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When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his initial state visit to Mauritius in March 2015, he introduced the Nagar, or Security and Development for All in the Region, theory.

A century later, in a second visit to Mauritius, Modi made the announcement to introduce the policy known as MAHASAGAR, an improved and more detailed version of SAGAR.

MAHASAGAR demonstrates a multifaceted, complete, long-term, and more optimistic American vision for the Indo-Pacific, one that goes beyond safety concerns to include development, sharing of technology, and economic cooperation.

India strengthened its diplomatic partnership with Mauritius during Modi’s attend to the country to become an Enhanced Strategic Partnership. &nbsp,

In order to maintain a stable future, Modi’s new perception of MAHASAGAR, which means” water” in Hindi, aims to incorporate trade-driven growth, capacity-building for sustainable growth, and a common security framework.

Key components of this initiative are anticipated to be administrative support, concessional financing, and modern assistance. However, how the MAHASAGAR coverage may be put into effect, as with SAGAR 2.0, is still up for debate. &nbsp,

In the growing Indo-Pacific dynamics, SAGAR has been India’s strategic platform for coastal engagement over the past ten years, highlighting India’s contribution to ensuring a secure, safe, and steady regional order.

Modi’s remarks at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, including his presentation speech, more heightened India’s Indo-Pacific perspective, placing it in a broader political context. Vikram Misri, then India’s Deputy National Security Advisor ( now Foreign Secretary ), laid out five fundamental pillars of SAGAR at the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue, namely:    

1. Security teamwork, &nbsp
2. Capacity-building;
3.  collaborative activity
4. Green creation and,
5. connection on the water

India’s relationship with local partners has been guided by these principles. As a complement to SAGAR, India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative ( IPOI ) was developed to provide a collaborative platform that is open and non-treaty-based. The IPOI encourages assistance in areas of sea ecosystem, reference management, disaster reaction, and security coordination.

Important US, Japanese, Australian, ASEAN, France, and New Zealand all have agreements with India regarding the IPOI, underscoring its equitable and joint approach to management in the Indo-Pacific.

India has effectively integrated itself into local security and economic frameworks in order to run SAGAR. Initiatives like the BIMSTEC, Colombo Security Conclave (established in 2020 with Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives ), and India’s observer status in the Indian Ocean Commission ( composed of Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mayotte, and Réunion ) underline its commitment to institutionalized maritime cooperation.

India has taken major capacity-building initiatives to improve local stability and maritime security beyond international engagements. These include improving maritime domain awareness, improving white shipping information, and promoting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief ( HADR) frameworks. &nbsp,

Mauritius exemplifies India’s strategic role in building capacity, benefiting from significant American support in the country’s Coast Guard modernization, institutional development, and financial partnerships. India has engaged in a number of development projects in Mauritius, including the metro job, the fresh Supreme Court building, the 956 housing job, a new Medical clinic, and others.

China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region ( IOR ) necessitates a rebalanced strategy despite India’s efforts. The political conflict between India and China, which was made worse by the 2020 Galwan border conflict, has heightened strategic competition, mainly in the IOR.

India’s traditional local part has been challenged by China’s systematic expansion of its economic and military control in the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.

India’s concern about China’s economic leverage is high because its bilateral trade with China ( US$ 1.1 billion ) is nearly twice as high as India’s ($ 554 million ), which shows how strong Beijing’s economic influence is. This financial space must be bridged while maintaining India’s strategic partnerships.

The transition from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR appears to be an attempt to address this issue by intensifying participation in the Indian Ocean Region’s coastal states for development and security.

The move from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR is necessary in light of the return of a transactional US foreign policy under the Trump administration, the fast-evolving US-China conflict, and the rapidly expanding US-China Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) footprint in the IOR and the Pacific Island Region.

India is a trustworthy and trustworthy online security provider to the IOR and the wider Indo-Pacific region because of the gaps between consistent non-traditional security threats and the readiness of coastal states.

Nevertheless, India faces significant economic challenges in order to expand its interests. A review of the Ministry of External Affairs ( MEA ) annual report revealed a decline in the ministry’s budget, which undermines India’s ability to provide aid and sustain substantial support for the MEA’s Technical and Economic Cooperation ( TEC ) programs.

The Committee on External Affairs ‘ Fourth Report ( 2024-25 ) of the 18th Lok Sabha of the 18th Lok Sabha of recommends” a gradual increase of at least 20 % annually in the MEA budget over the next five years to address resource deficits and alignment with long-term goals.”

Without adequate funding, MAHASAGAR runs the risk of becoming a lofty political word without the resources to support its transformational goals. India’s decision to switch from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR reflects its reputation of the need for a more expansive, active Indo-Pacific wedding strategy.

India may address a number of pressing issues in order for this vision to come into reality, including but not limited to increasing financial commitments and strengthening partnerships with ASEAN, the US, Japan, Australia, and essential IOR countries.

To strengthen economic proposal, the policy must diversify trade and investment partnerships to counter China’s economic dominance in the area. India may be institutionalized more to maintain long-term balance by playing a strategic role in local groups like the IPOI and the Colombo Security Conclave.

In the end, how well-equipped will India be to achieve the objectives of the MAHASAGAR depend on its ability to balance monetary and political goals. In a world where the political landscape is rapidly changing, MAHASAGAR’s effective implementation could strengthen India’s position as a leading power and provider of net security in the Indo-Pacific by balancing local security, financial growth, and strategic influence.

Rahul Mishra is a senior research fellow at the Thammasat University, Thailand’s Center for Excellence in Public Policy and Good Governance, and an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He can be reached at raj, and rnbsp. followed on X at @rahulmishr_ and sent via [email protected]&nbsp.

Harshit Prajapati is a graduate candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University, India’s School of International Studies ‘ Center for Indo-Pacific Studies. He can be reached at jnu.ac. harshi55_is [email protected]. followed on X at @harshitp_47 and followed in.

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Hungary is currently one of the poorest and, possibly, the poorest in the European Union. Commercial output is declining year over year. The region’s production is close to the lowest level. The rate of unemployment is rising. The community is shrinking, claims Anne Applebaum in the March 31 issue of The Atlantic, despite the ruling group’s hushed discussion of traditional values.

This diatribe, which claims to identify in Hungary’s regional conservatism a severe outlook for Trump’s America, contains no one correct fact that is stated. Ms. Applebaum, who is mathematically challenged, may think about taking the thi^rd degree again and learning math.

Hungary can’t avoid the effects of Germany’s commercial decline, and the majority of Europe is in or close to crisis. Under the Fidesz Party, which took company in 2010, Hungary’s achievement has been at or close to the top of its competition.

The World Bank adjusts the raw data to represent what people really can purchase with their income in terms of GDP, which is measured in terms of purchasing power parity. In light of this, Hungary’s per person GDP is higher than that of Greece or Poland, but it still trails the Czech Republic and Slovenia in this regard.

Hungary’s efficiency is at the top of the list among its peers if we take into account the development of GDP in purchasing-power equality since 2010, when Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban took office.

Applebaum asserts that Hungary’s community is shrinking as a result of people’s departures:” Despite the ruling group’s hushed claims about traditional beliefs, the people is shrinking.”

Nearly every Western nation’s population is declining, but Viktor Orban’s Hungary has experienced the biggest treatment. It is one of only two Northern European nations with positive net movement, along with Czechia:

Hungary also excels in another crucial area, especially the proportion of its adult population that is financially inactive.

Simply Japan is among the European nations with the lowest inactivity rate, according to the OECD, making it the only one. For instance, in the UK, only 6 % of men between the ages of 25 and 54 are employed, compared to just 6 % in Hungary. This indicates that there are many careers available and that people want to do them.

Hungary’s total fertility rate has increased significantly since 2010, but it has fallen in every other European nation, despite Hungary’s fertility rate still being below alternative. Other European nations received a reproduction increase from a flood of refugees, which Hungary refused to accept, as I explained in a January 21 writing in Asia Times.

In the first generation, immigrants typically have higher fertility rates than citizens; however, as this trend faded, fertility rates dramatically decreased across most of Europe, while Hungary’s fertility rate remained steady.

Applebaum has been throwing a protracted public outburst since her father, Radek Sikorsky, lost his position in the Polish unusual government when a traditional government emerged. Hitler is the only person she doesn’t enjoy. In 2020, I wrote a review of her punishment novel.

Anne Applebaum’s record of “little Hitlers” includes past flames like British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, former friends who attended her 1999 New Year’s Eve party in Poland while her father, Radek Sikorski, was a member of the foreign ministry, and others. Because they suffer from “authoritarian characteristics,” Applebaum avers, the rogue party guests apparently morphed from democracy activists to Germans.

The old Hungarian straight, the Spanish straight, the French right, the Roman straight, and, with differences, the English straight and the British right, are also included in her list. It’s difficult to tell the difference between Applebaum’s philosophical rage over her father’s career and her individual disappointment with her friends who left the liberal dogmas of 1989.

She may continue to serve as the Neo-Conservative Right’s Don Rickles. Simply put, Applebaum is unable to publish a table or add or subtract.

Hungary may, to be certain, enhance its economic management, but its demographics and family policy accomplishments are remarkable and unique. Every standard deviation identifies its financial achievement as close to or above that of its peers.

David P. Goldman works at the Budapest Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies as a research fellow and vice editor of Asia Times ( Business ).

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After a” secret” Pentagon memo directed the unit to prioritize “deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan” and” strengthening homeland defense,” concerns are mounting in South Korea over the evolving role of the United States Forces Korea ( USFK) in other regions.

The 28, 500 British soldiers stationed in South Korea may change their main focus from deterring North Korea to fighting China, which, in Seoul’s opinion, poses a risk to putting strain on already fragile relations with Beijing.

A defined file titled” Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance” was distributed to the US Defense Department in mid-March, according to a report from the Washington Post on March 29. &nbsp,

The report apparently outlines US President Donald Trump’s strategy for preparing for and possible winning a conflict with China while also standing up for US interests in the “near abroad” area, including Greenland and the Panama Canal.

Hegseth officially signed the document, which aims to rebuild America’s military engagements in the Indo-Pacific, shifting its focus apart from North Korean threats to China’s possible hostility against Taiwan. &nbsp,

The change comes in spite of North Korea’s new actions, including the growth and launch of new long-range rockets capable of hitting the US mainland. &nbsp,

The Pentagon” will believe risk in other theaters,” according to the report, which addresses personnel and resources shortages, therefore pressuring friends in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia to assume greater punishment jobs against regional enemies like Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

This reflects a more expansive burden-sharing approach that has been at the center of Trump’s foreign legislation since his first word. As the nation restructures its defense strategy to be less dependent on the continuous existence of US troops, the move may raise South Korea’s defense spending.

The letter’s designation as “other cinemas” implies that the US is considering establishing a new base there and possibly deploying American troops out of South Korea. &nbsp, &nbsp,

” South Korea claims to respect USFK’s” Statement of Flexibility,” but all of that is vacant. Lee Sang-soo, a visiting research fellow at the Jeju Peace Institute, told Asia Times that” South Korea ] needs the USFK to be anchored on the peninsula.”

Seoul lacks the ability to have its neighbor without US soldiers because of North Korea’s nuclear threat, according to Lee. He claimed that because of this, South Korea’s safety depends on USFK’s existence on the island.

Redeployment dangers

The concept of expanding USFK’s influence in the Indo-Pacific is never novel. &nbsp,

Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then-South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, who later became the UN’s Secretary-General, first agreed on the concept of” Strategic Flexibility,” which would allow for possible USFK operations outside the Korean Peninsula.

However, the US has previously acknowledged Seoul’s needed for a persistent protection assurance, as demonstrated by the British soldiers stationed in South Korea since the Korean War.

Concerns are now growing that the Pentagon’s new instruction makes the redeployment of USFK a feasible chance. &nbsp,

Kim Jong Un, a leader of North Korea, might be miscalculated as a result of the USFK’s exit, according to Kang Joon-young, a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, in an appointment with Money Today.

Washington might even use a reduced USFK presence as leverage in negotiations over defense costs, with the US probably demanding more money from Seoul.

According to Lee, the researcher,” The US has persistently urged South Korea to add more to maintaining the USFK.” It may also use economic pressure, such as taxes, to get what it thinks is a good share of the soldiers stationed there. &nbsp,

Lee’s worries are now a fact. Trump made his long-awaited record of “reciprocal tariffs” on April 2 to make amends to the “unfair” trade practices of nations that import to the US. A new 26 % tax was applied to South Korea.

During Trump’s shared address to Congress on March 5 that outlined his reasoning behind reciprocal taxes, South Korea received a particular shout-out. &nbsp,

Trump referred to South Korea as a nation that badly treats the US in the address, saying that” South Korea’s regular price is four times higher… And we give so much support physically and in so many different methods to South Korea, but that’s what happens.”

Trump’s remarks, which associate military aid with tariffs, have sparked concerns in South Korea that the US might increase its tariffs even further when negotiations begin to discuss defense costs.

Trump is trying to use a method that ties security concerns to trade, according to Kim Dae-shik, floor spokesperson for South Korea’s ruling People’s Power Party. &nbsp,

South Korea needs a strategy that maintains a principled stance while also preventing any linkages to trade negotiations, Kim added.

South Korea has already agreed to increase its defense annual contributions to US$ 1.3 billion by 2026, after which costs will increase annually based on South Korea’s Consumer Price Index.

Trump did make the suggestion during the campaign that he would demand from Seoul up to$ 10 billion annually.

Taiwan’s conundrum

According to Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank, the Trump administration may also exert pressure on South Korea to play a more active role in Taiwan’s defense.

To be sure, US pressure on South Korea to clarify its position on Taiwan is not new. Due to its emphasis on North Korean threats and its economic reliance on Beijing, Seoul is reluctant to define its role in a Taiwan emergency involving Chinese aggression. &nbsp,

However, according to Yeo, the Trump administration may pressure South Korea into “more concrete discussions related to Taiwan.”

In the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, Yeo wrote in a recent report that” the United States may push South Koreans outside of their comfort zone to provide more clarity and pledge robust support for the US-South Korea alliance.”

Lee noted that if China invades Taiwan, the US may have to compel South Korea to commit high-risk commitments, such as allowing US forces to use South Korean air and naval bases, or assisting in logistics and reconnaissance operations.

Any overt South Korean commitments to Taiwan’s defense would unavoidably strain Beijing’s economic ties. With exports to China reaching$ 133 billion in 2024, up 6.6 % year over year, China is South Korea’s main trading partner.

In light of Trump’s new prohibitive tariffs, China’s market will become all the more significant because of South Korea’s export-oriented economy.

” This will be a challenging balancing act, but South Korea must align its position with the United Nations’. It must support Beijing’s” One China” strategy while performing its full role as a US ally, Lee continued. ” [South Korea ] needs to consider its economic ties to China.”

South Korea’s prior strategic alignment with the US has prompted China to react strongly. &nbsp,

Beijing, for instance, imposed unofficial economic sanctions against South Korea that included a tourism ban, trade restrictions, and consumer boycotts after installing the THAAD missile defense system in 2016.

Geopolitical risk

Despite these worries, the South Korean government claims to still be confident in America’s commitment to deterring North Korea. &nbsp,

The US Department of Defense has not provided any official confirmation or statement, the South Korean government said the day after the Washington Post’s report on the secret memo was made public. &nbsp,

The Korean Peninsula’s main goal is still maintaining peace and stability, and that has not changed.

Seoul is under increasing pressure to align with new US priorities while balancing its own security and economic interests as Washington reshapes its Indo-Pacific strategy. &nbsp,

In light of the ongoing political unrest and the looming economic effects of Trump’s new tariffs, whether South Korea can maintain its strategic autonomy or become more and more involved in great-power competition is still a mystery.

The decisions Seoul makes in the upcoming months could redefine its geopolitical standing and risks for years to come as Pyongyang closely observes and Beijing poises to retaliate.

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Japan is working to build a Tomahawk-like weapon, aiming to reach further, faster, and on its own terms as China and North Korea’s missile threats come to an end and US stocks are running out.

This month, Naval News reported that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries ( MHI ) and Japan’s Ministry of Defense ( MOD ) signed a 32.3 billion yen ( US$ 219 million ) contract to create a new” Surface-to-Ship/Surface-to-Surface Precision Guided Missile” ( SURFA ).

Through improvements in range, precision advice, and aircraft capabilities, the weapon aims to improve its anti-ship and anti-ground efficiency.

Development is expected to start in 2024 through 2032, making use of improvements made by Kawasaki Heavy Industries ‘” New Anti-Ship Missile for the Defense of Remote Islands” and MHI’s Model 12 surface-to-ship weapon improvements.

The weapon has aerodynamic wings and a fuel-efficient website, which makes extended parallel journey possible, similar to the US Tomahawk. Targeting accuracy and penetration abilities will be improved by intelligence satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs ).

This security initiative highlights Japan’s strategic shift to disagreement weapons as it intensifies its efforts to combat China’s sea aggression and North Korea’s weapon advances. Important project details, including engine design, are still undetermined, according to an official from Japan’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency ( ALTA ) &nbsp ).

The action complements Japan’s more aggressive military development plan, with tensions spread throughout East Asia fueled by the need. In response to rising challenges from China and North Korea, Japan announced in October 2023 that it planned to purchase 400 US Tomahawk weapons.

In order to highlight China’s evolving missile threat to Japan, Newsweek reported in March 2025 that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force ( PLARF ) had deployed advanced missile systems capable of piercing Japan’s ballistic missile defenses.

The ground-launched cruise missiles CJ-10 and CJ-100, as well as China’s DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, pose considerable challenges to Japan’s island.

These rockets have ranges of 1, 500 to 2, 500 kilometers and are located in the northern provinces of Jilin and eastern Shandong, covering Japan’s four main islands. Moreover, the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is in use in Anhui province, increases China’s range of attacks by 4, 000 km.

In addition, USNI reported in January 2025 that North Korea’s test of its hypersonic missiles that quarter indicates its goal to improve its corporate punishment features. The weapon was reported by state media,” The missile traveled 1, 500 km at Mach 12 and traveled in a “dual top” before falling into the Sea of Japan.

However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff from South Korea and Japan’s MOD provided conflicting information, with data that showed a maximum range of 1,100 kilometers and the presence of the alleged next peak.

However, Japan’s decision to create a similar indigenous weapon may have been influenced by the challenges facing US Tomahawk weapon production. In a March 2025 post from 1945, Reuben Johnson points out that the US Navy is experiencing a severe lack of Tomahawk cruise missiles as a result of rapid consumption levels exceeding creation skills.

Over 80 rockets were used in a single day in latest issues, including the 2024 Yemen strikes. A” just-in-time” production model that limits surge capacity adds to business challenges caused by fluctuating procurement needs and insufficient production prices.

Efforts to increase production through exports have not yet had considerable impact. Also, inconsistent demand has resulted in bottlenecks in crucial components like rocket motors, further putting off replenishment. Recent production costs are insufficient, with orders from 2023 estimating that only five missiles will be delivered each month by 2025.

In a report released in January 2023 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS), Seth Jones points out that the US spent 400 Tomahawk missiles in just three weeks of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, with a replacement missile from a Tomahawk Block V taking 25 months.

This ability stock decline may leave much room for friends like Japan. However, Masashi Murano claims in a March 2024 article by the US Studies Center ( USSC ) that upgrading the Type 12 to a longer-range, more powerful missile presents a number of technical challenges.

A longer-range, better-than-ever Type 12 would require a satellite data link and its existing guidance system to update its flight path in real-time, allowing for time-sensitive targets like transporter-erector-launchers ( TELs ).

Additionally, an upgraded Type 12 may require different type of warheads to crater runways and obliterate bunkers and other hardened targets. China and North Korea are even likely to have strong threats, which would require the purchase of electronic warfare drones that can imitate the names of their adversary’s threats.

Murano also points out that Japan has limited manufacturing capacity for such munitions and that the long-range hit systems it is developing are costly. However, Japan needs to view much in order to take.

Christopher Woody makes clear in a March 2025 Breaking Defense article that Japan’s reliance on the US for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) is still significant, with gaps in its “kill chain” capabilities necessitating US support for target detection and tracking. This leaves the chance that the US will resign when Japan had most require them.

Importantly, the temporary suspension of US knowledge sharing with Ukraine in 2025 made it clear how powerfully significant such actions can be for a country’s defenses, prompting US allies to reevaluate their reliance on US military resources and technology.

In the case of Ukraine, the demise of US intelligence services led to Russia’s ability to retake important chunks of Kursk, upending Ukraine’s policy of using Russian country as a bargaining device for peace negotiations.

Withdrawing a decision like this may give Japan the plain but challenging choice to develop its own independent counterstrike capabilities without relying on the US, or to continue adopting US technology while reducing the chance of abandonment.

In a report for the Institute for International and Strategic Studies ( IISS) in January 2024, Veerle Nouwens and others point out that while Japan has launched a reconnaissance satellite and has pledged to launch small satellites for target detection and build over-the-horizon ( OTH) radars, it will likely continue to rely on the US for these capabilities due to the complexity and cost of the associated equipment.

Woody points out that the Trump administration’s transactional approach to relationships has strained US-Japan relationships deeper, with needs for more Chinese security funding and criticisms of Japan’s contributions to the empire.

Although Japan has pledged to double defense spending to 2 % of GDP by 2027, these plans are hampered by political and economic issues, including public opposition to tax increases. The check will be whether Japan’s missiles can travel farther than US promises, as it shifts from dependent to deterrence.

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