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China just pulled the trigger on the future of air defense with its new “Bullet Curtain” system—a drone swarm killer that aims to clear the sky with a storm of bullets.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China recently unveiled its Bullet Curtain system, the world’s first close-in anti-drone barrage weapon developed by state-owned Norinco, as revealed in the April 2025 edition of Modern Weaponry magazine.

Unlike traditional single-point interception systems, Bullet Curtain uses 35mm advanced hit efficiency and destruction (AHEAD) ammunition to unleash timed airbursts of sub-projectiles, forming a dense wall of shrapnel that can neutralize drone swarms, cruise missiles, mortar rounds and aircraft.

The system’s “plane-to-point” interception method allows for blanket saturation of attack zones—a capability Norinco chief designer Yun Bin has likened to a fly swatter regarding area coverage.

Bullet Curtain integrates radar, optical detection, fire control and management systems into a modular design, enabling compatibility with various platforms, including trucks, armored vehicles, naval ships and fixed installations.

Inspired by Metal Storm, a joint US-Australia concept from the 1990s, Norinco has advanced the prototype into a cost-effective operational system. Its modular adaptability ensures deployment flexibility across diverse combat scenarios.

Amid rising concerns over drone swarm tactics designed to overwhelm traditional defenses, live demonstrations of Bullet Curtain have reportedly proven effective.

Jake Rinaldi and Jake Vartanian highlight the weaknesses of traditional defenses against drone swarms in a January 2025 article for the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI).

The writers mention that China’s conventional air defenses, such as the HQ-17 surface-to-air missile and PGZ-95 antiaircraft artillery, effectively target specific unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) types but struggle with small, slow, low-altitude drones, face high costs and rapid ammunition depletion.

Rinaldi and Vartanian mention that jamming technologies, such as those mounted on rifles and vehicles, are versatile but increasingly limited by autonomous UAVs’ reduced signal dependence and susceptibility to swarms.

They add that while smoke screens are mobile and effective in obscuration, they are short-lived and impractical against large-scale attacks.

Furthermore, they state that counter-swarm UAVs, such as the CH-901 loitering munition, show promise in countering drones but remain a nascent tactic with limited munitions and evolving strategies.

They also note that aerial nets offer nondestructive capture for intelligence but are limited by performance against high-speed targets and dynamic scenarios.

Rinaldi and Vartanian say that advanced laser systems, like the LW-30, provide cost-efficient and rapid engagement of drone swarms but require clear lines of sight and significant power, posing logistical challenges.

They point out that China’s counter-UAS capabilities exhibit critical vulnerabilities, such as insufficient scalability, limited endurance in saturation scenarios and reliance on traditional methods ill-suited for modern UAV swarm operations.

However, Bullet Curtain may have significant advantages over China’s existing counter-UAS capabilities.

Ranjana Nallamalli and other writers, in a July 2023 article in the peer-reviewed Defense Science Journal, stress the effectiveness of systems like China’s AHEAD, noting their ability to generate dense fragment fields that lower accuracy requirements and neutralize multiple small drones efficiently.

Such a system may be necessary for China considering the US’s plans to use drone swarms in a possible Taiwan conflict.

In May 2022, The War Zone (TWZ) mentioned that US Air Force and RAND Corporation simulations highlight drone swarms as decisive in Taiwan defense scenarios.

According to the report, low-cost, autonomous UAVs linked by distributed mesh networks rapidly identify and strike Chinese targets like invasion fleets and transport aircraft, even without air superiority.

These UAVs, acting as sensors, jammers, and decoys, exhaust enemy air defenses while enabling stealth operations by manned aircraft such as F-35s.

In August 2023, the US Department of Defense (DOD) unveiled the Replicator initiative, which targets China’s military buildup by leveraging thousands of attritable, autonomous systems across all domains within 18 to 24 months.

According to the DOD, these unmanned, cost-efficient systems are designed to offset China’s strategic advantage on a military scale, comprised of its mass of ships, missiles, and personnel.

The DOD says that by relying on innovation and autonomy, the US aims to create a “mass of our own” combining rapid production and deployment capabilities with reduced human risk.

In line with its Replicator initiative, in May 2024, the DOD chose to accelerate the fielding of the Switchblade-600 loitering munition, produced by AeroVironment Inc, as part of its first tranche of Replicator capabilities.

As for the second tranche of Replicator drones, the DOD announced in November 2024 that systems under consideration include Anduril Industries’ Ghost-X and the Performance Drone Works C-100 systems.

As to how the US plans to use its Replicator drone swarms, the chief of US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), Admiral Samuel Paparo, mentions in a June 2024 Washington Post article that he intends to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned “hellscape” to allow at least a month for US forces to get ready.

That timing may prove critical, as Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwan is vulnerable to defeat in the first 90 days of a Chinese invasion.

According to Heath and others, that timeframe is the minimum required for the US to marshal sufficient forces for a major combat intervention in East Asia.

Further, Bonny Lin and other writers predict in an August 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that China could sustain major combat operations against Taiwan for six months.

But could the US actually pull off its “hellscape” strategy in the Taiwan Strait? In a June 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Stacie Pettyjohn and other writers mention that drone range and cost go hand in hand.

Pettyjohn and others say that while the US needs vast numbers of cheap, expendable units, they may not have the range to reach the Taiwan Strait launched from bases in Japan, Guam and the Philippines.

They also point out that this approach conflicts with the DOD’s historical preference for fewer, more sophisticated systems. Moreover, Pettyjohn and others add that it is doubtful if the US defense industrial base, currently struggling to produce enough munitions, could produce enough drones for a long war with China.

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Is a split prepare a practical way to put an end to the conflict in Ukraine? The plan by General Keith Kellogg appears to have now encountered challenges. That does not, however, mean that some sort of separation is out of the problem.

Kellogg’s “plan” may divide Ukraine into four divisions.

• American Ukraine would be the first zone, made up of British, French, and Russian soldiers, with the potential for others to meet. From the Finnish borders to the Delta river, that area would extend.
• The next area. The Russian army do defend the eastern border of the Dnieper, which would be under Russian control.
• A 18-mile cache area would serve as a second zone.
• The “occupied” Russian regions Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaphorize, Kherson, and Crimea would make up a third area. The true boundaries are not addressed by the Kellogg program.

In response to Kellogg’s program, the Russians have now stated that it is unacceptable to place NATO or NATO-state troops in Ukraine.

The legal status of the regions where Russian troops are stationed remains ambiguous, and Ukraine’s military is strong at all times thanks to the Kellogg plan. The plan’s assumption is that the conflict could restart at any time.

It is worthwhile to ask what the Russians ‘ “end goal” might be and how likely it is that they did accomplish it by taking a step back.

The Russians ‘ efforts to rekindle their relationship with Washington and persuade President Trump to support the immediate legalization of the provinces Kellogg places in the fourth area are the first and most crucial points.

In Congress, it would be very content if Trump agreed to Russian’s regional objectives, which would effectively grant de jure legitimacy to the territorial gains made during the conflict. Trump had face criticism if he agreed to an illegitimate invasion of Ukraine.

This is more troubling than Biden’s departure from Afghanistan, where the US just left by withdrawing its troops. The US did not recognize the new state or make any obvious concessions to it while the Taliban took control as the pro-US Afghan state collapsed. The US has no diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, but does have an Armenian affairs department in Doha, Qatar, right now.

Despite his assertions, the Kellogg strategy differs from the Berlin deal. People may recall that the Friends divided Germany into four groups at the end of World War II: the US, UK, France, and Russia. Similar to how the Allies divided Berlin, the country’s capital, into four distinct sectors ( though the US, British, and French sectors later merged ).

The allies ‘ deep disagreements over Germany’s coming and a change in the US and UK’s perspectives, which saw Germany as a political asset and the USSR as a threat, contributed to the European splitting.

Actually, Ukraine and Russia are at odds with one another, with third parties (especially NATO ) providing arms, experts, technical assistance, coaching, products, fiscal aid, and intelligence support for Ukraine. Contrary to Ukraine, the Russians have mostly been on their own, with the exception of China, which has provided some 12,000 men, as well as North Korea.

A major military-industrial base and a sizable army-industrial base are Russia’s main advantages, according to the country. From a assistance and resource perspective, Ukraine is essentially a member of NATO; it would have much since vanished on its own.

Putting those differences away, it is still possible to divide Ukrainian territory in some way in the future. Under some situations that aren’t necessarily unlikely, it might turn out to be a possibility.

Looking at the negotiations along a timeline where they sometimes fail or drag on without resolution, which may be suitable for both the United States and the Russians, particularly if Trump and Putin can’t come up with a solution and the Zelensky state continues to behave in the manner of an enfant terrible, the Russians may be successful in defeating Ukraine’s military on the front lines.

Without that remarkable outcome, they could devastate a sizable portion of the Russian army on-the-field, causing a real crisis in Kyiv. Zellensky may experience a significant threat keeping his government in Kyiv because he would not be able to really bargain with Russia ( assuming he really wanted to ).

In the event that the Russians capture the country or replace them with extreme separatists in the military and intelligence service, Zelensky may choose to travel to the east and establish a far enough away from Russia to be viewed as more or less safe.

Ukraine may be nearly divided under a new, good pro-Russian government in Kyiv. In essence, Kellogg’s Zone 1 may change into the Zelensky-led Ukraine with its headquarter in Lvov, and Russia would have complete control over everything south of the Dnieper, maybe even Odesa, a city that Catherine the Great viewed as Russian.

If this situation is to occur, then Europe, the EU, and NATO could be completely defeated by planting some sort of Western save army in Zone 1.

There are numerous advantages and disadvantages to this situation. Russia won’t receive global recognition for its defense victories, and NATO will likely be a part of Ukraine. This would lessen the burden on the US and NATO by physically, financially, and socially supporting Ukraine.

The US would be able to concentrate its efforts abroad, primarily in Asia and China, and restock arms strewn to replenish them after the Ukraine conflict. Europe may boast that it stood by Ukraine, but the conflict didn’t have the opposite effect as it spread outside of Ukraine’s edges. Washington and NATO would never lose their faces.

There is already speak in Europe about reintroducing” inexpensive” Russian energy to Europe, especially Germany and France. That sends a message that the goal is near. An economic collapse that may cause trauma on the continent, encourage social revolution, and cleanse the country’s governing elites from the mess cannot be tolerated in Europe.

Yet Europe will have to deal with the necessity of adjusting its perspective or face panic, despite all the battle talk.

Stephen Bryen is a former US assistant secretary of defense for plan and a specific editor for Asia Times. This Substack newsletter, Weapons and Strategy, was initially published as an original content with permission, and it is now available for reprint.

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Lee Jae-myung is likely to get the impromptu national vote scheduled for June 3 in response to President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment as president of the Republic of Korea. &nbsp, A Gallup&nbsp, poll&nbsp, released in April indicated Lee enjoys a support level of 34 percentage, while his highest-rated foe languishes at 9 percent. &nbsp,

Lee represents the progressive Democratic Party ( DP ), while Yoon was a conservative. &nbsp, Typically, a modify in South Korea from a traditional to a left-of-center government would have the ability to substantially stir up international relations in Northeast Asia.

Liberal Koreas tend to be comparatively cordial toward North Korea and China, which in turn causes conflicts with the US.

Kim Dae-jung, who served as South Korea’s president between 1998 and 2003, opposed the conservative US policy toward North Korea, opting instead to implement the now-infamous” Sunshine Policy” of offering economic benefits, including a key$ 500 million settlement to arrange a conference meet with Kim Jong-il, in an effort to calm Pyongyang’s animosity toward the ROK. &nbsp,

Roh Moo-hyun, Kim’s son, criticized the US strategy of using financial sanctions to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and he criticized the country’s approach to seeking “equidistance” between China and the US. He also criticized the US method.

The traditional Yoon, in contrast, was exceptionally supportive of the US plan despite being contentious and finally a disappointment abroad. &nbsp, His” Strategy for a Free, Quiet, and Rich Indo-Pacific Place” closely resembled the Biden Administration’s” Indo-Pacific Plan” published a few months earlier. &nbsp,

Yoon spoke out against North Korea without making any comments about China, which was in line with US jobs. &nbsp, He promised a foreign policy anchored in the same democratic norms Washington was therefore promoting. Despite Korea’s persistent historical disputes with Japan, the US government was particularly appreciative of Yoon’s determination to enhance corporate cooperation with Tokyo.

In response, Yoon to Lee’s transition to the president will cause a significant change in South Korea’s foreign policy, according to many spectators. &nbsp, They see the ROK at a” crossroads“, with some concluding a Lee government would” send shockwaves&nbsp, through East Asia’s delicate balance of power” or even create” a&nbsp, nightmare scenario“.

But, Yoon to Lee’s transition would probably be a vibration rather than an earthquake.

To be sure, Yoon’s perspective and Lee’s differ. &nbsp, The DP&nbsp, argues&nbsp, that Yoon unnecessarily damaged relations with China and Russia in his effort to please Washington.

Lee criticized Yoon for unduly antagonizing China, the nation that purchases about a third of South Korea’s export, during the National Assembly elections in March 2024. Because they dislike South Korea, Taiwanese people don’t purchase items made there. &nbsp, Why are we bothering]Beijing ]”? he asked, “he.” Why is it important to us what happens in the Taiwan Strait? &nbsp, Doesn’t we simply take care of ourselves”?

Lee opposed the US and other governments ‘ political sanctions against the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games. He also supports the implementation of extra US THAAD anti-missile chargers in South Korea.

Lee is also less pro-Japan than Yoon. When the Yoon government declined to press the Japanese government to pay for the forced laborers ‘ wages, Lee&nbsp described Yoon as” submissive and subservient.”

Former President Moon Jae-in’s strategy of pursuing rapprochement with North Korea through the use of sanctions relief has been supported by Lee, with the stipulation that sanctions may be resented if mutual DPRK concessions are not made.

While Yoon said South Korea may provide destructive military aid to Ukraine as a result of North Vietnamese soldiers fighting on Russia’s area, Lee has made clear he did not.

Lee is opposed to a trilateral military alliance that includes Japan, and claims that this could be “very dangerous” as a result of the territorial dispute between Korea and Japan over ownership of the Dokdo and Takeshima Islands. &nbsp,

In practical terms, however, Lee’s proposed policy toward Japan is not dramatically different from Yoon’s. Lee stated during his speech announcing his presidential candidacy that he believes it is “important” to” strengthen trilateral cooperation with Japan,” rather than formally allying with Japan.

The” two-track” diplomacy Lee favors would pursue strategic cooperation while also and distinctly pursuing justice for the Korean victims of Japan’s past misdeeds. &nbsp, Lee&nbsp, told&nbsp, The Economist&nbsp, he does not viscerally hate the Japanese. He claimed that while he was in Japan, he was shocked by the Japanese people’s diligence, sincerity, and courtesy. He also claimed that politics ultimately distorted the Korean people’s perception of Japan.

Lee supports granting South Korea operational control of its own armed forces during the Korean War, but he doesn’t want to see US military installations being evacuated. Although he once used the phrase” US occupying forces”, he later explained he was referring to the period immediately after the Second World War. He now states,” This is not an occupying force, but an ally.”

Lee wants to talk with North Korea to ease tensions, but this does not put him in conflict with the new Trump Administration. &nbsp, Trump himself&nbsp, <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/01/cc4179e88d07-trump-says-he-intends-to-reengage-with-n-korean-leader.html” target=”_blank” rel=”noreferrer noopener”>says&nbsp, he wants to re-engage with Kim Jong-un. Lee claims that he is “very grateful” for this, and even suggests that he might suggest that Trump be considered for the US president’s Nobel Prize.

Lee would follow Roh’s equidistance policy and work toward preserving the security relationship with the US while upholding a strong economic partnership with China. If the US-China cold war were to grow, that would prove challenging. &nbsp, But this would not distinguish Lee from his predecessor.

Yoon’s alliance with the US against China was arguably more rhetorical than substantive, aside from advancing trilateral cooperation, including Japan. For instance, Yoon’s government declined to speak out directly against China over its harassment of Philippine vessels close to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, and Yoon also declined to meet with US Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi the day after her 2022 visit to Taiwan.

From the standpoint of Korean conservatives and many in the US policy-making community, a left-leaning Korean government is prone to pursuing a North Korea policy that increases the South’s vulnerability to DPRK exploitation or aggression. The danger arises when Pyongyang acts in bad faith and outmaneuvers Seoul during negotiations. &nbsp,

That possibility is now much reduced, however, because the North is relatively uninterested in bargaining. Its nuclear and missile programs are ongoing, reunification is not on the table, Kim Jong-un has no desire to hold a summit, and Pyongyang has not attempted to re-open the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

For the DPRK government, Seoul has mainly been useful only as an intermediary for seeking concessions from the US. But Kim appears to have largely passed away. Kim has since developed a successful partnership with Russia after being badly burned at the 2019 Hanoi summit with Trump. &nbsp, Lee might have little opportunity to show magnanimity to Pyongyang even if he wants to.

In the end, Yoon and Lee would not be more likely than Lee to start nuclear. According to a recent poll, three out of four South Koreans want nuclear weapons. &nbsp, In 2023 Yoon threatened to acquire tactical nuclear weapons in response to the North Korean nuclear buildup, although he backed off after receiving US assurances as part of the&nbsp, Washington Declaration.

A South Korea with nuclear weapons would in fact send a” shockwave” through the area. Unintentional catastrophic escalation in a DPRK-ROK conflict would become more likely. &nbsp, The US and South Korean governments would reconsider the necessity of the bilateral alliance. Japan would probably also deploy nuclear weapons, according to sources.

However, Yoon to Lee’s change in leadership would not reduce the likelihood that anything like this would occur. &nbsp, The Democratic Party no longer considers nuclear weapons a taboo topic, but it currently goes no farther than&nbsp, favoring&nbsp, nuclear latency, not actual deployment.

We can easily assume that South Korea-Japan’s modest strategic cooperation would continue under a hypothetical Lee presidency while ROK-DPRK relations would continue to deteriorate. China would attempt to exploit a rumored opportunity to get the ROK out of the US Bloc, but this campaign would have its limits because South Koreans still value the US alliance. &nbsp, Seoul and Washington would agree in principle on working toward new talks with Pyongyang.

Thus, the region would experience a change in South Korea’s international relations, but not a significant reversal.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the Honolulu East-West Center.

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