After America: Redefining global leadership in an age of collapse – Asia Times

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For years, the earth moved along a distinct trail of creation laid down by the United States.

As the political anchor and designer of the post– World War II international order, America not just offered protection and investment—it also sold a powerful narrative of what improvement meant. Progressive politics, free markets, eternal growth—these were packaged as the only legitimate way to the prospect.

But slowly, we began to realize the value. Natural loss. Social injustice. A deepening issue of interpretation. The problem today is no longer whether this concept works but why we still cling to it even as its fissures grow louder and wider.

As American hegemony falters—marked by rising protectionism, trade war and declining world trust—many will mourn the pump of global leadership.

But apparently in that very pump lies a long-overdue offer: a time to wait, turn around and question again—what sort of enhancement do we truly need? Not only development that creates work or hydrocarbons GDP, but one that sustains career, heals the earth and restores human integrity in our relation with each other and the Earth.

The growth model that America designed and spread—through organizations like the IMF, World Bank and WTO—quietly imposed a hierarchy of principles. A state was deemed “advanced” if its business grew rapidly, its markets opened wide and its rules conformed to international standards set by a privileged few.

But today, we live in a world fractured by climate crisis, ecological exhaustion and extreme inequality. In such a world, development can no longer mean expansion, it must become consolidation. Not scaling up extraction but rebalancing power and rethinking how we relate to nature, capital and each other.

This reckoning reached a turning point in 2025, when Donald Trump returned to the presidency and declared what he called” Liberation Day” on April 2.

Standing at the White House, he announced sweeping tariffs on nearly all imports, framing them as an act of economic emancipation—an attempt to free the United States from what he called the shackles of unfair global trade.

But beyond its protectionist aims, Liberation Day marked something far more symbolic: the world’s leading superpower formally retreating from the very global order it had built and championed for decades.

Suddenly, the stage lacked an anchor. And in that moment of rupture, a door opened—not just for trade realignments but for deeper reflection. Has global development ever truly been designed for all? Or has it long functioned as a mechanism to prolong dominance beneath the language of universality?

We often associate sustainability with clean energy, green tech, and ESG investing. But true sustainability demands more than surface solutions: It requires structural change. The world cannot achieve ecological balance while its economic logic still rewards fossil fuel dependency, large-scale mining and supply chains that externalize harm.

There will be no climate justice as long as financial systems continue to incentivize extractive growth. And there can be no real sustainability if it remains a corporate slogan rather than a core principle of global governance.

America’s dominance normalized inequality. Countries deep in debt were pressured to cut social protections to meet loan conditions. Environmental regulations were weakened in the name of competitiveness.

Even the energy transition was calculated through the lens of profit, not collective survival. What the world needs now is not just redistribution of resources but a redistribution of direction. A reorientation of what development is meant to serve and whom.

Still, a world without a dominant power carries its own risks. Multipolarity without ethics can easily descend into new forms of chaos. Those stepping into the void may replicate the very logic they seek to replace: seeking influence, expanding control and chasing growth.

The question, then, is not who leads—but how we redefine leadership itself. Leadership not as domination but as collective responsibility. Leadership that serves life, not leverage.

We need global institutions that are no longer beholden to geopolitical monopolies. The United Nations must be reformed to be more democratic and responsive. The IMF and World Bank must abandon their outdated logic of austerity and begin centering justice. Global trade must internalize ecological and social costs into its core pricing structures.

This is not a technical reform. This is a transformation of values. Because no system can fix the crisis it was designed to protect unless it first changes what it believes to be valuable.

At this juncture, we must find the courage to admit: sustainable development is not about balancing growth with the environment—it’s about choosing the values that guide our lives together.

Will we continue to measure progress through GDP? Or will we begin to ask deeper questions—about community resilience, ecological limits and our shared capacity to live with dignity?

If American dominance handed us one model that dismissed these questions, then a post-American world must become the space where they are answered—honestly, urgently and together.

Perhaps for the first time in modern history humanity stands at the threshold of redesigning the global order—not from the ruins of war, but from a consciousness quietly rising from within the wreckage of illusion.

A consciousness that knows the planet cannot endure another century of extractive ambition. That the climate crisis is not just technical, it is moral. And that true sustainability cannot be owned by any single country, system or ideology.

If we can see America’s retreat not as a void but as an opening—for co-creation, co-responsibility, and collective redesign—then we are entering a new era of development.

One not obsessed with speed but rooted in depth. One not built on control, but on shared stewardship. One that refuses to be dictated by markets alone and begins instead with meaning.

From here, a quieter kind of hope can emerge. Not loud or triumphant, but grounded and enduring. A hope that does not seduce us with promises, but one that invites us back to what matters. The chance to build a world that no longer serves empire but serves life.

Setyo Budiantoro is Nexus Strategist at The Prakarsa, MIT Sloan IDEAS Fellow 2024,
and member of the Advisory Committee of Fair Finance Asia

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Trump’s trade ignorance will make America poorer – Asia Times

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I don’t really think you may beat Trump’s tariffs by arguing with them sensibly or by explaining financial concept. I mean, how do you say with something like this?

I’ve resigned myself to the concept that the only way America is going to travel to the large revelation that broad-based tariffs are negative is to experience the adverse consequences first-hand — i. e., to reach the proverbial warm stove. Luckily, I think Americans properly be coming about very quickly:

Source: Gallup

But regardless, this is an economy website, and so even though I don’t expect it to give some political earnings, I thought I might as well explain why trade imbalances don’t make a country poorer ( though that doesn’t mean they’re Fine ).

Trump’s mistaken perspective of business imbalances

Trump and his officials and sycophants believe that business imbalances constitute America being “ripped off” by foreign nations. &nbsp, As I explained in today’s blog, this is why Trump set his price prices at a level that he thinks may reduce America’s trade imbalance with each unique country.

Trump’s perspective of business deficits is based on two fundamental errors. The second is&nbsp, a basic finance problem. Trump’s officials looked at the formula for GDP and noted that goods get subtracted from GDP.

They didn’t know that this is because goods even get&nbsp, added&nbsp, to use and investment, so you have to remove them at the end in order to eliminate them from the amount. The truth is that goods don’t change GDP one way or another.

Trump’s subsequent mistake is based on the idea that imports will be replaced 1-for-1 by domestic production — i. e., if you stop America from importing a cleaning system, an American company will make one more cleaning system instead. That’s certainly one&nbsp, possible&nbsp, outcome, but it’s not the only one. American consumers could just go without one washing machine, making everyone poorer.

In fact, Trump and his people probably don’t even realize these are two&nbsp, separate&nbsp, misunderstandings. They probably think that their mistaken belief about accounting ( i. e. that imports reduce GDP ) follows naturally from their mistaken belief about import substitution. The two mistakes mutually reinforce each other.

Anyway, because Trump misunderstands trade deficits in these two ways, he believes that when America runs a trade deficit with a country, that country is ripping us off. He thinks imports are lowering U. S. GDP by forcing us to produce less stuff — essentially, &nbsp, stealing American production. He thus sees trade deficits as a measure of how much is being stolen from America.

But that’s not actually how trade deficits work at all.

A trade deficit is like buying stuff with a credit card

Suppose you import a washing machine from some Chinese guy named Ruimin. Why would Ruimin give you that washing machine? Nothing is free. Basically, you can pay for that washing machine in two ways. The first way is to give Ruimin something he wants — say, 50 interesting books ( Ruimin famously likes to read ). The second way is to write Ruimin an IOU. 1

The first case is called&nbsp, balanced trade. You get a washing machine, Ruimin gets 50 books. There’s no trade deficit or surplus.

The other thing that can happen is&nbsp, unbalanced&nbsp, trade. In this case, instead of 50 books, you give Ruimin a US Treasury bond. A bond is an IOU. In this case, you’ve contributed to America ‘s&nbsp, trade deficit&nbsp, with China. A real good or service — the washing machine — went from China to America, and the only thing that went back in return was a slip of paper (or, actually, a number in a spreadsheet ).

At some point when you hear economists discuss trade, you might hear them talk about the” current account” and the” capital account”. The current account is basically just the net flow of real goods and services, 2&nbsp, and the capital account is basically just the net flow of IOUs.

If you give Ruimin an IOU in exchange for a washing machine, it means you’ve contributed to America ‘s&nbsp, current account deficit, and you’ve also contributed to its&nbsp, capital account surplus. &nbsp, Both of those things just mean “paying foreigners for stuff with IOUs”.

Now you can see why a trade deficit is like buying stuff with a credit card. When I buy a washing machine from Target with my credit card, I’m writing an IOU and I’m getting a tangible thing in return.

Does using your credit card to buy a washing machine from Target mean that Target has ripped you off? No. Does it make you poorer when you use your credit card to buy a washing machine from Target? Nope. You now have less money, but you have &nbsp, more stuff. In just the same way, a trade deficit means that the US has &nbsp, less money and more stuff. It does not mean America is poorer, or that it has been ripped off by foreigners.

A case where trade deficits can be good

Asking whether trade deficits are good or bad is like asking whether buying stuff with borrowed money is good or bad. The answer is pretty obviously “it depends on whether the purchase was worth it”.

One thing to remember is that not all purchases are for consumption — a lot are actually&nbsp, productive investment. If an American factory buys a Japanese CNC machine tool for$ 100, 000, and the Japanese toolmaker simply stashes the money in US Treasury bonds, that contributes to the US trade deficit. But if the American factory uses that tool to make and sell$ 500, 000 worth of car parts, it has come out ahead — and America has come out ahead too.

This is what South Korea did when it was rapidly industrializing. Around 1980 and then again in the early 1990s, South Korea ran a trade deficit:

Source: &nbsp, World Bank

This was a time when South Korea was investing a huge amount in its industrial economy:

Source: &nbsp, World Bank

As an aside, in the late 70s and early 80s, at the same time it was running a trade deficit, Korea was also ramping up&nbsp, exports&nbsp, — not just in dollar terms, but also as a percent of its GDP:

Source: &nbsp, World Bank

Remember that exports add to GDP, while imports don’t subtract from GDP. So even as South Korea ran a big&nbsp, trade deficit, trade was &nbsp, adding more and more to South Korea’s GDP&nbsp, each year. A MAGA guy will have a very hard time wrapping his head around that fact.

But anyway, South Korea’s trade deficits at that time were probably worth it, because importing capital goods ( machinery, etc. ) helped them industrialize more rapidly than if they had had to take the time to make all those capital goods themselves. They just bought the machines and immediately used them to make cars and TVs and other useful stuff, much of which they sold to the rest of the world at a profit.

In fact, the US does some of this as well. When we think of U. S. trade deficits, we usually think of&nbsp, consumption goods &nbsp, — cheap Chinese TVs and such. But the US also&nbsp, imports a decent amount of&nbsp, capital goods, which American companies use to produce and sell things. The US&nbsp, did even more of this in the 1990s, when we ran a trade deficit but also had an investment and export boom.

But be careful here:” Using a trade deficit for investment” doesn’t mean” The trade deficit is good”. If companies import a lot of capital goods but see a low return on the investment, it can be bad.

What if trade deficits are used for consumption? Is that good or bad?

Anyway, what about when you use trade deficits to buy consumption goods — those cheap Chinese TVs and Canadian-made cars and such? Consumption goods a majority of America’s trade deficit these days. Is&nbsp, that&nbsp, trade deficit good or bad?

In this case, we have to decide whether “buy now, pay later” is good or bad. Remember, a trade deficit is like buying something with a credit card. When America imports Chinese TVs and Canadian cars, and China and Canada get US Treasury bonds in exchange, it means that America now&nbsp, owes China and Canada money.

At any time, China and Canada can choose to sell the bonds for dollars and use those dollars to buy US goods and services. If they eventually do this, then at that time, they’ll run&nbsp, a trade deficit with the US. &nbsp, In that case, what basically happened is that the US&nbsp, borrowed from China and Canada, and paid them back later.

This is just like if you buy a washing machine from Target with your credit card, then work to earn some salary, and then use your paycheck to pay off your credit card. Was this bad or good? It depends.

Maybe you could have just waited to get the washing machine until you had the cash in the bank. Or maybe it was worth it to you to get the washing machine now instead of waiting a few months, even though you had to pay a bit of interest on the credit card debt.

Buying consumer goods with debt can be a good financial decision or a bad financial decision. That’s basically what the US is doing when it runs a trade deficit with other countries.

It’s also worth mentioning that just like a credit card borrower, the US might never fully pay its foreign loans back. If the US experiences a burst of unexpectedly&nbsp, high inflation, the US bonds that China and Canada hold will be devalued. 3&nbsp, That’s basically like a partial debt default. Or, if someday an irresponsible US leader comes along and defaults on the debt, China and Canada will see some of the value of their Treasury bonds evaporate into thin air.

So when the US runs a trade deficit with other countries, those other countries are taking a risk. They’re basically giving us a credit card that we can use to buy stuff that they make. There’s always the possibility that we might just declare bankruptcy and never pay them back.

So you could say that in a sense, countries that run trade deficits are more short-term focused, or less patient, than countries that run trade surpluses. Nations don’t really have motivations and personalities like that, but it’s not a terrible way to think about it.

Do trade deficits deindustrialize America?

The final question here is whether importing stuff from other countries causes America to make less stuff. Maybe if you buy some tomatoes with your credit card, it’ll mean you grow fewer tomatoes in your own garden as a result. And then when it comes time to pay back the credit card debt, you might have forgotten how to grow tomatoes. That’s basically what deindustrialization is. 4

Obviously, there are some cases where a trade deficit doesn’t cause deindustrialization. For example, in the case of South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s, we saw that trade deficits helped to&nbsp, industrialize&nbsp, the country and ramp up manufacturing. Something similar probably happened to the US in the 1990s.

But OK, we’re not talking about those historical cases, right? We’re talking about the trade deficits that the US has run in the last 25 years, mostly with China but also with a bunch of other countries. Those trade deficits were&nbsp, mostly&nbsp, America borrowing to consume, not to invest. The question is whether they resulted in America losing its manufacturing industries.

The answer, at least with regards to China, is “yes”. Autor et al. ( 2013 ) &nbsp, famously find that “import competition ]from China ] explains one-quarter of the contemporaneous aggregate decline in US manufacturing employment]between 1990 and 2007 ]” .&nbsp, Bloom et al. ( 2024 ) &nbsp, find that Chinese import competition caused a big reallocation from manufacturing to service jobs on the West Coast and in big cities, but in the Midwest it mostly just caused wage declines and job losses. And&nbsp, Acemoglu et al. ( 2014 ) &nbsp, write:

In this paper, we explore the contribution of the swift rise of import competition from China to sluggish U. S. employment growth. We find that the increase in US imports from China, which accelerated after 2000, was &nbsp, a major force behind recent reductions in US manufacturing employment&nbsp, and that, through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium effects, it appears to have significantly suppressed overall US job growth…Our central estimates suggest net job losses of 2.0 to 2.4 million stemming from the rise in import competition from China over the period 1999 to 2011. ]emphasis mine ]

You can just kind of eyeball this by looking at the raw data. Until 2001, when China joined the WTO and started exporting tons of cheap stuff to America, US manufacturing employment had held up pretty well over the years ( despite falling as a percentage of the total ). In the 2000s — the decade of the big Chinese import surge — it just fell off a cliff:

It’s worth noting that it wasn’t &nbsp, the trade deficit per se&nbsp, that caused these job losses. Even if trade between the US and China had been balanced, Chinese import competition would probably have cost some US manufacturing workers their jobs, because A) some of the US exports would have been services instead of manufactured goods, and B) the US probably would have exported more capital-intensive goods, thus shifting away from the labor-intensive goods that China was good at making back in the 2000s.

But yes, the US trade deficit with China was huge, and caused significant deindustrialization. And the continued US trade deficit with China might be holding back US reindustrialization, both through import competition, and through China crowding US companies out of export markets.

So if you think manufacturing is important above and beyond its contribution to GDP ( as I do ), then the trade deficit with China is probably an important thing to address. But that doesn’t mean Trump’s tariffs are the right way to address it. I know that this is repeating stuff I’ve written in a lot of other posts, but this really bears repeating.

First of all, by making imported components more expensive, Trump’s tariffs are weakening US manufacturers — that’s why&nbsp, auto workers&nbsp, and&nbsp, steelworkers&nbsp, in the US are being laid off right now and why measures of manufacturing activity and sentiment are all&nbsp, heading down. Second of all, Trump’s tariffs will ultimately reduce America ‘s&nbsp, exports, not just its imports, both through exchange rate shifts, and through retaliation by other countries. That will hurt American manufacturing.

Tariffs on China might have been one part of a bigger strategy to improve America’s competitiveness in manufacturing. But broad tariffs on all of America’s trading partners, like the ones Trump just rolled out, are highly likely to accelerate America’s deindustrialization— even if they also reduce trade deficits. Ultimately, what’s important for the US isn’t to reduce imports — it’s to increase exports. Trump’s tariffs will only hurt that goal.

Notes

1 In practice, no one actually barters when they trade — no one actually trades books for washing machines. But when two countries have &nbsp, balanced trade, it means that they pay each other in currency that gets quickly used to buy some real good or service.

Ruimin gives you a washing machine, you swap some dollars to another Chinese guy for some yuan, you give the yuan to Ruimin, he uses the yuan to pay his doctor to treat his bad back, the doctor swaps the yuan for dollars, and then the doctor uses those dollars to buy 50 books from some other guy in America. That’s how balanced trade actually works.

2 It actually includes a few other things, but let’s keep it simple.

3 This is because the principal and interest on those bonds is specified in&nbsp, US dollars, and inflation makes a US dollar worth much less in terms of real physical goods and services.

4 This could matter because A) you might need to grow your own tomatoes for a food fight, or B) forgetting how to grow your own tomatoes might make it harder to pay back your debt in the future. OK, so it’s not a great metaphor.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Germany’s Lithuanian base complicates grand US-Russia deal – Asia Times

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Germany &nbsp, just opened&nbsp, its first permanent military base abroad since World War II&nbsp, amidst the competition &nbsp, for leadership of&nbsp, post-conflict Europe&nbsp, between itself, France and Poland.

Located in southern Lithuania near the Belarusian borders and in contact to Russia’s Kaliningrad Region, it’s strategically positioned to provide Germany enormous effect in shaping Europe’s potential security architecture. That’s because Germany is now a direct stakeholder in Central &amp, Eastern Europe’s ( CEE ) security.

This development improvements many related strategic objectives. For instance, it poses a problem to Poland’s work to present as the Baltic States ‘ most dependable European alliance, given that Germany now has a bottom in one of those countries, exactly the one that connects Poland to the other two.

On that subject, Germany and Poland agreed to create a “military Schengen” in early 2024 to facilitate the movements of soldiers and products, which makes it easier for Germany to supply its Ukrainian center.

This alliance may consequently be expanded to encompass Latvia and Estonia, especially after the German Parliament&nbsp, confirmed the centrality&nbsp, of the” Baltic Defense Line” to the republic’s eastern protection plan.

Germany’s Lithuanian base could, therefore, pair with its&nbsp, envisaged military buildup&nbsp, and an expanded “military Schengen” to compete more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics. That might, in turn, result in Germany subordinating Poland to become the dominant military player in CEE.

Germany’s new base in Lithuania doesn’t just pose a challenge to Polish interests, even if Warsaw won’t openly admit as much. Some Polish officials might even support a more important regional security role for Berlin.

Any hypothetical Russian military action against Lithuania, including if Moscow tries to carve out a so-called” Suwalki Corridor” from Belarus to Kaliningrad, could serve as a tripwire for the EU’s de facto leader to become militarily involved in the crisis.

To be sure, Russia hasn’t signaled any intent to blitzkrieg through Poland or much weaker Lithuania en route to its Baltic exclave. Nor has anyone cogently suggested why it would do so, considering this scenario would almost certainly lead to a continental conflict and perhaps even World War III if the US becomes involved.

Nevertheless, it still worries many Europeans and thus influences how they formulate policy, with Germany now poised to play a greater role in such discussions, given its direct stakes in deterring or responding to this scenario.

And, finally, the two preceding objectives of Germany competing more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics and having a greater say in” Suwalki Corridor” contingency planning are meant to ensure that it’s included in any Russian-US deal over Europe’s future security architecture.

Putin’s late 2021 request for the US to return to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act by withdrawing Western troops and military infrastructure from the former Warsaw Pact countries can’t now be achieved without Germany’s participation.

Every other NATO member’s eastern deployments&nbsp, are rotational, &nbsp, even though they function as permanent. Yet the US and Germany’s are officially permanent, which is a different legal status that’s considered more serious by Russia.

This doesn’t automatically mean that Germany will be included in the Russian-US talks, not even in the capacity of representing the EU, but just that Berlin can now serve as more of an obstacle than anyone else to them possibly clinching a grand deal over European security without any European nations ‘ input.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Trump’s tariff onslaught headed for self-defeating recession – Asia Times

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It takes a truly incredible impact to drive the global market into crisis. Did Donald Trump’s bilateral tax strategy simply shove the earth into one?

Eastern policymakers can’t help but fear the worst as the area bears the overwhelming weight of the US president’s worldwide revenge tour.

Liberation Day? More like” Obliteration Day”, quips Neil Dutta, economist at Renaissance Macro Research, as about US$ 2.5 trillion was erased from the S&amp, P 500 Index on Thursday ( April 3 ) alone. Now, economists at JPMorgan worry a Trump downturn is likely.

” This affect alone could get the business perilously close to slipping into crisis”, says JPMorgan analyst Michael Feroli. ” And this is before accounting for the more visits to total imports and to purchase spending”.

Feroli thinks Trump’s tariffs will add as much as 1.5 % to already rising prices this year, using the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE ) index, the Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation gauge. The taxes also did bang individual wages and consumer investing in the US, he predicts.

Any large dispositions in the US would resonate Asia’s method almost instantaneously. But Trump’s about straight focus on Asia is because self-defeating as it is harmful.

Trump’s concerns are very much on screen. China, for example, now faces a 54 % tax on all supplies to the US. On April 2, Trump slapped an additional 34 % tariff on top of an earlier 20 %. Vietnam, however, faces a 46 % price.

Vietnam’s place in the line of flames stems from the mistakes of the Trump 1.0 time. Most of the work that Trump thought had tilt from China to the US went to Vietnam otherwise. It was the China solution of choice for firms from American Eagle to Deckers to Hasbro to Nike to Wayfair.

Trinh Nguyen, top analyst at Natixis, speaks for many when she calls the income “devastating for Vietnam”. As such, Trump may have just raised the prices of clothing, furniture and toys manufacturers everyday. Cost hikes for customers around the globe are all but certain.

Like some developing Asian economies, Vietnam is far more probable to communicate than fight. ” Vietnam is extremely unlikely to observe Canada or Europe in applying mutual taxes. At present, it imports to some US products to establish any real pain”, says Craig Martin, president of Dynam Capital.

Japan and South Korea got off easier with tariffs of 24 % and 25 %, respectively. But without moves by Tokyo and Seoul to placate Trump, it’s unclear how Asia’s No 2 and No. 4 economies avoid bigger levies.

The question now is whether Trump’s truly epic shock causes a catastrophic global downturn. There have been two such events since the 1990s: the 2008-09 global financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Though the 1997 Asian financial crisis came close, it didn’t send the West into a tailspin.

This Trump 2.0 assault on the global trading system could indeed be the third such economic earthquake in 17 years – and an inflection point for the global financial system.

If these actions are “implemented, the effective US tariff rate would be higher than the Smoot-Hawley Act rate”, says Priyanka Kishore, economist and founder of consultancy Asia Decoded. ” The estimates range between 26 %-29 % compared to around 20 % in the 1930s”.

This, she notes,” challenges our view of resilient US growth this year. While we expected the Trump administration to act swiftly on tariffs, the scale and scope have exceeded our expectations. With heightened policy uncertainty and rising downside risks to investments, we now anticipate US growth to falter in the coming months”.

Part of that problem – and the disorientation – is that the logic behind it is completely nonsensical.

” If a 9th grader in high school presented this tariff chart to a teacher in a basic economics class, the teacher would laugh and say sit down and work on the assignment”, says Dan Ives, an analyst at Wedbush Securities.

Jeffries analyst W Brad Bechtel adds that “our textbooks tell us that tariffs are inflationary if the currency market does not adjust to offset. The dollar dropping 2 % amid the addition of tariffs around the world on US imported goods is very inflationary“.

Kevin Thozet, an investment committee member at Carmignac, notes that” this is the US economy flirting with recession this year and inflation reaccelerating. And this is before we get the next wave of sectoral tariffs, which Trump mentioned again on chips, pharmaceuticals, copper, timber and shipping services”.

Analysts are counting the ways that Trump’s tariffs will backfire. In 2024, the US exported$ 2.1 trillion in goods and$ 1.1 trillion in services.

If his taxes on imports send other top economies into recession or even crisis, the fallout for US growth could be devastating. And that’s even before America’s biggest trading partners hit back with retaliatory tariffs.

” This is a game-changer for the global economy”, says Fitch Ratings economist Olu Sonola. ” Many countries will likely end up in a recession”.

Japan, for example, may seem to have gotten off easy relative to China. But the 25 % tax Trump slapped on all imports of automobiles and car parts already has economists upping the odds of Japanese stagflation.

It’s not just Japan facing a scenario where growth flatlines and inflation accelerates, though. Stagflation scenarios now stalk the US as well.

” An increasing probability of stagflation risk in the US may see further narrowing of the two-year sovereign yield premium spread between US Treasuries and Japanese government bonds”, says Kelvin Wong, senior market analyst at brokerage OANDA.

Wong adds that recent policy shifts” suggest a rising risk of stagflation in the US economy due to uncertainties in growth prospects and the cost of living, which are exacerbated by the current US White House’s erratic and aggressive trade tariff policy”.

China, though, is grappling with deflationary pressures. Trump turning the screws tighter on China could send mainland prices even lower.

The latest US tariffs “limit China’s ability to rely on stimulus and raise long-term export costs”, says Lauren Gloudeman, an analyst at Eurasia Group. ” The usual playbook of domestic stimulus will be constrained. More spending will risk inflating local government debt while deeper rate cuts could hurt banks. Beijing will opt for central government-led infrastructure investment”.

Beijing has been preparing exporters through low-cost financing and tax rebates. ” But”, Gloudeman says,” the removal of the de minimis rule will deal a heavy blow to employment, as it affects the labor-intensive segment of the export sector”.

Though China’s share of global trade is rising, headwinds bearing down on US households raise question marks on the$ 3.3 trillion the US imported last year. If US imports disappear under the weight of Trump’s tariffs, so would a key driver of global growth. That’s the last thing export-dependent economies from China to Germany want.

One concern is the so-called “wealth effect” kicking into reverse. Just as rising stocks make average households more confident, plunging shares often slam sentiment. UBS Group analyst Bhanu Baweja thinks the S&amp, P 500, which is now at 5, 396, could be headed even lower.

” We see 5, 300 as the near-term target for the S&amp, P 500, but if tariff uncertainty persists or negotiations with trading partners don’t go well, risks of downside through 5, 000 become real”, Baweja says. ” The probability of US stocks entering a bear market is going higher”.

The huge drop in shares of financial companies is ringing alarm bells of their own. They include Citibank ( down 12 % on Thursday alone ), Bank of America (-11 % ), Morgan Stanley (-9.5 % ) and JPMorgan (-7 % ).

” Although financials don’t have direct exposure to tariffs, the uncertainty and ensuing market volatility around the indirect impact of broad-based tariff increases on the economy and activity levels is likely to dominate bank stocks in the near term”, says Jim Mitchell, an analyst at Seaport Research Partners.

The violent stock selloff that shook the region on Thursday dramatized Asia’s place in Trump’s trade destruction. Japan’s benchmark Nikkei 225 Stock Index tumbled more than 4 % at one point yesterday, Korea’s Kospi index dropped 2.7 %.

Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi called the new levies “extremely regrettable”, warning they’re likely to have a” significant impact on the economic relationship between the US and Japan”.

Wishful thinking, perhaps, but Hayashi said Tokyo would “take all necessary measures” to ensure its economy isn’t hobbled by such tariffs.

Korea’s acting President Han Duck-soo called on the government to “exert all its capabilities to overcome the trade crisis” at an emergency meeting on Thursday, calling the related uncertainty “extremely serious”.

China’s Communist Party slammed Trump’s move as a “typical unilateral bullying practice” and said it would “resolutely take countermeasures to safeguard its own rights and interests”.

Beijing “urges the United States to immediately cancel its unilateral tariff measures and properly resolve differences with its trading partners through equal dialogue”, the Commerce Ministry said in a statement.

” As we had worried, Asian economies have been hit hard by the new tariff announcements”, said Decoded’s Kishore. Outside of China and Vietnam, Trump’s tariffs hit Taiwan ( 32 % ), Thailand ( 36 % ) and Indonesia ( 32 % ). Malaysia’s 24 % was in line with Japan and Korea, as was India at 26 %. The Philippines ( 17 % ), Singapore ( 10 % ) and Australia ( 10 % ) fared slightly better.

” Whatever be the outcome, the increased economic uncertainty is likely to take a toll on sentiments and spending in the foreseeable future”, Kishore says.

” We will be following up with a more detailed note on the channels through which the tariff shock will likely flow through Asian economies and to what degree. Several indirect and spillover impacts need to be considered”.

Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers worries Trump’s latest tariff hikes could trigger an oil crisis-like shock to the globe’s biggest economy.

” This is the kind of thing you discuss in the way we would usually discuss an oil-price spike or earthquake or a drought, as a supply shock”, Summers tells Bloomberg. ” The question is mostly how much damage is going to be done”.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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China’s KD-21 missile puts US carriers and bases at range – Asia Times

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China’s KD-21 air-launched ballistic missile ( ALBM ) has quietly entered service, adding a potent new threat to US aircraft carriers, air bases and exposed parked aircraft across the Western Pacific.

Recent images obtained by The War Zone ( TWZ ) show frontline People’s Liberation Army Air Force ( PLAAF ) H-6K bombers armed with KD-21 missiles, confirming the weapon’s operational status.

First revealed during Airshow China 2022 in Zhuhai, the KD-21 represents a significant step in China’s anti-access/area-denial ( A2/AD ) strategy to counter US power projection across the Indo-Pacific.

Researchers instantly recognized the rocket’s proper possible, with some likening it to Russia’s Kinzhal ALBM. While its exact role—whether tailored more for anti-ship or land-attack missions—remains confusing, the KD-21’s resemblance to the CM-401 anti-ship nuclear weapon suggests it may be worthy of both.

Spectators noted that the weapon was carried by a bomb from the PLAAF’s 10th Bomber Division based in Anqing, Anhui Province, under the Eastern Theater Command, suggesting its possible work in activities targeting Taiwan, Japan and above.

The KD-21’s reported fast speed and flexibility make it especially difficult for US air defense systems. Its combination with the H-6K, a modified version of China’s Cold War-era fighter, offers China considerably extended approach.

Equipped with more effective turbofan engines and worthy of in-flight fuel, the H-6K allows the KD-21 to intimidate target well beyond the First Island Chain, perhaps reaching as far as Guam, where the US maintains substantial military assets.

By integrating the KD-21 with an expanding army of conventional ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial techniques, China aims to challenge and fight US and allied threats.

The functional implementation of ALBMs, such as the KD-21, underscores China’s efforts to expand its missile power and increase its strike capabilities against important assets throughout the Western Pacific.

ALBMs offer several advantages over cruise weapons. A 2019 Federation of American Scientists ( FAS ) report by Eugene Saad and Adam Mount explains that with their higher speeds, ALBMs enable rapid strikes, thereby compressing the time available for enemy forces to react.

Also, their deployment from mobile flying platforms allows them to start from unexpected vectors, thus bypassing air defense systems that are tailored for conventional ground-based threats.

Saad and Mount even emphasize that ALBMs improve the endurance of distribution systems. Unlike fixed missile sites, bomber aircraft can disperse, remain airborne or operate from concealed positions, reducing their vulnerability to preemptive strikes.

However, these advantages are tempered by operational risks. A 2018 RAND report by Derek Grossman and colleagues highlights the persistent vulnerabilities of the H-6K bomber, particularly during overwater missions near contested airspaces, such as those surrounding Taiwan and the Japanese archipelago.

While the KD-21 may extend the bomber’s standoff range, allowing it to fire from safer distances, the H-6K remains susceptible to interception by US and allied air combat patrols equipped with advanced fighters and air defense networks. These risks could complicate Chinese strike operations in an actual conflict.

Still, the PLAAF has steadily modernized its bomber force and doctrine. A 2022 report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI) describes the H-6K as the backbone of China’s long-range conventional strike capabilities.

The bomber’s upgraded engines allow it to project power deep into the Western Pacific, and its integration within the PLAAF’s preserved division-regiment structure provides the organizational resilience for sustained operations.

CASI notes that regiment-level training and modernization efforts have ensured the H-6K’s relevance in China’s evolving regional deterrence posture. Meanwhile, the KD-21’s speed, maneuverability, and precision make it particularly suited for disabling critical US military infrastructure.

In a 2019 National Defense Magazine article, Jon Harper and Tom Callender discuss how bomber-launched hypersonic missiles, such as the KD-21, could exceed Mach 5 and maneuver unpredictably during terminal phases to evade US defenses.

Callender notes that such missiles can exploit gaps in high- and low-altitude coverage, posing a threat to carriers even at long ranges. While John Richardson has downplayed the vulnerability of US carriers, citing a combination of operational concepts and defensive systems offsetting the threat, others, including Michael Griffin and Samuel Greaves, stress the urgency of developing countermeasures.

Their recommendations include novel interceptors, space-based sensors for continuous tracking and advanced technologies such as railgun projectiles to improve missile defense capabilities.

Beyond carriers, US airbases in the Western Pacific face acute risks from China’s expanding missile arsenal. A 2024 Stimson Center report by Kelly Grieco and others outlines how China could cripple US airpower projection by targeting runways with ballistic and cruise missiles carrying runway-penetrating submunitions.

Grieco and others estimate that such attacks could render fighter runways in Japan unusable for up to 12 days and Guam’s for at least two, severely disrupting the tempo of US military operations in a conflict scenario.

Moreover, tanker operations—vital for sustaining airpower over vast distances—could be denied for weeks, particularly in Japan, exacerbating the challenge of generating sorties during the critical opening phase of a conflict.

These vulnerabilities have been compounded by relative underinvestment in the hardening of US base and other facilities. A 2025 Hudson Institute report by Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton reveals that, despite recognizing the missile threat for over a decade, the US has constructed only two hardened aircraft shelters ( HAS ) and 41 non-hardened shelters at airfields within 1, 000 nautical miles of Taiwan.

In stark contrast, China has built more than 3, 000 hardened shelters. The report further notes that key US bases in Guam and the Philippines have no HAS at all, leaving aircraft, fuel stores and maintenance facilities exposed to even small-scale missile salvos. Shugart and Walton conclude that these shortfalls leave US air assets vulnerable to initial strikes, limiting their capacity to sustain operations during a significant contingency with China.

The KD-21’s introduction into China’s operational missile inventory signals more than just the fielding of another precision strike weapon—it underscores China’s commitment to recalibrating the military balance of power in the Western Pacific in its favor.

As China refines its ability to penetrate US defenses from the flight deck to the flight line, the risks for US and allied forces will only grow more acute over time.

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Myanmar’s junta exploiting earthquake to shore up control – Asia Times

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After a 7.7-magnitude disaster struck Myanmar on March 28, 2025, the country’s military and the various resistance groups fighting a years-long legal battle faced international calling for an immediate ceasefire.

A pause in the fighting may allow important aid to provide the main quake zones and help rescuers to assist victims in a disaster that has already killed more than 3, 000 people.

The first to heed the call was the opposition National Unity Government, which formally announced a two-week wait on problems by its military aircraft, the Women’s Defense Force, on March 29. The Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of three cultural opposition groups: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, theTa’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army – also agreed to a momentary peace.

But Myanmar’s martial demurred. Just days after the collapse, as firefighters continued to dig through dust in search of victims, the generals ordered airstrikes on enemy positions in Shan state and Karen position in the country’s south – a decision that United Nations special rapporteur Tom Andrews described as “nothing quick of outstanding”.

The generals eventually yielded to pressure late on April 2– some five days after the earthquake hit – announcing that they would halt fighting until April 22. But the statement appeared to be hollow, with reports just a day later that the military’s bombing campaign and ground offensive were continuing unabated in Kachin state in Myanmar’s north.

People stand in front of the rubble of a building.
Mandalay buildings, like Myanmar’s democracy, lie in ruins. Photo: Stringer / AFP via Getty Images

As an expert on the political history of Myanmar, I believe the behavior of the country’s military is of no surprise. The generals who have had a grip on the country for much of the past six decades have a track record of exploiting disasters for political gain.

Weakened by years of entrenched civil war, they are now seeking an opportunity in the earthquake to rehabilitate their image overseas while consolidating power at home.

From disasters to elections

Myanmar’s ruling junta has tried this tactic before.

In 2008, a week after the deadly Cyclone Nargis killed more than 100, 000 people in Myanmar, the military proceeded to hold a constitutional referendum that would guarantee the military’s control of government by reserving 25 % of all parliamentary seats for officers while requiring 75 % of votes for any future constitutional reform. It also allowed for the military to take over the country “in the event of an emergency”.

The referendum took place while much of Myanmar was still reeling from disaster, yet the junta announced a 98.12 % turnout, of which 92.48 % voted in favor of the new pro-military constitution.

It paved the way to elections in 2010, which the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party won. Though that vote was boycotted by the opposition National League for Democracy, or NLD, Washington had by then signaled a shift in policy toward “pragmatic engagement” with the then-ruling junta.

This US shift forced the recalcitrant NLD to cooperate in subsequent elections, giving legitimacy to a process that was stacked in favor of the generals.

Fig leaf of legitimacy

The latest disaster comes as the junta is again attempting to push for elections. Just a day before the earthquake, Myanmar’s military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, confirmed plans for a December national vote and called on opposition parties to participate.

But the proposed election in Myanmar is widely seen as a face-saving strategy for both the Myanmar military and, I would argue, an international community that has done little of any significance to end the civil war. In this context, elections would allow the generals to cover their 2021 power grab with a fig leaf of legitimacy.

The entrenched civil war that was sparked by that military takeover – a coup that ended a 10-year experiment with limited democracy – derailed the military’s initial plan to return to full control of the country.

Men in army fatigues sit on a boat in a river.
Anti-military soldiers sit in a long-tailed boat on the Salween River. Photo: Thierry Falise / LightRocket via Getty Images/ The Conversation

Four years of fighting a broad-based opposition that includes ethnic minority groups like the Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army ,Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, People’s Defense Force and Bamar People’s Liberation Army has taken its toll on the military.

It has lost territorial control in many regions to the myriad resistance groups. Internationally, it has become more isolated through sanctions, and its largest trading partner, China, concerned over instability on its border, has slowed investments as it tries to play all sides of the conflict.

In desperation, the generals have resorted to forced conscription for foot soldiers, while looking to Russia for arms and investment.

Failure of the generals

What the military desperately needs now is a lifeline and a civil war exit plan. The earthquake could provide both, with a ceasefire – no matter how badly observed – providing a cover for allowing for a national vote.

But as has been evident in the days surrounding the announcement of a truce, the military is likely to exploit the disaster to weaken the resistance along the way. It has said that it will take “necessary” measures against any resistance group found to be regrouping or attacking the state during the ceasefire. Yet it has reportedly continued its own offensive.

The earthquake has revealed the failures and brutalities of the military in other ways, too. In the aftermath of the disaster, the military shut down private clinics and hospitals in badly hit Mandalay for allegedly employing rebel doctors and nurses who were treating members of the resistance.

As it was, many health care workers have been in hiding since the coup, and young people who could have been on the front lines of relief efforts have either joined the resistance groups or fled the country.

The earthquake will also further hurt a Myanmar business community already suffering from the pullout of international businesses after the 2021 coup.

Unsecure foundations

Yet, the military may be hoping that it can use the disaster to rebuild its brand overseas. The surprise announcement of a ceasefire by the generals is part of that process. So, too, is the decision to allow in international rescue teams, after initially blocking relief workers from entering the country. It is the military’s way of showing willingness to cooperate with the wider world.

In short, disaster diplomacy has kicked in for Myanmar’s military, as it did after 2008’s Cyclone Nagris. That earlier cyclone provided an opportunity for the junta to present a different face to the international community.

Elections were held, not once, but twice – encouraged by the US and others– and investments rushed into Myanmar as the country was touted as” Asia’s next Tiger”.

But the foundations of military-backed reform in Myanmar were built on fault lines that cracked and crumbled amid the 2021 coup. The military’s exploitation of the 2025 earthquake will, I fear, result in similar ends.

Tharaphi Than is associate professor of world cultures and languages, Northern Illinois University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Burnt allies: Japan, S Korea toe cautious line after Trump tariffs – Asia Times

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Two weeks into US President Donald Trump’s subsequent word, the liberal global order is on life support.

Alliances and international organizations are now seen by the United States as obligations. Europe and NATO are framed as bad company, “ripping off” the US. On his so-called” Liberation Day”, Trump even imposed 20 % tariffs on all European Union goods.

The Trump presidency has been far less important of the US ‘ relationships in the Indo-Pacific place. On a visit to Tokyo this year, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described Japan as America’s “indispensable partner” in deterring Taiwanese anger.

But, Japan and South Korea fared even worse than the Union with Trump’s fresh tariffs. Trump slapped Japan with 24 % tariffs and South Korea 25 %. ( Both countries enjoy a trade surplus with the US. )

But, how are the US ‘ two key supporters in the Indo-Pacific dealing with the capricious US head? Did they follow Europe’s result in reassessing their personal safety relationships with the US?

Japan: a good mountain but concerns remain

America’s post-war protection plan in Asia contrasts from Europe. While NATO was built on the premise of shared military among its users, the US adopted a “hub-and-spokes” type in Asia, relying on diplomatic relationships to contain the spread of communism.

Japan and South Korea have huge sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella and held big US military bases. Both are also very sensitive to changes in the US ‘ Indo-Pacific policies.

Japan, in particular, has a long history of cautious empire control with the US, epitomised by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s courting of Trump.

During Trump’s first term in office, Abe’s plan targets aligned strongly with the US: transforming Japan’s security position to make it a serious military and diplomatic energy. Japan increased defense spending, lifted hands trade restrictions and increased ties with India and Australia.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida continued to raise Japan’s safety profile from 2021-24, once increasing military investing and taking a hard line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He emphasised” Europe today may become Asia tomorrow”.

His son, Shigeru Ishiba, had a successful conference with Trump in February, soon after his opening. The mutual declaration reaffirmed US protection promises to Japan, including over the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by China.

Japan even agreed to buy American liquefied natural gas, and eventually committed to working with South Korea to build a US$ 44 billion plan to import LNG from Alaska.

Nevertheless, these positive advancements do not think the marriage is on solid ground.

In early March, Trump complained the US-Japan security agreement signed in 1960 was “one-sided” and a top administration official again called for Japan to increase its defence spending to 3 % of gross domestic product ( GDP ) – a huge increase for a country facing serious demographic and fiscal pressures.

Reports even emerged the US was considering cancelling a new shared headquarters in Japan aimed at deeper connectivity between US and Japanese forces.

South Korea: exceptionally susceptible on trade

South Korea faces comparable pressure. Ties between the two countries were strained during Trump’s first word over his require South Korea increase the amount it pays to network US troops by nearly 400 %. A 2021 deal restored some security but left Seoul seriously worried about the future of the empire.

Trump speaks to US troops stationed at Osan Air Base north of Seoul in 2019. &nbsp, Photo: Ed Jones / AFP share / AP via The Talk

South Korea’s operating leader, Choi Sang-mok, has expressed a desire to improve relations with the US, though Trump has apparently been great to his improvements.

With a$ 66 billion trade surplus with the US, South Korea is considered the country most vulnerable to trade risk with the Trump administration, according to a Swiss research group.

Trump’s prior recommendations that both South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons or compensate for US atomic security has also rattled some emotions. As trust in the US empire diminishes, both places are engaging in an urgent public debate about the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Conflicts moving forwards

Potential for conflict is on the ocean. For instance, Tokyo and Washington are set to renegotiate the deal that dictates how much Japan pays to host US soldiers next month.

Both friends pay large sums to host US foundations. South Korea will pay$ 1.14 billion in 2026, and Japan pays$ 1.72 billion annually.

A trade conflict may also enable a reevaluation of the expenses of US efforts to detach from China, possibly leading to closer economic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. The three countries have agreed to accelerate talks on a trilateral free trade agreement, which had been on hold since 2019.

Another challenge is semiconductors. Japan’s new semiconductor revitalisation strategy is prioritising domestic investment, raising questions about whether Trump will tolerate “friendshoring” if Japan diverts investments from the US.

In 2024, Japan outspent the US in semiconductor subsidies ( as a share of GDP ), while Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s largest contract chipmaker, expanded its production capacity in Japan.

Seoul remains an important partner to Washington on semiconductors. Samsung and SK Hynix are both boosting their investments on new semiconductor plants in the US. However, there is now uncertainty over the subsidies promised to both companies to invest in America under the CHIPS Act.

Ultimately, the strength of these alliances depends on whether the Trump administration views them as long-term bulwarks against China’s rise in the region or merely vassals that can be extorted for financial gain.

If the US is serious about countering China, its regional alliances are key. This would give Japan and South Korea some degree of leverage – or, in Trump terms, they’ll hold valuable cards. Whether they get to play them, however, depends on what Trump’s China policy turns out to be.

Sebastian Maslow is associate professor of international relations, University of Tokyo and PaulO’Shea is senior lecturer, Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Iran lacks leverage for fair nuke deal with US – Asia Times

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Iranian-US tensions are boiling after Trump threatened to bomb Iran following its rejection of direct talks over a new nuclear deal. He also ordered the Pentagon to move six B-2 stealth bombers, which CNN assessed to be 30% of its stealth bomber fleet, to the Indian Ocean island base of Diego Garcia.

The Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded by promising strong retaliation if the US attacks. One of his chief advisors, Ali Larijani, warned that Iran would have “no choice” but to build nukes if the US or through it Israel bombs the country.

Although the US intelligence community’s latest Annual Threat Assessment found that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon”, there are long-standing concerns it could do so quickly with its program’s alleged rapid breakout potential.

This makes Iran’s nuclear program no different in principle than Japan’s, which reputedly could begin churning out nukes in a matter of months if it so chose, but neither the US nor its regional allies consider Japan to be a threat.

The US’s renewed bombing campaign against Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen may be partially intended to send a message to the Islamic Republic that the Trump 2.0 administration does indeed have the political will to initiate military action if Iran refuses to enter talks.

Trump might hold off on bombing for now due to the likelihood that Iran could inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage to US regional bases and allies.

Furthermore, diplomacy hasn’t yet been exhausted since Iran didn’t reject indirect talks of the kind that Russia offered to mediate after reportedly being asked by the US to do so, which was discussed here.

It would thus seemingly be premature for the US to seriously consider bombing Iran at this juncture, but the option isn’t off the table if indirect talks fail to reach a deal. Iran lacks the leverage for a fair deal with the US, however, so it’ll either have to accept a lopsided one or prepare for a major war that it might well lose.

Iran is a proud civilization-state that’s loath to subordinate itself to anyone, hence the difficulty in getting it to agree to sovereignty-eroding curbs on its nuclear program that would effectively make it a second-class country in this regard, all while abandoning any chance of acquiring nuclear weapons in the future.

From Iran’s perspective, this could embolden Israel into one day launching a large-scale conventional or even nuclear war against it, which Iran believes has only hitherto been deterred by dangling a sword of Damocles nuclear weapon threat.

That said, while Iran could inflict severe retaliatory damage to US regional bases and allies (first and foremost Israel) if it’s attacked over its refusal to agree to a Russian-mediated lopsided deal, it cannot inflict such damage to the US nuclear triad and would thus likely be destroyed.

Iran couldn’t count on Russia intervening to help it either since their newly updated strategic partnership doesn’t include mutual defense obligations and Moscow doesn’t want war with Washington or Jerusalem.

Even though the US could survive a major war with Iran, it no doubt prefers to avoid one. So long as US demands remain limited to drastically curbing Iran’s nuclear energy program and don’t expand to include curbs on its support for regional allies or its ballistic missile program, then creative diplomacy could yet prevail.

For that to happen, Russia would have to devise a set of incentives for Iran that the US approves and Iran then agrees to, but that’s still a long way off and Trump might strike first if he loses patience.

This article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.

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Asia’s poorest pay as Trump tariffs target China by proxy – Asia Times

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US President Donald Trump’s” Liberation Day” tariffs will punish some of the most fragile economies in Asia as collateral damage in his effort to corner China. It is tactical carelessness presented as nationalist drama.

The most severe tax increases have occurred in Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Yangon, and Hanoi, no Beijing, but in other places. &nbsp,

Myanmar, which is still reeling from a devastating earthquake and years of political unrest, is now subject to a 44 % tariff on exports to the US. Laos, where, in addition, has been slapped with a 49 % rate. Vietnam, which was viewed as a recent example of economic prosperity, has experienced 46 % damage. &nbsp,

China’s supply chain is being targeted by Washington’s industry arms, and Asia’s least developed countries are taking the brunt.

This strategy threatens to sever full regions ‘ economic anchors, as well as defying the spirit of international trade. These nations are constructing fundamental wealth rather than a global system.

Many rely on export-driven development to maintain delicate job markets and prevent hard-won growth gains from waning. It’s like hard motivation to hire them with levies of this size. It stifles local business, discourages advancement, and makes it clear that developing countries are unfit for the political game.

Trump asserts that these taxes are intended to end decades of being” defrauded” by different nations. This be clear, though: this is not about Myanmar, Laos, or Cambodia. &nbsp,

This is a direct effort to demonize China by focusing on the nations it invests in or operates through. These are countries that have firmly woven into local production ecosystems, with many of them hosting Chinese-owned or sponsored operations. &nbsp,

The US is attacking its Eastern footprint more than just retaliating against China.

The catch is that these nations are not just home to Taiwanese investment. Additionally, they house native businesses, regional manufacturers, and the growing middle groups. They offer opportunities for both themselves and the world economy. &nbsp,

Cutting them off from one of the largest markets in the world doesn’t hurt China. It deteriorates the chances of shared rise and regional security. And it places a propaganda success on a tray for Beijing.

This is the wrong path if the US really wants to dominate business. By focusing on Asia’s poorest countries, it didn’t win the trust of the region. And it definitely doesn’t outperform China by severing American firms ‘ systems.

In Southeast Asia, for example, US companies like Nike and Adidas are intensely produced. May they now face punishment for operating in environments where work is readily available and supply chains are successful?

Overall, Trump’s strategy is self-harming and misplaced. It conveys a message to international businesses that the regulations are no longer foreseeable. It does raise house inflation by raising the price of consumer goods. The US will lose the relationships necessary to provide a significant financial solution to China’s growing supremacy.

Trump’s tax plan also undermines spiritual leadership in Washington. The US has long advocated for a system of open markets, development assistance, and mutually beneficial industry. That was important. It drew nations nearer to each other and America. &nbsp,

That kindness is being shredded in favor of republican posturing now. And in that situation, others will step in, particularly China, whose deep pockets and infrastructure deals immediately seem much more appealing to governments that are on the receiving end of British “reciprocal” tariffs.

The US is reversing its grip on the world economy, and it is rash and foolish criticizing the very places it has been sold on and also believes in the promise of modernization.

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Ukraine and the ‘democratization’ of precision weapons – Asia Times

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Erik Prince argues that the most important defense lesson from the Ukraine war is how profoundly the “democratization of precision weapons” transforms war and causes serious modifications in defense and foreign policy.

For Prince, an assistant to the US Pentagon under the current administration and the founder of Blackwater, robots, cruise missiles, and other precision weapons with AI that are now frequently used on any front line or insurgent causes like the Yemeni Houthis, are excellent equalizers.

According to Prince, they challenge regular US defense capabilities and cost modern armies unsustainable. In addition, Chinese mass production of missiles overpowers any US military force in the North Pacific Ocean and the points north.

Russia, a rival country in the region, adapted and defeated US high-tech weapons with a particular skill in digital warfare. Russia’s military has fared much better than it did during the Ukraine war.

In response to this wings trend, Prince urges a perfect rethink of US military plan in an appointment with Hillsdale College President Larry Arnn and in a statement to Hillsdale individuals. Following are the exams:

LA: I want to briefly discuss Ukraine. You appear to be well-versed in that, as well as in what does and is going on there. What are your thoughts on it?

EP: I believe that President Trump has the guts to send that conflict to an end. There is a 0 % chance that the Ukrainians will retake all of their property. They ought to have reached a resolution a time and a half ago.

Right then, they seem to be engaged in a war of attrition. They’ve been reintroduced to literal World War I-style, ditch warfare-style techniques, but also with the addition of precise drones and precision rockets to make it even more destructive for infantrymen trying to survive.

The Russians are utterly determined to claim Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and, I believe, Mariupol, which are regions with standard Russian tongues, and they already have Crimea. They don’t give up on that.

In a war of attrition, mathematics still matters, and I believe an imperfect harmony is preferable to a shiny battle. In terms of population, Russia has significantly more people and significantly more weapons than the Ukrainians can produce. And the defence sector in Western Europe and America is far too expensive and far beyond.

I believe that America should be given a stark reminder that our munitions don’t do so well there. They’re never in very high demand. Some of the items may work for a month or two before Russian electronic warfare discovers a way to jam the transportation, command link, or anything else to render them useless.

And the foolish officials say,” Oh, we’re degrading the Russian troops and we’re destroying all this technology.” No, the Russian military is now much better and more deadly than they were when they first started. It might take them an hour, an hour and a half to fire back with ordnance if you shot at the Russians when they went in in February 2022.

It’s more like two or three minutes today. So their period time of communication between a battery receiving the fire and a battery receiving the fire with precise positions to take up is much shorter. Yes, they’ve become a bit smarter.

LA: You anyone identify this information?

EP: A lot of it is available resource. A lot of this information is being analysed fairly well by the RUSI, the Royal United Services Institute in London. I have a ton of relationships in strange places where I interact with people and hear from first records.

But yeah, the US government has not taken the necessary lessons from [Ukraine], the motion, that the nature of war has drastically changed as a result of the use of precision and drone warfare in that battle space.

It represents a reform of perfection strike. It’s as shocking as Genghis Khan’s use of rods on horses, in my opinion.

LA: Is it accurate to say that we can’t defend our plane companies?

EP: Well, the Houthis, right, the Iranian proxy in Yemen have been firing a lot of missiles at ships, right? They claim to have shot down US ships with a billion dollars worth of US missiles, which is bad math because you’re using not one but two$ 1 million missiles to shoot down a$ 20, 000 to$ 50, 000 drone.

However, they claim to have spent a billion dollars on that, but that figure is actually$ 5 billion because, if the charges were from the 1990s when they purchased that weapon, they would have to have spent five times as much to replace it.

Any aircraft ship, whatever location is currently in danger, may be targeted by dozens and dozens of precise arms. However, it’s just a matter of arithmetic.

If the US Navy has to wage a war to protect Taiwan and you drive an aircraft carrier close to those [ Chinese ] missile batteries, they can continue to shoot missiles until they run out of them to shoot down, which causes real problems.

That is a pretty good job done by the Chinese. Our weapons cost eight to ten times as much, and we only have a limited number of them.

LA: We didn’t appear to add more quickly.

EP: [ There are ]ways]. A top professional and I were the only ones we spoke to about this. He claimed that they must shift from a government-led security specialist mentality to one centered on cars. They ought to learn” Freedom’s Forge,” which explores how American business actually influenced the outcome of World War II.

Then you visit an automotive supplier or manufacturer who has an understanding of a complicated legislature in quantity. And they are expected to lower prices annually rather than increase them. There is a lot of electrical production capacity and know-how that can produce excellent weapons at an increasingly affordable price.

What does this mean for the United States ‘ method in LA? The Navy, the Air Force, and some men are all involved in strength forecast in the modern United States, which might begin with the First World War.

What does it mean for the future of our defense and foreign policy if those large aircraft carriers carry all of those planes but are dangerous, cheap, and can be killed by something less cheap?

EP: That submarines have more significant roles in terms of scattered heat power, dispersed combat power, and fight projection power into submarine, semi-submersible, or other more difficult-to-kill vessels. Innovation counts, as does thoughts.

Curiously enough, remember that when President Ronald Reagan decided to build two battleships, he actually removed them from storage and returned them to complete combat service in the 1980s.

They were essentially impervious to present missiles because they were designed to withstand 15 and 16-inch gun hits, which was an oddity. Any of these boat weapons, drones, or other such weapons had flimsyly fall off a ship.

Also a water movement missile, which is intended to break a ship’s hull, was so powerful that it wouldn’t have mattered. But perhaps you return to a really old technology.

LA: Some of them are also present.

EP: Yes, they’re still in store. That’s a lot of material to try to rust ahead.

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