political project. If the general or the president does n’t fit the project, the soldier can turn against him either through proper internal channels or by voting against the president at the next elections. Nothing like that can be found in China. Unwavering loyalty is to the party and its top leader, who cannot be dissented or questioned without putting a dent in the entire socio-political edifice on the line.

The Western dynamic starts a complex dialectical relationship with one’s superiors and generals. Generals are not expected to motivate soldiers as they become replaceable tools. Starting this dialectic produces levels of freedom of expression and what we might refer to as “democracy,” challenging a monolithic hold on power. Soldiers must be kept happy or they will revolt and topple the power.

Soldiers must not have freedom if all power is held in one place. Then they are passive, not proactive, and unsuited for contemporary war conditions.

Plus, a fully disposable army fits a social model where families agree to sacrifice a young man for their collective benefit and have more young men who enjoy the sacrifice of their sibling. This requires a large number of unattractive young men in a family, or children. However, because of the one-child policy, that pool no longer exists, and families only receive damages if their single child is dead, burned, or shell-shocked.

One might have imagined fighting a modern war was like playing a video game, guiding from afar toy- like drones. However, that dream is disproven by the World War I-like casualties on the battlefields in Ukraine or Gaza. To risk their lives and well-being, China would need millions of volunteers. Maybe China does n’t have them.

In essence, modern wars demand various degrees of freedom for a man to risk his own return and the rights of his followers. The traditional Chinese army and state are in trouble with this.

Moreover, while posturing and threatening might work with countries similarly cautious about war, it can backfire with countries more ready to engage in conflict. The US Army’s intention when it calls on the PLA to reduce its rhetoric is to create a situation where it wo n’t feel forced to act in response.

That is, if China expresses its anger through symbolic gestures and words, the US might respond by silently and effectively instead of by backing away ( as China might expect ). Still, China ca n’t back down from this trend because its domestic structure would see it as a loss of face. In Chinese politics, losing a face signifies losing everything and losing power.

Due to the two defense ministers ‘ firings and the PLA’s overall shaken, this is the deep-seated challenge of the 3rd Party Plenum, which will focus on both the economy and perhaps also the army.

In summary, China needs a different kind of state organization and a different economy to have a modern fighting army. Perhaps this is the issue. Despite the enormous domestic headwinds, President Xi Jinping is moving in this direction, and it’s unclear what will happen next.

In the meantime, one could argue that the king is naked, the PLA is possibly far less fierce than it claims to be and it could be easily challenged. Even making this claim could have ominous consequences: it could make China lose face and, in turn, lose everything. China could start a devastating war if it takes the risk of losing everything. Then: damn if the PLA is strong, worse if the PLA is weak.

This article was originally published on the Appia Institute and is now republished with permission. Read the original right here.

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A design is emerging in major cities near Myanmar’s war-torn borders. From Myitkyina and Bhamo in northeastern Kachin state to Lashio in northern Shan, and Sittwe, on the Bay of Bengal in the west, the Myanmar Army is pulling up into urban paragons shielded by air power, artillery and copious supplies of ammunition.

The nation’s troubled State Administration Council ( SAC ) junta is slowly but surely shifting, best described as a porcupine strategy, curling up on itself behind an array of lethally sharp quills, after eight months of repeat defeat at the hands of ethnic minority insurgent armies.

As what started early this year in the tribal borderlands turns out to be an extremely national trend, whether this battle program offers a practical path for regime survival will likely be decided in the forthcoming months. However, in northern Myanmar, the porcupine’s move towards the federal hinterland has now begun.

With offensives in Madaya township, which is directly north of Mandalay, and in Pyin Oo Lwin, the military’s prestigious Defense Services Academy ( DSA ), ethnic Palaung insurgents from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) and their ethnic Bamar People’s Defense Force ( PDF) allies, have begun pressing army forces back toward the ancient royal capital on June 25.

The government’s grinding retreat into an ostensibly unmanageable industrial stronghold is a less conscious choice than a turbulent response to an intense advance of resistance forces that shows no sign of slowing down. But even if enforced instead than planned, the emerging industrial quill offers three different layers of benefit.

Militarily, it invites the opposition to cross the borderlands ‘ hills and forests to meet with the troops on the prairies and rice ricefields, where the military’s enormous advantage in terms of artillery, weapons, and heat energy will be most potently used. For power is guaranteed to demolish poorly equipped and poorly coordinated PDFs if it can be concentrated on the desired effect.

Socially, the SAC’s grip on metropolitan areas maintains control over the majority of Myanmar’s population and offers the foundations for new elections planned for next year – the only practical exit strategy for a martial that has been trapped in a catastrophic political cul- de- sac since the coup of February 2021.

Diplomatically, in contrast, if some form of electoral process, however transparently constrained and flawed, can be staged, the pseudo-civil administration that emerges may be able to give the military the time it needs to achieve what it is currently at risk losing at an international negotiating table.

Myanmar’s main neighbors, China, India, and Thailand, as well as the ASEAN bloc in general, will likely waste little time in supporting any administration that is dressed in civilian longyis rather than military khakis. Once that engagement gathers traction, it seems likely enough that the West will slowly, if grudgingly, fall into line.

The overarching question for the coming year is whether the SAC’s porcupine strategy anchored on the cities of the populous national heartland can sustain a military stand- off for long enough to ensure the military’s ongoing central role in Myanmar’s governance that it sees as its prerogative.

It would be foolish to make a clear suggestion at the start of the rainy season of 2024. There is undoubtedly nothing wrong with the survival of a shattered military regime that has been abused and is currently facing unprecedented challenges.

Conflict endgames in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 and Afghanistan in 1992 and 2021 point to an irrefutable lesson: &nbsp, well- equipped militaries enjoying foreign backing but anchored on the defense of shrinking urban enclaves can be overwhelmed by ubiquitous and relentless resistance forces to the point of disintegration and collapse.

Equally, there is nothing predetermined about Myanmar’s ability to form a federal-democratic resistance. The” Spring Revolution” continues to lack the most crucial elements for revolutionary victory, including a charismatic leadership capable of imposing strategic coherence and direction, and an external supporter willing to offer both material and diplomatic support.

Two strategic approaches

In the coming year, Myanmar’s chaotic battlespace will be shaped by two key factors in this fluid environment. Both will be fully visible by the start of 2025 despite the knowns today.

First, and perhaps the more crucial, is the extent to which opposition forces adopt a direct or indirect approach towards the SAC’s porcupine strategy.

A direct strategy would involve PDF forces, either affiliated with the National Unity Government ( NUG) or independent of it, trying to launch attacks on large urban centers and risk being massacred in front of the military’s big guns, which would have potentially disastrous effects on resistance morale, which has remarkably improved since 2021 after three and a half years of conflict.

The Ministry of Defense of the NUG has typically made up for what it lacks in material resources and effective command and control with politically rousing pleas for “victory within a year.” There is no guarantee that the MoD, where real military experience is in short supply, will not continue to press ahead with calls for stirring but unrealistic objectives.

An indirect approach, in contrast, would involve a multi-pronged effort intended to divide and expel already exhausted regime forces. The primary operational focus would not be on urban areas, but rather on the strategic road, rail, and riverine lines of communication that connect them, especially in the coming months.

In short, a war for the roads needs to precede any war for the cities. Resistance forces could prevent the need for a city war by causing internal collapse through stifled supply routes. In the earlier examples from Indochina and Afghanistan, it was not accidental that almost all provincial centers, including Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Kabul, fell to anti-government forces with little or no fighting.

The topography of central Myanmar offers a remarkably favorable setting for such a strategic approach. Along the Ayeyarwaddy and Sittaung river valleys, the Bago Yoma, the Bago Yoma, the mountains of the Arakan Yoma and Chin Hills, the Karen hills, and the main north-south communication lines are hemmed in to the west.

What starts off as a small-unit hit-and-run ambush and harassment turns into a war of attrition along critical communication and supply lines for the delivery of vital fuel and munitions. The process sees an incumbent regime being drawn into exhausting and costly operations to hold open and then re- open major arteries while being forced to abandon minor roads and lose smaller towns for lack of troops to defend them.

Similar a strategy has already been adopted by default over the past dry season along the major highway connecting SAC-held facilities along the Andaman Sea coast along with the escalating sabotage of the Yangon-Mawlamyine and Yangon Mandalay railway lines. &nbsp, &nbsp,

However, larger mobile resistance units would undoubtedly need to ambush roads for days at a time, ambushed in strength and at designated regime response points, and then vanished into nearby hills before repeating the process elsewhere to achieve strategic traction in the upcoming months.

Such tactics would mirror operations launched in early 1944 by British Chindit columns operating behind the lines of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Indaw region of northern Sagaing, which cut its supply routes to lethal effect.

Other components of an indirect approach would be mounting pressure on neighboring townships where the regime lacks the manpower to retake once lost, and destabilizing guerrilla attacks inside major cities where the SAC is already dealing with austere economic strains and the challenge posed by large restless populations.

The ethnic factor

The second variable hinges on a decision that the leaderships of key ethnic resistance organizations, most notably Kachin, Karen, Ta’ang and Rakhine, will need to make soon if they have not already done so.

That choice is merely influenced by historical precedents and how best serves any ethnic community’s long-term goals in relation to who holds the position of power in the Bamar heartland.

Option 1: Increased support for allied PDFs in the form of weapons, advisors, and training that could fuel an indirect strategy and effectively shift the military’s balance in favor of the SAC, likely ushering in an interim administration centered on the NUG.

The alternative would be based on an assessment that ethnic interests are better served by formalizing with the SAC an autonomy already largely won on the battlefield while accepting the risk of leaving an unreformed if weakened military in the national driving seat.

The ethnic armies ‘ wait-and-see or hedging strategy is almost certainly more likely than the success of under-equipped and poorly-directed PDFs in mid-late 2024 to be in favor of the survival of the SAC porcupine.

These variables will play out against the backdrop of the military’s Achilles Heel: its manpower shortfall. Today, a crisis with potentially fatal consequences has become a problem that has been a problem for the past 20 years, with infantry battalions typically numbered around 200 men compared to the 827 that were previously prescribed. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

The frantic scramble to accelerate conscription since the introduction of the People’s Military Service Law last February has given the lie to the Wikipedia mythology of a 350, 000- 400, 000 strong Tatmadaw—figures, which to the extent they were ever true, emerged from calculations based on units at full strength and included the military’s notoriously bloated tail of non- combat branches – administrative, commercial, technical and medical.

A figure that combines between 70 000 and 90 000 troops is the centerpiece of the army’s combat-capable strength, according to almost all credible assessments of its strength made by Myanmar and foreign analysts today.

Two factors add to the shortfall in raw numbers. The first is structural: a pattern of penny-packet battalion-sized deployments across 14 regional military units motivated by the essentially political need to confine the entire nation’s population, especially in ethnic regions, rather than protect against foreign aggression.

The second driver, highlighted by recent dry season campaigns in Rakhine and Kachin states, is operational: a stubborn unwillingness to temporarily surrender territory in the interest of regrouping forces for counteroffensives.

The end result has frequently seen smaller tactical operations commands ( TOCs ) fighting until they have either been overrun or surrendered while the hemorrhaging of numbers is getting worse and worse.

Indeed, the military is now at risk that the current battlefield losses may soon outweigh the 5, 000 man-per-month rate of new conscripts ‘ initiation, even if draftees with no prior combat experience have some enthusiasm for the fight.

A resistance strategy targeted squarely over the rest of this year on corridors of communication and supply rather than SAC- held urban porcupines would be well- calculated to act as a further accelerant to the army’s escalating manpower crisis. &nbsp,

However, it’s not guaranteed that such a strategy will be implemented or that Myanmar’s key ethnic armies, whose influence is now crucial, will be willing to support it.

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Keir Starmer, the UK’s new prime minister, was calm on the topic of relations with the US due to his vote, choosing to prevent, in particular, speak of how he would handle a second Donald Trump presidency.

Starmer is a center-left politician, the first to rule the UK for over ten years, so his opinions do n’t really align with Trump’s. However, the US presidential election is only a few months away, and depending on the outcome, the connection between the UK and the US was differ significantly.

The new American government will be focusing on how to prepare for Trump’s possible resumption of office in January 2025 following the first US vote conversation and Joe Biden’s subpar performance. And while Starmer has kept quiet in private, his and his best crew had spent some time planning behind the scenes.

They made a lot of energy before becoming leaders in the US. This is a well-traveled-about way for UK Labour officials, which was most notably demonstrated by the close friendship between Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Bill Clinton in the 1990s.

Amazingly, Starmer and his foreign minister, David Lammy, have been trying to build ties on both sides of the aisle. On US trips, they have spoken with both Republicans and Democrats, as well as Biden.

Lammy, who was the first dark European man to study at Harvard Law School and practice law in the US after college, just stated in a statement that the unique relationship is” key not just to our own national protection, but the safety of much of the earth.”

He said that the two sides must work together “whoever is in the White House,” in response to a query about previous remarks he had made about Trump.

The respondent may have been referring to Lammy’s comments about Trump being a “racist KKK and Nazi sympathizer” before he became a minister. Lammy also said he would take to the roads if Trump was allowed to enter the UK.

Lammy’s careful response to questioning today reflects his much more tempered attitude toward the subject since it first appeared as though Labour could actually gain strength, and he may be a member of the cabinet.

Proving the UK is valuable

Starmer may attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the UK in the US-UK empire. With Biden, this will be very program. But, Starmer would need to demonstrate this significance to those who are close to Trump in the event of a Trump victory in November, which is a more challenging work.

Socially, Starmer can support US administrations manage relations with NATO, encouraging more anxious members, such as Germany, whilst restraining some of the more strategic NATO members pushing to increase the alliance.

Starmer will also need to work with European allies to demonstrate the relevance of NATO to the US in light of Trump’s stated commitment to reevaluating the purpose of NATO.

Militarily, the UK has to demonstrate intent to restore the armed forces, especially after the US declared that the UK military was no longer a” top- tier” military partner.

Doing so would demonstrate that the new British government is paying attention to its American allies and would also demonstrate that the UK plans to be able to deploy its military to support US and NATO operations. Trump has repeatedly cited his reluctance to use the US military and his belief that allies are more responsible for the military burden.

Starmer will be negotiating with President Biden until the November presidential election. After a recent D-Day celebration and less than a week after taking office, Starmer will meet Biden once more as prime minister at a Nato summit.

Starmer will have to tread carefully in this area, just like he does for other world leaders. Given that Trump has a vehement dislike for his successor, having a close relationship with the Biden administration could be challenging when attempting to establish trust with any incoming Trump administration.

Since taking office, Biden has set out his foreign policy priorities, including guardrails on the relationship with Russia, and competition with China. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, these guardrails flew off. The Biden administration has nevertheless established clear priorities and was able to coordinate international assistance for Ukraine.

In contrast, Trump has given little insight into how he would approach foreign policy. He has stated he will “end” the conflict in Ukraine, but he has not provided any specifics about how.

We are aware that he wants to stop funding Ukraine’s defense efforts and that he wants European allies to pay for the replenishment of US military equipment. Additionally, he has pledged to support Hamas ‘ conflict in Gaza, which has caused a Starmer’s party’s leadership since the election, which has caused a rift between the two countries.

During his first term, Democratic leaders from all over the world struggled to deal with Trump. They typically had to ignore the controversy that had surrounded him or use them as a justification for Trump. The former US president’s preference for” strongmen” was repeatedly on show.

It would be nearly impossible for Starmer to imitate those who roll out the red carpet and parade through the streets of Trump’s preferred style. Given that the UK’s free speech laws prohibit protests against Trump if he were to visit, and they are practically unavoidable given what transpired last time he was there.

Starmer would do his best to stay away from Trump’s state visit, which might include meeting with the king.

The implications for the” special relationship” are obvious: demonstrating the value of the UK will be much simpler for Starmer in a Biden presidency than in a Trump presidency. Starmer would feel compelled to take action against Trump’s refusal to support it, which would further undermine the US-UK alliance.

The new government of the UK has been discussing potential relations with either a Republican or a Democratic president. Starmer will be hoping for the predictability of Biden while planning for the chaos of Trump, as will be the case for many world leaders.

Christopher Featherstone is Associate Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of York

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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An earlier expectation of a significant Russian victory has been replaced by the fact of a grinding war of attrition in Ukraine after more than 26 weeks of devastating battle. &nbsp,

” Putin’s principle of success is to make creeping improvements in Ukraine indefinitely”, &nbsp, wrote the Institute for the Study of War, a secret US defense think tank. The plan is designed to “protract the warfare” with the aim of “destroying Ukrainian statehood”, ISW concluded.

Putin’s authentic goal, to stop Ukraine’s integration with the West, remains the same as it was when he first launched his thus- called” special defense operation” in February 2022. In addition, Kiev is also hopeful of joining the European Union and NATO in light of the growing threat of invasion and a total sacking of its territory.

Both sides are therefore girding for an available- ended, long- pull issue, analysts say. Ukraine’s American allies believe Kiev may surpass Moscow’s assaults on civil and military goals, so long as it receives adequate weapons.

Ukraine and the West must develop a succinct “grand strategy …aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage on Russia,” according to the Royal United Services Institute ( RUSI), a think tank with headquarters in London. The objectives may include bringing” Russia to a position of inability/unwillingness to continue the war,” according to RUSI.

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin first suggested a similar goal early in the war. We want to see Russia so weakened that it ca n’t carry out the actions it has done invading Ukraine, according to Austin.

In response to Putin’s threat to employ nuclear weapons, US President Joe Biden after rejected the idea of bringing Russia to its knees or that it would deteriorate into chaos in the face of battle.

In any case, Austin has never repeated the goal of an all- out success. Additionally, the US lowered its supply of weapons to Kiev in order to aid in its defenses by producing arms in response to Russian actions rather than attempting to defuse an advance increase.

Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, opposes the idea of an attrition conflict. Even though an attempt to remove Russia from eastern Ukraine failed last time, he wants to launch a significant battle this year. ” Yes, we have a counteroffensive program. We’ll undoubtedly prevail. We have no alternative”, he said back in April.

What Zelensky and other Western critics have called a “drip-drip” plan of arms supply a “drip-drip” plan have caused scorn from Zelensky and others. &nbsp,

Biden has faced unfavorable front-firing from the Russian president, but not the EU. He criticized European countries in March for alleged poor artillery supply. ” Ammunitions is a vital issue”, he said. ” Europe can provide more. &nbsp, And it is important to show this now”.

Another issue is the ban on the use of weaponry supplied by the allies. After weeks of devastating Russian rocket strikes on Kharkov in Ukraine, Biden lifted the US’s ban on using US weapons to attack targets inside Russia, just to target a remote region close to the border.

Zelensky has been frustrated by repeated delivery delays because unresolved problems have destroyed civilian infrastructure and military ‘ life. On May 13, Selensky requested a attack inside of Russia. On May 31, just Zelensky’s public complaint the week before was granted, and it was only after she had filed a lawsuit.

So, who is winning this impending war of attrition? Surely, Putin has made constant efforts to thicken alliances with polite countries. They are content to support a Russia that is determined to defeat a shared enemy in the United States, even if they do n’t share his obsession with Ukraine.

Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Kazakhstan on Thursday ( July 4 ) for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional organization. In Kazakhstan, Xi urged the ten- participant group to” combine the power of unification” in the face of” the true issue of intervention and section”.

In his statement, Xi made no mention of Ukraine, and neither did the Chinese media outlets that reported on the appointment. The focus of the Xinhua news agency was on how China and Russia are unwavering in their resistance to Western “pressure.”

China is also optimistic about backing Russia’s war in Ukraine. It provides parts and tools to Russian companies that produce only defense technology.

Just before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Beijing and Moscow announced a” low limits” relationship. After the war and presently prolonged battle, Xi has apparently dropped the” no limits” explanation of relations, preferring to explain their near relations as a “friendship”.

Xi has also taken care to support a peace in Ukraine, which is in line with many of China’s business partners in Europe. And he has continuously echoed the Russian assertion that the battle is primarily due to NATO’s growth.

The conflict has benefitted Beijing directly. Since the start of the war, its deal with Russia has more than doubled, the majority of which has involved the purchase of gas products at discount rates. Despite a kind of declared independence, likely to avoid Western restrictions, China has also supplied Russia with components for use in arms produce.

Putin traveled to North Korea last month and wrote a” complete strategic partnership agreement” that pledged Russia would assist in the event that North Korea is attacked. A similar agreement was reached to change rockets for North Korean technology for Russian military resources.

Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, referred to the contract as an “alliance.” Putin was evidently more cautious by using the term “partnership” to describe the relationship. In any case, the two countries made it possible to restock Russia’s jet products with North Korean artillery and missiles.

In brief, between China and North Korea, along with military aircraft materials from Iran, there is no more talk in the West of Russia running out of munitions.

Zelensky, also, has been barnstorming the world in search of arms and political help. He held a peace conference just in Zurich, where some 80 participants signed a declaration reaffirming Ukraine’s regional morality.

But, important places did not participate: China stayed away, as did Brazil, India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Ukraine’s European allies, however, pledged to deliver extended- awaited aircraft bombers to support Ukraine contest its air space against Soviet planes.

The allies also agreed to close the EU’s frequently disjointed help by appointing NATO to manage training and arrange arms deliveries. All NATO’s 32 people, not just the most ardent supporters of Ukraine—for occasion, the US, France, Poland and the European states bordering Russia—will been expected to contribute.

In a statement from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in June, the choice aims to “put our aid to Ukraine on a firmer standing, for years to come.” The US will also provide a large hand: General Chris Cavoli, who leads the US military’s German Command, will mind the effort.

However, the rapid deterioration of essential ally governments in Europe may be a potential disturbing concern for Ukraine.

President Emmanuel Macron may have to veto some of the same authority in France as a far-right group that when opposed Russian punishment. People of a burgeoning far-right gathering in Germany have been accused of having ties to the Kremlin and accepting money from China.

The death of Joe Biden, whose campaign aims to win reelection have been thwarted by complaints about inflation, a rise in illegal immigration, and violence, as well as concerns about his mental abilities following a conversation performance that raised questions about his superior age, is more worrying for Ukraine.

His possible successor, former president Donald Trump, who once called Putin a “genius”, is leading in election opinion polls. He has n’t stated how he might handle the US support for Kiev. He did, however, make numerous blatant remark during the televised debate with Bide last week about how terrible the war is.

He promised to resolve the Ukraine conflict “before he took office” in January 2025, but he provided no specifics on how he would do it.

&nbsp, Zelensky replied testily. ” If Trump knows how to end this war he should tell us today”, Zelensky told an interviewer. ” Because if there are risks to Ukraine’s independence, if there are risks that we lose statehood, we want to be prepared for this”.

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The Asian Signals Directorate, the organization responsible for foreign signals knowledge and information security, has signed an AUD$ 2 billion ( US$ 1.35 billion ) agreement with Amazon. A Major Key Cloud may be constructed by a local affiliate of Amazon Web Services to provide secure data storage for military intelligence.

The deal may safely manage leading- key data vital to Australia’s nationwide security. More than ten years are anticipated to be in this agreement. In Australia, it will construct three safe data centres at unnamed areas.

This initiative will “bolster our security and nationwide intelligence group so they can provide world-leading protection for our nation,” according to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

The initiative, which is scheduled to start in 2027, is expected to result in more than 2,000 jobs and generate billion in operating costs. Thus – why Amazon? Does Australia actually require it?

Why is a key cloud necessary in Australia?

Australia faces a rising flood of safety issues. A wide range of potential risks must be protected by the ability to safely shop military intelligence.

The director-general of the Australian Signs Directorate, Rachel Noble, stated that the project may provide a” state-of-the-art collaborative space for our brains and defense community to store and get top secret data.

The sky is furthermore part of the directorate’s REDSPICE plan, which aims to improve Australia’s knowledge skills and computer threats. Australia is better safeguard its sensitive data by switching to a cutting-edge cloud system. Additionally, it may increase security agency coordination.

Why Amazon Web Services?

You may only be aware of Amazon as a major website retailer. Amazon Web Services ( AWS ) is a tech subsidiary of Amazon. It was a true trailblazer in the cloud service sector.

It provides cloud computing services to tens of thousands of companies and governments around the world today.

AWS’s market share among the top ten cloud providers grew to 50.1 % in 2024. The next two largest suppliers are Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud.

Known for its stability, scalability and security, AWS now provides related services to various governments and organizations worldwide. The United States Department of Defense, the CIA, as well as all three of the intelligence services of the United Kingdom, are included in this list.

Does the new cloud be protected?

When we think of” the cloud,” we frequently picture the internet we use every day.

Nevertheless, the Top Secret Cloud that AWS will develop for Australia’s government is quite different. It’s a secret, very secure system fully insulated from the open internet.

While AWS is the company, the data centers may be built to the American Signal Directorate’s features.

Data will be protected by sophisticated encryption in the sky. No program is entirely secure against hacking, but this configuration makes it extremely difficult for unauthorised users to access the data.

The American government has emphasized that it will continue to have complete control over the statistics that is stored in the cloud. On the job, simply employees with high-level security clearance will work.

Broader craze

This transition to a safe cloud is a part of a wider trend in military and government systems around the world.

Some nations are updating their outdated computer systems to make the most of modern engineering. This can provide greater versatility, better performance, and possibly lower prices in the long run.

The initiative also has global implications. Collaboration with partner countries may be made easier thanks to The Bottom Key Cloud.

Similar statistics clouds have already been established in the US and the UK, facilitating the exchange of significant amounts of data between friends. It’s important to point out that possible opponents are also making significant investments in similar systems.

Australia aims to stay ahead of the curve in the fast expanding computer threat landscape by creating this Best Key Cloud. More nations will likely follow similar sky systems for their security and intelligence needs in the coming years.

David Tuffley is Older Lecturer in Applied Ethics &amp, CyberSecurity, Griffith University

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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