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The Assad family’s harsh 54-year rule in Syria appears to be around.

In a matter of days, criticism makes took the main city of Aleppo before advancing south into another government-controlled places of Hama, Homs and suddenly, on December 7, 2024, the capital, Damascus.

Given that the 13-year legal battle had been generally at a standstill since Russia and Turkey brokered a ceasefire in 2020, the rude was all the more remarkable. According to reports, Bashar al-Assad reportedly resigned and left the nation. What he left behind, though, and what comes next?

As a specialist on Middle Eastern safety, I think the ability of the opposition forces to maintain cohesion may be crucial for the transition to a post-Assad Syria. Despite their recent defeat, the numerous opposition parties in Syria have been splintered by ideological differences and additional supporters ‘ interests since the civil war started in 2011.

The sudden change in fortunes in Syria’s civil war poses serious concerns for nations that have supported either side of the conflict. For Iran and Russia, the fall of their alliance Assad may damage local objectives.

There will also be difficulties for supporters of some of the opposition’s forces, particularly Turkey and the US, both of which maintain a military appearance in Syria.

Catastrophic victory

Iran, the US, Russia and Turkey have been important athletes throughout Syria’s civil conflict.

The new opposition rude came as Assad’s three important friends — Russia, Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah — were stretched thin. Hezbollah appeared hesitant to commit further fighters, as it had done formerly, while Russia’s rely on Ukraine and Iran’s setbacks from Jewish strikes has limited their capacity to provide Assad with strong support.

Then, on Dec. 2, as opposition forces were on the move, Russia began withdrawing naval assets from its strategic Mediterranean base at Tartus, Syria. Assad’s ability to regroup and launch a successful counteroffensive was severely hampered by this erosion of external support.

The US will undoubtedly be pleased with the diminished Russian and Iranian influence in Syria. However, a scenario of” catastrophic success” in which Assad is replaced by an Islamist group that many in the West view as terrorists has already been uncovered in Washington.

Much of the opposition’s gains in Syria were made by members of the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, who were also involved in fighting against the Syrian National Army, which was supported by Turkey.

The risks for the 900 Syrian American soldiers may increase as a result of instability and the possibility of clashes between opposition factions and US allies, even though Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has not directly targeted the US troops stationed in the northeast, which is under the control of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.

A fragmented landscape

The fact that different opposition groups have taken control of various once-government-held areas points to a crucial fact: Syria is de facto partitioned. The Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian National Army, which are supported by Turkey, rule the northwest. The northeast is under the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by the United States.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian National Army fight frequently despite having the same objective: to remove Assad and the joint offensive in Aleppo. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Abu Mohammad al-Golani aims to assert control over opposition-held areas, including those currently managed by the Syrian National Army.

And the Syrian National Army and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham maintain complex, often conflicting relationships with the Syrian Democratic Forces, shaped by ideological, territorial and strategic differences.

The Syrian Defense Forces, which Turkey views as a terrorist organization and an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party, are frequently directly armed clashes between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and the Syrian Defense Forces in southern Turkey.

The opposition’s internal dissolution may eventually weaken its ability to stabilize Syria.

Adjustment problems

The fall of Assad will have a significant impact on nations interested in the region.

Iran’s grand plan to preserve the” Shia Crescent” has failed by connecting Tehran to Beirut through Baghdad and Damascus while attempting to combat Sunni Islamist groups.

For Washington, Assad’s departure doesn’t necessarily fit any hoped-for outcome.

The US has given importance to balancing, containing, and possibly reducing Syria’s Russian and Iranian influence. However, that did not until recently mean that Assad had been removed. In early December, the Biden administration even made hints that it would be willing to lift sanctions against Syria if Assad cut ties with Iran and Hezbollah.

There was also talk of Assad’s government collaborating with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which was supported by the US. However, it became increasingly unlikely that the Kurdish organization would join the weakened Assad forces as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army fell from power to power, especially as Kurdish forces themselves made significant territorial gains.

In response to the demise of Assad, the Syrian Democratic Forces will have to adapt. This will be doubly true if the US withdraws from Syria, as many people anticipate and as President-elect Donald Trump has suggested. Currently, the 900 US troops are in eastern Syria, alongside a military base in Al-Tanf, located near the Iraqi and Jordanian borders.

The Syrian Democratic Forces and the autonomous region it governs, known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, would need to negotiate their autonomy with both the opposition’s various factions and Turkey’s neighbor, in the event that American forces withdraw.

A Kurdish and Islamist alliance?

The US might have a significant headache over the Syrian Democratic Forces ‘ precarious role in the US’s transition to the post-Assad era.

Should the US eventually withdraw, the Kurdish organization may need to align with some of the opposition’s factions, most likely Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, given Turkey’s history of military incursions and campaigns against the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern cities like Afrin and Kobani.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has largely stayed away from igniting the Syrian Democratic Forces in recent months. Indeed, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s efforts to rebrand and moderate itself are notable, especially given its origins as a Salafist group with ties to al-Qaida.

The Islamist group has attempted to soften its hard-line image and win favor – or at least neutrality from international stakeholders, like the US, by adopting a range of policies, including amnestying Syrian army personnel, facilitating evacuation agreements, and using the language of building an ethnically and religiously diverse governance structure.

Yet skepticism about Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s ultimate objectives persists.

Strategic calculations for Turkey

Turkey’s position on Syria now is equally complex. Turkey is home to 3.6 million Syrian refugees — the largest refugee-hosting country globally. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoan had been under pressure by a prolonged economic slump and rising anti-refugee sentiment to declare a willingness to cooperate with Assad prior to the opposition offensive.

Turkey hoped that normalized relations with Syria would ease concerns about a potential Kurdish state in northeastern Syria.

However, Assad refrained from making such advances, and he launched airstrikes on Idlib, causing new waves of displacement close to the Turkish border.

Turkey’s position on Syria is also closely linked to its renewed negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers Party. Among these discussions, according to reports, are discussions about the potential release of imprisoned Kurdistan Workers Party leader Abdullah Calan, whose influence is strong in northern Syria’s Kurdish-led regions.

The chance for a new Syria

After 50 years of brutal oppression, the apparent end of the Assad family’s rule reveals a pivotal moment for Syria, giving the country the chance to rebuild on the foundation of inclusivity, pluralism, and stability.

The ability of the opposition factions to navigate the enormous challenges of transition is crucial to achieving this vision. This includes fostering social harmony among various groups, addressing grievances from conflict, and creating governance structures that reflect Syria’s racial, religious, and political diversity. That is not going to be simple.

Sefa Secen is assistant professor of international and global studies, Nazareth University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The main opposition Democratic Party ( DP ) pledged to continue its impeachment efforts while the ruling People Power Party floated alternative strategies to deal with the ongoing crisis after Saturday’s parliamentary session in Seoul, when Yoon Suk Yol’s critics came within five votes of the number needed to impeach him.

What will happen next, and how will this change the political scenery on a global scale domestically and internationally? Asia Times spoke with Sonamu Party leader Song Young-gil, a former top senator from the Democratic Party, late on Saturday to discuss these issues. In addition to serving as Incheon president from 2021 to 2022, Song was also the party’s leader.

Q: The movement to oust Yoon failed. Why?

A: First, within the People Power Party, there remains a deep-seated pain from the prosecution of former traditional President Park Geun-hye. Some lawmakers worry that the whole conservative camp will fall as well if President Yoon is toppled. Also, they are determined to avert any scenario in which Lee Jae-myung, the liberal opposition leader, could take over as leader following Yoon’s eventual ouster. The PPP sees the prosecution motion as an existential threat when looking at the present crisis from a political and social perspective.

]The PPP head ] Han Dong-hoon’s antagonism to prosecution is perplexing, though, especially since he was targeted for imprisonment under Yoon’s martial law. His ambiguous attitude highlights his lack of gravitas and social skills. The so-called Han Dong-hoon party is certainly blindly devoted to him, particularly as he isn’t actually a member of the National Assembly. Instead, they appear to be assessing the broader social environment. Han’s ability to formulate a strong position or inspire confidence only strengthens his standing as a politician without management.

What led to President Yoon’s declaration of martial law, in your opinion?

The main issue, I believe, lies in the ongoing political efforts to get a special counsel probe against Kim Keon-hee, the second lady. To protect his family, Yoon issued an crisis martial law declaration, essentially creating a “bulletproof” protection. Beyond this instant motivation, it reflects Yoon’s consistently stance since taking office, which has been to label socialists as hostile to the state and to suppress political dissent.

Yoon’s latest strategy, however, does not appear to be a unplanned decision but instead a deliberate act. Kim Young-hyun, a close friend and former high school student, was recently appointed as the minister of defense and established a personal network made up of Yoon’s essential allies, including Counterintelligence Commander Yeo In-hyung and Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min ( he resigned on December 8 ).

Does Yoon’s action constitute rebellion? &nbsp,

South Korea’s congressional unit is officially unassailable, even under martial law. The National Assembly retains its freedom even though a military laws decree may place the executive and court under its control. In these circumstances, North Korean law expressly imposes congressional control. The leader must contact the National Assembly as soon as possible under Article 4 of the Martial Law Act. The president may request a legislative session to explicit the declaration right away if the Assembly isn’t in session.

Under Yoon’s law, these legitimate safeguards were plainly disregarded. Armed men forced their way into the primary building in an effort to arrest politicians, not only did the military wall the National Assembly to prevent politicians ‘ access. The conjugal legislation control also breached the building housing the National Election Commission, an automatic organization. These actions amount to a clear act of insurrection and constitute a flagrant violation of the constitution.

The opposition will fight for impeachment until it is successful. Will it work?

To investigate President Yoon’s declaration of martial law, a special investigation headquarters was established. The headquarters needs to immediately summon important figures and find out more about what happened this week. For instance, according to a report from broadcaster MBC, the Yoon administration may have aimed to retaliate by attacking North Korean targets in retaliation for the regime’s trash-filled balloon attacks. If this is substantiated, it would constitute a serious felony, tantamount to treason, which could pave the way for the president’s removal under Article 84 of the Constitution.

Before the impeachment bill was approved, an investigation into former President Park’s numerous scandals was conducted. If the evidence favors a course like Yoon’s, impeachment would become more feasible given the ongoing investigations against him. [President Yoon has been named a suspect in the insurrection case on December 3].

You talked about the need to dismantle Yoon’s “prosecutorial state”. Can you explain?

By staffing government agencies, the ruling party and the presidential office with a pro-Yoon prosecutorial clique, Yoon has effectively created a “republic of prosecutors”. By using its influence to obstruct the president and his family from criminal liability, restrict press freedom, and silence opposition and dissent, this faction, who operates under his leadership, has undermined South Korea’s democratic norms. I have long argued that, even if the Yoon administration falls, little will change as long as Han Dong-hoon, with his equally prosecutorial mindset, remains the leader of the ruling party. A fundamental overhaul of our prosecutorial system is urgently required in addition to Yoon’s ouster.

Washington claimed to have been unaware of the event’s significance and had not been given any notice.

We welcome Washington reaffirming that the foundation of the South Korea-US alliance is democracy, which is crucial. However, as a sovereign nation, South Korea has no obligation to give prior notice, regardless of the legitimacy of the martial law.

You had a recent meeting with South Korea’s Russian ambassador. Can you share what was discussed?

First, I emphasized that the use of nuclear weapons should never be considered under any circumstances. Second, I argued that heightened military ties with North Korea and Russia shouldn’t lead to escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. I also stressed the value of a quick end to the Ukrainian conflict.

How would you rate President Yoon’s response to the conflict in Ukraine?

First, Yoon’s rationale for supporting Ukraine is rooted in Cold War-era rhetoric: a battle between communism and democracy. However, Russia is no longer a communist state. It’s essentially a democratic republic, the Russian Federation, which former President Yeltsin defended against a communist coup. Putin has inherited that legacy, and Russia’s political landscape has moved beyond the communist ideology.

Second, Ukrainians are ethnically closely related to Russians, and historically, Crimea was transferred to Ukraine as a gift by former Soviet leader Krushchev. Additionally, the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s headquarters is located in the port of Sevastopol in Crimea. As such, Ukraine’s situation differs significantly from that of the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — or the Scandinavian countries.

Third, from Russia’s perspective, NATO’s eastward expansion, despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and promises from Washington not to expand, is a significant security concern. Moscow has repeatedly stated that Ukraine’s potential NATO membership is a redline, but these concerns have been largely ignored, with the US welcoming Ukraine’s entry. If we consider Russia’s position, it mirrors Washington’s obstinate rejection of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Of course, when the 2022 war broke out, I publicly criticized Russia and even personally donated money to Ukraine. But in diplomacy, it’s crucial to listen to all parties involved.

How should the policy change?

South Korea should maintain diplomatic ties with Moscow and Kyiv and concentrate on putting an end to the conflict rather than taking sides and advocating for an extended conflict. How can South Korea afford to make Russia a friend as a neighbor of Russia?

South Korea already relies on cooperation with the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to deal with the difficulties of dealing with North Korea on its own. Therefore, making Russia a foe is not a wise course of action and should be avoided in favor of a more balanced and sound foreign policy.

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For JAPAN Forward, Kenji Yoshida is a translator and correspondent in Seoul.

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The success of the Islamic rebellion that ousted Bashar al-Assad’s regime was a result of both the strength of &nbsp and Syria’s own troops and the unwillingness of supporters Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia to lend assistance in a time of need.

A decade ago, those three friends aided Assad in fending off an armed rebellion by a diverse group of rebels that emerged from the Arab Spring legal protests that had swept across the Middle East. Finally and cruelly drove military Syrian rebels into a corridor in the country’s far west with the help of Russian air force and Syrian ground forces supported by Iran.

When it comes to the present, only one of those friends was able to assist Assad in thwarting the most recent rebel battle. However, they simply offered a limited amount of assistance; it was too much, far too late.

• Iran, which heads what it had called a local” Axis of Weight” but which is now engaged in a proxy conflict with Israel, had just been bruised by Israeli jet problems. Tehran informed Assad that it would only fly some drones and missiles to the Arab government to protect the country’s leader.

• Last Friday ( December 6), Hezbollah sent only two “advisors” to Damascus and Homs, with just two of them being killed in a number of attacks by Israeli-permanent arms and its military bombarded throughout southern Lebanon and Beirut. Homs Saturday was immediately taken by the rebels, who subsequently quickly moved on to the funds.

• Despite having two Russian military installations, Russia, its troops, who were focusing solely on thwarting the Ukrainian resistance, refused to support Assad. Only the insurgent rude, according to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, was bad. Lavrov, who was speaking at a meeting in Qatar with representatives from Turkey and Iran looking to find ways to put an end to the Syrian conflict, said,” It’s illegal to allow the criminal group to take control of territory.”

The Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, a think tank based in Berlin, wrote that Damascus was surprised by new improvements made by armed parties in northern Syria. However, the failure of Bashar al-Assad’s plan is easily explained by its friends: Iran and Hezbollah have suffered harm from the issue with Israel, while Russia is preoccupied with its conflict in Ukraine.

And what of the Palestinian army? The majority of Syria’s population, which is made up of Sunni Muslims, is essentially a poorly equipped force, with many members from that ethnic group having fought and been repeatedly persecuted by him. As insurgents advanced beginning late last month, Arab defense units disintegrated, leaving the towns of Aleppo, Hamas and Homs and, ultimately, Damascus defenseless.

According to analysts, Palestinian society in general and military morale in particular have been affected by ongoing armed conflict and severe economic hardships. The Arab army is primarily made up of draftees.

” The military’s decline is a reflection of a more general decline in Palestinian state institutions”, said Jihad Yazigi, director of the Syria Report. There is a strong impression in government regions that things aren’t improving and that there aren’t any hopes for things to improve.

” The fact that the security forces melted away is a bit of a surprise, but it’s not a big surprise”, said Nathanial Hall, a scientist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. They “didn’t have the kind of confidence to face something like this,” they claimed.

In addition to his proper military support, Assad relied on domestic militias to thwart the rebel advance. In case there were need to impose sanctions against local critics, he also relied on wealthy Republican Guard units and a sizable intelligence service.

Where were the Republican Guard and where are intelligence officers then located as the insurgents advanced toward Damascus?

Syria’s home spy method had, in any case, degenerated long before the rebellion. The government no longer has control over Syria as it once did, despite the fact that the state security apparatus still has an iron fist in place. It lacks the capacity to provide stability and peace, according to Chatham House, a research academy with headquarters in London.

A coalition of various rebel organizations, the majority of which are based in northeast Syria, are the cause of this sudden change of fortunes, though some are dispersed along its deep southern and northern borders.

The Organization for the Independence of the Levant ( Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS), which is the largest, is in English. Proteomics was the team that entered Damascus. Units ‘ leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, had been recently seen walking down the steps of the large Citadel mansion in Aleppo, mobbed by followers, when HTS conquered the area last month.

Units was initially associated with al-Qaeda, which aimed to establish an Islamic conservative state in Syria. In 2017, the party left the organization. In a move to bring international compassion, if not aid, HTS has pledged not to carry out terrorist attacks outside Syria. It is still regarded by the United States and the European Union as a criminal business.

In recent years, HTS has successfully ruled Idlib province in northeast Syria. During the protracted legal battle, thousands of refugees emigrated to Lebanon and Turkey as well as the Idlib region. To replace its divisions, there were many needy recruits.

HTS’ next task will be to establish administrative dominance over the area it controls. That probably would not include southern Syria and the small areas where US forces are stationed in north Syria and close to Jordan in the south.

In the most recent campaign, which ended with the catch of Damascus, many allies participated. One of them, the Syrian Democratic Forces, is a Kurdish team sponsored by the United States. Another organization, the Arab National Army, is funded by Turkey and used to combat Kurdish hardliners in Syria who might want to aid Iraqi Kurdistan secede from Iraq.

Assad alliance Russia, on the other hand, operates a naval base on the Mediterranean coast and an infantry interior. In recent days, Russian forces were preparing for rebel attacks by deploying artillery and spaceships around its foundations.

However, in an artless statement, Iran called for” the sharp end of martial conflicts, the prevention of criminal actions, and the initiation of nationwide dialogue”. Hezbollah has remained motionless.

The US government, caught up in a democratic transition from lame-duck President Joe Biden to President-elect Donald Trump, reacted slowly to the invasion. The administration under Biden merely stated that it was” closely monitoring the remarkable events in Syria.”

Trump said in a more incisive tweet on social multimedia:” Assad is gone. He has fled his land. His keeper, Russia, Russia, Russia, led by Vladimir Putin, was not interested in protecting him”, he wrote. Russia and Iran are currently in a diminished state, one due to Ukraine and a poor economy, and the other due to Israel and its success in fighting.

Trump ended his remarks by saying that the United States would not become involved in any way while perhaps forgetting that he was not yet leader.

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A key moment in Middle Eastern modern history is witnessed by the sudden and unexpected fall of Damascus, the capital of Syria, to Sunni opposition forces.

Since the onset of common protests in 2011, Bashar al-Assad’s government had endured more than a decade of rebellion, civil war, and international restrictions. However, it fell apart in a remarkable short amount of time.

Regional powers are scrambling to evaluate the consequences and its broader implications as a result of this unexpected turn of events, with the criticism advance without considerable battles or opposition.

This significant development signs a reshuffling of regional energy dynamics. Additionally, it raises questions about Syria’s prospects and the part that its neighbors and international partners play in regulating the post-Assad environment.

What does Syria’s potential keep?

With the fall of the Assad regime, Syria is then divided and divided between three strongholds, each with a different objective and additional supporters:

1. Arab opposition forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: These organizations, supported by Turkey, today control northern Syria, extending from the northern border with Turkey to the southern border with Jordan.

The Sunni groups have a history of domestic conflicts, which may prevent them from forming a coherent state or maintaining long-term stability despite their common religious identification.

The opposition groups range from previous Islamic State and al-Qaeda jihadists to liberal organizations like the Arab National Army, which split from Assad’s military following the rebellion in 2011.

2. Kurdish causes: The Kurdish organizations have control over the territory in northern Syria, which borders Turkey in the northern and Iraq in the south. The United States, which has built martial installations in the area, continues to support them. This help runs the risk of escalating tenses with Turkey, which views Kurdish enslavement as a threat to its geographical dignity.

3. Syrian causes: Pro-Assad Alawite factions, generally situated in the southern regions of northern Syria, maintain robust ties with Iran, Iraq and Lebanon’s Hezbollah violent party. These areas may function as a redoubt for remnants of Assad-aligned organizations after the opponent’s acquisition, perpetuating religious divides.

Given Syria’s current severe divisions and turmoil, as well as the absence of a consensus-building mediator, indicate that there may be more instability and conflict in the future.

How will this affect the place?

The big Middle Eastern players have important implications from the Assad regime’s swift demise.

The Sunni insurgent troops, with solid Greek support, capitalized on a time of risk in Syria. Russia and Iran, along with their ongoing conflict with Israel, were the Assad administration’s friends, who were preoccupied with their ongoing issue. The rebels had a proper opportunity to advance quickly across Syria to Damascus, the country’s money.

Turkey has been successfully occupying a section of northern Syria where its government has been fighting Arab Kurdish forces. Turkey is anticipated to increase its political and military impact in Syria today, with the support of its Arab opposition supporters, creating more difficulties for the Kurdish majority fighting for its independence.

Israel is also in a better placement on a strategic level. The fall of Assad disrupts the so-called” shaft of weight”, comprised of Iran, Syria and Tehran’s substitute organizations like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Iran’s crucial defense provide lines to Hezbollah are likely to be severed, isolating the militant group, and good weakened even more.

Also, the division of Syria into ethnic and religious groups may lessen Israel’s regional focus, making it easier for it to pursue its larger strategic objectives. After Israel agreed to a peace with Hezbollah last month, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu&nbsp, emphasized&nbsp, a change in focus to combating the” Egyptian risk”.

Iran, however, has the most to lose. Assad was a vital ally in Iran’s local substitute system. And Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel’s various partners, have now suffered significant harm, and the collapse of his government comes as a result. Iran’s local influence has now been greatly diminished, leaving it more susceptible to direct issue with Israel.

Syria’s division even poses major security threats to its neighboring nations, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Migrant flows, cross-border murder and sectarian tensions are likely to rise. Turkey is now home to more than 3 million Palestinian refugees, many of whom it anticipates returning home today that Assad’s government has been overthrown.

This volatility may only make their delicate political and economic conditions worse for Iraq and Lebanon. In the name of autonomy, the Balkanization of Syria was entice different ethnic and religious groups to fight against local administrations. This could lead to regional fight being sown down and continued conflict.

While many Syria have hailed Assad’s drop, it’s still to be seen how much their lives will improve. Restrictions are unlikely to be lifted in Syria because there isn’t a unified and globally recognized government there.

This will put pressure on the now devasted Arab market, aggravate the humanitarian problems, and possibly stoke extremism.

Ali Mamouri is exploration brother of Middle East Research, Deakin University

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Koreans and the rest of the world were caught off guard by Yoon Suk Yeol’s surprising coup attempt. The declaration of martial law shocked Koreans and sent ripples through Washington and Tokyo despite the country’s harsh social conflict between progressives and conservatives.

Korea appeared to be on the verge of a possible violent conflict between the armed forces and a large number of activists for a few hours. The establishment of political organisations achieved a swift and comforting victory.

The rejection of civil community, the media, and even the liberal Peoples Power gathering to bow down to threats of repression echoed the National Assembly’s unanimous decision to overturn the military law declaration outside the building.

The ambiguous course of the upcoming months tempers the festival of democracy. Yoon is attempting to reach a pose of rebellion, hoping he may live.

On Saturday night, the National Assembly voted to remove the president from office, with protesters blocking the pavements of Seoul. The opposition plans to try again, but the ruling party politicians walked out on the matter, preventing the two-thirds majority voting that would be necessary for the impeachment. No matter what the result, Yoon’s law is effectively over.

Democratic party chief Lee Jae-myung will probably win if an early presidential election is held, after Yoon lost the previous battle by less than one percent.

Why President Yoon took this huge risk with seemingly little preparation and the only support of a select group of close allies still unresolved, not the least of which is why. How much was the martial ready to back Yoon’s rebellion? Why was Washington, which has invested so much in the achievement of the Yoon state, caught off guard?

What seems more obvious is that the Progressive Democratic Party’s replacement of Yoon may actually alter important aspects of South Korea’s foreign and security policies, starting with those with Japan and China, the United States, and North Korea.

One crucial section of the senate decision that the National Assembly was given evidence of contained hints at what might be on the progressive agenda. The resolution included this indictment of the government’s foreign policy, along with the serious crimes against Yoon that were most likely an illegitimate attempt to use the martial law rules.

” In inclusion, under the guise of so-called’ value diplomacy,’ Yoon has neglected political balance, antagonizing North Korea, China, and Russia, adhering to a ridiculous Japan-centered foreign policy and appointing Pro-Japan individuals to essential government positions, thus causing isolation in Northeast Asia and triggering a crisis of war, abandoning his duty to protect regional security and the people”.

This is interpreted by seasoned observers of Korean politics as a sign of how forward-thinking foreign policy will be both after Yoon leaves and if Lee Jae-myung is elected president.

” Now the opposition party has even more incentive to do a wholesale cleansing of all Yoon policies, including foreign policy”, Benjamin Engel, a visiting professor at Seoul’s Dankook University, told Toyo Keizai Online.

” If a normal democratic transition had taken place, we might have had a slightly healthier discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of what Yoon’s foreign policy accomplished and what needs to be preserved or revised.” That won’t happen now”.

Relations with Japan are at the top of the progressive target list, as the impeachment resolution makes clear. Yoon’s outreach to Japan has received a lot of criticism from the Democratic party, who claims that South Korea has repeatedly made concessions to Japan regarding issues from wartime history, such as the forced laborers, without receiving much in return.

Although there is a lot of public support for improving relations with Japan, Yoon’s ignominious demise may have tarnished that effort.

” If the opposition party grasps power, current Korea-Japan relations will go through a very rough time, as well as Korea-US relations”, predicts a former senior South Korean official who remains very engaged in Japan policy. In particular, the progress made in building trilateral security cooperation between Japan, Korea and the US” will no longer be viable”.

The opposition Democratic Party’s most powerful supporters continue to support positive relations with Japan, but they also stress the need to win the Korean public’s support and encourage Japan to be more forthcoming.

” The administration’s unilateral foreign policy approach has failed to build political momentum”, National Assembly member Wi Sung-lac, a former diplomat and close foreign policy advisor to former presidential candidate Lee, told this writer. ” Public opinion continues to decline, particularly regarding historical issues like Japan’s refusal to apologize and its denial of forced labor.”

Wi pledged that if the Democrats return to power, the” stance that Korea-Japan cooperation is necessary will remain unchanged”. But he added,” the pace of progress will depend on Japan’s response. If Japan responds constructively, there is significant potential for improving bilateral relations, though the speed and intensity of that improvement will vary”.

The potential change in Seoul’s government challenges Shigeru Ishiba’s government. As part of preparations to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations, the prime minister had been making plans for a trip to South Korea in January. Ishiba has been more willing to address issues involving Japan’s colonial and military past than he has personally been about maintaining close ties with Korea.

At the least, this effort will have to deal with months of political uncertainty. A progressive government will eventually emerge and want to halt Korea-Japan’s ties. And that may be compounded by the return of Donald Trump, who does not share the Biden administration’s commitment to creating more durable trilateral cooperation.

” Now, the Japanese government must prepare for a perfect storm”, says Tobias Harris, the head of the Japan Foresight consulting firm.

Japan will have a US president who not only favors bilateral multilateral negotiations but also has shown little interest in strengthening trilateral cooperation. The swing to the left could happen in Tokyo in 2025 instead of 2027.

Progressives have also objected to US attempts to impose a de facto China containment strategy, as the impeachment resolution suggests. If Trump pushes hard in this direction, and makes demands on the alliance such as higher defense cost sharing, he may meet some resistance.

” But since the US-to-South Korea alliance is so well-liked, I don’t see Lee or another progressive trying to undermine it,” says Engels. Trump will give that a major impetus, according to Trump.

Lee, Engels says,” will be more neutral, I think, in US-China competition. However, even liberals are limited in how far they can travel from China. The general public in South Korea will oppose it.

An attempt to resume diplomatic contact with Kim Jong Un and North Korea might be a potential area of convergence between Trump and a progressive administration. Moon Jae-in’s progressive government supported Trump’s first administration’s efforts to reach a deal with Kim. It’s not entirely clear whether North Koreans will be interested in continuing this effort, even if the party will change in Seoul.

” Their current line is that the South is the enemy nation no matter who is in charge”, Fyodor Tertitskiy, an expert on North Korea and a Lecturer at Korea University, told Toyo Keizai Online.

” The previous left administration failed to deliver anything substantial for them– so it seems they (or, rather, Kim personally ) have lost any hope in South Korea. Having said that, I think they would definitely prefer the Democrats to People’s Power, since at least the left would be far less aggressive, and maybe even deferential in their policy towards Pyongyang”.

Indeed, Yoon has led a sharply anti-Communist turn in South Korea. In his declaration of martial law, he claimed to be assisting pro-North Korean forces that were attempting to overthrow the South Korean government.

In ultra-conservative circles, where Yoon was viewed as their savior, these views have been permeated for a while. But Yoon’s attempt to point the finger at Communists” will backfire and undermine his leadership”, says the former senior official.

For now, Yoon clings to power in Seoul. The former senior official describes him as having” a seige mentality because of recent all-out political attacks against him and his wife from the opposition party and even from within his own ruling party.”

Yoon’s desperation, sadly, may end up destroying one of the most significant achievements of his troubled time in office, the restoration of relations with Japan and the beginnings of serious cooperation.

At Stanford, Danel Sneider teaches on international policy.

This article was first published by The Oriental Economist. It is republished with permission.

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After his ruling party’s boycott of Saturday’s ( December 7 ) vote, South Korea’s National Assembly failed to receive the 200 votes needed to remove President Yoon Suk Yeol. However, the government’s unexpected political crisis is still ongoing, as opposition politicians have pledged to file a new prosecution petition in the coming days.

Before today’s prosecution vote, rumor-busting members of the ruling People’s Power Party walked out of the parliamentary chamber, putting an end to the speculation that Yoon might be in trouble with his surprise decision to impose martial legislation this month, which he retracted after about six days.

Yoon stated in a televised address on December 3 that he would impose martial law to overthrow “pro-North Vietnamese and anti-government makes.” Then Yoon imposed a ban on all National Assembly activities and deployed military forces to detain key opposition figures and seized control of the legislature.

But, lawmakers defied the order and finally convened to voting down the military law order universally. The president’s deposed order was afterwards called an illegal self-coup effort by six opposition parties, who later filed an senate motion against him.

Even though at least two of its legislators had already indicated they would vote against the group’s collection as of December 6, the People’s Power Party formally declared its opposition to impeachment.

Yoon’s next unexpected regional address, delivered a few hours before the prosecution vote, consolidated the group’s rank and file. Yoon expressed his deep regret in a small talk,” I apologize to all South Koreans who were surprised by the military law.”

“I’ll give my gathering the rest of my term and all the steps I need to maintain the nation.” Our party and the government may assume responsibility for progressing up, Yoon continued, suggesting that he would delegate some of his political duties to the party.

Yoon’s group is then expected to have a bigger influence on how the nation is run, which may or may not help give the People’s Power Party’s waning legitimacy to be a minority group in the government. His apologies even provided a pretext for the ruling party to rebel against popular opinion.

Ruling group chief&nbsp, Han Dong-hoon&nbsp, held a meeting with Prime Minister&nbsp, Han Duck-soo&nbsp, shortly after Yoon’s talk, at which they were expected to had sketched out how the government would run following the vote.

However, over one million South Koreans gathered in front of the National Assembly in freezing temperatures to require Yoon’s prosecution. The majority of voters predicted that Yoon may lose in the election.

” I think there will be politicians who vote against group ranges”, a 43-year-old rebel Kim Young-ae told Asia Times. Yoon is demonstrating his stubbornness when he needs to move over. I hope the ruling group gets a morality”.

Another prototype, Kim Dong-yoon, said, “people are now walking on the road to success. We are making history by presiding over the crimes against the traitor Yoon Suk Yeol and his fans.

But, as the ruling party users walked out, making the vote debate, desire and enthusiasm turned to despair. Some protesters sobbed and yelled profanity at the floor, while others yelled at one another in protest. The majority of them appeared confused and drained.

Is the ruling party definitely a people’s group? asked 28-year-old Park Seo-yeon. They “illegally boycotted the ballot to serve their interests,” the statement read.

Some took issue with the Women’s Power Party’s approach of opposing prosecution.

” There are so many people gathered around. They ought to exercise some dignity and at least ballot. They are disrespecting the citizens and the congressional branch”, said 33-year-old Song Yoo-min.

After the ruling party lawmakers left the chambers, unhappy activists surrounded the 1.4 square-kilometer National Assembly, properly blocking them in. Some protesters stormed the Person’s Power Party’s primary business, where they locked antlers with local law enforcement.

Lee Jae-myung, head of the Democratic Party, the world’s largest opposition party, called the People’s Power Party a” treacherous and illegal group” and vowed to introduce the prosecution movement again on December 11.

Lee stated in a press conference that his party do” consistently introduce the prosecution motion each month” in the hopes that the ruling party may experience more tension each time it casts a ballot against it.

The ruling party claimed that the impeachment would have “paralyzed government operations and suspended a constitutional government.” Instead, it suggested other ways to hold the president accountable for his martial law decree, including a potential constitutional amendment to shorten the term.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Han’s role in government is projected to increase significantly. Han stated in a press release that he would do everything in his power to make sure” this situation is resolved as soon as possible and that people’s lives are kept stable.”

Han, the leader of the ruling party, added,” I will work with the prime minister to provide for the public.” Under the country’s constitution, the prime minister’s role is to assist the president and direct the ministries following orders from the president.

However, experts expressed concern that South Korea’s already polarized society will become even more divided if the impeachment process is unreliable.

At a symposium held on December 6th, Ahn Doo-hwan, a professor of political science at Seoul National University, said,” The impeachment process can further polarize South Korean society.”

” Korea’s conservative]ruling ] party cannot settle on a new ideology to rally around. That is why they bring in outside celebrities]like Yoon ] to garner the public’s support. And sometimes that backfires”, Ahn added.

Another SNU professor, Kang Won-taek, said,” Yoon is no longer in a position to lead the government”.

The symposium’s seven political experts all agreed that Yoon’s martial law was unconstitutional and illegal. However, no one could come to an agreement on how South Korea could emerge from this political unrest as a resilient democracy.

The only thing that seems certain right now is that as South Korea’s political crisis develops, the streets of Seoul will be rife with protesters.

Lee Seung-ku is a Seoul-based freelance journalist.

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A poor US manufacturing base, uncertainty from a second Trump administration, and a reluctance to share nuclear technology are the reasons Australia’s nuclear underwater interests are under attack by the AUKUS security agreement.

US SSNs could serve Australian and US SSN missions in the region, according to a report released by the US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) in October.

Such an arrangement would be similar to existing ones between the US and some of its NATO and other allies on significant naval assets such as aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, SSNs, amphibious warfare ships and non-naval capabilities such as nuclear weapons, space-based capabilities and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ).

There are a number of other options for planned SSNs for Australia, according to the CRS report. These include forwards cycles of US and UK SSNs to Australia, three to five US SSN operations outside of Australia, or Australia spending money that were originally intended for SSNs in other assets, such as B-21 bombers and another long-range hit plane.

The report discusses additional variations of these options, including the possibility that Australia would continue investing in US and indigenous underwater construction capacity while American SSNs continue to build their Asian SSNs.

Another change that the report mentions is that Australia was continue investing in other martial resources to support a US-Australia division of labor while US SSNs may continue to perform American SSN missions continuously.

The CRS record warns that if Australia’s SSN plans under AUKUS reach a cost-death circular, it could decrease Australia’s money for other military features, adversely impacting Australia’s barrier capabilities versus China.

Contrary to the site’s earlier hype enthusiasm, the CRS record may indicate a major change of heart for AUKUS regarding SSNs for Australia.

One of these factors might be a sagging US submarine construction base. A 2023 US Congressional Budget Office ( CBO ) report mentions that the US faces significant challenges in its submarine production base, directly impacting the AUKUS’s submarine-sharing goals.

According to the CBO report, US submarine production struggles with cost overruns, construction delays, and missed deadlines. It notes that this is compounded by a 50 % projected increase in submarine construction workload over the next decade, as the US Navy aims to produce five types of submarines simultaneously, including Virginia-class, SSN ( X ) and Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN).

The report says the high cost of implementing the US Navy’s 2024 shipbuilding plan, driven by surging submarine expenses, exacerbates these issues. It proposes that submarine construction will surpass historical funding levels, putting the AUKUS’s goal of having SSNs by the 2030s in jeopardizing.

Uncertainty over a second US Trump administration’s stance on AUKUS has compounded doubts about Australia’s SSN acquisition ambition.

David Andrews mentions Donald Trump’s return to the White House in a November 2024 article for The Conversation that raised significant questions about the AUKUS agreement‘s future. Andrews points out that the Australian government has expressed concern that Trump may attempt to renegotiate or revoke the deal.

He mentions that this concern stems from Trump’s history of demanding greater financial contributions from allies, as seen in South Korea, Japan, and NATO, with AUKUS possibly being subjected to similar demands. According to Andrews, the AUKUS agreement allows any party to withdraw with a 12-month notice, which depends on political will.

In keeping with that, Australian Greens defense spokesperson David Shoebridge stated in August 2024 that AUKUS places the US and UK above responsibility. According to Shoebridge, the agreement includes numerous exit clauses that allow the US and UK to back out of Australia without receiving compensation and hold Australia accountable in the event that the formers ‘ SSN technology fails.

Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, the head of the AUKUS submarine program, was reportedly contacted by ABC News in July 2024 to ask if Australia would be reimbursed if the US didn’t deliver nuclear-powered submarines as part of the AUKUS agreement.

Senator Shoebridge allegedly inquired about the US$ 4.7 billion ( US$$ 3.3 billion ) payment during an Australian Senate estimates hearing in order to find out whether there is a refund clause. Mead reiterated the US’s commitment to providing two Virginia-class submarines by the early 2030s, but he avoided addressing the implausible issue of non-delivery.

Andrews notes bipartisan support for AUKUS in the US Congress, but Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy approach and potential demands for more Australian contributions raise questions about the stability of the agreement.

Australia’s refusal to cooperate with the US and the UK on nuclear power may also serve as a stumbling block to its SSN ambitions, which will prevent the construction of the nuclear infrastructure required to run SSNs.

ABC News reported in November 2024 that Australia has declined to join a UK and US-led pact to accelerate civilian nuclear energy development, citing the technology’s inapplicability to the country.

Acting Prime Minister Richard Marles stated in the report that developing nuclear energy would be Australia’s most expensive option for electricity because the nation lacks a civilian nuclear industry. It states that the UK and the US had initially anticipated Australia to sign the deal, but the Australian government ultimately backed it, focusing instead on switching to renewable energy sources.

While AUKUS’ SSN ambitions are lofty, some analysts believe that its rationale may be ambiguous, impractical, and militarily unsound. Sam Roggeveen cites AUKUS critics in a March 2024 article, where neither the Morrison nor Albanese governments can explain in detail what the SSNs are intended to accomplish.

Roggeveen points out that the discussion has primarily been focused on hazy definitions of “deterrence” without having a thought-provoking discussion about how best to achieve it.

He makes the claim that he had doubts about the Australian Labor Party’s sincerity in backing AUKUS, saying it was more a matter of political calculation than genuine conviction. He also emphasizes the project’s financial burden, which could lead to cost overruns and program delays, potentially straining other defense budgets.

Roggeveen also points out concerns about the potential impact of a second US Trump administration, including worries that Trump might not support it. Notably, he wonders whether the AUKUS SSN project is a wise idea, suggesting that Australia should use its geographic distance to avoid attempting to project military power into China’s near seas.

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