Anti-colonial call to cancel US RIMPAC naval exercises – Asia Times

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The largest naval exercise in the world has been involving navies and naval assets from 29 nations since the previous month of June.

The US-led RIMPAC 2024 ( Exercise Rim of the Pacific ), the 29th such exercise to be held since 1971, claims to promote” a free and open Indo-Pacific”. But many of the Indigenous peoples of this region, which covers more than 50 % of the Earth’s surface, do n’t see it that way at all.

In June, Protecting Oceania, a group of Indigenous Pacific, economic, and social justice companies, released a speech, saying:

We stand together, in order to accomplish our sacred responsibility to get great ancestors, and strongly oppose the fortification of our islands and oceans … These exercises threaten our sovereignties and our communities, people and other-than-human everywhere, here in Hawaii, across Moananuiākea, and throughout the globe.

The global Cancel RIMPAC promotion in Hawaii contends that the training does not offer the security it claims. Instead, it contributes to stereotyped violence, economic damage, and colonialism in the area.

Since their creation more than 50 years ago, the Royal Navy has participated in the tasks. RIMPAC is a topic that is rarely discussed in the UK. This is in spite of the UK’s considerable and protracted colonial history in the Pacific and the UK’s renewed and growing Indo-Pacific focus on foreign policy.

A lake of archipelago

In 1994, Tongan-Fijian author Epeli Hau’ofa described Oceania as” a lake of islands” connected by countless generations of sea transportation, inter-island relationships and careful observation of economic cycles. This challenged imperial notions of the Pacific as isolated “islands in a way sea” that could be used by foreign powers.

Britain, France, and Germany have long imperial histories in this ocean, despite the US now having the most significant territorial and military presence in the region.

Following Captain James Cook’s excursions in the late 18th century, the rise of European colonization into the Pacific extracted vast amounts of wealth from Australia, Aotearoa New Zealand, Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.

Charts of Oceania frequently show that there is still Euro-western territorialism in the area in contrast to indigenous oceanographic interpretations. &nbsp, Peter Hermes Furian/Alamy Stock Photo via The Talk

American imperialism attempted to impose Western culture on indigenous peoples as well. The scattered Mori vocabulary and knowledge systems in Aotearoa New Zealand were later brought back by Mori movements, who have since worked hard to revive.

Phosphor mining on Banaba ( a island in Kiribati ) ruined island ecosystems and forced the indigenous Banabans to flee.

Defense testing floor

Between 1946 and 1958, the US tested nuclear arms in the Marshall Islands. The American military tested gas bombs in Malden Island and Kiritimati, as well as in Australia. These assessments caused serious health issues among islands, including birth defects and tumours, and long-term natural harm.

Indigenous Pacific-led actions have long resisted military and nuclear imperialism in Moananuiākea ( the vast ocean ). The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific action pressed for the 1986 Rarotonga Treaty to create a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Important discussions about Pacific indigenous self-determination were sparked by this approach.

Lately, the Indo-Pacific has become a target yet again for European power. In the UK, the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh sets out the objective of establishing” a permanent German sea presence in the Indo-Pacific” in response to the “epoch-defining problem” of China.

This came after the UK, the US, and Australia launched AUKUS in 2021. This agreement aimed to “deepen political, security, and security assistance in the Indo-Pacific region”. This may include preparing Australia with nuclear-powered boats, to been built by American firms BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce.

How the novel Labour administration may view the Pacific is still to be seen. But in the UK and US’s shared language of a “free and empty Indo-Pacific”, the concerns of Indigenous Pacific islands are usually ignored. ” World protection” and business take precedence, it seems.

Little has changed since the British military’s support of a group of American businessmen’s overthrow of the separate Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893. Despite the fact that Native Hawaiians ( Kenaka Maoli ) have a lot of cultural, spiritual, and ecological significance, the US military started using the Hawaiian island of Kaho’olawe as a bombing range in 1941.

Pushing against RIMPAC

By the middle of the 1970s, the growing Pacific independence movement was beginning to force the US to stop using Kaho’olawe for military training activities, including RIMPAC.

The tension eventually bore fruit when, before Rimpac 1982, Australia and New Zealand agreed never to tank Kaho’olawe. In 1984, Japan followed match.

The Royal Navy firing of Kaho’olawe was brought up in parliament by UK MPs Jeremy Corbyn and Tam Dalyell in 1986. In 1990 all bombing of Kaho’olawe suddenly stopped. However, the bombing’s economic damage may be difficult to stop.

This time, a coalition of Hawaii-based and foreign groups are resisting RIMPAC afterwards.

Through the military’s activity of the islands and environmental damage to lands and waters, group organizers Kawena’ulaokal Kapahua and Joy Lehuanani Enomoto claim that RIMPAC contributes to continuing Aboriginal displacement.

It’s also associated with increased sex trafficking and sexist violence that largely affect Kānaka Maoli girls, girls, and gender-nonconforming individuals.

In a time of extreme violence against Palestinians in Gaza, groups in Hawaii, the US, Aotearoa New Zealand, and Malaysia have condemned their countries ‘ involvement in RIMPAC alongside Israel this year.

A woman wearing jeans and a keffiyeh, and holding a shell, speaks into a microphone to a gathering of people with Cancel RIMPAC protest signs. Near her feet is a sign saying 'Free the people, free the land'. The sign for the Headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet is visible behind the protestors.
Withdraw the press conference for Rimpac on June 17. Israeli Voice for Peace Hawai’i hosted the gathering outside the O’ahu, Hawaii, headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet. Photo: Sara Saastamoinen, CC BY-SA

Defining RIMPAC as an “exercise” – in other words, a model – the strategy argues, obscures its dangerous material results on communities and ecosystems in Hawaii and above.

According to Cancel RIMPAC alliance members, they want to “build on the legacy of previous generations of Kanaka Maoli and Indigenous Pacific-led efforts for demilitarization and colonialism” and” thousands of years of Aboriginal stewardship and ethnic tradition throughout Pasifika.”

In this “multi-generational, multi-racial” movements, they add, global solidarity is important. In this environment, issues need to be asked about the UK’s continued participation in these naval exercises.

Kate Lewis Hood is postdoctoral fellow in landscape, Royal Holloway University of London

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Why the ‘Trump trade’ has Asia in a panic – Asia Times

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TOKYO — Suffice to say, 2024 has n’t turned out the way Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expected.

Rather than being a superstar in Asia, Japan’s economy is skirting crisis. The&nbsp, Bank of Japan&nbsp, still has n’t hiked interest rates, though Tokyo had fully expected a tightening move or two by now.

Instead of coasting to win in September’s Liberal Democratic Party vote, Kishida’s approval rating is stuck in the small 20s. China, which suffers from a deflation, is more of a development drag on Asia than it does a growth engine.

The biggest punch to Kishida’s belief that he knew anything about 2024 is that he is coming from Washington.

Joe Biden’s devastating political discussion with Donald Trump on June 27 was the first. Therefore, Biden’s decision not to work for re-election, leaving Tokyo to know which of its officials may have &nbsp, Kamala Harris‘s telephone number.

As the chances of a Trump-friendly White House rise and drew nearer to the Northern Asian economic perspective, China, South Korea, and Taiwan also face political whims.

In Beijing, Xi Jinping’s government abruptly sees the risk of 60 % across-the-board taxes as a clear and present danger as Trump’s political prospects rise to once-unthinkable rates.

The People’s Bank of China announced a surprise rate cut on Thursday ( July 25 ) amid concerns about slowing growth. The PBOC cut the medium-term lending facility&nbsp, by 20 basis points to 2.3 %.

As Trump attempts to restart trade wars, President Yoon Suk-yeol’s troubled administration in Seoul is immediately playing out losses. Additionally, North Korean authorities may develop emergency plans for Trump to deepen his crazy relationship with Kim Jong Un’s violent regime.

Taiwan, however, senses a&nbsp, great bullseye&nbsp, on its market. Lately, Trump accused Taipei of stealing America’s market share in the US$ 500 billion business of making computer chips. In a Bloomberg interview, &nbsp, the Republican candidate&nbsp, said Taiwan snatched “almost 100 %” of the business. ” We should have never permit that happen”, Trump complained.

Wedbush Securities researcher Dan Ives says that” we have seen a terrible software sell-off post Trump responses to the press.” about enforcing stronger Chinese taxes and protecting Taiwan from China, which caused the Street’s Ban on Semis, AI Revolution labels, and Big Tech.

For today, though, authorities in Tokyo are perhaps the most befuddled about what might lie ahead.

Before then, the ghost of a Trump 2.0 White House had n’t been taken too seriously by&nbsp, Tokyo government. Today, the situation has Japan’s state scrambling to examine the many risks this would cause — starting with Asia’s second-biggest business.

” Japan’s economy is in for a big ‘ Trump shock ‘ if Donald Trump returns to the White House”, says economist Richard&nbsp, Katz, author of&nbsp,” The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future” &nbsp, and the Japan Economy Watch newsletter.

His plan to impose an all-inclusive 10 % tax on all imports and 60 % on imports from China will seriously affect both the delicate global supply chains and the need for Japanese exports, Katz claims.

Katz warns that Trump’s inflationary plans, including more significant tax cuts and tariffs, will force the Fed to raise interest rates beyond what the Reserve currently intends. That, in turn, will put upward pressure on the renminbi”.

These challenges, and other uncertainties, are now complicating the Bank of Japan’s selection at next year ‘s&nbsp, July 30-31&nbsp, plan meeting. Anticipation that Governor Kazuo Ueda’s crew might raise interest rates may actually be overstated.

Now, Ueda confronts conflicting financial currents. On the one hand, the secret market is displaying encouraging signs of recovery, as demonstrated by the rise in the Jibun Bank Flash Japan Composite getting professionals index to 52.6 in July. It marked the fifth straight month of development.

Nevertheless, BOJ representatives notice a decline in consumer spending at a time when the market is only just starting to expand. Tightening today might even end&nbsp, Japan’s best inventory rally&nbsp, in more than 35 times.

This last tidbit explains why BlackRock Inc. is so confident that the BOJ wo n’t act next week. ” We expect an flexible environment to remain in Japan”, Yuichi Chiguchi, chief investment strategist at the Japan component of the country’s biggest asset manager, tells Bloomberg.

Another danger: a skyrocketing change level may unsettle global investors as the so-called “yen-carry business” goes awry. Immediately, investors who borrow cheaply in the yen could sell their positions in high-yielding assets all over, including those in Seoul and Shanghai.

Forex traders ‘ opinions about the BOJ meet next week are much more divided than usual. According to Charu Chanana, head of FX approach at Saxo Capital Markets, “potentially squeezing the yen small posts is a popular approach over the last few times.”

According to Chanana, Fed easing bets coincide with “expected that the Bank of Japan may increase rates further at the July meeting.” This potential change in yield differentials favors the yen.

Takeshi Yamaguchi, an economist at Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities, states that” we believe the economic case for a July rate increase is compelling because more data points to a rise in the underlying inflation trend.”

Meanwhile, Kishida’s political fate is getting renewed attention in the days since Biden bowed out of the election.

Within his party, Kishida is under pressure to “pull a Biden” so that the LDP can find a more dynamic successor. A new prime minister is needed, according to party powerbrokers who believe the country’s fragile economy and a string of finance scandals.

Biden’s political recusal robbed Kishida of a top selling point: a strong relationship with the&nbsp, US leader. Kishida also gained points from trilateral summits with Yoon and Biden as well as his closeness to Biden.

This sort of detente with Seoul disapproves Xi’s Communist Party, which fears that the US, Japan, and South Korea are constructing a democratic bulwark against China. even occasionally involving Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

Biden’s exit complicates Kishida’s way forward. In much of his 33 months in office, Kishida struggled to get his support rates into the 30s, never mind the 20s they’re stuck in now. Even though Japan’s opposition parties are in disarray, the LDP may opt for a new face before September.

Should Trump return, Japan is not without leverage. For one thing, Kishida initiated a big jump in defense spending, heading off what’s sure to be a top Trump priority. For another, Japan is America’s top foreign investor.

” Trump wants Japan to keep investing in the United States”, notes David Boling, an analyst at Eurasia Group. Boling continues,” the United States needs Japan as an ally to effectively counter China.” Advisers to Trump will remind him of Japan’s importance”.

Given that” trade policy is one of Trump’s highest priorities and tariffs are in his genetic makeup, it will be difficult for Japan to avoid higher tariffs if Trump returns to office,” Boling writes.

Should the yen resume its decline, Trump might be even harder on Tokyo. According to Jasmine Duan, senior investment strategist at RBC Wealth Management Asia, the markets will be watching for Trump’s actions to increase the yen’s rise.

Bottom line,” we do n’t think Japan would be the&nbsp, safest market&nbsp, in Asia if Trump is re-elected”, Duan notes.

Trump’s trade dispute may have a far reaching impact beyond Asia. ” For Europe, the prime concern is tariffs”, says Sharon Bell, an analyst at Goldman Sachs. ” Trump has pledged to impose a 10 % tariff on all US imports. According to our economists, the US GDP could be reduced by 0.5 percentage points and by one percentage point from the Euro area.

Each one percentage point drop in sales-weighted gross domestic product could mean a 10 % drop in earnings per share, Bell explains.

The numerous different scenarios that investors must consider before the US election&nbsp, on November 5, add to the confusion factor.

David Roche, president of Quantum Strategy, thinks that Harris leading the Democrats boosts the odds of a Trump victory. However, it also makes it less likely that the Republicans will control both of Congress.

On the other hand, says Charles Myers, founder and CEO of advisory firm Signum Global Policy, Harris could spell trouble for Trump’s election hopes. Myers claims that Harris ‘ nomination as the Democratic nominee” a whole new race” makes it” a whole new.”

” There’s a new candidate with an enormous amount of unity and enthusiasm behind her”, Myers explains. She’ll be a key driver of women, young people, Black voters … I think people will underestimate her, “he added.

Bottom line”, I think that it’s a bit too early for the markets to declare victory for Trump, and I think she’s going to give him a real run for his money,” Myers says.

Anatole Kaletsky, economist at Gavekal Dragonomics, adds that” whatever one thinks of Kamala Harris, her chances of winning the election are certainly higher than were Biden’s. And the remote possibility that the Democrats might agree on another, much better candidate than Harris— while a low-probability&nbsp, tail risk&nbsp, — would transform the likely outcome of the race.”

Kaletsky notes that, until new polls are released and the Democrats ‘ succession is clarified, it is impossible to quantify the scale of this transformation. My guess is that Trump will hold onto his position of authority for the next few weeks, at most until Labor Day’s traditional start of full-scale campaigning. But I think his probability of winning will fall sharply from last week’s 70 % or 80 %&nbsp, in the best election models, to something like 55 %.”

In theory, Tokyo would prefer a Harris victory, viewing it as the best chance of continuity. One of Trump’s biggest fears is that he will continue to try to bury Tokyo for$ 8 billion annually to house US troops ( Trump 1.0 tried unsuccessfully to do that policy ).

Japan also worries that Trump, who is “grand bargain,” may negotiate a “grand bargain” trade agreement with Xi, leaving other important Asian nations staring in the face.

But whether a Trump Trade emerges, or Harris wins the presidency, all that officials in Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul and Taipei thought they knew about the year ahead is no longer clear or certain.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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UK pulls the throttle on Tempest next-gen fighter – Asia Times

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The UK has started building its first sixth-generation warrior lecturer, aiming to subject a next-gen combat aviation by 2035. Despite price concerns with comparable warrior projects and questions of strategic significance in the changing weather energy storage, the UK is still steaming ahead with the program. &nbsp,

This month, the UK Defense Journal reported that the UK’s defense industry, including BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, MBDA UK and the UK Ministry of Defense ( MOD ), has started manufacturing the first Tempest crewed combat air demonstrator.

The Tempest program, announced in July 2022, evaluates innovative technologies like cunning features. Within three decades, it intends to get the plane ready for flight, and it wants to have a fresh battle vehicle by 2035.

Paul Wilde, mind of Tempest at BAE Systems, emphasized the program’s value in maintaining the UK’s combat aviation design and production authority, as stated by UK Defense Journal.

The source claims that the system uses cutting-edge modern methods and has conducted more than 215 hrs of modeling flights in Warton, Lancashire.

The flying systems demonstrationator, according to the UK Defense Journal, may use cutting-edge manufacturing techniques like 3D printing to develop new combat aircraft.

It points out that the Farnborough International Airshow 2024 featured a new concept model with an evolved design as part of the Global Combat Air Program ( GCAP ), which includes the UK, Italy, and Japan, reflecting the rapid development and international collaboration in developing the next-generation fighter jet.

Additionally, Nikkei reported earlier this month that the defence ministries of Japan, the UK, and Italy gathered in London to reiterate their devotion to the GCAP initiative to develop a next-generation fighter aircraft by 2035.

Nikkei claims that the parties established a coordinating system to track the progress of the program despite current concerns about possible cost overruns and a security review by the new British government under Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

The meeting comes as a result of a bilateral deal between Starmer and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, according to the cause.

It points out that the defense pact, which includes provisions for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces ( JSDF) to safeguard UK military assets in non-combat settings, highlights the three countries ‘ growing security ties as a result of China’s and Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine.

Despite having close ties with the US and having the ultimate Tier One companion in the US F-35 system and having nuclear propulsion under the AUKUS framework, the UK decided to pursue an impartial sixth-gen fighter program for a number of reasons.

Trevor Taylor and Isabella Antinozzi make the claim in a May 2024 content for the Royal United Services Institute ( RUSI) that the UK’s desire to establish a prominent defence industrial and technological capacity, with all the advantages it can take to the UK market, supports this claim.

Additionally, Taylor and Antinozzi claim that the UK’s dedication to the GCAP system indicates that it needs to maintain functional autonomy, which necessitates a stable and adaptable system in the country.

Most importantly, they mention that the threat environment beyond 2040 requires a significant capability upgrade from fifth-gen fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, with multiple sixth-gen fighter projects such as the US Next Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) and French-German-Spanish Système de Combat Aérien du Futur (SCAF ) programs.

Defense One points out this month that the GCAP’s opening comes amid questions surrounding the program and American sixth-generation fighter jets in public. A UK established, according to Defense One, declined to sign up for the program as the new UK government’s” strategic security review,” which focuses on a near-term conflict with Russia.

The source mentions US Air Force officials who have questioned the viability of the Next Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) program in contrast to the progress of GCAP.

The NGAD software may be in a downward spiral, according to an article in Asia Times from June 2024. The US Air Force is considering adjustments to the NGAD system as it grapples with budget constraints, cost overruns, technical difficulties and fast-evolving concepts of air supremacy.

Both the US Air Force Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall and the US Air Force Chief of Staff David Allvin have resisted funding the NGAD program. A winner between Lockheed Martin and Boeing is anticipated to be announced this year, but Allvin has stressed that no final decision has been made.

The NGAD program’s slow progress is partly due to delays in Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program and Boeing’s unsatisfactory defense performance. Other contributing factors include Boeing’s management issues and Lockheed Martin’s lack of cost-effective execution incentives.

The high cost of NGAD, at an estimated US$ 300 million per unit, poses a challenge for the US Air Force. The F-35, B-21 Raider, and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) programs are funded in addition to these costs.

Kendall claimed that the fighter could end up with a less expensive, less expensive engine to save the NGAD program, as Defense News reported this month.

According to Defense News, the NGAD will adapt engine technology to adapt to changing flying conditions. The source does point out that earlier attempts to use the technology in the F-35 were thwarted due to its high cost.

According to Kendall, the US Air Force is looking at the NGAD concept to see if it is the right one, whether it can do something less expensive, and accept some trade-offs for lower costs, as reported by Defense News.

However, despite the effort and cost of getting sixth-gen fighter projects off the ground, they might not be the best solution for the evolving aerial threat environment.

The US Air Force is reportedly reviewing the NGAD combat jet this month, and possibly moving it to an unbuilt platform due to budget constraints.

The War Zone notes that NGAD’s future is uncertain amid an 81 % cost surge for the Sentinel ICBM program, now at$ 141 billion.

Kendall emphasized the need for a careful evaluation before beginning the engineering phase of the NGAD, taking into account both cost effectiveness and affordability.

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Israeli democracy as a Gaza war casualty – Asia Times

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The country under his leadership continues its descent away from democracy as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prepares to handle a joint session of the US Congress on July 24, 2024.

Prior to Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the nation was sucked into a long-running argument over government-led measures that threatened to stifle criminal authority.

Following that argument, for the first time, a leading democracy score demoted Israel’s categorization from a “liberal republic” to an “electoral democracy”. The new classification noted that the government’s judicial and legislative responsibilities have declined, as well as the government’s ability to protect civil rights.

Israel is not the only country in the world where democracy is in danger: According to a recent report from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, the state of politics has been declining for the past six decades.

Democracy is associated with three key elements: administration, organisations and individuals ‘ principles. When they appear to be deteriorating, a republic is said to be fast.

According to researchers and social experts, a nation’s democracy can often deteriorate during a protracted conflict. For example, people may lose belief in human organizations, like the authorities, the police and the military. Additionally, political extremism and help for violent values like the use of force frequently become more commonplace in society.

Soon after October 7, there were some flimsy expectations that the attack would lessen internal political animosity and possibly reverse Israel’s political decline. But as the battle against Hamas has continued, the country’s republic has continued to diminish.

Soldiers wearing masks carry a body
Jewish military carry the body of a victim of the Hamas assault on October 10, 2023 in Kibbutz Kfar Aza. Photo: Ap / Erik Marmor via The Talk

Israel’s political complacency

Most assessments of Israel’s political drop tend to focus on Netanyahu’s criminal test for corruption, which is continuing, and his government’s efforts to remove the judiciary of its power to examine and limit government actions.

However, there are more recent developments of authoritarian legislative activities, restrictions on civil society organizations, and the deterioration of underlying democratic norms that have been more important.

For example, in 2018 the government’s legislature, the Knesset, passed a law declaring that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish folks and omitting the concept of political equality for the 21 % of the people that is non-Jewish

Even concerning is the growing share of the population, especially among the young, that supports these exclusive plans. According to a 2016 statement, nearly 40 % of Israelis aged 15 to 24 believed that political freedom should be withheld from Egyptian people.

The 2016 NGO Transparency Law, which makes it more difficult for human rights organizations that receive quarter of their revenue from abroad, places additional operational strain on these companies.

Additionally, each of these things is occurring in the context of Israel’s ongoing employment and rule over the Arab people and their territories. The fight between Jews and Arabs has long been the subject of Netanyahu’s populist speech and management style.

He uses language that emphasizes threats made by Palestinians, both internally and internationally, including his 2015 poll time “warning” that” the Arabs are voting in countryside.”

No surprisingly, the conflict has amplified this speech.

Also, and as the example above illustrate, attempts to undermine political institutions and values have generally centered on Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, both within Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

a white man in a gray suit gestures as he speaks at a lectern
On July 17, 2024, Benjamin Netanyahu lists lawmakers in the Knesset. Photo: AP / Ohad Zwigenberg via The Talk

Limits on completely talk

Since the start of the war, the condition has only gotten worse as a result of the coalition government passing a number of laws restricting legal rights, most notably freedom of speech.

In Israel, a law passed in April allows the state to halt a foreign media outlet’s activities if the prime minister or the secretary of conversation determines that it poses a security risk. Using this law, Israel shut down Al Jazeera, a Qatar-based television channel, in May.

Additionally, the Israeli government seized the AP’s equipment when The Associated Press provided media services to Al Jazeera. Although the equipment was returned following a widespread outcry, including from the White House, this demonstrates how this law affects the freedom of the press.

A proposal for a June legislative proposal would require the dismissal of academic professors who allegedly support or incite terrorism. The bill would impose a punishment without a trial for an offense that has no clear definitions or fair trial. Critics claim that it could be used to silence the opposition.

Another law, currently awaiting a ruling from Israel’s high court over its constitutionality, would give the far-right national security minister broad powers over policing. Critics worry that it could be used to impose sanctions on those who oppose government action.

People claim they have abstained from participating in public demonstrations because they fear police violence as a result of this direct ministerial intervention in police affairs. Moreover, this legislation appears to politicize the police, which is supposed to be an independent institution in a democracy.

an apparently unconscious young man is being dragged
On June 15, 2024, Israeli police dragged a man away from a protest against Benjamin Netanyahu’s administration in Tel Aviv. Photo: Photo: AP / Maya Alleruzzo via The Conversation

Illiberal sentiment

A growing number of Jewish citizens in Israel wanted a strong leader who was not easily influenced by the media or public opinion even before the war started.

A rise in militarism and illiberal sentiment resulted from the shock of the surprise attack and Hamas ‘ brutality. In the first month of the war, for example, there were 18, 000 calls for Gaza to be “flattened”, “erased” or “destroyed” in Hebrew posts on the social media platform X, The New York Times reported, citing FakeReporter, an Israeli group that monitors disinformation and hate speech.

As the fighting has progressed and Israelis in general have come together around the war and its objectives, this sentiment has n’t subsided. Two-thirds of Jewish Israelis oppose humanitarian aid to Gaza, according to a poll conducted in February 2024, while 42 % claim that Israel should not abide by international humanitarian laws or international laws of war.

Netanyahu is the main threat to Israeli democracy, despite Israeli protests and claims that he is prolonging the war and keeping him in power, according to my opinion. These, I fear, will outlive Netananyu and the war.

Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch is associate professor of political science and legal studies, Suffolk University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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North Korea is winning its youth information war – Asia Times

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Two opposing perceptions of North Korea’s younger technology have been presented to the outside world.

In the outside media, children are portrayed as rebel and dramatic, ignoring the Kim regime’s increasingly severe crackdowns on international media and trends, and rather toting the latest North Vietnamese fashion trends and adopting North Vietnamese lingo.

However, position advertising perpetuates the notion that young people in North Korea are incredibly committed to Kim Jong Un and the government.

Both conceptions of North Korea’s younger technology fail to acknowledge a more sophisticated reality.

Kim Jong Un is aware of the importance of winning over the younger generation in order to maintain his administration’s life. Since coming into strength, Kim has increased the magnitude of consequences for importing, distributing and consuming international press. This stale details environment amplifies the effectiveness of a youth-focused youth-loyalty campaign intended to be a bear hug to the younger generation.

As a consequence, when compared with older groups, North Korean children have a more positive perspective of the government, juche philosophy, and Kim Jong Un himself. In summary, the plan is successful.

A revitalized international media transmission strategy is needed to split the deadlock and win the battle over hearts and minds. Despite the dangers, North Koreans continue to be very interested in foreign press. Study shows that those who consume tend to feel more warmly about South Korea and see the North Vietnamese government thoroughly.

European media provide a strong foundation for a common knowledge of concepts like animal rights and civil society and can serve as a strong foundation for regime propaganda. A revitalized approach should focus on content collection and modern propagation methods to maximize energy and decrease blowback for end users in North Korea.

There are two types of the children of North Korea.

The outside world is presented with two very distinct narratives of North Korea’s children. On the one hand, the state media in North Korea portrays the country’s youth and twenty-somethings as steadfast supporters of the “revolutionary” produce led by Kim Jong Un. But, on the other hand, illegal balances hint that these youngsters are extremely questioning the faithful orientation that represented prior generations.

The youth’s ideological orientation speaks to the regime’s long-term viability, prospects for reconciliation with the international community, and a soft landing: change from within, which does n’t lead to bloodshed, more than just an academic discussion.

Kim Jong Un’s decision approach necessitates that he inculcates the children to feel the outside world is a hostile area. His autocratic control is legitimized by this assault mentality. The challenge for young people’s hearts and minds — pitting passion for the Marshal against South Korean K-Pop — is live, and there are reasons to think that the government has taken a pleasant result.

Let’s begin by examining the two distinct ways that younger people in North Korea are depicted.

In the government’s version, the children are doting and obedient, aspiring above all else to make the affection and approval of Marshall Kim Jong Un. The Kim dynasty and the state media would make the world think that its young people are unquestionably committed to the ideals of socialism, juche ideology, and the Kim dynasty.

A recent Rodong Sinmun article showcased a glossy propaganda scene rife with symbolism: children at Mangyongdae Schoolchildren’s Palace “burst into cheers full of great excitement” when Kim Jong Un arrived. For his enjoyment, children danced and sang “full of excitement and joy” in their own costumes.

This performance reportedly reflects the determination of the children to become “young revolutionaries and patriots … guaranteeing that the Juche revolution is full of vitality”. Kim Jong Un served as a representative of” the mightiness of Korean-style socialism” while the “bright laughing of children” served as a representation of his role as the “benevolent father.”

But other sources reveal that not all children are as devoted as the regime wants us to believe. When they watched a well-known South Korean drama called” Full House,” North Korean children first encountered a song called” Three Bears.” Youngsters adapted the lyrics of the song to insult the Kim regime, singing:” Grandpa bear]Kim Il Sung ] is fat, papa bear]Kim Jong Il ] is also fat, and baby bear]Kim Jong Un] is foolish”.

Representatives from the Socialist Youth League were dispatched to catch and discipline students found singing the song or possessing foreign media in response. This was in 2015. However, traditional patterns are sadly lost. In 2022, Youth League monitors were again tasked with busting students for singing mocking, satirical versions of revolutionary North Korean songs and embracing South Korean music.

In fact, since a famine in the middle of the 1990s broke the social contract between the state and society, millennials have been referred to as the jangmadang ( market ) generation because of their resistance to state ideology and proclivity for adopting South Korean fashion, slang, and even dating culture.

This version of freewheeling youngsters conflicts with the version described by Kim Jong Un and broadcast in state media. Which is the truth, then? A careful analysis suggests that these conflicting characterizations represent extreme ends of the spectrum and both fail to reflect the complex reality.

North Korea recently increased penalties for those who speak the language of South Korea, which suggests that the government is trying to keep an ideological hold on the populace. A new law is especially telling. The anti-reactionary thought law, which was passed in 2020 and amended in 2022, “describes South Korean movies, dramas, news, and other outside content ] as ] reactionary thought and culture.”

Those caught with the banned content are subjected to heightened punishments: six years to life of reform through labor for consuming, and ten years or even death for importing or distributing.

Additionally, the law forbids the use of South Korean expressions like “older brother” and adding the honorific suffix “nim” to titles when addressing others. These phrasings are signifiers of South Korean influence that diminish the more stodgy and rigid North Korean values and conventions.

The law forbids” citizens from imitating puppet style ] South Korean intonation by raising and lengthening their intonationation obsequiously, lilting, and nauseatingly in aegyo speech.” Anyone who has watched South Korean movies or dramas knows what this is referring to.

While bribery and corruption have reduced the impact of previous crackdowns, this one is having a stronger impact: Video footage shows two teenage boys serving 12-years of hard labor in a show trial in front of hundreds of classmates for the crime of consuming South Korean media.

This is part of a larger trend that has its roots at the inception of Kim’s rule. In an effort to combat the flow of foreign media and information, Kim Jong Un oversaw the establishment of the Central 109 Inspection Command of The State Security Department ( now known as Group 109 ).

Since then, 85 % of respondents said that punishments are tougher now for consuming foreign media than they were under Kim Jong Il, according to a 2018 survey by the US Agency for Global Media.

According to a poll conducted by InterMedia of 350 refugees who left the nation between 2016 and 2018, two-thirds of North Koreans “personally experienced an inspection by Group 109.” North Korea ranked dead last in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders.

North Korean refugees provide the most reliable information on this subject, but sadly, the number of people who have escaped has dramatically decreased since the Covid border lockdown. Much information is therefore out of date. Only as the border opens, will we be able to better understand how things have changed recently.

North Korea’s not-so-radical youth

Analysis of other defector surveys paints a much more complex picture than the persistent presence of North Korean interest in foreign media, which suggests that North Koreans are largely rejecting the regime’s narratives and ideology in favor of more entertaining foreign alternatives.

In particular, the younger generation is overall more positive toward the regime, juche ideology, and Kim Jong Un compared with older cohorts, according to defector surveys conducted by Seoul National University ( SNU).

A higher proportion of North Korean defectors in their 20s and 30s viewed Kim Jong Un as the country’s most popular leader from 2011 to 2020 than their elders did. Twenty and 30-somethings were also less likely to report hearing criticism about the government and the leader compared with those in their forties, fifties, and sixties.

The young generation had less pride in juche in 2014 than the older generation. But that dynamic flipped in 2020: over half of the young respondents had” a lot” of or” some” pride in juche, while the majority of older respondents had” not much” or “none”.

What justifies these surprising discoveries? There are a few factors at play. First, the Kim regime has launched a youth loyalty initiative to win back from Kim Jong Un and the party.

Young people are a captive and malleable audience. The days of students are jam-packed with Kim family history and ideological training, labor mobilizations, organizational activities, and criticism sessions.

The exploits of Kim Il Sung, expounded in a massive eight-part memoir, are akin to a Homeric epic that is genuinely entertaining to North Korean students. According to North Korean refugee Jae Young Kim, the book is even more challenging to borrow from the library because of its popularity.

One North Korean refugee turned activist, Kang Chol Hwan, described his childhood perception of Kim Il Sung as a” Father Christmas” who gifted children sweets and school uniforms. This education gave Kang, who would later be sent to a political prison camp and then defect,” a wellspring of admiration and gratitude for our political leaders and in the willingness to sacrifice everything for them.”

The foreign media crackdown is another factor. Although there is conflicting evidence regarding whether or not consumption has decreased in recent years, former US special envoy for North Korean human rights Ambassador Robert King contends that the crackdown has discouraged “more casual use of foreign media.”

This ca n’t help but have knock-on effects. Consuming foreign information slowly but surely alters the viewpoint of the North Korean people. Those who consume foreign media tend to have more negative feelings about the North Korean government and its intentions, according to surveys conducted by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland for their book” Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea”.

Significantly, after Kim Jong Un’s increased crackdown on foreign media, survey respondents increased their likelihood of finding state media to be credible ( over 70 % ), while the percentage of skeptical people decreased to about 20 %.

The lack of disconfirming sources no doubt plays a role in youth’s perceptions. Consensusting foreign information has the effect of enhancing kinship ties between North and South. Nearly three-quarters of respondents said their perception of South Korea “improved a lot” after consuming South Korean media, according to a 2020 SNU survey.

Given that Kim Jong Un recently declared that North Korea would no longer pursue unification and labeled South Korea as the North’s “number one enemy,” the ability to improve South Korea’s image is especially relevant.

Finally, young people tend to have rose-colored glasses when looking at the government, compared with the older cohorts, because they have yet to spend any significant time in the sphere of North Korean life that tends to lead to the most antipathy towards the regime: the markets.

During Kim Jong Un’s rule, there has been a rise and remain high in the proportion of North Koreans who participate in the unofficial market economy, but there has been a steady decline in the proportion of respondents who participate in the official ( state ) economy. More significantly, only a tiny minority of respondents ( 13 % ) earn enough money per month to buy a single kilogram of rice from their state jobs, the SNU survey reveals.

This implies that the majority of people rely on market earnings for their household income, which places the state as a burden on their way of life rather than a resource. In fact, respondents spent an average of 20 % of their earnings on bribes and 46 % of people identified “bribes and crackdowns” as the greatest difficulty for their economic activity.

This explains why the older “money-making” generations in North Korea have resisted the regime. In contrast, the younger cohorts are busy with school and compulsory military service through their early 30s and therefore have yet to encounter the regime in this light.

Next steps

Despite Kim Jong Un’s severe crackdowns and harsh punishments, North Korean people remain interested in outside media. This presents a chance. Increasing the quantity and availability of foreign information inside North Korea will be crucial for:

  • establishing a civil society, planting the seeds,
  • challenging state propaganda that demonizes the outside world,
  • educating people about their human rights in North Korea.
  • increasing feelings of kinship with South Korea and
  • creating conditions that can result in a long-term soft landing, making the peninsula a more stable and prosperous place for all Koreans.

It’s especially important to reach young North Koreans to counteract the Kim regime’s information blockade and loyalty campaign, which have proven surprisingly effective. The North Korean Human Rights Act of the United States authorizes funding for information programs.

The last iteration of the law authorized the government to spend$ 3 million per year to increase” the availability of sources of information not controlled by the Government of North Korea”. Although the law has bipartisan support, it expired in September 2022 and has not yet been reauthorized.

Reauthorization bills have been introduced multiple times, for example in the House by Congresswoman Young Kim (R-California ) and Congressman Ami Bera (D-California ) and in the Senate by Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida ) and Senator Tim Kaine (D-Virginia ), but each of these efforts have ultimately foundered.

The National Endowment for Democracy funded a number of innovative initiatives, many of which were based in South Korea and were led by North Korean refugees, in order to reach the North Korean people through radio news programs in 2021.

A focus on both content and method is required to enhance North Korea’s foreign media presence. It will only be possible to outcompete regime propaganda if the content succeeds in meeting the needs, gaining the trust, and provoking the curiosity of the North Korean people.

According to a 2019 survey by Unification Media Group, when asked what types of media North Koreans need the most, the most widely received response was “news about South Korean society” ( 41.5 % ), followed by “entertainment programs made in South Korea” ( 18 % ).

Radio broadcasts that feature North Korean defectors provide a familiar voice that North Koreans can relate to. Heavy-handed content that explicitly criticizes the regime is counterproductive because it resembles North Korean propaganda and poses a risk to any North Koreans who consume it.

On the other hand, entertaining and straightforward depictions of ordinary South Koreans going about their lives with the freedom to choose their own jobs and vote for their own government officials can be subtly radicalizing.

Actionable content, such as market prices and weather forecasts, can also help to establish a foundation of trust, allowing for the introduction of topics like universal human rights and civil society.

Content should also be differentiated for audiences, as in the case of VOA’s Korean targeting elites.

Also, methods for distributing information need to be rethought and revitalized. With the border largely sealed, the most effective way to inject information into the country is currently radio broadcasts. However, radio is impeded by signal jamming, and surveys indicate that the older generation favors radio.

Distributing the kind of content favored by the young, like hallyu pop music and K-dramas, is typically done manually over the border via memory sticks like USBs and micro SDs. Although overused, distributors can now make money from this method. However, it is dangerous and very risky. To get around this, innovative new concepts like utilizing satellite technology or decentralized mesh networks should be looked into.

In this game of cat and mouse with the authorities, the key is to replace old, discoverable methods with new, innovative ones faster than the regime can keep up. Each method must also be carefully examined to make sure it is simple to use, deployable, and protects end users from detection. A balance must also be struck to avoid provoking too forceful a response from the regime.

Conclusion

Kim Jong Un is aware that winning the hearts and minds of his country’s youth is a crucial step in ensuring the continued rule of his family. For now, Kim has the edge. However, if they play it right, outside actors who want to spread foreign media within North Korea, such as those from the US and South Korea, can win.

Doing so can help foster the rudiments of a civil society capable of seeing through the Kim regime’s lies and imagining a brighter future.

The Korea Society’s director of policy is also a professor at SUNY Stony Brook University and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Chelsie Alexandre is the policy program officer at The Korea Society. At SUNY Stony Brook University, Alexander Tufto is a political science student.

First published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. Read the original here, complete with endnotes and charts.

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Australia’s ANZ faces fire for alleged market manipulation – Asia Times

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The Australian Securities and Investments Commission ( ASIC ) is looking into ANZ in light of serious allegations that the bank manipulated the market when it facilitated a$ 14 billion ( US$ 9.2 billion ) sale of government bonds in April of last year.

ASIC has today officially stated that it believes ANZ acted unlawfully. ASIC chair Joe Longo told the Australian Financial Review on Tuesday,” We are talking about you.

The CEO of ANZ has the right to define how he would describe it, but it is clear that it is an research, which means we must by definition believe there is a violation of the law.

Earlier this month, ANZ launched its own domestic investigation into alleged misconduct in its industry sector. ANZ says it is treating the claims” with the highest severity” and has engaged additional constitutional lawyers to help with its studies.

ANZ has also been accused of increasing the value of its bond buying by billions of dollars in order to get “lucrative” government mandates that come from large-scale trading.

Tie markets? State demands? You’d be forgiven for feeling a little lost.

On its encounter, the alleged crime might seem very mystical and professional. However, the Australian Financial Review has suggested that the dispute might turn into” the biggest incident” in ANZ’s 182-year story.

To be clear, these are claims amid an ongoing research by Australia’s business regulation. However, it’s crucial to comprehend exactly what the lender has been accused of doing here and how what transpires in the relationship sector has the power to affect everyone.

It’s all about federal borrowing

You need a thorough understanding of a transaction that sounds a little dry-sounding and quite routine in order to understand the allegations made against ANZ.

The state of Australia frequently takes out loans. It does this by selling so-called “bonds” to shareholders.

An investor purchases a bond, which was once a piece of paper but is now electronic, and in exchange receives (usually fixed ) interest payments known as” coupons,” one each month or year.

At the issuance of the tie, get it after three years, ten years, 20 years or more, the trader gets her or his money again.

You do n’t need to know everything about how bonds function. Bonds are only available on the open market, meaning that their value is shift, and that investors can buy them to other investors.

The investors ‘ returns are a result of both ( a ) receiving those coupons and ( b ) the difference between the amount they spend on the bond and the final principal amount when the bonds are due.

The price of the friendship will drop if standard interest rates rise above the bond’s coupon rate. Because the bond simply would n’t pay enough in comparison to what they want from an investment with that much risk.

Likewise, if standard interest rates fall, the relationship price is likely to walk.

An Australian Office of Financial Management ( AOFM), a branch of the Commonwealth Treasury, issues new government bonds. In order to conduct significant relationship sales, AOFM normally appoints a bank or banks to oversee the process and communicate with investors.

The state contracted ANZ to maintain a sizable A$ 14 billion bond sales in April 2023. ANZ was given access to sensitive information, including information about when the giving do take place.

ANZ was required to purchase bonds from investors who wanted to trade them for new bonds as part of the position. The value of those securities may depend on the gain that investors want from government bonds. Remember that a bond’s value drops if it receives an unrequited gain in excess of what is needed. So, if the expected return increases, the cost ANZ has to spend decreases.

You might have heard the notion: purchase low and sell high. Also, ANZ reportedly sought to do just that.

It is claimed that ANZ allegedly tried to raise bond yields by investing in what is known as the “futures industry,” a market that essentially allows traders to place bets on upcoming interest rate movements.

These wagers even affect the reference rate that determines the cost of new ties. Because the government uses the futures level to determine the profit the business needs for its debt and determine the bond issuer’s coupon rate.

If that prospects price climbs, then so too does the discount price on the government’s new relationship issues. This increases the government’s overall interest costs.

Image: ASIC Chairman Joe Longo. &nbsp, Photo: Lukas Koch / AAP via The Talk

ANZ is accused of manipulating future yields to get it to buy bonds from investors for a lower rate.

ANZ supposedly then reversed its future trades, allowing the price of the securities it held to rise and the general interest rate to fall, earning a profit.

If the claims are accurate, ANZ did have engaged in both insider trading and market manipulation. This would be outlawed.

According to the Australian Financial Review, trading information details to unexpected price moves on and around April 19 of last year.

Up until the relationship was issued on April 19, the data shows that bond prices had risen (yields had risen ), then produces had dropped, leading to a rise in bond rates.

But it’s important to notice this diagram says nothing about cause. Charges may have decreased for reasons related to ANZ.

Exaggerated achievement

ANZ has also been accused of overstating its investing success to the state, to secure rewarding friendship control options.

Based on their trading of government bonds and their skills, the state chooses managers. It is claimed that ANZ falsely reported how much buying it did.

According to the Australian Financial Review, ANZ told the government it had “facilitated”$ 137.6 billion in bond trades to the year ended June 2023, when it had really only facilitated$ 83.2 billion – a discrepancy of$ 54.4 billion.

Although it may seem far removed from daily life, what happens on the bond market has the ability to have an impact on everyone.

If found to be true, ANZ’s reported deception was reportedly had cost citizens as much as A$ 80 million. That number reflects how much more interest the government may be required to pay if it issued bonds with higher interest rates than they needed to.

Mark Humphery-Jenner is associate professor of funding, UNSW Sydney

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Harris has decidedly different view on Gaza than Biden – Asia Times

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The Democratic Party’s units have been brought under the light by Benjamin Netanyahu’s attend to Washington because of the conflict in Gaza.

After Joe Biden’s departure from the presidential race, the presumed Democratic nominee, Kamala Harris, inherits a socially thorny topic. Since the Hamas problems in October 2023, the president has been plagued by this problem.

Harris will have to strike a tricky balance between defending the performance of an management in which she still serves and explaining how she would graph a unique path for Israel and Palestine.

In democratic lines, the evil president’s report on the subject and her choice to not rule over Netanyahu’s talk in Congress have stoked hope that she may take a tougher stance toward Israel. Such a change may be necessary to persuade pro-Palestinian voters who are dissatisfied with Biden to support her in November.

Vice leaders frequently cross the party line when it comes to international politics. However, Harris has spoken out exceedingly openly about US policy toward the Middle East. In December, for instance, she delivered a discourse in Dubai after meeting with leaders of many Arab states. She expressed concern about the severity of the anguish experienced by Gaza’s citizens in the conversation.

She did restate the Biden administration’s place regarding Israel’s right to defend itself against Hamas. She added that “international charitable rules may be respected,” which implies that Israel’s behavior was at risk of deviating from that standard. ” As Israel defends itself, it matters how”, she said.

Harris became the first senior administration official to visit for an “immediate stalemate” in March. She was again strong in her condemnation of the Jewish administration’s handling of the charitable aspects of its combat, which had led to “inhumane conditions” in Gaza.

Harris made the statement:” Our popular society compels us to act. We must act. Our strong society compels us to act.” She urged Netanyahu’s administration to “do more to considerably improve the flow of support.” No mistakes”.

Honestly, according to normal political theory, Harris will have a difficult time putting together any agreement between her and Biden to win the November election. The US consumer is said to know much, and treatment less, about foreign affairs. But, when most people enter polling stalls, it is kitchen-table problems – inflation, interest rates and immigration – that determine who wins their vote.

In fact, between 10 % and 20 % of Americans rate any foreign policy issue as the most pressing issue facing the nation. Citizens are three times more likely to be concerned with financial problems.

The pro-Palestinian presentations on university campuses earlier this year and the ones in Washington this year may thus exaggerate the significance of a topic that only appeals to a small minority of people.

Leadership elements

However, recent research suggests that these figures may be a false reflection of how people evaluate political individuals. In reality, voters tend to worry less about certain issues than whether a applicant has the appropriate personal traits to be a successful commander-in-chief.

Harris’s remarks regarding the conflict may enable her establish a broader reputation as a leader who is willing to defend specific principles on the international stage, such as the necessity of upholding international laws and protecting human rights. This would be in stark contrast to Donald Trump’s location.

Trump and Biden repeatedly demanded that Israel “finish the job” without additional limits from Washington during their now-infamous 2024 conversation in June, and they showed no sign of concerns about the way Israel pursued its conflict with Hamas.

This is crucial because we are aware that while foreign policy does not play a significant role in polling, it has been shown that if voters are given a choice between individuals, it will have an impact on elections.

The alternative in 2024 is between a member who is determined to defend the rules-based global order and one who has a track record of undermining it, according to Harris and Trump’s posts on Israel.

There is also a straightforward scientific justification for why this may question in November. The results of this year’s presidential poll are likely to be in a few states, with great margins.

These include Michigan, where more than 100, 000 younger voters and Muslim Americans demonstrated their frustration with the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict in Gaza by casting “uncommitted” votes in the country’s Democratic primary in February. This in a state that Trump won in 2016 by just 11, 000 votes ( but lost in 2020 ).

The place Harris takes on Gaza might be enough to tip the scale in these must-win tribes, even if foreign policy changes only a few seats on a national level.

Where does this keep Joe Biden?

Assuming he does not bow to pressure from Republican critics calling for his departure, Biden will also serve as commander-in-chief for another six weeks. President in the final years of office must also consider the political calendar when making decisions about war and peace, as I’ve already stated in a new book.

Like many of his successors, Biden is likely to switch to international policy as a means of cementing his reputation. A tempting scenario might become reached regarding a ceasefire in Gaza. If the leadership were able to broker a deal between Hamas and Israel before the vote, it would also benefit Harris by lessening the impact of a contentious social problem.

Biden ( belatedly ) aims to become the transitional president he once promised to be after stepping aside in favor of his vice president. On Israel, he may indeed be the last of his sort.

Harris might serve as a bridge between the Democrat leadership of the Biden generation, who has a strong personal connection to Israel, and a younger generation of progressives who are much more open to criticizing the Jewish government’s policies.

Andrew Payne teaches at City University of London on international policy and safety.

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Harris’s ‘brat’ summer: How memes can juice a campaign – Asia Times

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A number of stars rushed to support Kamala Harris when she was chosen as the new Democrat party nominee, but one has attracted much more media interest than the others. Charli XCX, a song, endorsed Harris in her personal minimalistic post on X, saying that “kamala IS a brat.”

The article went viral about suddenly, with millions of views, and Harris’s personal X accounts switching its colors to bright wallpaper – the color of the album cover for Charli’s new album, Brat.

The internet is thriving on innovation and inside quips. That’s partly why cartoons – a pretty middle-aged sensation that initially originated in the 1990s – are still going strong, while we’ve long seen the rear of Bebo, Vine and Clubhouse. ( What are those, you ask? My point precisely ).

Cartoons have grown to be a significant tool for political contact because of their popularity. In my research, I have identified four functions of cartoons: social mindbombs, fast-food media, daily jargon and a calm system. Kamala Harris ‘ support by Charlie XCX is the epitome of “political mindbomb.”

The word “political mindbomb” was coined by the co-founder of Greenpeace, Bob Hunter, who claimed that a strong visual communication can slice through the noise and change the minds of people – not quickly, but in the long run.

Image: Lawrence Jackson/Made with Canva, Creative Commons BY

He cited a photo of a bleeding whale attempting to flee a hunting ship as an illustration. He sent the heartbreaking image to media outlets, where readers from all over the world can be affected, and he hopes to inspire them to vote or protest whaling one day.

When Kamala Harris was announced as “brat”, the suit-wearing, experienced and sharp vice-president received a gift of vibes, rather than something concrete. The seriousness of Charli XCX’s statement explaining Harris ‘ suitability for the top position in the nation would not have had the same impact as viral potency.

The three words, written by a 31-year-old British pop singer, are cryptic for some internet users. You must have been keeping an eye on Charli’s album’s recent coverage and the coveted brat aesthetic in publications like Vogue this July to fully comprehend what is actually being discussed. But as with any good meme, “brat” is defined by incompleteness.

When I explain memes to my students, I often use the metaphor of a half-baked joke. The reader must finish the sentence and understand why the creation of an image with excessive text, such as a good meme, is intended to be funny, irreverent, or sarcastic.

You need to know some context, some popular culture, some internet or lifestyle slang. A good meme is not for everyone, and this closed-community feel makes them precious.

As Charli XCX’s definition of “brat,” a bold move that attempts to make fun of and relatability work with one of the most powerful women in the US today.

Because of the complex effects memes and viral culture had on political candidates in the past, Harris ‘ team may be embracing memes.

In 2016, the treatment of memes by the Democrats could have been called heavy-handed. Many now associate the” Pepe the Frog” meme – a laid-back green cartoon frog known for the speech bubble “feels good man” – with right-wing nationalism.

However, it was a startling meme about social awkwardness before becoming famous when Hillary Clinton’s office posted about Pepe the Frog’s connection to the alt-right movement, cementing its cultural significance.

In another instance, UK Labor politician Ed Miliband’s awkward eating of a bacon sarnie, generally associated with working-class cafes, generated a whirlpool of memes that questioned his relatability to the general public and may have cost him the election.

A word of caution, though: Memes are always subversive, they cannot communicate complex and progressive ideas with consistency. Their very nature of sarcasm, irony and jester-like playfulness makes them a dangerous tool for a politician.

A person who believed memes would benefit them can quickly be turned against them. Despite what you might think, riding a bit of a viral wave of awe and surprise and exploring the hidden playfulness of a serious political candidate does feel somewhat “brat” in any way.

Anastasia Denisova is a University of Westminster senior lecturer in journalism.

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Long Covid puzzle pieces reveal an unsettling picture – Asia Times

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Long Covid-19, a condition that affects millions of people’s health and quality of life worldwide, has since spread to a large number of people, costing economies billions of dollars in employee performance losses and labor declines in general.

The extensive clinical research that Covid sparked has resulted in more than 24, 000 scientific papers, making it the most extensively researched medical problem in any four years of human history.

Long Covid is a term used to describe the series of long-term health results brought on by SARS-CoV-2 disease. These range from prolonged respiratory ailments, such as shortness of breath, to debilitating stress or mental cloud that boundaries people’s ability to work, and problems such as heart failure and diabetes, which are known to last a lifetime.

Since the start of the pandemic, I have been deeply immersed in long-term Covid research. I am a physician scientist. I have extensively researched long Covid, testified before the US Senate, and was named one of Time’s 100 most influential people in health in 2024 for my research in this field.

A flurry of reports and scientific papers on long Covid over the first half of 2024 made this complex condition more clear. These include, among other things, new insights into how Covid-19 continues to wreak havoc on many organs years after the initial viral infection, as well as new research on viral persistence and immune dysfunction that persist for months or years after the initial infection.

Computer-generated image of coronavirus inside lungs surrounded by multiple copies of the virus.
Early on in the pandemic, the SARS-CoV-2 virus seemed to be primarily wreaking havoc on the lungs. However, it was quickly apparent to researchers that it was having an impact on numerous organs in the body. Image: Uma Shankar sharma / Moment via Getty Images/ The Conversation

How long does COVID last on a person’s body?

On July 17, 2024, a new study that my colleagues and I published in the New England Journal of Medicine revealed a decrease in the risk of long Covid over the course of the pandemic.

In 2020, when the ancestral strain of SARS-CoV-2 was dominant and vaccines were not available, about 10.4 % of adults who got Covid-19 developed long Covid. By early 2022, when the omicron family of variants predominated, that rate declined to 7.7 % among unvaccinated adults and 3.5 % of vaccinated adults. In other words, people without vaccinations had twice as much of a chance of developing long Covid.

Researchers like me do not yet have precise figures for the current rate in mid-2024 due to the time it takes for long Covid cases to be reflected in the data, but the flow of new patients into long Covid clinics has been on par with 2022.

We discovered that the decline was brought on by the availability of vaccines and changes in the virus ‘ characteristics, which made it less likely to develop severe acute infections and may have decreased its capacity to survive long enough to lead to chronic disease.

Despite the decline in risk of developing long Covid, even a 3.5 % risk is substantial. Millions of new long Covid cases are created each year as a result of new and repeated Covid-19 infections, which add to the staggering number of people who are affected by this condition.

According to estimates for the first year of the pandemic, at least 65 million people worldwide have experienced long Covid. My team will soon release updated estimates of the global burden of long Covid and its impact on the global economy through 2023, along with a group of other leading scientists.

Additionally, a significant new report from the National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine lists every health effect that goes along with long Covid. The Social Security Administration requested the report to understand the impact of long-term care on the benefits for disabled people.

It comes to the conclusion that long Covid is a multifaceted chronic condition with more than 200 health effects that can be experienced by all body types. These include new onset or worsening:

Long Covid can affect people of all ages, from young children to older adults, as well as people of all races, ethnicities, and baseline health status. Importantly, more than 90 % of people with long Covid had mild Covid-19 infections.

The National Academies ‘ report added that long after an initial infection, a person can be unable to return to work or school, have a bad quality of life, be unable to do daily living activities, or have their physical and cognitive function decline for months or years.

The report points out that many health effects of long Covid, such as post-exertional malaise and chronic fatigue, cognitive impairment and autonomic dysfunction, are not currently captured in the Social Security Administration’s Listing of Impairments, yet may significantly affect an individual’s ability to participate in work or school.

YouTube video

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Many people go on COVID for years after the initial infection.

A long road ahead

What’s more, health problems resulting from Covid-19 can last years after the initial infection.

A significant study conducted in the first year of the study’s publication in early 2024 discovered that even people who had a mild SARS-CoV-2 infection still had new health issues related to Covid-19 in the third year after the initial infection.

Similar findings follow other studies that have demonstrated that the virus persists in various organ systems for months or years following Covid-19 infection. And research has shown that immune responses to a mild infection persist for up to three years. Together, these studies may explain why a SARS-CoV-2 infection years ago could still cause new health problems long after the initial infection.

Important progress is also being made in understanding the mechanisms by which long Covid wreaks havoc on the body. Two recent studies from the US and the Netherlands demonstrated that when researchers transfer auto-antibodies, which are directed at a person’s own tissues and organs, from long Covid-like people into healthy mice, the animals begin to experience long Covid-like symptoms like muscle weakness and poor balance.

These studies suggest that long Covid may be caused by an abnormal immune response that is thought to be the source of these auto-antibodies, and that removing these auto-antibodies may have potential as treatments.

An ongoing threat

Despite overwhelming evidence of the extensive risks of Covid-19, a lot of the messaging suggests that it is no longer a threat to the general public. Although there is n’t any empirical proof to support this, the general public has been persuaded by this false information.

The data, however, tells a different story.

More hospitalizations and fatalities are caused by Covid-19 infections than the flu, which still outnumber the number of cases. Covid-19 also leads to more serious long-term health problems. It is untrue to label Covid-19 as an inconsequential cold or to compare it to the flu.

Ziyad Al-Aly is Chief of Research and Development, VA St. Louis Health Care System. Clinical Epidemiologist, Washington University in St. Louis

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Why is US manufacturing so unproductive? – Asia Times

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Throughout the 2010s, many people – including myself – treated it as a truism that manufacturing industries have faster productivity growth than service industries.

Historically that was true, and the reason wasn’t hard to grasp – machines improve faster than human beings do, so industries that depended on better machines naturally tended to advance faster than labor-intensive service industries.

But this particular piece of conventional wisdom stopped being true over a decade ago. In 2011, manufacturing productivity in the US hit a ceiling, and has actually declined in the years since:

Joey Politano has a good post where he breaks this productivity stagnation down by industry and shows that it holds true across industries in general. Here’s his key graph:

Source: Joey Politano

Importantly, this manufacturing slowdown isn’t mirrored by a general labor productivity slowdown across the economy! Service industries have been picking up the slack here, and keeping labor productivity growth going:

Service productivity rising faster than manufacturing productivity runs counter to many of the narratives you see in economics and policy debates. But it appears to be the reality for the last 13 years.

Americans seem to be waking up to the fact that something is wrong here. Greg Ip had a good chart showing that the stagnation in manufacturing productivity isn’t worldwide – the US and Japan have done uniquely badly since 2009:

Source: WSJ

A word of caution here: This data is cobbled together from various different sources. One or more of those sources might have major problems, and even if not, they might make different methodological choices that make them not directly comparable (for example, including subcontractors or not).

But the stagnation is so broadly distributed across manufacturing industries that it’s pretty clear something big is going on here. Anyone who wants to revive the US manufacturing sector, for national security purposes or otherwise, needs to worry about the possibility that something is going especially wrong with the American system.

Did the problems begin earlier?

In fact, the troubles might have begun well before 2011, and simply been masked by two other forces: 1) Moore’s Law, and 2) China.

You’ll notice in Politano’s chart that one sector dominated manufacturing productivity growth from 1987 to 2005 – “computer and electronics.” A landmark 2014 paper by Houseman et al. showed just how crucial this sector was to US manufacturing in that era:

Manufacturing output statistics mask divergent trends within the sector…Real value-added in the computer and electronic products industry, which includes computers, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and other electronic products manufacturing, grew at a staggering rate of 22% per year from 1997 to 2007…Real value-added declined in seven industries over the decade…[W]ithout the computer and electronic products industry, which accounted for just 10 to 13 percent of value-added throughout the decade, manufacturing output growth in the United States was relatively weak.

And almost all of the growth in that sector was due to quality improvements — the US wasn’t producing more computers and computer chips, but thanks to Moore’s Law, we were producing better ones:

The rapid growth of real value-added in the computer and electronic products industry…can be attributed to two subindustries: computer manufacturing…and semiconductor and related device manufacturing…The extraordinary real GDP growth in these subindustries, in turn, is a result of the adjustment…for improvements in quality.

Now, producing better stuff, instead of more stuff, is real productivity growth! Moore’s Law represents real improvement in our productive power. But the fact that quality improvement was the main driver of total US manufacturing output for much of the pre-2011 period means that other things may have been quietly going very wrong in terms of the US ability to manufacture large quantities of output.

And at the same time, there was another factor pumping up the US’ manufacturing productivity, especially in the 2010s: offshoring to China.

Until 2001, manufacturing output and manufacturing productivity went up in tandem in the US. Starting in 2001, productivity kept rising for a decade, while output flatlined:

The 2000s were the decade of the China Shock, when the US – along with many other rich countries – offshored a large amount of manufacturing work to the People’s Republic of China.

That raised measured manufacturing productivity in two ways. First, there’s a composition effect. Remember that in the 2000s, even as US manufacturing output per worker supposedly rose, the total number of manufacturing workers was falling off a cliff:

The most productive US manufacturers tended to stay competitive and survive this devastation, while less productive ones were driven out of business by Chinese competition. That composition effect will tend to raise measured productivity even if it doesn’t result in any increase in the productive power of American manufacturing overall.1

Second, offshoring to cheaper countries introduces biases in the data. Houseman et al. (2011) pointed out that when US manufacturers switch to suppliers in cheaper countries, the US government statistics often miss the switch, interpreting it as a rise in product quality rather than a drop in input cost.

That means that the manufacturing productivity benefits of offshoring to China in the 2000s were likely overstated. (Basically, Susan Houseman warned us, and we all should have been paying attention.)

So it’s very possible that serious structural problems in US manufacturing were brewing as early as the 90s but were covered up first by Moore’s Law and later by offshoring to China.

Anyway, let’s talk about some hypotheses as to why American manufacturing productivity flatlined.

Hypothesis 1: US manufacturers don’t buy enough machinery

One popular explanation for stagnating labor productivity in US manufacturing is low capital investment. Basically, a factory worker with machines is going to be more productive than a worker without machines. If you look at Chinese factories, they’re absolutely chock-full of machinery to help human workers do every task:

YouTube video

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In the US, meanwhile, investment in this sort of capital equipment – and every other sort – has slumped in recent years. Capital intensiveness – basically, the amount of machines per worker – has increased more slowly since the 2009 recession:

Many observers point to this lack of investment as a factor behind slowing productivity. For example, Robert Atkinson of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, writes:

In 2021, China had installed 18% more robots per manufacturing worker than the United States. And when controlling for the fact that Chinese manufacturing wages were significantly lower than US wages, China had 12 times the rate of robot use in manufacturing than the United States…The United States had 274 robots per 10,000 workers, while China had 322.

And he posts the following chart:

Source: ITIF

Robots are only one small part of capital investment. But they may be an indicator of a more general failure of capital accumulation in US manufacturing. After 2004, although a drop in total factor productivity (TFP) growth was the biggest culprit, capital deepening (an increase in the amount of capital per worker) also made a much smaller contribution to overall US productivity growth than in the years prior:

I should note that Chad Syverson, an expert on productivity measurement, is skeptical of this factor; he points out that there’s no short-term relationship between capital deepening and labor productivity. But that still leaves room for a long-term relationship, since companies presumably take time to learn how to most effectively use the equipment they buy.

If US manufacturers aren’t buying enough machinery, what’s the reason? Poor business prospects, due to slowing technological improvements, Chinese competition, and/or slowing population growth are one obvious cause. If you don’t think your business can expand in the future, why buy machinery in the present?

Another possibility, raised by Robert Atkinson, is that US wages are too low:

[M]any [US] manufacturers can staff operations with a relatively low-paid workforce. This reduces their incentive to invest in raising productivity…[H]igher productivity enables firms to pay higher wages. Still, it’s also likely that the causation runs the other direction, with lower wages providing less motivation for raising productivity.

Of course, Chinese manufacturing wages are also low, but the government puts its thumb very heavily on the scale there, encouraging capital investment instead of letting China specialize in more labor-intensive products and production methods.

It’s also possible that the US financial system is broken when it comes to financing manufacturing. In other countries — China, Japan, Korea, Europe, etc. – manufacturers usually finance themselves with bank loans. In the US, they mostly borrow from markets – i.e., they issue bonds.

US banks don’t do much financing of manufacturing; instead, they concentrate mostly on financing home mortgages, and on various kinds of bond trading. Banks might provide a crucial source of expertise in making loans to manufacturing companies – expertise that bond investors might simply lack. Also, banks are an easy lever for governments like China’s to boost their manufacturing industries by insisting that loans be made at below-market rates.

Finally, American management might just be short-sighted. Perhaps stock-based compensation discourages long-term investment. Or perhaps all the good managers have gone to work in software, finance, and consulting.

So there are a bunch of sub-hypotheses of why capital investment might be low in the US manufacturing industry. But in any case, let’s turn to the next explanation: industry concentration.

Hypothesis 2: The sector is too concentrated

In general, US industry has been getting more concentrated since around the turn of the century. This has fed fears of monopoly power. But a lack of competition might also be making US manufacturing industries more torpid and complacent. Politano writes:

Using data on the dispersion of productivity across factories and other establishments, it also becomes clear that the gap between the most and least productive US manufacturers increased considerably since the turn of the millennium. This gap is most stark in previously high-productivity-growth sectors like electronics—a small subset of factories saw substantial (if slower) productivity gains through the 2000s and 2010s while most establishments saw stagnating or declining productivity…[A] small subset of companies remained at the technological frontier, where a much larger share fell behind.

And he posts the following chart:

Source: Joey Politano

Syverson also suggests this as one possible explanation:

The second explanation, proposed by Andrews, Criscuolo, and Gal (2015), is that a productivity growth rate gap has opened between frontier firms and their less efficient industry cohorts. Andrews et al. (2015) show that companies at the global productivity frontiers of their respective industries did not experience reductions in their average productivity growth rates throughout the 2000s.

However, most other firms in their industries did see decelerations. It appears that something has impeded the mechanisms that diffuse best technologies and practices through an industry.

Here’s the graph from Andrews et al. (2015):

Source: Andrews et al. (2015)

Now, it’s notable that the divergence is worse for service industries here, even though service-industry productivity in the US has kept on growing.

Also, that chart is for the entire OECD. Politano’s graph shows that the dispersion in US computer and electronics manufacturing productivity mostly happened in the 2000s and leveled off after 2010.

Data from Akcigit and Ates (2019) shows the productivity dispersion for overall US manufacturing mostly happening in the late 90s. So the timing doesn’t really seem to line up perfectly with the observed productivity slowdown since 2011.

But anyway, this could be one thing contributing to manufacturing’s slowdown.

Hypothesis 3: The US doesn’t export enough

One possibility that I haven’t seen anyone talk about, but which seems like a pretty obvious hypothesis, is that US manufacturers don’t export very much.

Industrial policy enthusiasts tend to be fans of the idea of “export discipline.” This is based on the theory that competing in export markets, instead of staying within the safer and less competitive domestic market, forces companies to adopt international best practices, while also offering them opportunities to develop new markets, invent new products, and absorb foreign technologies.

Manufactured goods figure prominently among the US’ export mix. But compared to other advanced countries, US exports just aren’t very significant as a percentage of its total economy:

A lot of this is just that the US is really, really big. The bigger a company’s domestic market, the less incentive there is to go looking for customers abroad. China is big too, but its government puts its thumb very heavily on the scale in favor of exports. If you’re a manufacturer in Pennsylvania, why bother selling to Korea when you can sell to Florida?

America’s meager exports are exacerbated by its possession of the global reserve currency, which increases demand for the dollar and thus makes US exports uncompetitive. But even if exports rose so much that the entire trade deficit vanished, that would leave the US still behind Japan and the UK in terms of exports as a percent of GDP – and far behind China, France, Germany, etc.

If lots of American manufacturers are ignoring export markets, either voluntarily or due to macroeconomic factors beyond their control, that will also tend to weaken investment. The smaller your expected customer base, the less machinery you need to buy.

Hypothesis 4: The end of the rainbow

So far, all of these hypotheses have come with policy prescriptions attached. The US can incentivize its manufacturing businesses to invest more. It can encourage the circulation of workers between manufacturing companies, in order to diffuse know-how and innovation from frontier firms to lagging firms. And it can subsidize exports in various ways.

There are other hypotheses I didn’t list above2, such as bottlenecks in the manufacturing ecosystem and overregulation of land use, both of which also come with policy solutions attached. But there’s one more common explanation out there that’s much more pessimistic than the others, because it implies there’s very little to be done about the manufacturing productivity slowdown – at least, in the short term.

This is the hypothesis that manufacturing productivity growth depended on a set of key innovations – steam power, chemistry, combustion engines, electricity, computerization, and perhaps one or two others – that have now been mostly fully exploited.

Syverson suggests this possibility:

One is that the “easy wins” among information-technology-sourced TFP gains have largely been won, and producers have entered a period of diminished returns from these technologies. There is considerable evidence that information technologies (IT) were a key force behind the productivity acceleration of 1995-2004 (e.g., Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2008). More recent work like Fernald (2015) and Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2015) have presented evidence that these IT-based gains have slowed over the past decade, however.

And The Economist sums this idea up succinctly, writing that “low-hanging fruit might have been plucked more eagerly in manufacturing.”

Why did manufacturing traditionally have such rapid productivity growth? One reason is that manufacturing technology is embodied — whereas improvements in services typically require imparting new knowledge to humans or changing up human organization, in manufacturing you can buy a new machine. This makes it easy to spread productivity-improving technologies. It also increases the demand for innovation, because machines are easier to sell at scale than business processes.

Another reason is that manufacturing is very modular, and thus lends itself to constant rearrangements of the production process. My favorite explanation is how electricity supercharged manufacturing productivity in the early 20th century not by offering cheaper energy, but by enabling the rearrangement of factory floors into a bunch of little independent workstations.

It’s conceivable that both of those processes are now reaching the end of the rainbow that began in the Industrial Revolution. It’s possible that factory floors have been optimized, machine tools installed, and production processes computerized.

There’s no guarantee that those techniques will be able to keep boosting manufacturing productivity at historic rates forever. In fact, manufacturing R&D in the US has grown in real terms since 1990, at an accelerating (linear) rate. But it’s not doing much to boost productivity.

Of course, even if that low-hanging fruit has been picked, manufacturing productivity can still improve. It can still get cheaper energy – which thanks to solar, may now become a reality.

And it can get better inputs – better materials, more high-performing computer chips, and so on. But if the problem of how to set up a factory has been mostly solved, it might put a big damper on overall manufacturing productivity growth – even if AI makes some marginal improvements.

OK but if that’s the case, how come other countries – Germany, Korea, France, etc. – have managed to increase their manufacturing productivity over the past 13 years?

One possibility is that they’re just catching up to the US and Japan, which were the leaders in manufacturing productivity back in the early 1990s. I can’t find a great data set comparing absolute levels of manufacturing productivity across countries over time, but I’ll keep looking.

Another important thing to remember is that we’ve been talking about labor productivity. If manufacturers buy more machinery, labor productivity will go up, because each human can do more. But machinery isn’t free — creating it and upkeeping it comes at a cost. And it’s possible to buy too much of it.

(If you don’t believe me, imagine buying 20 machine tools for each human being in the labor force; they wouldn’t be able to operate it all! That’s an extreme example, but you see the principle.)

It’s possible that all those vast fields of machine tools in the China factory videos are something the US should emulate. But it’s also possible that they’re wasteful — that China has over-automated, and that its economy is going to be held back by paying the upkeep and obsolescence costs on a bunch of machinery that made only marginal improvements in labor productivity.

The way to test this would be to look at total factor productivity. TFP measures the combined productivity of labor and capital (or at least, it tries to). If you pump up labor productivity past the optimal point by buying too many machines, your capital productivity should go down, and your TFP will remain unchanged.

And when we look at the TFP for advanced economies, we see that it has flatlined for every single country on Greg Ip’s chart from above, since right around…2010 or 2011.

China’s TFP has even gone down in recent years.

Now, there are some big caveats here. First of all, TFP is hard to measure, and I don’t entirely trust these numbers. Second, this is TFP for the whole economy, including services, manufacturing, and agriculture – not just for manufacturing alone. So this is very far from definitive proof that humanity has reached the end of the Industrial Revolution rainbow. But it’s at least one hypothesis we should look into.

Anyway, the question of why American manufacturing productivity has stagnated is a very important open question. More than just a few percentage points of economic growth hang in the balance here — defense and defense-related manufacturing will be one of the keys to victory in Cold War 2, and the US has a lot of catching up to do in that regard. So we had better get started chasing down some of these hypotheses — and any other plausible ones we can think of.

1 Note: This may be one reason US and Japanese manufacturing productivity grew more slowly than others in the 2010s. US offshoring to China slowed considerably after the Great Recession, while Japanese offshoring to China was always limited by the political troubles between the two countries.

So some of the relatively faster manufacturing productivity growth of Taiwan, France, etc. in the 2010s might be because they kept going full speed ahead with offshoring to China. This could be a combination of “real” productivity growth (specialization), composition effects, and statistical artifacts similar to the one Houseman et al. (2011) document for the US.

2 Note: I talk about overregulation of land use and bottlenecks in the supply chain so much that I didn’t feel the need to go over them again. Both also have significant weaknesses as overarching explanations for the manufacturing productivity slowdown – in particular, the timing is way off for both. But in any case, my list of hypotheses is not an exhaustive one.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here and become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

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