When Trump and Xi seek a war-ending trade deal – Asia Times

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As Xi Jinping declares his eagerness to meet with Donald Trump’s White House, the chances of a China-US trade agreement are once more rising.

With obvious pre-conditions, of training. According to reports from Bloomberg and other media outlets, President Xi’s federal wants Trump and his cabinet to tone down the rhetoric, define what precisely Washington wants, and name a certain point person to take the lead of the discussions. On Wednesday, China appointed a new business agent.

Each of these could be a non-starter – or a teaser over time– given US Trump’s predilection for late-night social-media fits and exotic plan shifts from moment to moment. After all, Trump’s taxes on imported goods have increased from 10 % to 145 % at warp speed.

The real issue is not whether Xi and Trump reach a Group of Two industry agreement, though. It’s whether it will amount to anything other than a face-saving practice of rearranging the deckchairs on a sinking business, economic and financial marriage.

Japan can provide some information from its powerful encounter with the Trump 1.0 crew in this regard. Effective because Shinzo Abe, then-Prime Minister, made sure Japan’s bilateral trade negotiations with Trump World were unbroken.

Case in point: Trump was so frightened for a “win” versus America’s long-time rival that he agreed to leave auto industry agreements for another day. Of course, Shigeru Ishiba, the current leader of Japan, was left to face Trump 2.0 in the wake of the scrub of a free-trade agreement.

Trump’s industry representatives and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent are now negotiating with Ishiba’s business negotiators, under the direction of Japan’s minister of economic revitalization Ryosei Akazawa.

Immediately, Trump claimed there’s been “big development”. Tokyo may be able to escape once more with a watered-down, face-saving business agreement that doesn’t lose even half as much as Trump may claim, given the chaos caused by Trump’s tariffs and the multi-trillion-dollar decline in US stocks.

However, Xi is aware that China has a little stronger side.

This weekend’s news that gross domestic product exceeded expectations to develop 5.4 % year on year in the first third suggests China is moving into the Trump 2.0 tax neighborhood with good speed. No bursting at all, but not as much as some economists had predicted.

Xi also put on quite a show by retaliating against Trump’s string of tariffs, even increasing China’s levy on US goods to 125 %. In the process, China communicated it’s set to support considerable financial problems before caving to Trump’s needs. And that Team Xi anticipates that Trump’s team will bring their own sugar and agreements.

By calling Trump’s hill, Xi made it clear that he had taken Washington by surprise and forced him to engage in a number of humiliating back-and-forth. It’s fair to ask which market is not getting a carve-out on Trump’s sky-high transfer taxes on Chinese products?

Some policy wonks who are suffering from PTSD from Trump 1.0 are talking about subsidies for farmers in response to China’s punitive taxes on their products. All of this suggests a lack of commitment rather than a high level of suffering.

Today, even the Federal Reserve is calling Trump’s mountain. Fed Chair Jerome Powell threw cold waters on Trump’s reassurance that lower US prices may lessen the harm caused by taxes in a statement on Wednesday.

These are “very important policy changes,” according to Powell. ” There isn’t a present knowledge of how to think about this”.

The issue, according to Powell, is that” the level of the price rises announced so far is substantially higher than anticipated” and that doubt about the potential impact on the economy. That includes family desire and prices falling.

” Jerome Powell only laid down the law with Trump”, says David Russell, world mind of business plan at TradeStation. It was both a distinct warning about recessions and a charter that the Fed won’t allow the White House to implement price reductions.

The Fed faces a rapidly growing problem because of the risk that the US is entering a large inflation-flatflatlining growth period.

As Austan Goolsbee, leader of the Chicago Fed, puts it,” a price is like a bad supply shock. That is a stagflationary impact, which means that it simultaneously worsens both sides of the Fed’s two authority. There is not a common handbook for how the central banks should listen to a stagflationary shock because prices are rising while jobs are lost and progress is slowing.

Cleveland Fed President Beth Hammock adds that” this is a hard set of challenges for economic policy to understand. There is a strong argument to keep monetary policy low in order to stabilize the risks from more inflated prices and a slowing labour market, given the economy’s starting point and with both sides of our mandate expected to be under pressure.

We would consider how far the economy is from each goal, and the potentially various time horizons over which those respective gaps would be anticipated to close, according to Powell, when he said if stagflation became a reality.

This nascent Trump-Fed standoff weakens the White House’s hand heading into China trade talks.

The Trump White House is already being chastised by international investors who are already reliant on US government debt. Credit rating organizations are concerned about the prospect of 10-year yields approaching 4.5 %, as well as Asian central banks, who own US$$ 3 trillion in US Treasuries.

The last time the US bond market flashed such warning signals was March 2020, just as the pandemic was taking hold. &nbsp,

Fortunately, according to Brookings Institution economist Nellie Liang, the Fed’s purchases made at the time to restore market functioning were in line with its monetary policy goals of the time: to stimulate the economy and lower inflation to its target of 2 %.

” It’s possible, however, that the Fed may someday confront the need to purchase Treasury securities at a time when doing so would conflict with achieving its mandate of maximum employment and price stability”, Liang says. The absence of this conflict highlights the value of regulatory changes to improve Treasury market resilience.

The chances of such upgrades are close to zero because US Congress is essentially gridlocked by partisan sniping.

In the meantime, bond vigilantes are letting Trump know that his tariffs are a clear and present danger to US financial stability. And Xi doesn’t like how the US stock market is affecting Trump’s approval ratings with voters, which is a problem Xi doesn’t have.

Advantage Xi’s far more rigid system also makes China less vulnerable to a significant capital flight as investors try to cast their ballots with their feet.

” If doubts about the exceptional status of the dollar were to increase, this would be very credit negative for the US”, says Alvise Lennkh-Yunus, head of sovereign ratings at Berlin-based Scope Ratings.

Unsurprisingly, China’s two leading figures are taking China’s charm offensive on the road. Xi is based in Southeast Asia, which is now his main trading partner.

In Hanoi, Xi and Vietnam’s Communist Party Secretary-General To Lam agreed to” jointly oppose unilateral bullying” amid trade jousting. Trump’s” Liberation Day” announcement on April 2 sent a 46 % tariff to Vietnam.

According to Xinhua’s official news release, Xi stated that” we must strengthen strategic resolve and uphold the stability of the global free trade system as well as industrial and supply chains.”

Stephen Olson, a former US trade negotiator, told the BBC that Xi’s comments were” a very shrewd tactical move. Trump appears determined to annihilate the trade system, but Xi portrays China as the proponent of rules-based trade and portrays the US as a “reckless rogue nation.”

An” Asian family” that can exploit regional cohesion for greater stability and unity was pushed by Xi in Phnom Penh. Written between the lines in bold font was Trump’s divide-and-conquer strategy targeting economies from the biggest industrialized ones to those in the Global South.

Premier Li Qiang has been managing the phones in China’s second-largest market, Europe. According to the EU side, Li and Ursula von der Leyen discussed China’s crucial role in preventing potential trade diversion caused by tariffs, particularly in those sectors that are already in danger of overcapacity.

Chief executive of Eurizon SLJ, Stephen Jen, an economist, advises against taking China’s economic diplomacy efforts for granted. According to Jen, economies that weren’t aligned with either the US or the Soviet Union’s orbit accounted for only 18 % of global output and 14 % of global trade during the Cold War era.

Nowadays, such third parties, including the EU, play a “much heftier” role — 44 % of global output and 64 % of trade. According to Jen,” Europe holds the key to the ultimate outcome of this US-China rivalry.”

China exported almost the same amount of goods to the EU in 2024, or$ 516 billion, which is almost the same as what it did to the US. Though China ships more to the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) economies, it’s “realistic” to assume that one-third of shipments bound for the US get redirected.

” This process could cascade to effectively lead to the ‘non-aligned’ countries taking the US’ side, leaving China economically isolated,” Jen explains.

Trump 2.0, who may not be aware of these dynamics, can’t seem to impose tariffs on Europe quickly enough. Hence, the outreach efforts by Xi and Li.

Trump, however, may be targeting both friends and foes with direct tariffs and additional taxes on steel, aluminum, and cars in order to advance China’s interests. By some standards, China needs a deal with Trump at the very least to lessen uncertainty. &nbsp,

The effective tariff increase from 11 % in 2024 to 14 % in 2024 will shake up trade dynamics in previously unthinkable ways, according to Hui Shan, chief China economist at Goldman Sachs. Particularly when considering that exports to the US support between 10 million and 20 million Chinese factory jobs.

Demand from ASEAN may be growing, but not fast enough to offset lost American business. Shanghai’s famously busy ports are becoming quiet as idle US-bound tankers crowded the city’s shorelines, according to Caixin.

Despite this, Xi’s China has made it abundantly clear that this will be real negotiations, not the one Trump envisioned.

This could quickly blow up the talks or enable China to get away with its own Japan-like trade deal “light” win. In any case, China may have more cards in this make-a-deal situation than Trump might realize.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Musk’s chainsaw fueled by American need for chaos – Asia Times

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A video of a Las Vegas Tesla dealership that had been set on fire by anti-Elon Musk protesters was posted on March 18, 2025, by an account on X called EndWokeness.

The next day, Musk replied to the post, “Some people just want to watch the world burn,” an iconic line from the 2008 Batman film “The Dark Knight.” Alfred, the Wayne family’s faithful butler, says the line to Bruce Wayne – Batman – to describe the motivations behind the Joker’s chaotic acts of violence.

Musk – and Alfred – was right. Some people do, in fact, say they think that society should be burned to the ground. It’s part of a psychological measure political psychologists created called “need for chaos.”

New data from the Center for Political Communication at the University of Delaware suggests that those people – the ones who want society to burn – are the ones with more, not less, trust in Musk.

They also report more trust in the Department of Government Efficiency, the government entity Musk advises, which the Trump administration claims it created to cut government waste and fraud.

Yet, critics point out that Musk and DOGE’s seemingly indiscriminate approach to spending cuts risks damaging the infrastructure necessary for American innovation.

This desire to watch the world burn doesn’t come out of nowhere.

Fear of losing status

Somewhat like the Joker, whose perpetual sense of victimhood – “You wanna know how I got these scars?” – drove his need for chaos and destruction, people can develop a need for chaos in response to a sense that they are losing.

When political psychologists introduced this concept of “need for chaos” in 2021, they described it not as a psychological trait, but as a character adaptation that occurs when some people experience a cultural and political situation that makes them feel like they are losing status and power.

For some people, this feeling triggers a desire to “burn it all down” – “it” being society, institutions, the world – maybe to rebuild it all anew, or maybe just to see it all destroyed.

Only a small percentage of the US population – less than 15% – tends to score high in need for chaos. But even so, understanding this minority is important to gaining insight into this political moment.

For example, people who score high in need for chaos exhibit greater support for political violence and a willingness to knowingly share hostile and false information online. And in our data, those higher in need for chaos report holding more trust in Musk, DOGE and Trump than people who score lower in the need for chaos measure.

Who wants to burn it down

We are political psychologists who study the link between psychological traits and political beliefs. Last month, the University of Delaware’s Center for Political Communication ran a national survey that we designed to understand where the public stands on various political issues and how those beliefs relate to psychological traits, including need for chaos.

In our national study of 1,600 Americans conducted between February 27 and March 5, 2025, by YouGov, we asked respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

• “I fantasize about a natural disaster wiping out most of humanity such that a small group of people can start all over”

• “I think society should be burned to the ground”

• “We cannot fix the problems in our social institutions; we need to tear them down and start over”

• “I need chaos around me – it is too boring if nothing is going on”

Similar to prior work by author Kevin Arceneaux and his colleagues, our data shows that a very small number – fewer than 20% of the sample – agrees strongly or agrees somewhat with each item.

However, looking at the need for chaos among groups of varying ages, education levels and media habits, we find the highest need for chaos scores among people under age 40, those with less education, and those who pay the least attention to politics.

Burning it down through government policy

Our new data also shows that while people highest in need for chaos report having more trust in Musk, DOGE, and President Trump, these chaos-seeking folks report having less trust in “people in general,” journalists or the federal government. These findings hold even when statistically accounting for other factors, among them party, race, gender, education and ideology.

Musk’s penchant for wielding chainsaws as a symbol of DOGE’s work provides some insight into why chaos seekers may like what they see in Musk. It’s not clear exactly what Musk’s aim is with his work at DOGE, as he eliminates the jobs of hundreds of thousands of government workers.

What is clear, however, is that by many accounts, the mass firings and the gutting of agencies, like the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Institute of Peace (USIP), are sowing chaos. And a significant portion of Americans want just that.

Dannagal G Young is professor of communication and political science, University of Delaware and Kevin Arceneaux is director of the Center for Political Research and professor of political science, Sciences Po

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Australia holds key to countering China’s critical mineral ban – Asia Times

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One notable exception stood out in the escalating business war between the United States and China: 31 crucial materials, including rare earth elements, were carefully exempt from taxes.

This wasn’t a show of kindness, either. It was a covert acknowledgement of the United States ‘ enormous reliance on China for resources that are essential to its shift to clean energy, national defense, and modern profitability.

Beijing responded quickly and carefully. The Ministry of Commerce of China announced new import restrictions and a change in pricing practices. The change is in line with China’s long-standing strategy of shifting market supply and demand for rare earths to pricing based on their proper value.

The effect was fast. Due to exporters awaited approvals under a novel, opaque licensing regime, rare planet exports from China successfully stopped.

US President Donald Trump was inspired by the news to enact a new administrative order mandating a review of the risks to national security brought on by the US’s dependence on imported, processed, essential minerals.

Australia occupies a special corporate position as the world’s supply chains struggle to cope with these disruptions. It has the resources, partnerships, and political investment to move into the fray as a trusted US alliance.

But did Australia profit from this chance, or will it come with restrictions?

China’s brand-new textbook

Seven rare earths, like as dysprosium and terbium, are under China’s most recent limits and are essential for electric cars, wind turbines, fighter planes, and weapon systems.

The coverage serves as a chokepoint while remaining within the bounds of a complete trade restrictions. It makes use of China’s nearly total global dominance of rare earth refining ( roughly 90 % ) and its monopoly over heavy rare earth processing (98 % ).

Two state-owned companies, each of whom possesses nearly 100 % of the country’s mining limits, dominate the country’s rare earth sector.

These actions have revealed how vulnerable American supply stores are. There is only one active rare earth me in the US, Mountain Pass in California, and there is little local processing power.

A fresh running facility owned by Australia’s Lynas in Texas is under construction, but it will take years to build a self-sufficient supply chain.

Rare earth (earths) ore held in open hand.
In the tax conflict, rare earths have become a source of contention. Photo via The Conversation on Shutterstock

Europe encounters the same difficulties. Local production is still constrained, despite the fact that the EU’s natural move depends on rare earths. Although efforts to expand through partners like Australia and Canada have assurance, high production costs and a persistent reliance on Chinese technology have been a hindrance.

China is also trying to change the pricing of unusual rocks. One idea would elevate the value of important minerals like dysprosium from professional inputs to political assets. Another may resolve unique earth transactions in yuan more than US dollars, furthering Beijing’s wider plan to internationalize its money.

This approach for China goes beyond economy. It is a deliberate federal resource policy that is comparable to OPEC’s oil management and attempts to relate pricing to the strategic significance of crucial minerals.

Australia’s glass

Owners are closely monitoring American producers. Japan, Europe, and the US are all showing renewed interest in proper debris like those found at Mt Weld in Western Australia.

Due to its rich geographical legacy and open regulatory environment, industry observers claim that Australia is better positioned than the US to create safe supply chains.

The state has begun to work in order to take advantage of this opportunity.

The federal government is considering measures like proper collecting, production tax credits, and increased domestic control support as part of its Future Made in Australia initiative. A unique earth plant will be built in Iluka Resources for$ 1.65 billion ( US$ 1.05 billion ) and will be operational by 2026.

Other nodes in the world rare earth supply chain network are already emerging initiatives like Browns Range and Lynas ‘ Indonesian plant.

But, architectural obstacles still exist. The American allies, including Australia, however lack advanced processing technologies and had probably prohibitively high costs for climate compliance. The Texas plant owned by Lynas was supposed to increase its allied capacity, but delays have resulted from climate approvals.

straddling a political wire

Geopolitical conflicts add richness to the mix. Australia’s double position as a main downstream supplier to China and a strategic alliance of the US forces it to walk a diplomatic tightrope.

Affiliation with the US too tightly could lead to Chinese retribution. Having an overt relationship with China might compel attention from Washington.

Equity issues are also rising. Northern Minerals and other Chinese firms have their shares in the state halted or forced to be divested.

These difficulties are made worse by market fluctuation. Prices are now boosted by political risk, but they have been turbulent. Additionally, China’s ability to undercut world prices may cause American exports to lose market share.

Importantly important in-manufacturing metals like chromium and gallium are subject to restrictions by China. Image via The Conversation on Shutterstock

A proper opportunity with cords attached

Australia is at the epicenter of a unique corporate turning point. It is a result of China’s flee as well as a potential victim of growing global energy competitors.

The problem for Australia is not just whether it has the metal debris but whether it has the plan to fit in a world where resources exert control.

If the authorities can make the most of this situation by diversifying partnerships, investing in capabilities, and browsing allies and rivals with proper care, it could become a force in a more diverse and crucial minerals landscape.

Being able to have the resources is no longer enough in the age of material geopolitics. The actual test is whether Australia has the will and vision to lead.

University of Technology Sydney associate professor of technology and innovation, Marina Yue Zhang

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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Chinese dragon elegantly twirled around American eagle’s neck – Asia Times

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There is an image that likely increasingly haunts the minds of US strategists: a Chinese dragon, no longer just coiled in defense but elegantly entwined around the neck of the American bald eagle. Not to suffocate but rather to regulate the bird’s breath.

The symbolism is not hyperbole. It captures a world where China, long caricatured as the imitator, has now morphed into a systemic rival, outrunning and outgunning the United States in critical business and security sectors.

From technology to trade, currency to cyber power, the Chinese state has mastered the long game. 

As Graham Allison warned in “Destined for War”, the Thucydides Trap is not only about the inevitability of conflict between rising and ruling powers. It’s also about the erosion of assumptions that the West has long taken for granted—namely, that liberal democracies will always innovate faster and govern better.

That assumption is collapsing under China’s weight. Let us now turn to the strategic sectors where China has not just caught up, but, in many instances, sprinted ahead.

1. Semiconductors: from dependency to near parity

Semiconductors, once China’s key vulnerability, are now the arena of its most dramatic gains. Despite Washington’s embargoes on Huawei and export bans on advanced lithography equipment, Beijing has poured over 1.5 trillion yuan into its domestic chip ecosystem.

China’s 14nm chips are now being produced domestically at scale, and according to Dr Dan Wang of Gavekal Dragonomics, an economic consultancy, “China is only a node or two behind global leaders, and catching up fast.”

This acceleration is powered by “dual circulation”—a policy that embeds state subsidies across the entire supply chain, from rare earth mining to chip design. 

In contrast, the US remains fragmented. The CHIPS and Science Act is slow-moving and could be scrapped while American fabs are still dangerously dependent on geopolitical choke points like Taiwan.

And it’s not clear that forcing Taiwan to build fabs in the US will even remotely work due to a lack of skilled labor and relevant supply chains.

2. Electric vehicles: Tesla in the rearview mirror

China’s BYD, not Tesla, is now the world’s top EV manufacturer. In 2023, it overtook Tesla in global sales and its footprint now spans Latin America, Europe and Southeast Asia.

Why? Because China owns the supply chain. From lithium in Bolivia to cobalt in the Congo, Chinese firms like CATL dominate the upstream. They also control over 75% of global lithium battery production.

As Professor Tu Xinquan of the China Institute for WTO Studies notes, “Beijing treats EVs as the next strategic industry, not just a consumer product.” The result? China is setting the global terms for green mobility.

3. Artificial intelligence: authoritarian efficiency at scale

While Silicon Valley battles over ethics and data privacy, Chinese AI firms race ahead by leveraging the scale of their digital ecosystems. 

With 1.4 billion citizens contributing to vast data pools, firms like SenseTime and iFlytek are training machine learning models at a rate unimaginable in the US.

Stanford’s AI Index 2024 noted that “China now publishes more peer-reviewed AI papers than the US and the EU combined.” 

More importantly, the integration of AI into national surveillance systems—facial recognition, behavioral analytics and even predictive policing—is an institutional advantage in authoritarian governance.

4. Space & hypersonics: leaping over the Pentagon’s horizon

In 2021, China tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that stunned Pentagon officials. It circled the globe before hitting its target—a demonstration of capabilities that America did not anticipate and does not have.

Today, China launches more satellites than any other country, and its Tiangong space station functions independently of NASA. 

This is not just about prestige. It’s about owning low-Earth orbit (LEO) infrastructure and building an integrated command architecture.

According to James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment, “China’s civil-military fusion in space tech gives it a decisive asymmetry—the ability to repurpose civilian launches into military capacity overnight.”

5. Quantum computing and cyber sovereignty

China’s quantum leap is not metaphorical. It has already built a city-level quantum communication network in Hefei and launched the Micius satellite to demonstrate secure quantum encryption.

While the US still grapples with theoretical breakthroughs, China is operationalizing quantum networks—one step closer to unhackable communication.

Simultaneously, China’s cyber units under the PLA Strategic Support Force have matured into a formidable force. 

As cybersecurity expert Adam Segal warns, “Unlike the US, where cyber operations must go through inter-agency review, China’s centralized command is more agile, more ruthless and more strategic.”

6. Infrastructure diplomacy: steel, fiber and sovereignty

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was once dismissed as “debt-trap” diplomacy. Yet in 2025, it has morphed into a network of real-world influence. 

Over 70 ports, 150 countries, and countless rail links are now locked into Chinese logistics systems. Malaysia’s ECRL and industrial parks under the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” initiative are cases in point.

In contrast, America’s Build Back Better World (B3W) never took off due to a lack of institutional backbone and material delivery.

7. Financial innovation: dollar dependency, yuan strategy

Though the dollar still dominates, China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) now clears over US$400 billion in yuan-denominated transactions annually.

As Professor Eswar Prasad of Cornell observes, “CIPS, when coupled with the digital yuan, offers China a way to de-dollarize bilateral trade without directly challenging the dollar’s global reserve status.”

Even in ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia have signed local currency settlement agreements with Beijing. The implications are serious: the US no longer controls the plumbing of international finance unilaterally.

8. Pharmaceuticals and public health diplomacy

Sinopharm and Sinovac may have drawn Western skepticism during Covid-19, but they reached over 80 countries. China became the pharmacy of the Global South, capturing new health markets.

Meanwhile, China controls up to 70% of active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) exports—vital for antibiotic and chronic disease drugs. Even the US Food and Drug Administration has flagged this as a national security risk.

9. Maritime dominance: steel leviathans in Asian waters

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the largest navy in terms of number of vessels, with China launching new destroyers, frigates and carriers at an unmatched pace.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China’s naval shipbuilding capacity exceeds the US by a ratio of 3:1 annually.

This has strategic consequences: with militarized reefs and carrier-killer missiles, Beijing is remaking the Indo-Pacific naval order—challenging the US Seventh Fleet’s dominance.

Conclusion: The end of complacency, the beginning of multipolar discipline

The Chinese dragon did not roar its way to supremacy. It studied the American system—its think tanks, capital markets, academic networks and defense-industrial base—and replicated a version of it with Chinese characteristics: centralized, agile, state-backed and global.

This is no longer a contest of ideologies. It is a contest of capacities.

For Malaysia and ASEAN, the time for strategic hedging has reached its limit. As Professor Lee Jones warns, “Neutrality in a bifurcating world must be underwritten by genuine resilience—economic, technological and political.”

China’s dragon does not need to strangle the eagle. It merely needs to squeeze at the right moments. And in that tightening grip lies the uncomfortable truth of 21st-century power: it is no longer about who dominates, but who endures.

Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia. His analyses have been published across Asia and Europe, with a focus on strategic diplomacy, interdependence and power asymmetries.

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Trade war jeopardizes China’s fusion energy drive – Asia Times

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Concerns are growing that the decoupling was soon expand to the two sides’ successful fusion power participation as the US and China exchange trade war salvos. &nbsp,

Trump ordered a probe into whether American companies are excessively reliant on China’s electronics, medical products, and important metals in April and imposed a 145 % tariff on Chinese goods. Additionally, he tightened export control measures to stop China from obtaining AMD and Nvidia’s creative control devices for the development of artificial knowledge.

Despite all of this, the US has remained one of the seven contributors to the 2007 Southern French-founded International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor ( ITER ), which was one of the group.

a portable blood system produced in China. Photo courtesy of Jeff Pao and Asia Times

The ITER currently offers China’s state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation ( CNNC ) industry standards and contracts, while French companies, like Framatome, offer China fusion technologies. &nbsp,

In a panel discussion at the The Economist’s London on April 14 panel discussion, Tone Langengen, a senior policy advisor for culture and power policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, said,” At the moment, China is definitely doubling down on expanding their work.”

” This could turn into another illustration of the thermal or electric vehicle industry, where we essentially only allow one nation run away and end up locating the entire supply chain and all the power that comes with it in a single land.” She said,” I believe this fluid could be even more important with fusion than it was with solar.

” China has been sending people away, stealing a lot of information, and using their capacity to provide a ton of finance to operate very successfully and break down barriers we set for ourselves around rules and planning,” said one author.

It is crucial for other nations to realize that a true political race is taking place right now. Not just the tech itself, though. It has potential important effects on the potential power and geopolitics. This is the ideal time for the rest of us to work more together.

US vs. China

With its Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak&nbsp ( EAST ) as a testbed for ITER technologies, China joined ITER in 2003. A hot plasma is confined by a donut-shaped container known as a Tokamak, which uses electromagnetic fields. &nbsp,

China has tremendously increased its investment in integration energy since 2022 as a result of the past Biden administration’s restrictions on entry to the chips, AI, and quantum technology sectors. &nbsp, &nbsp,

According to the Fusion Energy Base, an business website, the US invested about US$ 1.35 billion in the fusion business next year, while China contributed about US$ 1.3 billion. In contrast to China’s$ 2.49 billion investment, the US has invested$ 5.63 billion in the field as of 2024. Canada made 321 million dollars, followed by the UK and Canada made 200 million dollars. &nbsp,

The West furnace properly maintained a steady-state, high-confinement blood for 1, 066 moments in January 2025. WEST, formerly known as Tore Supra, achieved a record-breaking&nbsp of 1, 337 hours in February.

Laban Coblentz, ITER’s head of connections. Photo by Jeff Pao for Asia Times

I want my country to get the [fusion energy ] competition as an American. However, we are all going to build plants worldwide in the end, according to Laban Coblentz, ITER’s head of communications. Even though China has been the target of our attacks, what I’d really like to see people doing is imitate it.

” China is working on 26 nuclear plants,” with 22 more in the network. With a robust security system, they are putting together it on time. How did that happen? I had no idea.

Coblentz recently discovered that China had 140 European companies in its supply chain when it was building its third-generation pressurized ocean nuclear fission reactor Hualong Two.

Some of my friends have told me that if we don’t move faster, China will get the fusion conflict. That’s fine, he said. However, if there is the perception that China steals another person’s intellectual house, we should take lessons from what they are doing. They’re engaging in some really clever issues. And integration will need to effectively rehabilitate some of those things if we want for our children to experience millennial change.

Although” the Hualong Two and the Hualong One [are ] largely indigenous, but they [are ] very similar to European pressurized water reactors. But, steal up instead of worrying about China stealing or anything like that! Imitatement is a very good way to look at how they are doing and what they’re doing well and look at how they are doing it.

Deep skills share

China has even created a native talent share by sending students to the US to study integration technology, in addition to obtaining solutions from ITER and European businesses. &nbsp,

Jin Zhang is a Queen Mary University of London assistant professor of microwave electronics. Photo by Jeff Pao for Asia Times

In China, there are many PhD students and scientists returning from the US to China to work on fusion energy projects, according to Jin Zhang, an assistant professor in microwave electronics at Queen Mary University of London, in an interview with Asia Times.

The first high-temperature superconducting ( HTS ) tokamak ever created was built by them. Things are progressing very quickly in China.

Zhang, who is connected to the EAST project in Hefei, claimed that if the US forbids Chinese students to study there, China’s progress will slow and be negatively impacted. He anticipates that the US won’t attempt to halt China’s fusion energy sector because any technological advancements there will benefit the entire world.

Fusion is a shared goal for all people, according to the statement. The sooner that will occur, he added. &nbsp,

The European Union ( Euratom ), Japan, the Soviet Union, and the US all agreed in 1986 to work together to design ITER, a sizable international fusion facility. The members approved the members ‘ final design in 2001 after conceptual design work started in 1988.

With a$ 6 billion ($ 6.84 billion ) initial budget, the ITER reactor construction officially began in 2013. According to ITER, the total cost of the reactor would be about 22 billion euros in 2021.

When the facility can perform a fusion reaction using deuterium-tritium fuel, the US Department of Energy ( DOE ) predicted that the overall cost of ITER would be$ 65 billion by 2039. According to the DOE, US funding for ITER totaled$ 2.9 billion between 2007 and 2023, primarily through research, hardware design, and production for 12 ITER systems. &nbsp,

The remaining six member countries ( China, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the US) will each contribute 9.1 % of ITER’s total costs, while the European Union will contribute 45.6 %.

Read: China wants to have the first fusion-fission reactor in the world by 2031.

Read: China’s Jiangxi plans to construct a fusion-fission reactor

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China’s strategy in the tariff wars – Asia Times

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Xi Jinping, the president of China, is making position trips to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia between April 14 and April 18. It is Xi’s first outside visit this month, following the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries held in Beijing from April 8 to 9. When asked what the main point of the meeting was, Renmin University’s Professor Jin Canrong, a well-known Chinese analyst frequently cited in Western media, stated to the Chinese website” Observer” ( guancha.cn ) that Beijing would talk to its Asian trading partners to counteract the effects of US tariffs. According to Jin, China will keep investing in Asia as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, but it will also increase domestic need to purchase more from its Eastern trading partners. ASEAN nations could buy Chinese state securities denominated in RMB, and China could use the money to buy more, replacing to some extent the US need. Jin’s remarks are above:

This conference on work related to neighboring nations was held in response to the extreme global condition brought on by the United States ‘ desire to impose tariffs. It showed that we hope to make for work a still higher goal in our country’s global strategy.

China and the United States are currently at odds with one another. China’s ties to its neighbors have grown even more significant in this regard. Constantly developing and maintaining such relations has distinct and far-reaching importance for China. &nbsp,

We can keep our nation’s good placement in the Sino-US tactical game as long as we can perform a good job of home work and neighborhood diplomacy.

Over the past few years, despite the numerous global issues and very difficult circumstances, China and its surrounding regions have remained relatively stable. &nbsp,

China’s surrounding areas will develop into a unique “island of balance” in the future and will experience robust economic advancement momentum. The area will see outstanding prospects and excellent value in the future.

The populations of the nations that surround China are also sizable, with groups exceeding 1.4 billion as well. Additionally, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have a large population, with 290 million, 250 million, and 180 million people, both. China and its surrounding countries account for about 56 % of the country’s total population.

Nevertheless, we have had good relations with our neighbors, but there are some flaws that are related to our growth rate. We are still not at the point where we are completely modernized. Our per capita GDP is approximately$ 13, 000, while that of the United States is over$ 80, 000.

Although development is the main goal of humanity, China is still in its early stages of development and hasn’t yet established modernization standards.

Our enhancement also has limitations, especially in soft energy, from the standpoint of a comprehensive national power standpoint. If our country’s per capita GDP exceeds$ 50, 000, and we have a population of 1.4 billion, we may create a huge impact. But, we are still not certain of it at this time. China is just a recent grad if the United States is a doctoral fellow in terms of the degree of development.

From now on, we may change our development strategy, increase our usage capacity and enhance people’s living standards. To do this, we must properly raise person’s income levels and give them total social stability. &nbsp,

In the past, many of our government’s governmental expenditures were used for investment and growth. The government may spend more money right now on enhancing people’s lives by using sources that are unrelated to significant industries. &nbsp,

By allocating and adjusting public tools, we can ultimately resolve problems in four key areas: accommodation, health care, knowledge and retirement. We can make domestic need and obtain inner circulation by improving welfare and increasing people’s investment in their livelihoods.

From a local view, the development of China’s domestic market will support the nation’s attractiveness to neighboring nations, boost the region’s job markets and development environment, and reduce its dependence on US and European markets.

Our practical work should focus on soft cooperation in the economy and technology. China first needs to strengthen its platform for regional economic cooperation and push for the implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP ). Although the agreement became effective on January 1, 2023, it has not yet been fully understood. Under the RCEP framework, we should strengthen economic ties with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

In addition to strengthening economic ties with neighboring nations, we should continue to support the Belt and Road Initiative, put our emphasis on promoting subregional cooperation platforms like the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, the China-South Asia Dialogue, and the China-Central Asia Dialogue.

Guancha.cn: Most of China’s neighboring economies agreed not to retaliate against Trump but to engage in tariff negotiations with the United States. How should China explore its economic and trade potential with neighboring countries?

Trump’s recent decision to suspend the imposition of “reciprocal tariffs” on 75 trading partners for 90 days and concentrate on business with us can be attributed to two factors: On the one hand, it is punishing China because many nations have shown an attitude of surrender and kneeling to the US. ( While most others chose to compromise, Canada and the European Union vowed to retaliate. ) On the other hand, it is also intended to appease different opinions at home.

In this context, China’s external trade situation is unquestionably severe. &nbsp,

Some experts pointed out that when the tariff level between China and the United States exceeds 54 %, most of the commodity trade between the two countries will no longer have room for profit. The US increased its tariffs to 104 % and 145 %, but nothing much changed.

We must be fully prepared psychologically and willing to pay a certain price. Some scholars estimate that the impact of this tariff war on China may be as significant as that of the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic.

During the 2008 financial crisis and the pandemic of 2020, China significantly changed its policies. To combat the crisis, the central government spent 4 trillion yuan ($ 547 billion ) plus local government loans in 2008 to address the crisis. In 2020, our country used its “whole-of-nation” system, similar to military mobilization, to overcome the pandemic. &nbsp,

We must act now and act now to combat the US tariff war and to prepare as we did in 2008 and 2020. &nbsp,

About 19 % of our GDP is exported abroad, but only 14.5 % of all exports to the US are made up of exports. Because some of our products are exported through third-party channels, the proportion may be even higher.

In the last round of tariff war, large-scale capital outflows from the mainland involved mainly Taiwanese and US firms, while the outflow of domestic capital was relatively low.

Let’s say that US exports account for about 20 % of our total exports. If China and the US’s trade is completely stopped, we will need to take steps to lessen the pain caused by a decline in exports to the US, which accounts for 4 % of our GDP.

Based on common sense, we can take three measures:

  • increase domestic demand through fiscal stimulus while pursuing internal consumption,
  • promote re-export through nations that are only subject to 10 % US tariffs,
  • explore new markets such as Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

China and the United States could begin negotiations once they realize that China will not give in. &nbsp,

We can work together to negotiate tariff exemptions for some goods that are produced in China and then shipped to the United States, like Tesla and Apple, for example. This has already been approved by the US. – eds ]

We’ll press the other party into negotiations after the confrontation. After all, engaging in a trade war is intended to produce bargaining chips to keep China from losing some exports. If we can reach an agreement, all products made by American companies in China for the US market can be exempted from tariffs. This could lessen China’s desire to diversify its markets.

With all of the above measures, China’s GDP will be impacted by the tariff war overall, falling from 4 % to less than 2 %.

At the strategic level, I remain optimistic about China’s overall outlook. We can use this tariff war to prompt local businesses to make adjustments, promote the establishment of a domestic market with internal and dual circulation, and turn “bad things into good things” with internal circulation.

I can make a second suggestion. Faced with a 10 % US tariff, many countries will see a decline in their trade surplus to the US and receive fewer US dollars, which may cause a global shortage of US dollars. &nbsp,

China has the potential to use this opportunity to issue renminbi bonds in politically stable nations in large numbers.

The international market has a specific demand for renminbi. Renminbi bonds ‘ large-scale issuance can encourage Chinese investors to shop and invest there and help the country attract foreign investors. &nbsp,

Such a move will also help promote the use of the renminbi in global transactions and agreements, creating favorable conditions for its internationalization.

This article is republished with permission from guancha.cn, which was originally published on April 14, 2025.

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Central Asia beware: You may be Putin’s next target after Ukraine – Asia Times

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The Kremlin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine is a declaration of royal conquest in an effort to recover the country’s former royal heyday. Since there is little hope for the future for Russians, the Kremlin may look to the past for ideas. Ukraine is not just a neighboring status, but a missing element in a great historical puzzle, the key to the Russian empire’s reconstruction, for Vladimir Putin.

New comments made by US Middle East minister Steve Witkoff have caused warnings all over Europe as a deeply troubling indicator of Donald Trump’s long-in-motion hinge to Russia. Instead of urging the attacker to cease its war, Trump first took a more aggressive approach toward the target, pressuring Ukraine in a way suggestive of a mafia-style mattress.

Witkoff echoed many Kremlin remarkations about Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, which has worried German and Russian leaders, in an appointment with Tucker Carlson. He praised Putin, called him “gracious” and” smart,” and suggested that US-Russian discussions had made unanticipated improvement.

Witkoff even downplayed the regional issues surrounding Russia’s invasion of four Russian provinces, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, implying that Russia had a correct to these lands.

Witkoff struggled to recall the names of the four areas that have been under Russian power since the 2022 war to show his utter ignorance. Even though Crimea was occupied and annexed by Russia in 2014, he falsely included it on the record. He dismissed concerns of more Russian development, claiming that NATO may prevent a replicate of World War II-style anger. &nbsp,

Following his five-hour meet with Putin, Witkoff went back to Moscow and continued to suggest that Ukraine should provide more territory to Russia in order to achieve “permanent peace.” He even suggested the offer may open the door to renewed US-Russia connections through business opportunities, framing it as a broader effort to stabilize the area.

Once more, Witkoff demonstrated that he is far beyond his comfort zone when it comes to high-stakes politics. &nbsp,

When Russia rolled its vehicles across Ukraine’s edges in 2022, the information to all former Soviet republics was unmistakable: Vladimir Putin intended to restore the Russian Empire and bring the earth back decades to do it. Putin praised the tsar’s victories and suggested that, like his predecessor, he was also reclaiming what was “rightfully” Russia’s just a few months later. &nbsp,

This imperial vision has long roots. Putin referred to the Soviet Union’s collapse as the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century in his 2005 speech. He is running out of time to realize his vision at the age of 72. The war in Ukraine is, for him, not just about territory– it is about legacy. If that is what it takes to bring Ukraine to heel, he appears willing to see the Russian state bleed and possibly collapse.

Putin’s reign as Ukraine’s ruler is predated by Russia, and it won’t end with him unless Russia is defeated on the battlefield. The idea that Ukraine belongs within Moscow’s sphere of influence has been a persistent feature of Russian political thinking, even under supposedly democratic leadership in the 1990s.

These worries extended to the period immediately following the invasion. Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first elected president, reportedly considered conducting a nuclear strike to stop Kyiv from dissolving permanently after the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Though the threat was never carried out, it revealed how deeply rooted the Kremlin’s anxiety over Ukrainian sovereignty truly was.

Yeltsin claimed that Russia had the right to review its borders with any neighboring nation that wished to leave the Soviet Union, with particular reference to areas of Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

By 1994, Russia had already begun attempting to regain control of Crimea, which promoted separatist sentiment and political unrest. The tension never fully dissipated.

Then, in 2003, tensions rekindled as a result of Russia’s decision to build a dam in the Kerch Strait over a Ukrainian island, causing concern in Kyiv over an attempted land grab. It was a clear attempt to contest Ukrainian authority. Though the crisis was eventually defused, it foreshadowed the future Russian aggression in Crimea.

Russia’s strategy changed from economic pressure to outright aggression when Ukrainians marched against closer ties with the EU in 2013. The acceleration of Russia’s efforts to end the international system and the post-Cold War order itself was marked by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the spawning of war in eastern Ukraine.

If Putin should succeed, Russia would not just grow in size but gain immense strategic depth and economic leverage. Moscow would be able to increase its military, industrial base, and strategic infrastructure, increasing its strength and reach. A strong Russia would emerge stronger, more aggressive, and much harder to contain.

The implications of a Russian victory would extend far beyond Ukraine. Central Asian nations like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have made more efforts to distance themselves from Russia, both politically and linguistically.

While Kyrgyzstan initially reacted favorably to a large influx of Russian refugees fleeing conscription, the surge rekindled concerns about renewed Russian imperial influence. In response, many young Kyrgyz are embracing their native language as an act of resistance and identity reclamation. Kyrgyz is now required to be used in government under new laws, and grassroots efforts to promote the language are taking off, particularly among urban youth. &nbsp,

Much the same is happening in Kazakhstan, where efforts to revive the Kazakh language have accelerated, including a shift away from the Cyrillic script. In 2021, Uzbekistan made its own transition to the Latin alphabet, indicating a glaring departure from Russian cultural influence.

What’s stopping Putin from making a similar claim in Central Asia after he claimed to defend the invasion of Ukraine by claiming to protect Russian speakers in the Donbass? Could he one day argue that Russian speakers in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan also need “protection” and send in tanks under that pretext? After all, how many people believed that Russia would annex Crimea in 2014 or launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022?

Similar imperial rhetoric has been used by Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev against Kazakhstan, which he called an “artificial state” in 2022, not just against Ukraine but also against Kazakhstan.

Despite initial hopes that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would push Kazakhstan to pivot toward the West, Moscow’s influence in that country has actually deepened. Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev has used symbolic language to formally declare his independence, such as speaking in Kazakh during official visits, but his reliance on Russia continues to be significant.

During the unrest in 2022, Russia assisted Tokayev in holding onto the presidency. Since then, economic ties have strengthened, with record levels of bilateral trade, joint energy projects and Russian stakes in strategic resources like uranium.

The promised reforms toward a more democratic” New Kazakhstan” have largely stalled, giving way to growing authoritarianism, as Kate Mallinson, associate fellow in the Chatham House program for Russia and Eurasia, pointed out. Russia continues to have a strong position in Kazakhstan’s future despite China’s declining influence and expanding China’s presence.

But the Central Asian nations have attempted to distance themselves from Moscow politically, refusing to back its invasion of Ukraine or recognize Russian-claimed territories. In response, Russia has switched to soft power sources like humanitarian aid, cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and significant development funding.

With over 350, 000 Russian” compatriots” in Kyrgyzstan and deep institutional ties through the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union, Russia is investing heavily in maintaining its foothold. However, if Russia secures its desired outcome in Ukraine, which will free up resources for other fronts, that calculus could change quickly.

Putin keeps stifling any actual ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. He toys with Trump, who shows little interest in seriously addressing the war. Puntin wracks up concessions without making any concessions. Witkoff is by no means the only US official to chime in on Kremlin points.

For now, Trump continues to state he is “pissed off” and&nbsp,” not happy”, but there are still no concrete actions against the Kremlin to force the Russians to the table for an immediate ceasefire. Former US ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst stated that” While Putin has clearly stalled Trump‘s efforts to reach a ceasefire of any kind, he has not been punished for that in any serious way.”

Putin is likely to use a lot of force to influence a upcoming Trump administration, especially one that works by assuming that it can create a reverse Kissinger-China relationship. Such strategic naivety risks handing Moscow exactly what it wants: division among countries in the West, giving Russia more free reign in its empire-rebuilding projects. &nbsp,

Putin is unlikely to stop there if he is permitted to claim victory in Ukraine or reach a peace deal that effectively reduces it to a vassal state. Now in his seventies, with his imperial ambitions slipping out of reach, Putin may grow more reckless in pursuit of legacy.

Once Ukraine is under its control, the Kremlin elite will have a chance to focus their energies on Central Asia and resurrect Russia’s imperial project there. Regardless of the cost, Moscow continues to work hard to reintroduce the world to the 19th century.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. He can be found on X @ DVKirichenko.

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US-China trade war stuck in a Prisoner’s Dilemma – Asia Times

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It is tempting to interpret the situation as absurd brinkmanship as the US and China escalate their trade dispute through tit-for-tat levies.

However, beneath the surface, the routine resembles a well-known economics architecture, particularly the” Prisoner’s Dilemma” in sport idea, which is complicated by politics, national pride, and domestic politics ‘ experiences.

In the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players ( in this case, China and the US) have the option of cooperating ( lower tariffs, open trade ) or defying ( higher tariffs, trade restrictions ). The rewards are obvious:

  • If both parties cooperate, both parties gain and no one “loses mouth.”
  • If one cooperates but the other does not, the defector gains market share and a strategic advantage while the cooperator appears poor and suffers economically and socially.
  • If both suffer, both suffer, but at least neither “loses face” to the other.
Graphic: Author supplied

Mutually beneficial cooperation would undoubtedly be the most advantageous outcome, essentially economically. However, losing one’s experience in this situation has more serious repercussions.

For Beijing, being viewed as clinging to American force would not only damage its international standing but also its domestic social standing.

Being” hard on China” remains a significant political asset for Washington, especially under an leadership that is defined by its contextual design.

Time, respect, and Trump

This particular generation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is much more complicated thanks to two more relationships.

Second, there is a terrible amount of trust. Due to President Trump’s well-known capriciousness, counterparties are rightly wary of any guarantees.

Depending on local political trends and lobbying preferences, deals may be reversed, tariffs can be raised without warning, and political logic frequently shifts.

Second, at least from China’s point of view, this is not a sport that repeats itself. Recurrent interactions, as explained in sport theory, encourage cooperation because each part is aware that several rounds will have the same consequences.

China is aware that it might only need one word or perhaps just another year of Trump’s administration to survive. There is little opportunity for Trump to generate significant agreements now that the US midterm elections are looming.

The safest move is to defect when the match is short-term, regardless of the broader economic value. Vietnam provides a somber illustration of what occurs when a player attempts to cooperate to first.

US officials flatly rejected Vietnam’s proposal to remove tariffs on US products, criticizing its trade deficit and accusing it of “dumping” cheap products like crab into the American market instead of rewarding the provide.

The training for China was clear: allowing too much time does not guarantee mercy. However, it might just entice more requirements.

More than just business

The effects of the joint dissolution extend far beyond the taxes themselves. Global supply chains are shifting as businesses try to diversify away from US- or China-centric types.

Rather, they are making investments in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and perhaps Africa, thinking of them as potential final-demand destinations rather than just as offshore producing bases. As nations look for alternatives in a fragmented global order, intra-Asian trade is growing.

In the US, political discourse has gotten more and more zero-sum: if China benefits, America may lose. This allows for the detail and compromise that are usually required by international trade agreements.

The price war is no longer simply an economic dispute as a result. It is a battle between political influence, pride, and narrative.

No simple way out

In a perfect world, both parties do acknowledge the harm done to one side and get a quick fix.

However, with trust waning, opportunities being misaligned, and the social cost of losing being always so great, common departure has turned into the Nash Equilibrium. Both sides want to scale up, and both would prefer to lose economically over appear weak.

The true horror is not just those in the taxes themselves. The root of distrust has been compromised, making teamwork more difficult both now and in the future. There are still two large options for breaking the damaging cycle: changing the paybacks and finding a face-saving leave.

The first is when departure turns out to be much more painful than assistance. This may occur if the social benefits of “looking hard” begin to outweigh the local costs of the tariff war, which include slower growth, inflation, declining exports, and a louder backlash from disturbed industries.

The second path is more psychological, but it is still significant. Both Trump and Xi have strongman personas, but neither is likely to back down without creating a compelling narrative that will prevent their faces from fading.

This might be a temporary truce that is characterized as a” strategic recalibration” or even cooperation in response to a larger crisis that draws attention and justifies de-escalation.

In essence, what’s needed is more than just a better deal; it needs a better story that allows both sides to retreat gracefully without appearing to have given in.

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A question of motivation for China’s PLA – Asia Times

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China has more democratic area thanks to recent American messing with tariffs.

Beijing also has three options for handling America’s problems: negotiating with the US and the rest of the world regarding business, currencies, and regional claims, promoting a worldwide option ideology like the USSR did past century, or isolating itself like North Korea.

NAN—Negotiations, Alternative, North Korea in acronym shape. China may attempt to combine these three options, as it does right now, but it might eventually feel forced to do so. It’s about who the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) wants to be in the world.

The formidable ( on paper ) PLA ( People’s Liberation Army ) will likely be in charge of it, which will likely involve brinkmanship.

Here is the explanation. He Weidong, the vice president of the Central Military Commission led by President Xi Jinping, is the subject of rumors that the international media has been detained for corruption.

The most recent arrest in a row to date has been equivalent. As ratings of mature Army officials may already be under investigation, it might not be the last. The cost is allegedly corruption, a broad term that covers both political disloyalty to the best leader and a real interest in financial returns.

Since Deng began his reforms almost 50 years ago, the problem issue has plagued the Taiwanese army. The chamber of a gun has fundamental power, but why is it used and who is the internal or external enemy?

For instance, American troops risk their lives for the country and its political ideals. Why in China? Toward socialism Actually, not.

For China? No entirely. Who is the party’s representative in China? The most powerful person is Xi Jinping. May Chinese soldiers sacrifice their lives for Xi? Some people perhaps favor Xi over money. With the character worship, Mao addressed this problem.

The Red Army fought against the Patriots and the Asian against communism in a struggle for the country.

The army was the key factor in gaining strength, as in all effective rebellion in Chinese history. Certainly the opposite way around, as with the Soviet Revolution, the party was the descendants of the military.

After the PRC was established, Mao created a personality cult to support his position, and socialism turned out to be the name of another Taiwanese kingdom.

The army would fight alongside the emperor, much like they did throughout the Chinese military during World War II. Mao used the Army for political bickering during the Cultural Revolution because it was at his disposal.

After that, Deng had to remove the army from partisan politics, which included giving them money. Over the following years, the prepare varied in form and form but remained consistent.

It remained consistent in winning the military’s support and trust in exchange for financial benefits.

But, a money-driven army is not willing to fight for the nation or its head. Because hazards have become real and as the war in Ukraine has shown, fights are also a catastrophe, not a video game, Xi needs a battle, dedicated Army right now.

It’s unclear what the troops would be faithful to if money were taken out of the PLA’s formula. Is it to Xi? Finally, had a personality cult still exist today like it did 70 years back? Since then, the Chinese have significantly altered.

Every standard is for himself and has the potential to rebel against the head if there is a better chance. The Army has resumed political politics.

Maybe He or Admiral Miao Hua, a Xi nationalist who was detained in November, had a political mission. In the present method, Xi’s officials does have a vested interest in making anti-US recommendations that could help Xi win the presidency and help them succeed. Lin Biao and Mao met in 1971.

That doesn’t imply that China lacks men who are willing to perish. There are dozens of Chinese soldiers in Ukraine that demonstrate there is a potential lake.

The Russian practice demonstrates that it is possible to entice and compel the most underprivileged into serving in the army and using them as cannon fodder. Millions of potential participants from rural or rural China exist.

Also, the hanging question persists: how to inspire officers and generals?

With the advertising and fundraising of the Russian Orthodox Church, President Vladimir Putin in Russia made an offer to revert to a neo-czarist order. Neo-czarism appeals to the ultra-right in addition.

Finally, Xi may need to get a letter from the NAN acronym to prepare the army for its mission. Scores of self-declared neo-Confucian thinkers beat the powerful drum of a Chinese civilization to challenge the American one. Despite the fact that Xi has no chosen his journey, the proposal de facto pulls China into a North Korean function.

His army’s philosophy must be prepared if Xi wants to offer the earth an alternate global perspective, such as global comm-Confucianism. If the agreement is reached, therefore a different philosophy will be required.

However, there are many gaps between the three candidates, and Chinese officials may attempt to bridge them. Again, the decision to make the right choice may affect the PLA’s true capacity and commitment to their leadership.

Francesco Sisci, an Italian scientist and political commentator with more than 30 years of experience in China and Asia, is the chairman of the Appia Institute, which was the original author of this article. It has been republished with authority.

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Are US and China really in a Thucydides Trap? – Asia Times

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Over the past ten years or so, the so-called Thucydides Trap has become a cornerstone of foreign policy remark, frequently being used to illustrate the growing conflict between the United States and China.

The phrase was coined by political scientist Graham Allison in a 2012 Financial Times article and later expanded into” Destined for War,” which quote from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who wrote in his” History of the Peloponnesian War” that “war was inevitable because of the fear that this instilled in Sparta.”

At first glance, this strikes you as a powerful and well-presented comparison: Rising powers cause fear in well-established ones, leading to fight. The assumption seems obvious in today’s context: China’s rise is bound to cause a collision with the US, only as Athens previously did with Sparta.

However, this framing runs the risk of detracting from Thucydides ‘ more complex job and detracting from its deeper philosophical information. Thucydides wasn’t making a linear rules of politics. He was putting together a drama.

Does history repeat as horror?

Thucydides fought on the Greek area during the Peloponnesian War. His traditional tale has a strong influence on how people perceive Greek tragedy in their own world. His research explores how human frailty, social misinformation, and social decay can combine to cause catastrophe rather than a treatise on fundamental inevitability.

That dreadful sensitivity is important. Socrates drew attention to the position of selection, perception, and emotion, where present analysts frequently look for predicted patterns and system-level explanations.

His past is full of the acidic effects of fear, ambition seductions, leadership failures, and the dreadful deconstruction of judgment. This is a study of arrogance and nemesis, no structural determinism.

When the term” Thucydides Net” is elevated to a kind of quasi-law of global politics, much of this is lost. It becomes the abbreviation for finality: fear rises, fear responds, and war begins.

However, Thucydides himself was more interested in explaining how fear spreads, how ambition can twist judgment, and how leaders can persuade themselves that war is the only option left. His story illustrates how issue frequently arises from misinterpretation, error, and passions unmoored from reason rather than necessity.

Even Allison, to his credit, never made a claim that the” trap” was inevitable. His main argument was that when a rising power confronts a resolute one, war is obvious but still obvious. In fact, Allison’s creating serves as a caution against breaking the routine and from resigning from it.

The images of two men are seen on wooden dolls.
Russian puppets with standard depictions of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Donald Trump are popular. Photo by Dmitri Lovetsky / AP via The Talk

In that regard, both critics and politicians have used the” Euripides Trap” ineffectively. Some view it as assurance that war is ingrained into the structure of power moves, making it an excuse to raise defence costs or engage in tough negotiations with Beijing, when it should actually prompt reflection and caution.

The Peloponnesian War wasn’t just about a shifting power equilibrium, according to Socrates ‘ careful reading. It also involved pride, misjudging, and the inability to lead properly.

Consider his popular statement,” Knowledge is strong and understanding is reserved,” to be a good one. This is a mortal perception, not a structural one. It’s specifically targeted at those who mistake impulsiveness for approach and flair for strength.

Or consider his cold dictament,” The Powerful do what they will, and the Weak suffer what they must.” That’s not an support of geopolitics. What happens when justice is disregarded and energy becomes inaccountable is the dreadful lament.

In this context, Socrates ‘ real lesson is not that combat is preordained, but rather that it occurs more frequently when people allow fear to obscure reason, when officials mistake posturing for prudence, and when strategic decisions are made based on insecurity rather than quality.

Thucydides reminds us of how quickly understanding can turn into misperception and how dangerous it is when leaders stop giving in to disagreements when they are convinced of their own morality or necessity.

A stencil street art showing the faces of three men.
It’s not always the case. Photo courtesy of The Conversation: Dan Kitwood/ Getty Images

The true teachings of Euripides

In today’s world, using the Socrates Trap as a justification for a conflict with China may do more harm than good. It reinforces the idea that issue is currently going on indefinitely and cannot be stopped.

The Story of the Peloponnesian War teaches us that war is not obvious when it becomes more possible when the space for reflection and representation collapses under the weight of fear and pride, which is a lesson.

Socrates provides a reminder — an entreaty to leaders who are ensnared by their own narratives and force their countries over a cliff, rather than a theory of global politics.

Better judgment is required to avoid that death. And above all, it calls for the humility to acknowledge that the prospect is not just a function of the options people make.

Political science professor at Macalester College is Andrew Latham.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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