Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: The al-Qaida offshoot reviving Syria’s war – Asia Times

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In a big rude, rebel groups in Syria retake the second city of Syria, Aleppo, demonstrating Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s growing influence over the country’s civil war, which has lasted for 13 years.

Members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, who were fighting alongside Turkish-backed organizations opposed to the concept of President Bashar al-Assad, led the shock progress.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has grown in both popularity and capabilities over the past few years, despite the offensive being the most important fighting in recent years.

As an expert on the actions of Islamic militant groups in the area, I’ve witnessed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham transform from a rebel organization in Syria into a formidable force in the continuing issue.

It came as a major change in the organization’s strategy that has led to its shifting focus from global terrorism to gaining power in Syria.

Origins and worldview

The Syrian civil war, which started in 2011 as a common revolt against the Assad regime, is where Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is from.

The organization was founded as an outgrowth of Syria’s standard al-Qaida affiliate, the Nusra Front. The initial merits of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham include its combat effectiveness, its support for international jihadist ideology, and its support for strict Muslim rule in the Arab world.

The Nusra Front officially ended relations with al-Qaida in a significant change in 2016 under Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani’s authority and changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means” Front for the Conquest of the Levant.”

The firm became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or” Organization for the Independence of the Levant,” as it merged with a number of other Syrian-based groups the year after the Arab battle.

This marketing aimed to walk away from al-Qaida’s international jihadist plan, which had limited the group’s charm within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on problems specific to Syria, such as local governance, financial troubles and humanitarian assistance.

Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s fundamental philosophy is still rooted in jihadism with the main goal of overthrowing Syria’s state and establishing Islamist rule.

This proper shift was partially born of rationality. The leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham came to the conclusion that the organization needed to reduce international criticism and effectively assimilate into the wider Arab revolutionary movement in order to maintain control over the lands it controlled.

In other words, it needed to strike a balance between local government and social relationship needs.

Strategic transitions and new activities

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the last major rebel enclave in Syria, has ruled Idlib since 2017 as the dominant power.

Despite reports of human rights violations, the group has grown to the point where it can continue to exert its influence in the area by acting as a quasi-governmental body, providing legal service, and overseeing local politics.

In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s advertising has focused on shielding Syria’s country and its citizens from the Assad state.

This has improved the organization’s standing among local people and different rebel groups.

In an effort to further shine its picture, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has ramped up its public relations initiatives, both at home and abroad. For instance, it has negotiated and negotiated the delivery of assistance to the regions it governs with global media and charitable organizations.

These efforts demonstrate a commitment to the security of the common person and shield the organization from the crime that is frequently associated with ideology movements.

On the rude suddenly

Another important proper turning occurred with the latest military unpleasant, during which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led rebels quickly seized significant portions of Aleppo and moved toward the town of Hama. It demonstrates the rebirth of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s martial goals and its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s decision to launch an progress has probably been influenced by a combination of local and regional relationships. The Assad administration’s increasing risk has become apparent of soon, marked by economic decay and corruption.

Many regions in Syria are merely passably under state control, and the central government largely relies on the assistance of allies like Russia and Iran. These friends, however, have been preoccupied by their particular wars against Ukraine and Israel, possibly diluting their support for Syria.

Lebanon and Egyptian forces’ diminishing capabilities only add to Assad’s weakness. Both have played a significant role in supporting Assad throughout the civil warfare. However, Jewish airs in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran have the potential to stifle Hezbollah and Iran’s ability to support Syria. And this slashed in aid may have caused the military to shift more toward the rebels during the civil war.

Also, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other insurgent groups are facing a Palestinian military strike by low morale, higher abandonment rates and insufficient military equipment. Due to the discord between the state forces, it has been challenging for Assad to properly respond to the recent assault by opposition forces.

In comparison, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has bolstered its military functions. The organization has consolidated strength and trained its troops after surviving numerous military activities.

As evidenced by the latest advance in Aleppo, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has established a military college, reorganized its devices into a more regular military architecture, and created specific forces capable of carrying out coordinated and proper attacks.

In addition, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been able to gain some native support by positioning itself as a proponent of Sunni Muslim objectives. The inability to find a political solution to the Syrian conflict has only served to exacerbate native animosities toward the Assad state, giving rise to a friendly foundation for any army that constantly opposes the program.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has grown from a jihadist offshoot to a major player in Syria, a development that has had significant implications for the internal dynamics of the war-torn nation. It has also grown a more professional military and a political wing focused on governance.

Sara Harmouch is PhD candidate in Public Affairs, American University

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Tough talk may mask Putin’s growing urge to compromise – Asia Times

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The Kremlin needs to show local audiences that it continues to be strong as the battle is nearly three years old and the Soviet economy is in serious need of pressure following the collapse of the franc and rising inflation.

New speech from the Kremlin and intermediaries of the Soviet leader, Vladimir Putin, has focused on the government’s brave opposition to an extreme Western as represented by NATO.

Six out of ten Russians are against NATO, but being seen to remain firm against the US-led ally is a win for the Kremlin, boosting its legitimacy internally in people and aristocracy circles.

Sergei Karaganov, a Russian social scientist and past Putin adviser, was interviewed by a well-known Soviet newspaper, Argumenty i Fakty, who had a reasonably aggressive perspective on the probable thrust of Soviet negotiations over Ukraine and NATO. Karaganov demanded that the West empire returning to its 1997 borders and that Ukraine be completely capitulated.

Karaganov stated a year ago that Russia has struck a “bunch of goals in a number of countries” to avert the West from supporting Ukraine. New revisions to Russia’s nuclear strategy and the launch of the largely inefficient Oreshnik medium-range nuclear-capable projectile are additional indications of the Kremlin’s attempts to resolve disputes on its own terms.

Karaganov’s statements on forcing NATO back to its 1997 borders ( effectively to its Cold War borders ) appear to represent the Kremlin signaling to multiple audiences. To a local market, it shows that Putin takes a strong position.

However, a global audience is aware that the Russian method of negotiation is to require the entire cake and then agree to three-quarters, even though they have already agreed to accept half. This kind of attitude suggests that the Kremlin is converse with other countries.

Karaganov has spent over 30 years playing a major part in Russian politics and has always been seen as a bird. According to his 1992 Karaganov theory, Russian listeners in neighboring states should be used by the Kremlin as a political force to keep their nations near to Russia. Karaganov remains near to Kremlin loops despite not being no more immediately employed as an assistant to Putin.

For the Kremlin, the hobgoblin has always been NATO’s rise in Eastern Europe. Since the 1997 Madrid NATO summit, at which it was agreed to start accession talks with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 16 Western nations have joined the empire.

In a Kremlin order in the weeks leading up to the full-scale war of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO troops and weapons were ordered to be expelled from all 16 of these nations.

NATO’s rejection of it gave Putin the justification he needed to attack Ukraine while blaming NATO as a warmonger.

Two information

The Kremlin continues to be strong and determined to have an impact on international affairs, thanks to Karaganov’s vehement approach. Since the start of the war, an estimated 80 000 Soviet soldiers have died, and the market is stagflationary as rates rise and economic activity declines.

Thus, the Russian people need a show of power from their government. Maximalist language projects power, creates unity and legitimizes the Russian people’s concessions. Karaganov’s information also fits with Russia’s claim that it’s fighting in self-defense in Ukraine against an extreme West.

But beneath the surface is another possible view, apparently aimed at Moscow’s opponents: that the Kremlin is open to dialogue. Puntin has constantly called for discussions, but his theory of negotiations has always been biased. He has demanded that Ukraine follow the words of a package that was discussed in Istanbul in April 2022 but was never signed.

This would have demilitarized Ukraine’s troops, prevented it from joining NATO, and given Russia a veto over any aid it might receive abroad. He says Kyiv may accept Russia’s edition of the “facts on the ground” and agree to mobilise.

Russia’s ostensible willingness to negotiate appeals to a group of non-aligned nations who view the West as hypocritical because it has clearly condemned Russia’s invasion of another royal state, having done the same in areas like Iraq.

Leaders in the West are divided between those who want to put an end to the expensive conflicts and those who still fervently believe that Russia should not profit from its anger in Ukraine as a result of being seen as talking.

Public comments like those made by Karaganov might serve as a testbed for both domestic and international responses.

Combining speech and real

However, Putin faces some striking experiences. Russia has made progress in the autumn, but things are still not as good as they were in 2014 when the president said he could get Kyiv in two months.

The West continues to support Ukraine and continue to put a lot of pressure on the Soviet troops. And it’s unlikely that the empire will consent to revert to its 1997 edges. But, Putin may wish for growing disunity.

At house, in Russia, all this realist language will give a short-term rally-round-the-flag influence on the populace. This will be more difficult to maintain, especially if negotiations drag on and fighting keep adding to Russia’s death toll record.

Putin and his supporters will need to redouble their strong language.

David J Galbreath, is professor of international security, University of Bath and Stephen Hall is lecturer ( Assistant Professor ) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of Bath

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Jihadi offensive in Syria opens new flank in Ukraine war – Asia Times

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With a one-month test for only$ 1, you can subscribe right away and then get the special discount of just$ 99.

Jihadi unpleasant in Syria opens a new chapter in the conflict with Ukraine.

As the Ukraine war unanticipatedly extends into Syria, David Goldman and Uwe Parpart show the escalating political risks. Studies suggest that Russian special forces may have given Islamist fighters who stormed Aleppo training.

Putin facing aggressive force to back down

James Davis information on rising conflicts as Moscow interprets Western activities, such as supplying Ukraine with long-range weapons, punishment, and another political developments, as deliberate actions. The Kremlin may strongly respond, according to critics in Russia.

North Korean politics breaks down Yoon’s revolution try

The National Assembly of South Korea, led by President Yoon Suk Yeol, abruptly rejected the government’s declaration of martial law, according to Scott Foster. A shift in power to the opposition Democratic Party, which opposes Yoon’s laws, may create new issues for the approaching Trump presidency.

Raimondo’s last move toward the Taiwanese chip market

Scott Foster examines the Biden administration’s latest “groundbreaking and sweeping” restrictions targeting China’s semiconductor business. Despite their passion, the punishment face condemnation for loopholes, delayed application, and limited limitations on allies.

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Indian Hindu nationalist rhetoric fueled Canadian temple violence – Asia Times

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In the wake of the death of a French Sikh advocate in British Columbia, diplomatic relations between India and Canada are still in decline. A new violent clash at a Hindu temple in Brampton, Ontario, between pro-Khalistan activists and Hindu separatists has created more conflicts.

In one of the subsequent demonstrations in the Toronto area, lots of pro-Khalistan Sikhs gathered outside the Brampton church, many of whom were Sikhs for Justice people.

The Khalistan movement, which aims to erect a Sikh country in north India, is supported by the protesters. In Canada, however, the action is prohibited in India.

Most American media outlets covered the Brampton conflict, but the majority of them did not mention the far-right Hindu nationalists ‘ activism or the use of a controversial phrase chanted at the church.

The pastor at the Hindu Sabha Mandir church, later identified as Rajinder Prasad, is seen speaking to a sizable audience in movies that are available on social media.

He shouts in Hindi:” Batenge toh…”, and the group shouts up,” Katenge”!

What it means

The controversial term batenge toh katenge can become loosely translated to “if we are divided, we will be destroyed” or “divided we fall”. However, this menacing call for Hindu unity contradicts democratic norms and has an unsettling meaning that supports Hindu nationalist rules.

The phrase is directly related to Yogi Adityanath’s conversation at a protest in Agra, Uttar Pradesh, India’s state of Uttar Pradesh, in August of this year.

Adityanath, a legislator and monk renowned for his radical traditional beliefs, said that” the country will only be empowered when we are united.” The catchy slogan has been adopted by a number of members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP) and Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangha, its Hindu nationalist parent organization.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi utilized Yogi’s talk in another protest, saying,” Batenge toh baatne app mehfil sajayenge” — “if we divide, the persons who divide us may make joyful”.

Also, in Bihar in October, Union Minister Giriraj Singh called the market with “batenge” and heard the reply from the crowd: “katenge”. He continued:

You assert that if we don’t join, we will be butchered. So, all of you keep swords and trishuls]tridents ] at home. Goddess Durga has a dagger in her hands, while Lord Shiva has a trishul in his. You can protect yourself from adversaries by using these weapons, too.

Batenge bhai katenge, a term used in Singh’s conversation, uses Hindu militancy, which uses gods and their mythical forms and weapons as possible targets for violence.

Churches in Hindu nationalist politicians

Mythopolitics has a significant role in the spread of Indian Hindu nationalism, which has sparked concern about the risk of churches to “outsiders” episodes.

The debate over the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, one of post-colonial India’s longest legal and political wars, was one of the longest. Hindu republican organizations demolished the Babri shrine in 1992, insisting that there was a Hindu temple there prior to the mosque’s demolition.

The claim to construct a temple in the place of the destroyed shrine was a significant factor in the success of right-wing elections at the time. The debate over temple defense has since become a defining feature of Hindu nationalism in modern times.

Rhetoric of Hindu unification

It was obvious that the Indian diaspora is well-versed in the phrase as the Hindu crowd gathered just at the Brampton church and chanted batenge toh katenge regularly at the priest’s urging.

The word taps into an exaggerated history of temple problems that has been carefully planned and mobilized. Prasad, the Brampton pastor, was suspended from his jobs, though reinstated within weeks after temple-goers sharply criticized church control on social media.

The Hindu separatist conversation on unification has a lot to say. In Elements of Hindutva, Vinayak D. Savarkar, who is heralded as the parents of Hindu nationalism, writes:

We were all Hindus and had a typical heart, but some of us were Aryans and some were Anaryans, but Ayars and Nayars were different. Some of us are Sages and some are Namashudras or Panchamas, but we are all Hindus and have a typical heart. We are all Hindus and have a common body, but some of us are Gauds or Saraswatas, while others are Daxinatyas. We were Yakshas and Rakhasas, but we are all Hindus and share a common body.

To support Hindu unity, he makes a list of class differences and the assimilation of the various peoples of the Indian continent.

Hindu nationalist organizations have in truth attempted to centrally mysterious class conversations to give the impression of Hindu unity. However, this alleged Hindu unity finally aims to foster religious divisions and foster a linear between Hindus and non-Hindus.

Hindu populism in the West

In order to create and advance its political agenda in the West, the Hindu nationalist movement has made an effective use of liberalism and diversity. Social maneuvering often takes the form of tradition and history.

One of the first Hindu nationalist organizations in the country, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad of America, claims to be supporting Hinduism and engaging in social activities rather than social mobilization.

The American Hindu Association lists its objectives as creating “awareness in the younger generations about Hindu traditions”” and promoting” Hindi speech, society traditions and books in the community.”

However, the agency’s rulers have a long record of invoking violence. On the day of the fight, Ron Banerjee, the chairman of the non-profit Hindu Conference of Canada, was in the Brampton temple and was detained and charged with inciting anger.

Batenge hain katenge is a pro-violence dog bell, never a telephone for unity, and it needs to be understood in terms of how wild Hindu nationalism is covered and investigated in Canada.

Sheetala Singh is an associate professor in the Department of English, York University, Canada.

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South Korea president’s ‘self-coup’ try is part of a global trend – Asia Times

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On December 3, 2024, something unexpected but almost unprecedented occurred in South Korea. With much notice, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared crisis martial laws, citing the danger from “pro-North Asian anti-state causes”.

Many South Koreans were left stunned by the decision, which appeared to be more concerned with restricting work by the main opposition, the center-left Democrat Party, to thwart Yoon’s coverage plan. As one Seoul resident told investigators:” It feels like a revolt d ‘état”.

That speaker wasn’t far away.

We have spent countless hours documenting the story of dictatorships d ‘état since World War II as experts on autocratic politics and as artists of the Colpus Dataset of revolt types and features.

Yoon’s short-lived martial law charter – it lasted just a few days before being lifted – was an example of what political scientists call an “autogolpe”, or to give the sensation its English title, a” self-coup”.

Our data indicates that self-coups are becoming more prevalent, with more occurring in the last ten years than any other 10-year time since World War II’s end. What follows is a primer on why that’s happening, what self-coups involve – and why, unlike in around 80 % of self-coups, Yoon’s strategy failed.

The elements of a self-coup

All revolt efforts share some characteristics. Each attempt is made to seize administrative power, and each action involves a specific, apparent, and improper action by martial or civilian personnel.

In a typical revolution, those concerned will attempt to overthrow an elected or assuming leader. Generally, most coups have been perpetrated, or at least supported, by military players. The 1973 coupd’etat by the Peruvian troops, led by General Augusto Pinochet, led to the enactment of military rule in Chile.

Some dictatorships, however, are led by rulers themselves. These self-coups are dictatorships in change.

The former executive engages or sponsors unlawful actions against other members of the regime, such as the courts or parliament, with the intention of extending or extending power rather than the country’s leader being replaced in an illegal manner.

As Yoon unsuccessfully attempted to do in South Korea, the chief executive might use troops to stifle the government.

Others have had more success, such as the Tunisian president’s coup, which was sparked by the dismissal of the judiciary and parliament in order to make way for the expansion of his national authority. More than three decades on, Saied remains in strength.

A president may also attempt to pressure state officials or the legislature to reject an election result. In our list of” self-coup attempts,” we include Donald Trump‘s effort to force local authorities and then-Vice President Mike Pence to overturn the election result because we saw this happen after the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

The types of self-coup practices

But not all professional electricity catches are self-coups. For instance, if a president asks the government to extend the terms of his or her presidency and the judges rule, as Bolivian President Evo Morales did in 2017, we don’t think it’s a revolution because the change process is legal.

In all, we have recorded 46 self-coups since 1945 by constitutionally elected officials in the upcoming data, including the latest effort in South Korea. Over the past three decades, our self-coup data was compiled with the assistance of some entrepreneurial academic students at Carnegie Mellon University.

When we examine the circumstances and benefits of these events, we can determine the most prevalent traits in self-coups.

Yoon’s deeds in South Korea were common in some ways, but not others. Around 40 % of self-coup attempt explicitly seek to undermine democratic votes or stop election winners from taking office, while over half of self-coup efforts in democratic nations target the courts or the government. The rest are at odds with another government elites or a minimum executive.

Yoon declared martial law to retrieve executive power from an opposition-led government.

Ironically, only a third of self-coup attempt in democracies involve for disaster declarations. Attacks on opposition parties and officials and election meddling are much more frequent.

Approximaely one in every five self-coup officials halts or upholds the law.

Although self-coups that result in so-called “leaders for living” are becoming more prevalent in Africa, there are comparatively few self-coup efforts in governments that involve attempts to dodge term limits.

Why are self-coups on the rise?

Although their relative frequency has changed over time, uprisings and self-coups are two of the most prevalent causes of democracy’s demise.

Self-coups have become the main cause of democracy’s collapse since the Soviet Union’s drop in the first 1990s, whereas uprisings were the main cause of democracy’s collapse during the Cold War.

A second of all efforts to depose from democratically elected leaders since 1946 have taken place in the last ten years.

Although more research is required to explain the recent increase of self-coups, we think a portion of the solution can be found in the demise of anti-coup norms, which condemn coup leaders withholding recognition, foreign support, or business deals, and the increase of personalist politics on a global scale.

Why do self-coups crash?

A leader who attempts a self-coup probably believes there is a good chance of success; then, the chief probably wouldn’t try a coup in the first place.

It is strange for Yoon to launch his self-coup effort allegedly without the consent of his own party’s officials.

More than four out of five self-coup attempt by democratically elected officials have been successful, despite only half of standard coup attempt, according to our information.

What then went wrong in Yoon’s North Korean relationship?

Revolt success depends on the coordination of many people, including military elites and political allies. Although Yoon first received ostensibly military assistance, it is not always the case.

Most self-coup problems occur when military and political elites fault. These defections are frequently the result of a combination of fundamental and regiment factors. Military members may become anxious and flaw when large crowds of people take to the streets to protest the coup. And a coup attempt that has been criticized internationally is undoubtedly help.

People support for democracy is also beneficial. Self-coups generally don’t occur in long-established governments like the United States, which have accumulated “democratic capital,” a collection of civic and social property that expands with a long history of democracy.

South Korea, although a military dictator from 1961 to 1987, has had years of political law. And when threatened, South Korea’s structure continued to function. Voting against Yoon was led by group officials.

That contrasts with powerful self-coups in the country by Park Chung-hee in 1972 and Chun Doo-hwan in 1980.

What happens to failed self-coup officials?

Often have failed self-coup leaders remained in power for a long time. The self-coups may lead them to become ousted by revolt, as occurred to Haiti’s Dumarsais Estimé in May 1950. Or they may become impeached, as occurred with Peru’s Pedro Castillo in December 2022. Just one failed self-coup head, in our opinion, managed to hold onto office for more than a year before the end of her term. Though no forced from office after the weak 1994 Dominican votes, Joaquín Balaguer was forced to agree to fresh elections in 1996 in which he would not become a member.

Chances are, therefore, that President Yoon’s time in power are numbered. Six opposition events filed an impeachment action against the leader following his intended self-cease. The National Assembly needs 200 of the 300 people to go that activity.

All 190 current people voted to close military law, including 18 of the 108 users of Yoon’s celebration. Only a few more politicians from the traditional party would have to cast a ballot against Yoon for the advancement of impeachment proceedings.

Threatened by a self-coup, South Korea’s political institutions seem to be holding – at least for today.

At Carnegie Mellon University, John Joseph Chin serves as an adjunct professor of technique and technologies, and Joe Wright, a political science associate, serves as a professor at Penn State.

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Leftwing populists and far right teamed up to topple French PM – Asia Times

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France’s shortest-lived state has fallen in a vote of no confidence triggered by a dispute over now-departing excellent secretary Michel Barnier’s resources.

The far-right Rassemblement National ( RN ) supported the vote in an act that Barnier described as a” conjunction of opposites,” led by the left-wing populists La France Insoumise.

The condition is burial, according to Barnier, and it will only get worse if the government is unstable and the institutions are dysfunctional. As President Emmanuel Macron moves to remove Barnier, all involved, from state to opposition, really consider how they arrived at this scenario.

The political parties of France’s officials ‘ persistent dynamic and majoritarian tendencies caused this issue. They should then take that France’s situation will only be improved by a change in this kind of tradition.

Following his group’s disappointing performance in the European Parliament elections, Macron immediately suspended the National Assembly and called for first parliamentary elections in June.

Competent parties devised a joint strategy to stop it, anticipating that the RN might have won a clear majority in the National Assembly based on its election results in the first round ( where it received 32 % of the vote ). They organized a “republican top,” which brought together center-right, centrist, and far-left legislators.

In the first and second rounds of voting, the alliance’s parties made an electoral pact that allowed one party to withdraw their applicants where it would allow another to avoid the RN from winning the desk.

This technique resulted in the RN narrowly missing being in office for the first time after years of steady help growth. Additionally, it deposed France of a lot and created three roughly equal social clusters in the legislature, each of which could not stand alone.

However, while Macron’s party was content to work with the others to stay the RN from taking office, these noble sentiments vanished when it came to power. Each party’s financial ideology was very various for them to come up with a common ground. Otherwise, the moderates created a minority government, a move that Macron’s moderates made possible by agreeing to abstain from voting in the government’s investiture in order to obstruct its course.

Brinkmanship

The RN, which had become the kingmaker due to the government’s budget approval, continued to exercise its strong dynamic instincts when it faced the current crisis.

To address a colossal public debt and correct a yawning deficit, Barnier’s budget to the parliament was difficult: €60 billion ($ 63.5 billion ) needed to be discovered. To the president’s breaks, it tried to spread the pain consistently ( though not likewise ) across the board through a mix of tax rises and spending cuts.

A compromise would need to be reached between the government and the RN in order for the budget to be passed. But here again, a strict majoritarian logic was at play.

The RN alleged that the government was being kept out of the open and that it wasn’t being heard. In that respect, the RN was correct. Barnier himself proclaimed to be open to conversation but not to bargaining.

The RN drew its red lines and issued its demands, focusing on the measures that would be most immediately felt by voters, knowing that the key to ratifying the budget was to be found. It wished to stop the reintroduction of electricity taxes and make a U-turn on the proposed reductions in medical prescription reimbursements. Additionally, it demanded that pension payments be immediately indexed.

The government conceded, first over the electricity prices, then over prescriptions, until Barnier finally decided that was enough. The government was unable to advance without halting its plans to restructure public spending and without losing face to blackmail.

And this is essentially what the entire exchange was about. The RN’s demands were also a form of repentance for the leftists and a rehashing of its earlier threats to lower the government.

Barnier has a thorough understanding of the game to which he was subjected, and is a seasoned politician. Therefore, he chose to make the vote about the “responsibility of the government” rather than the budget. In order to do this, he cited a constitutional provision that permits the government to pass laws without the approval of the parliamentary majority.

He did this because he knew the opposition parties ‘ only way to stop him would be to hold a confidence vote and to overthrow the government. The RN welcomed the motion, which was brought forward by the left-wing New Popular Front.

Why would Barnier’s plan to obliterate the government in this way? To re-engage the RN and make it confront the risks that its own behavior carries was a constant display of the competitive and majoritarian logic.

What happens next?

The RN now has to navigate the unknown waters that it has pushed the nation. The government has fallen, but fresh elections can’t take place until July. In the interim, a technocratic caretaker government will be in power, causing political stagnation in France.

However, this paralysis has shook the credit markets and caused the French government’s borrowing costs to rise. If the electorate believes it to be responsible, it is a problem for the government, but it is also a problem for the RN.

Many of the RN’s core supporters have an anti-system attitude. Because it is a part of an establishment, they always will be opposed to the government.

But the RN will never win office, and certainly not the presidency, by relying solely on this core base. It needs support from moderate centre-right voters, including those with economically liberal inclinations, who prize economic stability above all. Alienating them is not an option.

As Barnier had intended, the budget dispute has highlighted these internal tensions and harmed the RN’s prospects.

In the hope that Macron can only do so much as resign, the RN’s most likely response is to try to shift the blame back onto the government. Le Pen is waiting in the distance.

Simon Toubeau is an associate professor at the University of Nottingham’s School of Politics and International Relations.

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Indonesia’s Apple tussle no way to build a tech hub – Asia Times

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Indonesia’s new fight with Apple over phone 16 sales offers a revealing windows into the Prabowo government’s emerging business and business plan.

President Prabowo Subianto wants to turn Indonesia from a merely consumer business into a high-tech production gateway, just like his father Jokowi. However, the conflict shows a basic connect between Indonesia’s desires and its implementation.

The conflict started in October when Indonesia prohibited sales of the iPhone 16 due to Apple’s failure to comply with rules mandating 40 % local developing content. In response, Apple made an initial investment offer of US$ 10 million to establish a mill in Bandung in collaboration with its suppliers, which was later upgraded to$ 100 million, including plans for research and development features and accessory part production.

Industry Minister Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita argued that the plan “has never met principles of justice,” while economy minister Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita rebuffed it. On the surface, Indonesia’s status seems fair. With 280 million people, Southeast Asia’s largest economy doesn’t want to be only another consumer market for technology companies.

The government might point to Samsung’s at least$ 20 billion in investments and Oppo’s expanding presence as proof that major companies can meet their terms. Indonesia’s desire to advance up the value chain and establish local manufacturing capabilities is both reputable and proper.

Southeast Asia’s largest economy may normally be a desirable target as global supply chains deteriorate and businesses look for alternatives to China. However, the president’s aggressive approach to achieving these goals may become counterproductive.

Without fostering true technological growth or technology transfer, mandating regional assembly without the ecosystem necessary for significant manufacturing can lead to superficial compliance, with products only being assembled enough to meet origin requirements.

The phone policy’s usefulness is also unclear. Apple dominates Indonesia’s smartphone market by only 2 %, and wealthy people can buy products in nearby nations like Singapore or Malaysia.

There’s good considerable overlap between possible phone 16 customers and people who often travel to these adjacent countries, limiting the plan’s leverage.

Indonesia’s difficulties become obvious when comparing them to Vietnam, a local competition that has properly attracted high-tech production. Vietnam, with a smaller community, hosts 35 Apple providers compared to Indonesia’s one part manufacturer and has established itself as a gateway for global supply chains.

Labor costs are significantly lower, with Hanoi’s minimum wage at$ 190 monthly compared to Jakarta’s$ 325. The country has also built world-class infrastructure, with three seaports ranked among the global top 50 for cargo throughput—Ho Chi Minh City ( 26th ), Hai Phong ( 33rd ), and Cai Mep ( 50th ) —compared to just one from Indonesia.

Also, Vietnam’s 17 free trade agreements have enhanced its inclusion into global supply chains, making it a more interesting place for manufacturing opportunities.

China offers another convincing case. Through laws like mandating joint ventures between foreign and domestic companies, it succeeds in fostering tech transfer and capacity-building.

As a problem for marketplace access, these requirements made overseas companies share technologies with local partners, making it necessary for Chinese firms to get advanced technologies and expertise. Apple CEO Tim Cook has apparently stated that the company may increase investment and support provide chain development perhaps this year despite rising political risks.

Similar to Vietnam, it has worked to foster partnerships between foreign investors and local businesses to promote tech shift by putting in place clear regulatory frameworks, providing incentives for high-tech industries, and promoting business climates.

The government estimates Apple generated 30 trillion rupiah ($ 1.9 billion ) from product sales in Indonesia last year. Indonesia risks deterring the pretty investment it wants to get by adopting such an intense position without creating necessary conditions for manufacturers.

The rejection of Apple’s$ 100 million expense is likely to be perceived by many as rigidity or exaggerated governance, potentially deterring another foreign investors.

Despite being the fourth-largest nation in the world, Indonesia is now struggling to gain respect internationally. The nation needs more than just sporadic displays of regulatory force to improve its standing and draw valuable investment.

It requires a complex framework for utilizing economic leverage that combines international business interests with domestic development objectives.

President Prabowo’s presidency appears to be at a juncture. Indonesia has an opportunity to place itself carefully in light of big markets turning inwards and shifting global supply chains.

But this requires moving beyond oppressive laws toward creating real dynamic advantages—streamlining rules, developing system, and fostering tech transfer through incentives rather than demands.

In an age of fragmenting global supply chains and shifting energy relationships, fresh market sizing isn’t enough—it’s how you utilize it that matters. Indonesia’s development as a hub for manufacturing depends not on imposing restrictions on investment through market access, but rather on creating an ecosystem that will inevitably draw and retain it.

Asher Ellis is a pupil at Yale University.

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Manufacturing is a war now – and the democracies are losing – Asia Times

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Elon Musk recently&nbsp, reposted a video&nbsp, showing a clip of aircraft crowds in China, declaring that the age of guarded fighter jet was around.

I’m not sure if Musk is right about the F-35 and other manned fighters — drones and fighters play different roles on the battlefield, and may coexist in the future ( for an argument that the F-35 itself has been overly maligned, &nbsp, watch this fun video ). But in any situation, Musk’s larger point that drones will occupy the battle of the future should presently be&nbsp, extremely uncontroversial.

Uavs have already become the standard method of battle surveillance and the necessary army weapon, able to defeat both tanks and soldiers.

For the moment, electronic warfare uses EM indicators to thwart drones ‘ interaction with their pilots and GPS satellites, but even that defense will be largely ineffective once AI becomes more advanced enough to allow drones to explore on their own. Without a large number of drones, it will be impossible to fight and win a modern war, even though this doesn’t mean robots will be the only means of combat.

And who makes FPV robots, of the kind depicted in Musk’s movie? China. China’s DJI and different manufacturers are the biggest players in the market for professional drones, despite the US still being the market leader in military drone production:

Source: DroneDJ

And a device is a fundamental part of any FPV aircraft. In fact, the first step in the development of the helicopter revolution was the advancement of better magnet for motors, better magnet for motors, and various types of computer chips for detecting and control. And who makes the chargers? That would also be China:

Source: BNEF

So I then want you to consider what would happen if the US and its allies engaged in a significant conflict with China, as researchers believe is becoming more and more likely. In the first few days, the majority of the two nations ‘ arsenals of weapons, including robots and the batteries that power robots, will be used up. It will then be up to who can make more ammunition and bring them to the field in time, as it did with Ukraine. 1

What will the US do if our friends and we are unable to produce a lot of munitions at that time? We will have to choose between losing the war to China and 1 ) starting with a nuclear war. Those may be our only choices. Either approach, &nbsp, the US and its allies will drop.

Then know that the US and its allies aren’t really falling behind China in aircraft and power manufacturing— they’re falling behind in&nbsp, all kinds of manufacturing. The table below comes&nbsp, from a 2024 review by UNIDO, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization:

Source: UNIDO

The United States and its allies in Asia, Europe, and Latin America made up the vast majority of international industrial production in 2000, with China only 6 %, despite decades of rapid development. Exactly thirty years later, according to UNIDO projections, China will account for 45 % of all global manufacturing, completely outperforming or matching the US and all of its allies.

This is a level of production dominance by a single nation that has only been witnessed half in the history of the world: by the UK at the start of the Industrial Revolution and by the US only after World War 2. It means that in an expanded battle of production, there is no assurance that&nbsp, the entire world united&nbsp, was defeat&nbsp, China alone.

That is a really dangerous and unpredictable position. If it does happen, China may be essentially free to start any standard issue it wants without worrying that it will be ganged up because there won’t be a strong enough gang to defeat it. The only thing they’ll have to worry is nuclear arms.

And, of course, other countries will realize this in advance, so in any issue that’s not absolutely philosophical, most of them will likely make the rational alternative to provide China whatever it wants&nbsp, without&nbsp, fighting. China wants to conquer Taiwan and occupy the entire South China Sea, according to 2&nbsp. Fine, go ahead.

China wants to annex Japan and Arunachal Pradesh. All yours, sir. As retaliation for the agreements China was forced to sign in the 19th century, China wants to make Japan and Europe sign “unequal treaties.” Absolutely. China wants preferential access to the world’s minerals, fossil fuels, and food supplies? Go ahead. And so on.

China’s leaders know this very well, of course, which is why they are unleashing a massive and unprecedented amount of&nbsp, industrial policy spending&nbsp, — in the form of cheap bank loans, tax credits, and direct subsidies — to raise production in militarily useful manufacturing industries like autos, batteries, electronics, chemicals, ships, aircraft, drones, and&nbsp, foundational semiconductors.

This doesn’t just raise Chinese production — it also creates&nbsp, a flood of overcapacity&nbsp, that spills out into global markets and forces American, European, Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese companies out of the market.

By creating overcapacity, China is&nbsp, forcibly deindustrializing&nbsp, every single one of its geopolitical rivals. Yes, this reduces profit for Chinese companies, but profit is not the goal of war.

America’s most economically important allies — Germany and Japan — are bearing the brunt of China’s most recent industrial assault. In the 2000s and 2010s, Germany’s manufacturing exports boomed, as they sold China high-tech machinery and components. China has now copied, stole or reinvented much of Germany’s technology, and are now squeezing out the German suppliers:

Source: &nbsp, Brad Setser

This is one reason, though not the only reason, for German industrial production to have been declining since 2017:

Source: &nbsp, Marginal Revolution

In addition, China has already wiped out a significant portion of Japan’s electronics sector, and a recent glut of cheap Chinese car exports has destroyed the country’s cherished Japanese auto industry:

Source: &nbsp, Bloomberg via Noahopinion

The democratic countries have all struggled to respond to China’s industrial assault, because as capitalist countries, they naturally think about manufacturing mainly in terms of&nbsp, economic efficiency and profits&nbsp, unless a major war is actively in progress.

Democratic countries ‘ economies are primarily set up as&nbsp, free market economies with redistribution because this is what increases living standards in peacetime. In a free market economy, you permit a foreign country to sell you cheap cars, and you instead use your own productive resources for something more lucrative.

If China is willing to sell you brand-new electric vehicles for$ 10, 000, why should you turn them down? Just make B2B SaaS and advertising platforms and chat apps, sell them for a high-profit margin, and drive a Chinese car.

Except for a war, you discover that B2B SaaS, advertising platforms, and chat apps aren’t very effective at defending your freedoms. Oops! The right time to worry about manufacturing would have been&nbsp, years before&nbsp, the war, except you weren’t able to anticipate and prepare for the future. Manufacturing doesn’t just support war — in a very real way, &nbsp, it’s a war in and of itself.

Democratic nations appear to be still largely in “peace mode” with regard to their economic models. They believe that manufacturing needs to be preserved and expanded in peacetime to be prepared for the resulting, growing likelihood of a major war.

Thankfully, Republicans and Democrats in America have slowed down this deadly complacency in recent years. However, the tariffs supported by the GOP and the industrial policies promoted by the Dems are only partial solutions and do not provide essential components for a military-industrial strategy.

Republicans and Democrats don’t have a comprehensive plan for winning the manufacturing war.

Three components must be included in a military-industrial strategy for the US and its allies to compete with China:

    To stop sudden surges of Chinese exports from forcibly deindustrializing other nations, China is subject to tariffs and other trade restrictions.

  1. promoting and expanding manufacturing capacity in democratic countries through industrial policy.
  2. A sizable common market outside of China for non-Chinese manufacturers to gain scale-savings.

The GOP’s tariffs-first approach achieves the first of these, but actively sabotages the third by putting tariffs on allies. The Democrats ‘ industrial policy-focused approach achieves the second goal, but it severely undercuts its own efforts with regulations and contracting restrictions.

First, let’s talk about the GOP, since Trump is about to come back into office. In his first term, Trump moved the US away from the free trade consensus and from the model of “engagement” with China. He was the first to use tariffs and export controls as economic weapons. In his second term, he’s almost certain to&nbsp, double down on tariffs.

This will help prevent a wave of subsidized Chinese imports from suddenly destroying the remaining US industries, as happened in the US solar panel industry in the 2010s. However, Trump is making a number of errors that will severely limit the impact of his tariffs.

First, he’s threatening&nbsp, broad tariffs&nbsp, on most or all Chinese goods, instead of tariffs targeted at specific, militarily useful goods. In a post two weeks ago, I explained why broad tariffs are of limited effectiveness.

Broad tariffs cause bigger&nbsp, exchange rate movements, which cancel out more of the effect of the tariffs. Putting tariffs on Chinese-made TVs, clothing, furniture, and laptops weakens the effect of tariffs on Chinese-made cars, chips, machinery, and batteries.

Second, Trump is threatening to put tariffs on US allies like&nbsp, Canada&nbsp, and&nbsp, Mexico. This will make American manufacturers less competitive with their Chinese rivals by removing the cheap parts and components they need to build things cheaply. It will also provoke retaliation from allies, limiting the markets available to American manufacturers.

As for industrial policy, Trump doesn’t seem to see the value in it. He has &nbsp, threatened to cancel the CHIPS Act, as well as&nbsp, the Inflation Reduction Act&nbsp, that subsidizes battery manufacturing.

However, tariffs cannot simply force chip and battery factories to sprout from American soil like mushrooms after the rain. Tariffs protect the domestic market but do absolutely nothing to help American manufacturers in the far larger&nbsp, global&nbsp, market, only industrial policy can do that.

Democrats do back industrial policy. And in fact, Biden’s industrial policies have been&nbsp, one of the few small successes&nbsp, that any democratic nation has had in the struggle to keep up with China’s manufacturing juggernaut. In the US, a colossal amount of factory construction is currently happening:

Although almost all of the actual money being spent is private, the construction is heavily concentrated in the industries Biden subsidized.

This is great, but the effort has been slowed by progressive policy priorities. &nbsp, Stubborn progressive defenses&nbsp, of NEPA and the American permitting regime have prevented major reform of that formidable stumbling block, while various&nbsp, onerous contracting requirements&nbsp, — the dreaded “everything bagel” — have held up construction timelines.

Even more fundamentally, progressives tend to see the point of industrial policy as&nbsp, providing jobs for factory workers, rather than in terms of national defense. Because of these, they end up providing more jobs even as they prevent anything physically from actually getting built, which makes them complacent about delays and cost overruns:

This is why some progressives oppose automation in the manufacturing industry because they claim it will destroy jobs. China, meanwhile, is racing ahead with automation, having recently&nbsp, zoomed ahead of both Japan and Germany &nbsp, in terms of the number of robots per worker, and leaving America in the dust:

Source: IFR

Meanwhile, although Democrats may become negatively polarized into opposing all tariffs ( throwing the baby out with the bathwater ), they still&nbsp, oppose measures like the TPP&nbsp, aimed at creating a common market capable of balancing China’s internal market.

In other words, neither political party in America has yet fully understood the nature, scope, or difficulty of China’s manufacturing might, or the nature of the steps required to take in order to respond.

While his progressive opponents view reindustrialization as a massive make-work program, Trump is still having the same basic protectionist dreams he had in the 1990s. Meanwhile, America’s allies overseas seem even less capable of averting their decline.

The manufacturing war is waning, and we need to start the process right away.

1 Of course, those munitions will have to be of a similar caliber, but it’s obvious that China is now technologically advanced in almost every area on par with other major powers.

2 Insert&nbsp, overused Sun Tzu quote&nbsp, here.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Yoon’s martial law stunt may cost Korea a lost decade – Asia Times

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Yoon Suk Yeol, president of South Korea, set his country’s economy back ten centuries in six days, and increased the chances that the following ten years will be lost.

The government’s urgent request to remove Yoon’s resignation and impeachment for his crazy martial law declaration later on December 3 is the focus at this time. When the dust settles, nevertheless, the actual collateral damage will be to Asia’s fourth-biggest business.

On Monday, the day before Yoon’s determined stunt, South Korea was now carrying serious existing conditions into a 2025 some Seoul policymakers despair. Between China’s decline and Donald Trump’s coming trade conflict, South Korea’s business may find itself in harm’s way first and often.

Record household debts, which is putting strain on consumer spending, complicates the way forward. Additionally, South Korea has a gender pay gap and a labor-intensive workforce that prevents technology.

Korea’s fertility level is the lowest everywhere. A handful of family-owned conglomerates, or chaebols, continue to dominate the market, making it hard for start-ups to grow and destroy the government’s export-driven development model.

And the monetary system needs major changes to end the” Korea cheap” that underestimates Kospi index prices.

Problem is, Yoon’s antics really proved traders doubting Korea’s eagerness for global night right. His government is now even more in the lame-duck area than it was three days ago, also if Yoon can prevent being impeached — a great “if.”

It’s difficult to imagine how Yoon will survive this unless something else is dropping that we haven’t already discovered,” says Eurasia Group scientist Jeremy Chan.

As ideal as we can tell, Yoon’s martial law campaign was motivated by his disappointment with opposition parties that are stymieing his plan. The issue was considerably worsened by Yoon. Hope all-out gridlock today.

This new complication in Seoul elections appeared to be apparent to The Bank of Korea. Straight after Yoon declared martial law, BOK Governor Rhee Chang-yong pledged “unlimited cash” to calm industry. On Wednesday, he set up an urgent meeting to discuss how the BOK may protect the market from further political scheming.

” From a near-term plan aspect, apart from the market problems, doubt could also come in the event of government changes”, says Goldman Sachs scientist Goohoon Kwon. On Thursday, Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun resigned.

According to Bank economists, in the best-case situation,” the negative effects to the economy and financial industry may be short-lived as uncertainties on the political and economic environment may be quickly mitigated on the back of strategic policy response.”

However, Moody’s Ratings ‘ economist Anushka Shah adds that a “prolonged period of political conflict that affects economic activity and leads to work stoppages would be credit negative.”

The significance of the Korean victory, both for domestic politics and the external sector, is a key climax. The domestic political unrest will only exacerbate the bearish sentiment surrounding the Korean victory, but Alvin Tan, a currency strategist at RBC Capital Markets, believes that the growth slowdown and potential US-China trade war in the coming year will continue to be the main drivers.

A wiser leader than Yoon might have examined his mediocre approval rating and adjusted his policies accordingly. Or create new ones that might appeal to voters and opposition parties. Instead, Yoon threw a tantrum, leaving many of Korea’s 51 million people wondering if Yoon’s support rate is way too high.

Yoon also spewed a dose of Trumpian skepticism by warning of “anti-state” militias sympathetic to North Korea’s plot against him. Not a wise choice from a leader who makes Shigeru Ishiba and Joe Biden the most well-known Americans in the world right now.

This was” an act of political desperation”, Chan says. ” It wasn’t about North Korea or social order — despite Yoon’s claims”. In the end, Chan adds, Yoon was” trying to bring all legislative proceedings to a halt” by calling on the National Assembly.

The issue is that South Korea’s government functions are squandering up at arguably the worst possible time. Along with China exporting deflation, Seoul is bracing for US President-elect Trump’s coming tariffs. Trump has threatened that the 60 % tariffs against China could be the start of a global arms race.

Trump has telegraphed 100 % taxes on automobiles made in Mexico. Car-making giants in Korea and Japan worry — for valid reasons — that they’re next.

Concerned about the fates of Hyundai, Kia and others, Yoon has been scrambling for a meeting with Trump. In a bid to get a Mar-a-Lago tee time, Yoon dusted off his golf clubs for the first time in eight years.

Yoon’s government even hired the lobbying firm Susie Wiles, the incoming White House chief of staff, worked for. The Washington embassy of Korea hired Mercury Public Affairs to build connections with the incoming White House, according to Korean media.

Trump, of course, is less of a bridge-builder than a geopolitical wrecking ball. Still, Yoon has studied up on former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Trump bromance.

Abe became the first world leader to hurl a long way to New York’s Trump Tower to kiss the ring in November 2016. The stunt also caused Abe to sit next to Trump at Group of Seven meetings and other global confabs, earning him a spot there.

If Yoon looked closer, he’d see how little the late Abe got in return for his subservience. Trump ignored Abe’s pleas and still abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, a cornerstone of Japan’s effort to contain China.

Abe’s acquiescence didn’t earn Tokyo a pass on the Trump 1.0 trade war. Trump continued to try to shake down Abe for US$ 8 billion in annual payments to keep American troop levels in Japan. It didn’t stop Trump from palling around with Kim Jong Un, legitimizing North Korea’s murderous regime at the expense of Japan‘s national security.

Yet Trump 2.0 is just one of South Korea’s biggest economic challenges. The other is how the economy is bouncing off course because of its already-existing circumstances.

The first half of Yoon’s five-year term did little to raise Korea’s economic game. He’s done little, if anything, to level playing fields to help small-and-medium-sized companies grow into larger ones.

He hasn’t made any discernible progress in lowering the nation’s crippling debt, increasing worker productivity, empowering women, and raising the average income.

Yoon hasn’t been able to dispel MSCI’s reservations about Korea Inc. Yoon argued in a uniquely assertive way earlier this year that the world’s largest index company should establish South Korea as a developed nation, a designation that would entice tidal waves of global capital into won-denominated assets.

Back in March, Yoon pledged to scrap outdated regulations, loosen limits on corporate ownership, strengthen capital markets, increase currency-trading hours, boost transparency and even tolerate short sellers.

MSCI went away unimpressed. According to its analysts,” these efforts will be subject to consultation with market participants once in effect,” as they stated in June. In other words, Team Yoon needs to carry out the Big Bang without resorting to a supply-side explanation.

Unfortunately, Yoon is only the most recent leader to talk a lot of money-savings and talk little. Like his five predecessors over the last 20 years, Yoon quickly realized the difficulty and risk of clashing with Korea’s chaebol-industrial complex and demurred.

This persistent complacency comes at a high price. In any tally of major economies courting a&nbsp, Japan-like lost decade&nbsp, through complacency and political distraction, &nbsp, South Korea&nbsp, deserves a primary place. Yoon, part of this sad continuum, also let the BOK run the show.

So did Moon Jae-in, who was elected in 2017 to restore faith in the Korean economy. Moon began with a bold plan to champion” trickle-up economics”. Higher corporate taxes were included in the plan to better distribute wealth and employment opportunities.

The strategy spearheaded by Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Abe decades earlier had a reversed impact due to Moon’s emphasis on enriching the middle class. Yet Moon, too, saw the magnitude of the task of taming Korea Inc&nbsp, &nbsp, — and he backed off.

The same was true for Park Geun-hye, president from 2013 to 2017. Not only was she Korea’s first female president, but also the daughter of former national leader Park Chung-hee, who built the chaebol-led model that still dominates today back in the 1960s and 1970s.

Park Geun-hye took office with grand plans to dismantle her father’s economic system. She talked of devising a more” creative” model of entrepreneurship and shifting&nbsp, tax incentives&nbsp, toward startups.

Park planned, too, to strengthen antitrust enforcement&nbsp, and penalize big companies for hoarding profits that could be used to boost paychecks and fund new cutting-edge research and development.

Her father’s export-driven development strategy placed a premium on loans to domestic businesses and shielded domestic industries from global competition. The strategy borrowed from the” Asian tigers” playbook Japan had written.

Of course, Park Chung-hee’s legacy is back in the news this week. The upheaval that occurred at the time of his 1979 murder occurred at the same time as a previous declaration of martial law.

Over time, Korean officialdom was captured by the home-growth giants Park&nbsp, Chung-hee’s policies created. But once daughter Park Geun-hye settled into the presidential Blue House, 38 years after her father’s assassination, she too decided change was too difficult and risky.

Rather than upending the chaebol system, Park got co-opted. By 2017, she was &nbsp, impeached and jailed&nbsp, in a scandal involving Samsung leader Lee Jae-yong. Both have since been pardoned, much to the dismay of many Korean voters.

Before Park, Lee&nbsp, Myung-bak, president from 2008 to 2013, &nbsp, pledged to generate more economic energy from the ground up. Voters hoped that, as a former CEO of Hyundai Engineering&nbsp, and Construction, Lee had the know-how to shift growth engines away from exports toward domestic demand. Lee demurred, siding with the chaebols that produced him.

If only these leaders had swayed the wind in a significant way, Korea might not be struggling to raise its prices and compete in the era of China. Even if Yoon manages to cling to power, somehow, his odds of elevating the economy to greater heights in the 887 days he’d have left in office are slight, at best.

What Yoon has accomplished is placing South Korea in the shoes of Asian martial law enforcers in a manner that international investors won’t find appealing. These include Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand – and now South Korea.

Yoon reassured markets about the Korean discount while also bringing up a past Kospi investors would prefer not to think about, such as 1948 martial law episodes.

One silver lining:” The swift reversal of the martial law underscores the resilience of South Korea’s institutions”, write analysts at BMI, a Fitch Solutions Company.

We anticipate only temporary effects for the economy and financial markets as the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of Finance have responded quickly by reassuring investors, according to BNI. Notably, the central bank has pledged to increase short-term liquidity and take steps to stabilize the FX markets, which is in line with our opinion that the risks associated with the South Korean victory should be kept under control for the time being.

Perhaps, but the effects of Yoon’s insane and selfish act may make South Korea worry about where and how all that potential was lost in a decade.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Jeongjo the Great: S Korea’s new destroyer bristles with missiles – Asia Times

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A crucial component of South Korea’s marine modernization strategy to advance standard deterrent against North Korea and other regional threats has been completed.

The Korean ROKS Jeongjo the Great battleship was commissioned in November at the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries factory in Ulsan, according to The War Zone’s report this quarter.

The ship, the first among three KDX-II I Batch 2 destroyers to be delivered, showcases the sophisticated Korean Vertical Launch System ( KVLS-II ) for ballistic missiles, indicating South Korea’s increasing focus on missile defense.

The destroyer measures 558 feet in length, displaces around 12, 000 tons and is equipped with the latest Foundation 9 Aegis fight program, which enhances its tracking, hit and anti-submarine war capabilities.

The KVLS-II is a major upgrade, allowing for the implementation of larger weapons, including the Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM ) and possibly ballistic weapons, which are essential for countering North Korean challenges.

The development comes as a result of South Korea’s decision to lift its missile collection limits in 2021, which will enable it to increase its missile arsenal.

Naval News reported in March 2024 that South Korea had initiated the development of a new ship-launched ballistic missile, known as the” Ship-to-surface Ballistic Missile” or Hyunmoo-IV-2, following approval by the Defense Program Promotion Committee.

The Agency for Defense Development ( ADD)-managed program will skip the research phase and move to system development, with detailed design work anticipated to be finished by 2028, according to the Naval News report.

The missile, designed for precision attacks on major enemy targets over long distances, will be integrated into KVLS-II and deployed on three types of Republic of Korea Navy ( ROKN) ships: the KDX-II I Batch-II Aegis destroyers, the future Korean Next-Generation Destroyer ( KDDX ) and the future Arsenal ship.

In April 2023, Asia Times reported that South Korea had introduced plans for an “arsenal ship”, a missile-equipped vehicle for land-attack activities targeting important goals like command centers, transportation hubs, air defense deployments and military facilities.

The ROKN plans to purchase three vessels by the end of the 2020s as a result of Daewoo Shipbuilding &amp, Marine Engineering ( DSME) as the company’s joint firepower ship concept.

In the event of an imminent missile threat, each vessel is designed to carry 80 missiles for preemptive strikes against North Korean military installations. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration ( DAPA ) will invest US$ 467 million between 2024 and 2036 to develop a new ship-to-surface ballistic missile for these ships.

The ships ‘ development may align with&nbsp, South Korea’s” Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation ( KMPR )” strategy as outlined in its 2022 Defense White Paper. The only way to deter North Korea is to threaten the Kim dynasty and its nuclear arsenal, according to KMPR, which is based on the idea that since it is not deterred by military action or economic sanctions.

The plan emphasizes deterrence by denying and punishing both, and hopes to cast doubt on North Korean leaders regarding the success of an attack and the possibility of severe retaliation. It includes a damage-limitation aspect, intending to minimize the impact of any North Korean nuclear attack. It is intended for preventive action, recommending quick strikes on nuclear targets if a North Korean attack appears on the horizon.

However, South Korea’s ballistic missile-carrying warships may be vulnerable to a multitude of North Korean asymmetric threats, which include submarines, special operations forces, fast attack craft swarms, naval mines, drone swarms, suicide attacks and anti-ship missiles.

Despite having no nuclear weapons, South Korea may have a limited ability to threaten North Korea, which may limit its conventional deterrence posture.

In an article published in the peer-reviewed International Security journal in January 2021, Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim claim that South Korea must face significant difficulties in keeping a credible conventional deterrence posture in order to combat North Korea’s nuclear threat.

To counter this, Bowers and Hiim mention that South Korea has developed an independent counterforce and countervalue strategy that relies heavily on advanced conventional capabilities, such as high-precision ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated missile defense systems and sophisticated ISR ( intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ) technologies.

However, Bowers and Hiim point out that this strategy presents several dilemmas. They claim that South Korea must quickly identify, track, and neutralize North Korean missile threats, which is extremely difficult given North Korea’s extensive use of hardened underground facilities and mobile missile launchers.

Additionally, they note that South Korea’s strategy must continually adapt to North Korea’s advancements in survivability and penetration capabilities, giving rise to high financial and technological demands. They claim that this strategy causes crisis instability strategically, and that counterforce threats could prompt North Korea to launch a first strike in a crisis.

Countervalue threats directed at North Korea’s leaders may encourage centralized or unauthorized nuclear use, further destabilizing the area. Additionally, South Korea may have to reevaluate its strategic approach to its long-time rival North Korea as a second Trump administration is under way.

During his first presidency, US President-elect Donald Trump favored re-engagement with North Korea, meeting Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in June 2018, and pledged to halt US-South Korea military exercises at the possible expense of downgrading Seoul’s deterrence capabilities. &nbsp,

Further, Trump’s transition team is discussing the possibility of direct talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un, with re-engagement apparently being the second Trump administration’s goal, though no final decision, dates or timetables have been confirmed. Trump may also choose to put Middle Eastern conflicts and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine before the Korean Peninsula.

Trump may also ask South Korea to pay more in cash for the service it provides. The first Trump Administration demanded$ 5 billion to help pay for the costs of hosting 28,500 US troops stationed on South Korean soil. A second Trump administration could bring on this demand, which would increase Seoul’s potential high new defense costs.

The incoming Trump administration will most likely carry on its previous hawkish stance toward China. The previous position demanded the creation of a 350-ship US Navy, large-scale arms shipments to Taiwan, and the promotion of anti-China blocs like the Quad. It also advocated for withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty.

These indicate potential differences between the US and South Korean approaches to China. Because China is Pyongyang’s primary economic and diplomatic lifeline, South Korea believes its relationship with China is crucial in shaping its decisions.

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