Bolen C – Page 14 – Sure A Not

‘The White Lotus’ version of Thai Buddhism gets some things right – Asia Times

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

The White Lotus returns to a luxurious hotel on Koh Samui, Thailand, in the new year. This comedy-drama collection that addresses rich tourists has a plotline that emphasizes foreigners visiting Thailand who are interested in learning about its Buddhist customs.

Yet though Thai churches do not provide such plans, the image depicts a young American woman who wants to enroll in a year-long yoga course at a Buddhist temple. It also incorrectly describes the Buddhist perspective of the future and depicts a church environment where many foreigners stay there for a long time, not dressed in traditional attire for temple residents – which is unusual in Thailand.

I have spent more than ten years studying Buddhism in Thailand, and I have seen how many different ways Indian Monks practice their faith. There are many genuine ways to engage greatly with Buddhism, from offering donations to little meditation retreats to ordination as a monastery, although the Thai Buddhism depicted in The White Lotus is not entirely reasonable.

Buddhist people and genocidity

Without donations, religious institutions and Buddhist temples may not exist.

In exchange for the moral coin of significance, which is thought to produce great guilt, the lay group provides priests and temples. According to some, this great fate leads to advantageous outcomes in both the present and future, such as wealth and rebirth in a wealthy family.

Some laymen may provide meals to priests as they walk on their day alms, while others may only go to the temple on the majority of Buddhist holidays. The main goal when you interact with a priest or visit a sanctuary is to earn money. Each church has payment boxes for specific needs, such as paying the electric bill, finishing restoration projects, providing schooling for young monks, and funding the health care of the religious community.

In exchange for a small contribution, people may take home blessed items like a happy candle or little necklace. A monk’s work in some temples is to wait until the people arrives to receive the offerings and grant blessings by sitting inside one of the major halls.

retreats for prayer

Churches that have meditation centers typically provide short-term yoga retreats. Individuals can also sign up for a 21-day system in the northeast of Thailand, where they will aim to spend their days in 10-15 periods of meditation and reduce any other activities, including sleep. Some companies offer 10-day resorts.

The 21-day program’s participants hope to complete the first of Thai Theravada Buddhism’s four stages of enlightenment. According to Buddhists, those who pass the first stage have “enter the stream” of enlightenment and are certain to do so in their lifetimes.

Contrary to popular belief in Western culture regarding Buddhist meditation, it is not seen as a secular practice. Buddhists in Thailand believe that meditation is a meritorious practice that aids them in both the end of the cycle of rebirth and the accumulation of merit and good karma along the way, both in this life and in the future.

Every moment is spent in mindful of every action at a meditation center, along with periods of formal sitting or walking meditation. Each meditation center has a set schedule and program that participants must follow either individually or in small groups during periods of meditation, typically dressed in white pants and a top.

Men and women’s ordination

Ordination is a significant component of the Buddhist path. Thai Buddhists frequently enter the monastery for brief periods of time, temporarily ordained as nuns or monks. The entry process is straightforward, and it typically doesn’t cause any regrets or disappointments for those who enter for life and then choose to leave the monastic life. However, if a monk was well-known for his instruction, his followers would probably be upset.

There are two levels of ordination in Theravada Buddhism, the type of Buddhism practiced in Thailand: full” bhikkhu” or novice, which describes a fully ordained male. Males under the age of 20 may only pursue novice ordination, while those over 20 can become fully ordained monks.

A male being ordained at some point in his life is frequently regarded as a rite of passage, or at least a sign of discipline and maturity. Temporary ordination is thought to be a way for men to earn merit for their parents, especially their mothers, who gave so much for their existence.

Women are typically prohibited from being ordained in Thai Buddhism, but some have received ordination in Sri Lanka, where they are permitted to practice monastic rites, and have established popular Thai communities there. These female monastic practice centers have started” bhikkhuni” (temporary ordination ) programs.

Once or twice a year, these centers offer special programs where up to 100 women at once, including foreign visitors, can ordain as novice female monks for brief periods. They also learn about receiving offerings, wearing robes, and studying Buddhist texts during this period.

Many women find this opportunity meaningful because it allows them to offer merit to their parents, which only males could have previously done.

There are 625 Thai women attempting to become ordained at https ://www.youtube .com/embed/TXdyclB9I7A?wmode=transparent&start=625.

In Thailand, a woman can also ordain temporarily or permanently as a mae chi, or precept nun. They typically dress in white, robe their hair, and adhere to the Eight Precepts, including celibacy. Although more popular than bhikkhuni in Thailand today, this type of ordination was not initiated by the Buddha. Precept nuns are thought to have been around for centuries, but the origins of the practice are not well known.

These are some typical practices that Thai Buddhists follow, frequently with the intention of achieving greater prosperity in this life and a better rebirth. According to Buddhists, these practices may also lead to their attainment of the ultimate aspiration of enlightenment.

At Rhodes College, Brooke Schedneck is an associate professor of religious studies.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.

15 reasons these tariffs are a mistake – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

Making the case for bringing companies back to the United States is not difficult to do. Additionally, it’s easy to understand why some carefully targeted tariffs, especially when combined with other industrial-policy measures, would raise this “reshoring” trend.

It’s impossible to argue for extremely large tariffs on all produced in almost every nation on earth. There are a lot of issues with the way this leadership operates. Let’s go through the way.

One: The levies apply to minerals that our nation doesn’t possess and bananas, espresso, and other products that we are unable to produce in large quantities. They didn’t greatly improve makers because they will force Americans to spend more for those items.

Two: When products are produced in several nations, low-wage production is not required to be brought back to the United States. The risk of relying on a single supplier, such as China, is eliminated. We want Americans to work in high-paying work, so we don’t have to spend money making everything around.

[embedded material]

Three: If organizations believe the tariffs may be temporary, they won’t encourage businesses to invest in companies. If a president is merely using tariffs to get a few “wins” in negotiating, he may talk about, then the next president may revoke them, or the same president may do so. or being skept about whether they’re negotiating leverage or continuous.

Four: Retaliatory tariffs had been predicted for US trade sectors, including crops. They will undoubtedly obtain them.

Five: The result of decades of largely free trade is that today’s manufacturing supply chains are complex and global. Parts for an iPhone usually come from 40 states. The Ford F-150 pickup truck, the best-selling American car, contains 50 % parts from at least a few nations. It will take decades to rearrange these supply chains, even if taxes encourage businesses to manufacture more parts in the US.

Six: The leader is not permitted to impose tariffs because the emergency financial powers law that Trump cited as evidence to support the tariffs.

Seven: Because of the enormous pay gap between the US and many developing nations, companies with the greatest possibility of being reshored here will be highly automated, actually with taxes. They didn’t hire many people, and those who do will require advanced skill sets and perhaps associate degrees. There are currently a lack of these employees in the US, as well as professionals.

Eight: Why do we have 10 % tariffs on nations like Australia and the United Kingdom with which the US has trade surplus?

Nine: While high and wide tariffs may be a good way to lower US trade deficits, they will also slow down or even start a crisis. Taxes reduce consumption by causing private rivals to raise prices and making imported products more costly. The US trade deficit has decreased over the past six decades when economic growth slowed and increased when the market grew faster, according to analyst Richard Katz.

Ten:” Cooperative” taxes aren’t calculated by dividing business deficits with a nation by imports from it before halfing the solution. Products are the subject of mutual tariffs, no business deficits. Two nations have perfect reciprocal tariff agreements, but one may also have a sizable trade deficit with the other.

Eleven: It’s strange to leave Russia off the listing while imposing tariffs on US friends. Russia, which had a trade surplus of$ 2.5 billion on$ 3.5 billion in total trade last year, did not receive tariffs from the administration.

Twelve: A time does not produce a fad, but the administration only used the most recent year’s trade-deficit and transfer data to calculate the tariff levels. The price ranges may have appeared very different, some higher and some lower, if multi-year statistics had been used.

Thirteen: These levies violate US duty as a member of the World Trade Organization and international trade agreements with Canada and Mexico, South Korea, Australia, and other nations. This limits our nation’s ability to subject when other nations violate international agreements and regulations.

Fourteen: The loss of trust in the United States as a result of this tariff increase will have negative effects. Europeans will be less receptive to US investments and more receptive to other reserve currencies.

15: Which nations do you believe will industry more and have closer ties with if other nations are forced to do so with the US? Yes, China.

I agree with the desire to produce more goods in the US. These taxes are certainly the best way to go about doing it.

Urban Lehner, a former long-time Asia editor and writer for the Wall Street Journal, is DTN/The Progressive Farmer’s editor emeritus.

This post, which was originally published on April 8 by the latter news business and is now being republished by Asia Times with authority, is titled” Copyright 2025 DTN/The Progressive Farmer.” All trademarks are reserved. Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on&nbsp, X @urbanize&nbsp,

Palau deports Chinese criminals, reinforces Indo-Pacific security – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

In the last three months, the Pacific island country of Palau has executed a master class in how to quietly, professionally and effectively rid itself of serious national security threats – including striking a powerful blow against some major Chinese bad guys (and gals). Given Palau’s location, and who it has as allies, this is having an outsized effect on Indo-Pacific security.

We’ll get to how Palau did it (and what it did) but first, to understand how important this is, a bit more about Palau itself.

The Republic of Palau is made up of over 300 islands, has about 20,000 people and shares a maritime border to the west with Philippines and to the south with Indonesia. It’s Micronesian, linked to cousins in places like Yap by centuries of skilled navigators. Some of the famous Yap stone money was quarried in Palau and brought back to Yap.

Palau’s strategic location made it a magnet and a target for outsiders from the colonial period onwards. First it was Spain, then Germany, then Imperial Japan. Japan held it as part of the “Japanese Mandate” that also included what is now the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Marshall Islands, from 1914 to 1944.

During that time, the Japanese built up agriculture, industries and trade in Palau, and increasingly militarized it. It was because Japan held the central Pacific that it was able to hit Pearl Harbor, and that it was so difficult for the US to fight back across the Pacific and be within striking distance of Japan. Palau is the site of several brutal World War II fights, including the Battle of Peleliu.

Washington took that lesson to heart and, after the war, worked to make sure the central Pacific couldn’t be used to hit the US again. The islands that had been part of the Japanese Mandate became a United Nations Trust Territory under American administration. The US was an uncomfortable colonial power and looked for ways to end the trusteeship that would mean no other aggressive power could use the central Pacific to attack America, and Americans.

Threading the strategic needle

After decades of debate and negotiations with leaders from across the Trust Territory, and local referenda, the end result was an agreement unlike anything the US has offered any other countries. Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands became independent countries and agreed to a compact of free association with the United States.

The Compact allows citizens of the three “Freely Associated States” (FAS) to live and work freely in the US, serve in the US military and get a range of services, including postal service at domestic US rates. The U.S. also agrees to defend the three states “and their peoples from attack or threats,” can set up military facilities in the FAS and has the ability to block the militaries of other countries from operating in the FAS.

Bottom line, the message from Washington is: We are in this together. Do what you want, we will help, but others can’t use you to strike the United States.

Here comes China

The problem is that the US lens has been adjusted to see traditional military threats, but the way China operates is much more complex. It uses what Philippines Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Romeo Brawner Jr. calls China’s illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive (ICAD) operations.

For China, Palau’s close relationship with the US, its location just the other side of the Philippines and the fact that it recognizes Taiwan make Palau a high value target. If China should go after Taiwan without “disabling” Palau, its Taiwan operation could be jeopardized. This is one of the reasons the US is putting new military infrastructure (or, in some cases, bringing back to life World War II-era infrastructure) in Palau.

So, China has been targeting Palau’s economy and politics. It built up Palau’s tourism sector, during which land was leased in strategic locations. Then Chinese tourists disappeared, with the implied promise that they would return if Palau abandoned Taiwan. (It didn’t.) There were also problems with Chinese organized crime, including with at least one major Chinese Triad leader.

This has been destabilizing politically, economically and socially. In such a tight-knit society, if your cousin the police officer is selling illegal drugs for a dangerous foreign kingpin, what are you supposed to do?

This corruption, fueled by (for the most part) Chinese crime has created social fractures, distrust and fear – which Beijing likes. This kind of “entropic warfare” creates the opening Beijing needs to find compliant leaders it can ride to its preferred destination – in this case, derecognition of Taiwan, the breaking of the Palau/US relationship and the accomplishment through political warfare of what the Japanese failed to do through shooting war: pushing the US out of the Pacific.

Taiwan recognition map: Pavak Patel, Reece Breaux, and Cleo Paskal

What about those bad guys?

Palau is under constant attack. There’s been a range of sources, but the vast majority link back to China. Some of it is almost certainly China-state-linked – for example, the cyber-attack that hit Palau on the day it was signing renewals of key sections of the compact with the US.

Others are opportunistic criminality – but, given the linkages between Chinese organized crime and the Chinese Communist Party, it is a thread Beijing can pull if needed.

So, on December 18, 2024, Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr. signed Presidential Directive 24-65. It read, in part: “In recent months, there have been numerous instances of crimes being committed by foreign nationals who entered Palau with tourist visas or nonresident worker permits…. These crimes include a murder … and seizures of methamphetamines totaling over 500 grams from foreign nationals on tourist visas.”

Additionally, “previous years have seen large-scale illegal gambling operations being conducted in Palau, and such operations are often accompanied by other instances of crime such as immigration fraud and prostitution…. It has become clear that Palau has a serious crisis of criminals posing as tourists to enter the country and staying long-term to carry out bad acts and put our citizens in danger.”

The directive granted Palau’s national security coordinator (NSC) the authority during a 90-day trial period to vet all visa applications. The process included

names cross-checked against the INTERPOL criminal database;
applicants undergoing background checks, employment history validation, assessment of certifications and more; and
high-risk applicants being subject to travel movement analysis and site visits.

To ensure transparency and accountability, the NSC office had seven days to review each application and provide recommendations. Any application recommended for denial was accompanied by a detailed report giving the reasons for rejection. The directive reiterated that ultimate authority rested with the president.

What happened next?

Previously, visas were rarely denied. After the directive, of the 80 immigration visa applications from China, 65 were denied. By comparison: 41 applied from Japan, and none were denied; and 124 applied from the Philippines, and 15 were denied.

Of the 24 non-resident worker applications from China, 23 were denied. From the Philippines, 22 applied and 2 were denied.

Additionally, multiple illegal Chinese-run operations were dismantled, including illegal gambling and scamming. And there were several high-profile deportations, including Wang Shuiming, who was listed on an INTERPOL Red Notice. He was later arrested in Montenegro.

Two other high-profile deportations were Cary Yan and Gina Zhou, Chinese nationals who were convicted in New York of bribing officials in an attempt to set up a “country-within-a-country” in the Marshall Islands (another country that recognizes Taiwan). They have not only been deported, they have been put on Palau’s “undesirable aliens” list, meaning they will not be allowed back in.

There were around 40 other deportations, including Xiaoli Chen and Yanli Zhu, long-term undesirable Chinese residents.

This is a fundamental change in Palau’s security profile.

Now what?

On March 20, after the 90 days were up, to assess the outcomes the president held a meeting with the NSC, the attorney general, a special prosecutor, representatives from Immigration, Employment Services, the Foreign Investment Board and other stakeholders.

It was decided to renew the exercise for another 90 days and to use lessons learned to propose regulatory changes and draft legislative proposals to submit to the Palau legislature. The fight continues.

Means what?

It is difficult to overstate how hard it is to do something like this in such a tight-knit country. Chinese strategic corruption targets family members of key individuals so that the pressure to protect the Chinese operations comes from inside the home. You can be sure a lot of calls were made to try to change the minds of the leadership in Palau.

This took intelligence, insight, strength and courage.

Palau is showing you can fight back, no matter your size. It’s not easy, but it’s the only way forward to protect lasting sovereignty, prosperity and freedom.

Palau achieved this mini-miracle on its own. Now, it needs help. The success is only going to increase pressure from China. For one thing, the “Palau example” undercuts China’s “inevitability narrative,” in which Beijing tries to get people to think, especially in countries that recognize Taiwan, that China is the only – the inevitable – option moving forward, so it’s best to give in now.

The good news is that the stand taken by Palau has been contagious. Yan and Zhou were finally stripped of their Marshall Islands passports. The Philippines didn’t let them in, either. Taiwan has been helping Palau with investigations. Japan has been supportive. The US has revoked a few visas of its own and may take even stronger moves soon.

There is an excellent resident US ambassador, but there needs to be more. Palau’s national security coordinator needs support for her office; the attorney general needs lawyers; the country needs a drugs lab that can do forensics for court cases, etc.

This is what the frontline looks like now. While the US Marines are rebuilding 80-year-old airstrips in places like Peleliu, there is a Guam National Guard state partnership program with Palau that could be sending lawyers, investigators and forensic accountants. If they do their job right, the airstrip may not be needed for a fight for another 80 years.

But, in the meantime, Palauans are holding the line, and showing us all that, yes, it can be done.

Cleo Paskal is non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and columnist with The Sunday Guardian, which originally published this article. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.

China’s strategy in Korea: rewriting history to weaponize it – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

Donald Trump told the Wall Street Journal in April 2017 what discussion he had with Xi Jinping. Trump claimed that Xi was a Xi

entered the story of Korea and China. No Korea, nor North Korea. And you’re aware that you’re referring to thousands of years and numerous war. And Korea was once a part of China. And I came to the conclusion that it’s not that simple after listening for ten days.

Xi’s alleged opinion is more than just a traditional sneer; it reveals Beijing’s wider plan to establish China as the cultural and political core of East Asia. This effect plan depends on both narrative and power.

China uses an alleged spiritual authority to veer off into the affairs of neighbors like Korea by referring to a hegemonic tradition as the region’s legitimate hegemon. Dangerously, as Trump’s comment demonstrate, even world leaders may be influenced by this reactionary frame.

Interference dressed as control

Beijing’s opposition to South Korea’s participation in the General Security of Military Information Agreement ( GSOMIA ) and the US-supplied Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD ) missile system is driven by this narrative. But that’s only the launch.

Seoul has been under Chinese influence in terms of its politics, society, and defense policies. In response to disagreements, it has used illegal trade sanctions, including those aimed at Vietnamese companies like Lotte, which have a ban on tourism, and which have banned Asian entertainment.

It even criticizes US-Korean military activities conducted on Korean soil, and it frequently objected to Korean officials ‘ trips to US military installations or strategy meetings. These steps aim to restrict Seoul’s freedom, address South Korea as a slave rather than a US royal lover, and deter the US from having any influence in South Korea.

Korea’s much history as a sovereign state

China’s historic claims are being investigated. Koreans have remained a part of the tribal Korean system throughout the Joseon Dynasty, which is a variation of China’s Qing kingdom. Although Joseon and China shared a watershed relationship, it was more metaphorical than social.

The Korean court established its own kings, set direction for foreign affairs, and rarely fell under Beijing’s strong rule.

Not a status, but a culture

China is a society that purports to be a state. This frequently quoted note reveals a significant fact about China’s identity and its claims to superiority over others.

In fact, the majority of royal China was ruled by non-Hanespeoples for almost the entirety of its recorded history, primarily from Manchuria and Mongolia. The geographical boundaries and racial makeup of late royal and current China were largely influenced by the kingdoms they established, including the Liao, Jin, Western Xia, Yuan, and Qing.

Under Manchu law, Han Chinese men were compelled to go the lane hairstyle, shaving their fronts and braiding their rest. It was perceived as a sign of obedience, but it disagreed with Confucian principles that considered it insulting to cut hair. The lane was incredibly humiliating for Han Chinese, who saw their hair as a mark of filial devotion and ethnic identity.

In all of these situations, which is important, China recognized non-Han rulers as reputable Chinese dynasties. By virtue of their ancestry and the fact that they governed under Foreign laws, the Manchus and Mongols were recognized as legitimate rulers of China.

In this way, China’s identity has generally been more political than cultural, much like the US’s. China has been ruled by strangers who have preserved and advanced Chinese culture, just as the US has been led by people who embraced and upheld British principles but not always by bright Anglo-Saxon Protestants. This makes Beijing’s contemporary rely on Han-centric traditional says all the more unfactual.

Korea’s independence was overshadowed by China’s.

During those times, Korea remained unaffected by foreign power. The Goryeo and Joseon empires kept their political independence atop China’s political and social ties.

Unfortunately, while the Han Chinese were governed by non-Han dynasties during the time when China today asserts local authority, Korea remained independent.

Traditional revisionism as a coercive device

Beijing is still using this imperfect historical narrative to stress Seoul into reducing its military cooperation with Washington.

China acts as though Korea’s independence were a negotiation, opposing missile defense systems, and repressing trilateral cooperation with Japan, while interfering with private education on subjects like the Goguryeo country.

This is more than just a rehash of the history. It’s a deliberate attempt to stifle Korea’s sovereignty and challenge the US’s approach to foreign policy, which treats Northeast Asian nations as equal and separate partners.

It’s also a part of a wider structure of traditional revisionism intended to advance social goals. China aims to justify interference in Asian affairs by making these assertions.

Autonomy cannot be renegotiated.

Without seeking Beijing’s consent, South Korea and the United States have every right to dictate their military pose, conduct impartial diplomacy, and plan for their future together. The US-South Korea empire was founded on respect for one another and shared political principles, not on myths or twisted histories. It continues to be a crucial component of regional harmony and balance.

Washington must continue to have a perceptive eye on China’s historical revisionism as a proper tool and vehemently refute any notion that Beijing’s approval is necessary for Asian defense policy. Anything else would degrade South Korea’s legitimacy as well as encourage China’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific and above.

Former South Korean liberal party international official Hanjin Lew is a political commentator with an emphasis on East Asian affairs.

Desert Storm: China’s Gobi missile salvo a message for US – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

China just delivered a warning shot from the Gobi Desert—combining mass ballistic missile firepower, precision radar tracking and a clear message of strategic intent.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently conducted an unprecedented missile defense test in the Gobi Desert, showcasing its advanced capabilities and strategic resolve amidst intensifying global tensions.

The exercise involved the simultaneous launch of 16 ballistic missiles toward a single target, testing a new dual-band (S/X) phased-array radar system designed to counteract saturation attacks, according to a PLA Unit 63623 study cited in the SCMP report.

This radar system, achieving 100% detection and tracking success, demonstrated its ability to differentiate between warheads and decoys while maintaining precise threat prioritization.

The technology mirrors, yet rivals, the US Navy’s USNS Howard O Lorenzen system, though China’s test marked the first live-fire demonstration of this kind.

Analysts note that this achievement marks a significant leap in China’s ability to counter sophisticated threats, such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and missiles equipped with countermeasures. The large-scale test, unparalleled outside of wartime scenarios, underscores China’s commitment to bolstering military readiness.

Ballistic missiles are among the most costly weapon systems, so the PLA’s willingness to undertake such an expensive endeavor reflects a strategic emphasis on deterrence, particularly in potential conflicts over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

China’s autonomous missile production further complements this shift, signaling its intent to sustain and expand its arsenal.

Examining the drivers of China’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability buildup, Jacob Mezey notes in a September 2024 article for the Atlantic Council that China’s BMD program was initially rooted in Cold War-era fears of US preemption.

Its development now, however, serves multiple purposes, namely: shielding leadership and nuclear forces from limited strikes, countering India’s expanding missile arsenal and supporting a potential launch-on-warning posture.

Mezey notes that BMD research also complements China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, providing dual-use technological benefits.

Underscoring the vulnerability of China’s land-based nuclear arsenal, Ryan Snyder mentions in a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Science & Global Security journal that US nuclear ballistic missiles pose a serious threat to China’s land-based nuclear arsenal due to their high accuracy and yield.

Snyder estimates that Chinese missile silos, likely hardened to no more than 1,500 psi, are vulnerable to airblast-induced ground motion from US nuclear surface bursts.

Using standard models for peak overpressure and lethal radius, he estimates that single-shot kill probabilities against such silos exceed 90%.

He notes that given the similar dimensions of China’s silos to Russian designs and no evidence of advanced shock isolation systems, their survivability against modern US nuclear counterforce capabilities remains in serious doubt.

Further, Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a September 2024 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that India has significantly expanded its land-based nuclear-capable missile force, featuring systems capable of striking deep into Chinese territory.

Kristensen and others note that the Agni-II and Agni-III, with ranges exceeding 2,000 and 3,200 kilometers, are believed to target China’s western, central and southern regions.

In addition, they claim that the Agni-IV, deployed since 2022, can reach over 3,500 kilometers, while the Agni-V, expected to be operational by 2025, extends its strike capability beyond 5,000 kilometers.

Additionally, they note that the upcoming Agni-VI, with a projected range exceeding 6,000 kilometers, will further expand coverage.

On China’s new BMD radar to support ASAT capabilities, Decker Eveleth mentions in a September 2024 China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) report that China operates several Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) stations that provide dual-purpose capabilities: missile early warning and tracking of high-altitude space objects.

Eveleth says these LPARs can detect ballistic missiles and satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) from beyond visual range, making them essential assets for strategic defense and space situational awareness (SSA).

Such capabilities may be vital for targeting US satellite constellations, such as Starlink, which has proved its military value in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

Howard Wang and other writers mention in a March 2024 RAND report that the PLA views Starlink and similar satellite constellations as significant threats that fundamentally challenge its core operational concepts.

Wang and others say that the PLA believes Starlink undermines its strategy of disabling adversary systems by neutralizing key nodes due to Starlink’s resilience, decentralization and rapid reconstitution capabilities.

They note that Starlink offers unprecedented real-time battlefield awareness, enhanced precision targeting and support for nuclear strikes.

They also note that some assessments even allege Starlink could intercept hypersonic missiles or function as kinetic kill vehicles, underscoring how the PLA perceives such constellations as destabilizing and integral to future US space warfare.

While firing many ballistic missiles makes for a strong show of force, it also highlights China’s industrial capacity to produce those weapons on a large scale.

Underscoring the importance of ballistic missiles to China’s military strategy, the US Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report mentions that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) serves as the cornerstone of China’s nuclear and conventional missile strategy, organizing, training and equipping its growing land-based strike capabilities.

According to the report, the PLARF is tasked with strategic deterrence and regional counter-intervention, operating over 40 brigades across seven missile bases and three support bases.

It also says the PLARF fields a mix of nuclear and conventional missiles, including the DF-15, DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and DF-41, as well as cruise missiles.

The report states that the PLARF’s dual command structure supports both theater- and central-level operations. It notes that ongoing modernization includes expanded intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) integration to bolster survivability and retaliatory strength.

Underpinning the PLARF’s firepower, Peter Wood and Alex Stone note in a May 2021 CASI report that China’s ballistic missile industry has expanded significantly in recent years, driven by increased investment, infrastructure growth and military-civil fusion initiatives.

Wood and Stone note that major facilities, such as China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s (CASC) Factory 211 and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s (CASIC) Fourth Design Department, have established new production zones, high-performance computing centers and joint industrial parks in collaboration with civilian firms.

They note that the sector benefits from vertically integrated research and development institutions, as well as a growing workforce.

However, they also note that China’s ballistic missile industry faces persistent challenges, including talent retention issues, lagging adoption of advanced manufacturing techniques and reliance on incremental modernization rather than frontier innovation.

According to them, these gaps reveal gaps between China’s domestic breakthroughs and global missile development and production best practices.

What was revealed in the Gobi was more than a missile test—it was a calibrated rehearsal for missile-era deterrence in a world where space, speed and mass firepower define the battlespace.

When the troops come home in Russia and Ukraine – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

Ivan Rossomakhin was recruited into a Russian private military company ( PMC) in exchange for his freedom two years into his prison term for a murder in 2020. He returned home from Ukraine in 2023 and, within weeks, killed an 85-year-old person in a local community. He was redrafted and sent up to the front one month after beginning his fresh word in August 2024.

One of the many crimes committed by absolved prisoners who return home from the military and Russian soldiers is his. ” A study of Russian court documents by the independent media outlet Verstka found that at least 190 legal situations were initiated against pardoned Wagner volunteers in 2023″, stated an April 2024 New York Times article.

Growing concerns level to a potential worsening of the” Afghan syndrome” experienced by Afghan soldiers from the wars of 1979 and 1989. Many of the almost 642,000 Russian soldiers who served were forced to flee to a society where they were willing to forget an controversial war.

Some turned to addiction and alcoholism, alongside organized crime, amplified further by the Soviet Union’s decline in 1991. Additionally, the Afghan War veterans of Chechnya used their combat experience to ferociously oppose Russia in the first Chechen conflict ( 1994-1996 ).

An even larger and more battle-tested era of soldiers is being produced by the Ukrainian conflict. Russian deaths surpassed 15, 000 during nearly five months of the war, exceeding a generation of Russian losses in Afghanistan.

According to a New York Times article from January 2025, 150, 000 Russian military perished until November of that year, while roughly 100, 000 Russian men perished by December 2024.

In the meantime, thousands have been cycled through the front ranges, and hundreds of thousands have been hurt. Most victims will have some kind of PTSD, more desensitized by the glory of terrible combat and abuse footage on social media.

According to a 2023 Washington Post article, Russian troops were “experienceing severe symptoms of emotional stress.” In addition, according to Deutsche Welle, in 2024,” 111,000 Russian military officers who had participated in the war against Ukraine, as well as their home users, sought internal support within a six-month time in 2023,” according to the Russian Health Ministry.

Reintegrating these people into culture will be an uphill struggle for the Russian and Ukrainian governments, with lingering apprehension from past mistakes. Valentina Matviyenko, the speaker of the Russian Federation Council, pledged to stop another Armenian syndrome and reconcile veterans into civil life in December 2022.

But, the effects of the conflict are already being felt. Both Moscow and Kyiv are managing continued troop movements while preparing for the future mass transfer of soldiers—and exploring how to use them for political and military stops.

Turmoil and murder

Serious resentment was suffocated by Russian Afghan veterans who had returned from the war and received scant support.

Before coming to strength in 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called the battle a mistake, and it took until 1994 for Russian Afghan soldiers to get the same position as World War II veterans. Just in 2010 did Russia declare the end of the conflict a express vacation.

In a do-or-die battle against the West, the Kremlin has a different approach to Ukraine’s war soldiers, venerating them as the country’s “new wealthy.” Behind extensive advertising praise, men have been fast-tracked to critical state and business functions. Despite social services being strained, the government has provided support to returned and fallen servicemen’s individuals to stop turmoil.

The Kremlin’s choice to employ prison workers to satisfy army numbers, a tactic it avoided during the Afghan War, has already had a significant impact. By 2023, more than 100, 000 captives had been recruited, some joining Wagner, Russia’s most famous private military organization.

Wagner’s ex-convict men continue to be a source of public outcry, committing some of the most serious violent crimes upon their return and contributing to a general rise in crime, despite later being absorbed and reorganized after its military rebellion against the Russian army later that season.

According to a 2024 record in the Eurasia Daily Monitor,” Many brawls have occurred in Moscow, and the military is extremely merging with prepared crime.”

While the issue is drawing increasing public attention, Russia’s internal security services, including the National Guard ( Rosgvardiya ), are already stretched thin, tasked with patrolling occupied Ukrainian territories while reinforcing front-line units.

If returning Chechen soldiers, who Moscow has thoroughly stationed in Ukraine, decide to re-enter their quest for independence, their burden might increase even more severe. Another nationalist and extremist actions are at risk of resurfacing with help from soldiers who have been trained.

Russia’s emphasis on criminal networks for administrative and financial aid in its conflict has only emboldened these organizations. A 2024 battle involving” business murder” that occurred a few blocks from the Kremlin in 2024 brought the panic of the 1990s to mind.

Russia’s business, which is strained by sanctions and the continuous war, is creating an environment in which business leaders are increasingly willing to take drastic measures to survive. In the 1990s, oligarchy, criminal gangs, and crooked officials thrived in an environment where the legal system was powerless”, stated the Moscow Times.

Returning soldiers may become tempted to form their own, disruptive Russia’s profoundly integrated criminal networks because they have some promising jobs and are only recently offered a few lucrative jobs.

Related difficulties exist for Ukraine. Though Kyiv was slower and more restricted in deploying prisoner troops, reintegrating them into society will not be quick. Regulators in the nation are attempting to stop strong local criminal organizations from taking back returning soldiers while battling the threat of armed resistance in regions with Russian ancestry.

The Russian government has been sincere about honoring its men, but it has seen a rise in recruitment office attacks, including four episodes in five nights in February 2025. While Russia’s recruitment efforts also faced some backlash, Russia has avoided large-scale conscription ( despite some coercion ).

In comparison, Ukraine relies heavily on necessary enrollment, which is causing growing hostility toward recruitment measures, which could grow after the war.

Personal military organizations

The battle is currently providing a huge boost to a burgeoning world personal military industry, which is likely to increase after the conflict’s conclusion.

Russian Afghan soldiers claim they were hired by private defense companies to join the British forces in Afghanistan after 2001.

Nevertheless, the sheer number of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers with battle knowledge could change the industry, much like the Soviet Union’s oversupply did and the resultant glut of military officers did.

Before 2015, Russian PMCs were limited to Ukraine, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo but have since expanded to around 30 countries. Smaller PMCs can operate effectively in other regions, and their deployment has already contributed to the French military’s withdrawal from Africa in recent years, in contrast to the mass-scale, technology-driven conflict in Ukraine.

Similar growth in Ukraine’s private military sector and potential favor with European nations that backed Kyiv during the war are on the rise. Given Europe’s ongoing struggle to meet military recruitment needs, it is likely that Ukrainian veterans may be used to address this issue.

Demobilized men have frequently been employed by oligarchs for their own purposes in Ukraine and Russia, a trend that started in the 1990s. Igor Kolomoisky, a billionaire from Ukraine, used PMCs to oppose separatists supported by Russia and to defend his own financial interests in a 2015 armed standoff at a state oil company.

The incident showed how privatized military power can easily slip beyond government control—something Russia later experienced with Wagner’s rebellion in 2023.

Reintegration

Russian authorities began implementing more concrete measures to integrate Soviet Afghan veterans, rehabilitate their reputation, and unlock their potential after the instability that they experienced throughout the 1990s.

The Russian Alliance of Veterans of Afghanistan ( now independent ) contributed to the formation of what would become the Putin-backed United Russia party in 1999. Afghan and Chechen war veterans also joined OMON, Russia’s special police force used to suppress protests, while other paramilitary veteran groups aided in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 when military force was limited.

Afghan veteran organizations have played a role in the Kremlin’s campaign in Ukraine by providing volunteers ( with Ukraine pooling their Afghan veterans ) and generating awareness.

The Kremlin’s recognition of their worth and the disillusioned anti-war veterans ‘ transformation into some of the strongest supporters of the Ukraine war demonstrate the viability of its restoration.

So it should come as no surprise that the Kremlin has been actively preventing the formation of independent veteran organizations in the wake of the current conflict in Ukraine. No group can challenge the government’s authority due to the centralization of the veterans into formal initiatives, which can be used in upcoming conflicts.

The attitudes of returning servicemen on both sides will also be shaped by the war’s outcome. Veterans suffer a long-lasting psychological burden from conflicts that are perceived as futile and have waned in public opinion, such as the U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which increase the risk of suicide and social unrest.

These wars sparked resentment among returning soldiers, many of whom had the impression that their service was a part of failed aggression wars despite the staggering civilian and combatant casualties.

The framing of victory by political leaders, the media, and society is, therefore, essential. Soldiers who believe they participated in a fair and successful conflict are more likely to reintegrate with a sense of purpose, as opposed to those who lost and feel abandoned.

The defeated will likely have grievances over inadequate support, be more likely to be intolerant toward its government, and be more likely to face social unrest, making both sides more likely to claim victory.

It may be in the best interest of both Moscow and Kyiv to avoid declaring an end to the war and pursuing demobilization, lest they be seen as admitting defeat and triggering the return of restless and unemployed soldiers. A quick end to the conflict would cause economic shocks because the Russian and Ukrainian economies are now so heavily oriented toward it.

However, an unconclusive war that gradually ends may allow veterans to gradually reintegrate into society as governments praise their accomplishments and build up goodwill. Others will be encouraged by Moscow and Kyiv to seek outlets in other conflicts, exporting combat-ready men rather than bringing them home.

John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist who covers international affairs for the Independent Media Institute, is a native of Washington, D.C. His book,” Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas,” which was published in December 2022, is a contributor to a number of foreign affairs publications.

This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute, and is republished with permission.

China’s J-50 blasts by US in race for sixth-gen dominance – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

China’s next-generation cunning fighters are emerging in plain sight, and they might be flying around the still-underdeveloped US ideas.

The J-50, officially referred to as the J-50, has received the clearest look but from recent images from Chinese internet sources, according to The Aviationist, which was released this month.

The largess twin-engine aircraft, which was first seen in December 2024, has a beta flap design, which seems to have made a major advance in Chinese aircraft technology. Diverterless Supersonic Intakes ( DSI), 2D thrust vectoring nozzles, and a twin-nosed tricycle landing gear system are all featured in the most recent photos.

Its possible inclusion of lateral and half weapon bays, as well as a bulge beneath the cockpit that might building an electro-optical sensor, similar to the J-35’s equal, has been noted by observers.

This plane is a part of China’s effort to develop a sixth-generation fighter, but its classification is still ambiguous due to unknown intergenerational requirements.

Its common flight in December 2024, which is in honor of Mao Zedong’s day, highlights a deliberate attempt to make it known as a show of power. Reports suggest that a Chinese Flanker generic serving as a hunt aircraft may have made its debut flight earlier.

The J-50 highlights China’s ambitions to strengthen its position in cutting-edge military aircraft technologies, despite its specific function and capabilities remaining fanciful. No formal remarks have been made, and the operation’s schedule is still unsure.

Thomas Newdick and Tyler Rogoway discuss the J-50’s tailless design with swiveling wingtips in a January 2025 article for The War Zone ( TWZ ) that advances digital flight systems and improve roll and pitch control.

According to Newdick and Rogoway, this development reduces the stability issues inherent in mammal configurations but compromises radar stealth due to the welded surfaces. They claim that the risk of detection is reduced by small expression or locking these controls in journey.

They point out that the mini thrust-vectoring nozzles make for more flexibility, compensating for the design flaws brought on by the heavy weight. The vague ceiling details suggest a potential guarded operation, despite the claim that it is unclear whether the J-50 is a guarded or autonomous plane.

Newdick and Rogoway add that the complex trailing border power schemes used in the J-50 highlight the development’s emphasis on dexterity. They point out that the J-50 reflects courageous trade-offs that favour control superiority despite its diminished small observability.

The J-50 may be able to maneuver more efficiently and maneuverably in close-in engagements thanks to these design features, which will enable it to operate properly within enemy air defense bubbles.

However, John Stillion mentions that aerial combat has changed significantly from close-range dogfighting to engagements beyond visual range ( BVR ), primarily as a result of improvements in sensors, weapons, and communication in a 2015 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment ( CSBA ) report.

According to Stillion, radar-guided and ultraviolet missiles are the only available air-to-air weapons, allowing pilots to strike from hundreds of kilometers away without making physical contact. He points out that maneuvering heat conflict is now seen as dangerous and becoming less and less effective.

In a May 2022 article for 1945, Alex Hollings makes a counterpoint to Stillion’s assertion that even with better technology and situational awareness, nearly 40 % of air activities came within visual spectrum, with some requiring standard dueling tactics.

Hollings makes the claim that close-range engagements can be a result of technological limitations, human error, and chaotic combat settings. He claims that in large-scale conflicts, dogfights are unavoidable due to the sheer volume of aircraft and operational complexity.

He continues, adding that dogfighting skills remain a necessity despite the dominance of stealth and long-range capabilities over strategy.

Along with the J-36, the J-50 might suggest that China is looking to build a high-low force combination for its fighters of the future. In this combination, smaller, less expensive, and more advanced aircraft are paired with smaller, less expensive, and more advanced models.

A high-end fighter with a high-low force mix could be made to penetrate defended enemy airspace, requiring stealth, range, and heavy armament.

In keeping with this, Bill Sweetman mentions in a December 2024 article for The Strategist that the J-36’s all-aspect stealth is achieved by a tailless configuration, unbroken edge lines, and concealed sensor apertures, thereby reducing its radar cross-section.

Sweetman points out that the double-delta wing design of the J-36 makes it possible to perform extended-range missions. Additionally, he claims that the J-36, which comes with three engines, is designed to achieve supersonic cruise without afterburners, increasing efficiency and lowering thermal signatures.

A low-end fighter, in contrast, may be less capable overall and was created to operate in contested airspace rather than through defended airspace. With its purported emphasis on maneuverability for close-in combat, the J-50 may adhere to that philosophy.

China could rely on the fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter, which could be the most expensive fighter in China’s current in-service fighter fleet, with between 200 and 250 units already built as of 2023, because the J-36 and J-50 are still prototypes.

The J-36 and J-50 could put China in the lead over the US in the search for sixth-generation fighters on a strategic level. The US Next-Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) platform, in contrast, is still in the engineering and manufacturing development ( EMD) phase.

Abraham Abrams mentions in a January 2025 Aviation Geek Club article that China’s J-20 stealth fighter advanced from flight demonstrator to front-line service in just six years, as opposed to the US F-22 and F-35, which took 15 to 20 years.

Given China’s industrial and technological advancements since then, according to Abrams, it could easily field a sixth-generation jet years ahead of the US.

In a December 2024 article for The China Academy, Wang Xiangsui mentions that China’s position as the world’s leader in hypersonic wind tunnel testing facilities enables super-precise feedback without having to transport aircraft test models 100 kilometers in altitude, lessens the risk of espionage, increases the maturity of the technology testing equipment, and guarantees fewer losses and greater safety for test pilots.

Wang points out that while US hypersonic wind tunnels like the” Z Machine” can simulate speeds up to Mach 30, they can only do so for 30 milliseconds, making them unsuitable for sustained testing of missiles and aircraft. He points out, in contrast, that China’s JF-22 is engineered for constant operation of up to 130 milliseconds at Mach 30.

A US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from February 2025 highlights the gap in testing technology, which limits US ability to develop hypersonic weapons at the same speed as competitors like China.

According to the report, the US Department of Defense ( DOD ) relies on a patchwork of 48 specialized facilities, many of which are outdated or located in academia, including ground test sites, open-air ranges, and mobile assets.

Additionally, the report mentions that China has more wind tunnels and flight test ranges, some of which can simulate speeds exceeding Mach 20. These are complemented by a stronger hypersonic testing infrastructure.

Indonesia’s Prabowo asleep at the wheel on Trump tariffs – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

JAKARTA – One week since President Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs threw the global economy into turmoil and Indonesia’s government seems to have been caught flat-footed.

Adopting the same conciliatory position as most of ASEAN, the country is looking for a tariff-easing deal. But, with domestic economic policymaking chaotic and the foreign ministry adrift, forming a coherent response may be difficult for Southeast Asia’s biggest economy.

Indonesian stocks dropped more than 9% today (April 8) as trading resumed for the first time since March 27 and recovering after a 30-minute halt. The rupiah fell as much as 1.8% versus the dollar in early trading, closing in on a record low, while bonds also slumped.

There seems no easy way for Indonesia to absorb its Trump-assigned 32% tariff. The apparel and footwear industries will both be hit hard. Nike and Adidas, between them, have about half their labor force stationed in Indonesia. The furniture industry, which exports about half its product to the US, will also likely be driven to the wall.

Comparatively, Indonesia has not taken the hardest direct hit. With a large domestic market, the country’s export-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.5% in 2023. That year, only 9.35% of its exports by value went to America.

Exports of commodities like coal, palm oil and metals go largely to China, Japan, India, and other Asian countries, which make up a large percentage of Indonesia’s total exports.

Compared to Vietnam – which is facing 46% tariffs, has an export-to-GDP ratio of 87.2%, and sent 27.8% of its export’s total value to the US in 2023 – Indonesia’s tariff crisis is less severe.

Still, the challenge should not be underestimated. A global recession, which seems increasingly likely, would depress Indonesia’s crucial commodity exports.

And while Indonesia is not as export-dependent as others, they do play a vital role in earning the dollars it needs to sustain its imports of crucial items, including fuel and food.

“Yes, Indo is less exposed to tariffs,” notes Siwage Dharma Negara, co-coordinator for the Indonesia Studies Program at ISEAS. “But its exports contribute to foreign exchange reserves, which will be depleted quickly. We need to anticipate more pressure on the rupiah. This, in turn, will have an adverse impact on its imports of critical inputs and raw materials.”

Facing this difficult situation, Indonesia has reacted like much of ASEAN by quickly looking for a deal. “We will also open negotiations with America. We will say: ‘We want a good relationship. We want a fair relationship. We want an equal relationship,’” President Prabowo Subianto told journalists April 7 in his first public comments on the matter.

It seems Indonesia is looking to coordinate with Malaysia or perhaps ASEAN writ large, with Prabowo discussing the matter with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who currently is the rotational chair of the bloc.

“Not retaliating is the overall strategy from ASEAN countries, hoping Trump will be willing to make exceptions,” explains Dewi Fortuna Anwar, co-founder of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia.

“Trump is committed to protect the US market, but like the Godfather he’ll likely be more generous to those willing to kiss the ring. As SEA is the epicenter of US-China rivalry, Trump will probably not want to push the region completely into the China orbit. But some kowtowing will be required.”

Trade negotiations could prove tough, though. Trump has signaled resolve to stick to the tariffs despite plunging stock markets and his goals seem quixotic, if not unreachable. Speaking to reporters recently, Trump said he would not strike any deal to cut tariffs unless it also eliminated the US trade deficit with that country.

Meanwhile, Indonesia’s chaotic governance may leave it struggling to deal with the extremely difficult task of managing both the domestic economic fallout and trade negotiations with the US administration.

Notably, Indonesia does not currently have an ambassador in Washington DC and has not had one for two years. Speaking off the record, senior civil servants talk of entrenched dysfunction at the foreign ministry.

Speaking with a now-retired veteran diplomat, this writer commented that Indonesia seemed to have been caught with its pants down on the tariff announcement. “If any pants all,” came the dry reply.

Part of the problem is that President Prabowo fancies himself an international statesman, spending roughly one-third of his first 100 days on marathon trips abroad, mostly to attend summits.

As foreign minister, instead of the veteran diplomat, Prabowo appointed his extremely inexperienced aide Sugiono – a move widely seen as meant to allow Prabowo to dictate foreign policy to a junior who is dependent on him.

The result has been disorganization internally and embarrassing botches externally. Most notably, Indonesia seemed so desperate for new deals with China that it briefly appeared to acknowledge China’s claims to Indonesian territorial waters soon after Prabowo’s inauguration. None of this augurs well for managing Trump.

As for domestic economic policy, Indonesia was starting to struggle economically well before the tariff announcement, in large part due to erratic policymaking.

Structural factors like weakening consumer spending and a rupiah hitting lows last seen during the pandemic have been exacerbated by fears about the government’s populist spending policies.

The government has slashed huge swathes of the state budget to channel money into a school meals program. And a new holding company for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that lacks parliamentary scrutiny and reports to the president has sparked fears of a 1MDB like-scenario.

The result has been foreign capital flight at alarming rates. A market crash in mid-March saw trading briefly suspended on Indonesia’s stock exchange.

Rumors swirl that Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, seen as key to the government’s bids to maintain credibility with markets, and Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto attempted to resign but were turned down.

Both ministers have denied the claims. However, sources with purported knowledge of the requested resignations claim otherwise.

All this bodes ill for dealing with Trump. One way to deal with Trump’s tariffs would be to seek new markets for Indonesia’s exports. Signing a long-delayed trade deal with the European Union and deepening integration with ASEAN would be two quick wins.

Such moves would likely find some of their strongest support in the government from figures like Sri Mulyani and Airlangga – whose standings have apparently been weakened.

Another, perhaps likelier possibility, is that Indonesia will default to its usual highly protectionist instincts – even if this proves self-defeating.

Worries about cheap Chinese imports destroying local manufacturers were already ubiquitous before Trump’s tariff bomb. As tariff-hit Chinese businesses desperately seek markets outside the US, it seems like worries about this – and pressure to block imports – will grow.

Prabowo himself has fundamentally autarchic economic instincts. Coming into office, he declared food and fuel self-sufficiency as top policy priorities.

Speaking on economic issues at international summits, he has often displayed a Trumpian suspicion of trade, suggesting Indonesia is exploited by trade partners and made vulnerable to outside shocks. Trump’s tariffs could seem to Prabowo as confirmation of such views – and push him deeper toward dangerous notions of self-reliance.

Guiltless scorching sky: Balochistan’s unjust climate burden – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 8, 2025

In: Asia

In the vast, rugged expanse of southwestern Pakistan lies Balochistan, a province that stretches across nearly half of the country’s landmass yet remains home to only a fraction of its people.

While global debates on climate change often focus on industrial powerhouses like the US, China, and the European Union, the harsh realities faced by vulnerable regions such as Balochistan remain overlooked.

This arid, mineral-rich region, often overshadowed by political unrest and insurgency, now faces an equally formidable foe: climate change.

The irony is stark—while Balochistan bears the brunt of escalating environmental disasters, Pakistan as a whole contributes almost nothing to the global emissions driving this crisis.

This juxtaposition demands a closer look: How can a province so vulnerable to ecological collapse exist within a nation that leaves such a negligible carbon footprint?

Through a lens of recent developments, hard-hitting data, and critical analysis, it becomes clear that Balochistan’s plight is a microcosm of global inequity, where those least responsible for climate change suffer its harshest consequences.

Balochistan’s geography tells a story of extremes. Covering 44% of Pakistan’s territory, it is a land of towering mountains, sprawling deserts and a coastline along the Arabian Sea.

Yet, despite its size, the province is sparsely populated, with roughly 15 million residents (Projected Population for 2025: approximately 16.9 million), a mere 6% of Pakistan’s 250 million people.

This vastness, coupled with its arid climate, makes it inherently susceptible to environmental shifts. Droughts, once occasional visitors, have become frequent intruders since the turn of the millennium, parching the land and its people. Recent reports underscore this grim reality: water scarcity has intensified, leaving communities on the edge of survival.

Consider the numbers. Since 2000, drought frequency in Balochistan has surged, a trend that aligns with global warming’s exacerbation of dry spells in semi-arid zones. Unlike Punjab, where irrigation canals fed by the Indus River sustain agriculture, Balochistan relies heavily on erratic rainfall and dwindling groundwater.

Studies suggest that over 80% of the province’s water supply comes from sources vulnerable to climate variability—rain, seasonal streams, and aquifers depleted by overuse and under-replenishment.

The result? A province where farming, the backbone of rural livelihoods, teeters on the verge of collapse. In 2022 alone, drought conditions slashed crop yields by nearly 40% in some districts, pushing families into food insecurity and deepening poverty.

Then there’s the heat. Temperatures in Balochistan have climbed steadily, with summer highs now regularly exceeding 50°C (122°F) in areas like Sibi and Turbat. According to the Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) report, 2023 was one of the hottest years on record, with Turbat hitting a scorching 53.7°C.

These scorching conditions amplify evaporation rates, drying out what little water remains. Livestock, another pillar of the local economy, perish in droves during these heatwaves, their carcasses littering a landscape that can no longer sustain them.

A recent news piece highlighted how shepherds in the province lost half their herds in a single season, a loss they can ill afford in a region where development lags far behind the rest of Pakistan.

Balochistan’s vulnerability isn’t just a matter of geography—it’s a consequence of systemic neglect and inadequate adaptation. While the province faces some of the most severe climate impacts in Pakistan, its capacity to respond is crippled by underfunding and weak governance.

A special report from late March 2025 pointed to a glaring disconnect between Balochistan’s water policies and climate realities. Despite the province’s dire need for resilient infrastructure, think rainwater harvesting systems or drought-resistant crops, such initiatives remain woefully underfunded.

The report noted that while Punjab has seen pilot projects for climate-smart agriculture, like drip irrigation boosting water efficiency, Balochistan languishes with outdated methods ill-suited to a warming world.

This disparity is quantifiable. Pakistan’s federal budget allocates a fraction of its climate adaptation funds to Balochistan despite its outsized exposure to environmental risks.

In 2022, when devastating floods swept through the country, Balochistan bore a heavy toll of over 300 lives lost and thousands displaced. Yet, the province received less than 10% of the $10 billion pledged internationally for recovery, with most aid funneled to more populous regions.

Fast forward to 2025, and the pattern persists. Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb recently lamented that only a third of those pledged funds ever materialized, leaving vulnerable areas like Balochistan to fend for themselves.

The human cost is staggering. Women in remote villages trek miles daily to fetch water from shrinking springs, a task made more grueling by rising temperatures and receding resources. Children drop out of school to help their families survive, their futures sacrificed to a crisis they did not create.

Meanwhile, glacier retreat in the northern reaches of Pakistan—a key water source for downstream Balochistan—threatens to unleash new disasters, like outburst floods and landslides.

The government’s launch of a Glacier Conservation Strategy in March 2025 is a step forward, but its focus on northern ecosystems does little for Balochistan’s immediate needs.

Contrast Balochistan’s suffering with Pakistan’s role in the climate change equation, and the injustice deepens. Pakistan is a featherweight in the arena of global emissions, contributing less than 1% of the world’s greenhouse gases.

In 2022, its per capita carbon footprint was a mere 0.9 metric tons, dwarfed by the United States’ 14.9 tons or China’s 8.7 tons. The country’s energy mix leans heavily on natural gas and hydropower, with coal still a smaller player compared to industrial giants.

This low contribution is not a fluke; it is a reflection of Pakistan’s economic reality. Unlike developed nations, where industrialization and consumerism drive emissions, Pakistan’s economy is agrarian and underdeveloped.

Balochistan epitomizes this: its vast mineral wealth—gas, coal, copper, gold—remains largely untapped or exploited by external players, not burned locally to fuel a carbon-intensive lifestyle. For instance, the projects like that of Saindak Metals and Rekodiq in Balochistan merit consideration.

The province’s people live simply, their energy use minimal, their emissions a rounding error in the global ledger. Yet, they pay a disproportionate price for a crisis fueled by distant smokestacks and tailpipes.

The 2025 Climate Risk Index, released by German-watch, ranked Pakistan as the most vulnerable country to climate change in 2022, a position cemented by floods, heatwaves and droughts.

Scientists attribute these erratic patterns to climate change, with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warning that South Asia will face more intense and unpredictable rainfall.

Balochistan’s fragile infrastructure, compounded by decades of underdevelopment, leaves it defenseless against such disasters. The province’s woes are a key driver of that ranking, yet Pakistan’s leaders can not point to their own actions as the cause.

At COP27, the country’s delegation, alongside allies like Bangladesh, fought for a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate nations like theirs, victims of a warming world they didn’t warm. The fund’s creation was a moral victory, but its slow rollout leaves Balochistan waiting, its people drowning in a deluge of consequences they didn’t sow.

Balochistan’s climate vulnerability doesn’t exist in a vacuum: it is tangled with the province’s long-standing political turmoil. The Baloch insurgency, fueled by grievances over resource exploitation and marginalization, has flared anew in 2025, with attacks like the Jaffar Express hijacking in March dominating headlines.

Separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) argue that Pakistan’s central government plunders the province’s riches while leaving its people in squalor. Climate change amplifies this narrative: as droughts and heatwaves devastate livelihoods, resentment festers, turning desperation into militancy.

Lack of focus by the government towards Balochistan’s climate resilience has further exacerbated the situation. Decades of excessive water extraction for agriculture, coupled with minimal recharge, have drained Balochistan’s aquifers.

There are thousands of unchecked tube wells that are extracting water at a lethal and devastating pace. A 2023 study by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) found that Quetta’s water table is dropping by 3 meters annually, risking total depletion within a decade.

The province’s iconic Hanna Lake has shrunk by 40% since 2000, symbolizing the broader ecological collapse. Meanwhile, deforestation, driven by illegal logging, has reduced forest cover to a mere 2.5% of the province, accelerating desertification.

The loss of biodiversity threatens indigenous wildlife, including the endangered Balochistan bears, tigers, ibex’, fox’ and the iconic Chiltan & Takatu markhors.

Balochistan’s predicament is a clarion call for global accountability. If Pakistan contributes next to nothing to climate change, why should its most fragile province suffer so acutely?

The answer lies in the skewed dynamics of a world where industrialized nations, historically responsible for 79% of cumulative emissions, export their ecological debts to places like Balochistan.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that over 60% of Balochistan’s population faces acute water shortages, pushing communities toward poverty and migration. The province’s droughts, heatwaves and water crises are not homegrown; they are the fallout of a global system that thrives on inequity.

Data backs this up. The top 10 emitting countries, led by China and the US, account for over 60% of annual greenhouse gases, while Pakistan’s share hovers below 0.8%. Yet, Balochistan’s climate vulnerability rivals that of small island states facing existential threats from rising seas.

The province’s carbon neutrality, its people emit almost nothing, offers no shield against a warming planet. This mismatch demands a rethink of climate justice, where responsibility aligns with impact, not just emissions.

Pakistan must also look inward. While it can not control global emissions, it can bolster Balochistan’s resilience. The government’s climate rhetoric, think “climate-smart policies” and glacier strategies, needs teeth.

Redirecting funds to water harvesting, solar-powered irrigation and reforestation could blunt the edge of drought and heat. Engaging Balochistan youth in these efforts, rather than letting them drift toward militancy, could turn a liability into an asset. Recent field trials in Punjab show promise—why not replicate them in Balochistan?

Globally, the Loss and Damage Fund must move from promise to practice, delivering aid to places like Balochistan before they’re lost to desertification or conflict.

Wealthy nations owe it to regions bearing their burden; Pakistan’s $10 billion flood pledge should be a floor, not a ceiling. Without this, Balochistan risks becoming a cautionary tale: a land punished for a crime it did not commit, in a nation that can not afford to save it.

The polluter pays principle demands that the industrialized nations must compensate vulnerable regions. However, climate financing remains inadequate. The $100 billion per year pledge by developed nations (2009 Copenhagen Accord) has never been fully met.

So far, Pakistan has just received $3.5 billion in climate aid since 2015—peanuts compared to its losses. As per the principle, global reparation is the need of the hour.

The US, EU and China must increase climate funding to vulnerable nations and regions like Balochistan. The Pakistani province needs drought-resistant crops, solar-powered desalination plants and reforestation programs. Also, Pakistan should prioritize climate-resilient infrastructure in Balochistan, not just urban centers.

For the sake of argument, Balochistan stands at a precipice, its vulnerability to climate change a stark reminder of nature’s indifference to human borders. Droughts parch its soil, heat scorches its people and water slips through its fingers—all while Pakistan’s contribution to the crisis remains at a statistical blip.

The province’s 15 million residents, living on the edge of survival, embody a profound injustice – they suffer not for their own actions, but for the excesses of a world far beyond their reach. Recent news, from funding shortfalls to the rise of insurgency, only sharpens this truth.

This is not just Balochistan’s story; it’s a global one. As long as the nations most responsible for climate change shirk their duties, provinces like Balochistan will pay the price.

Pakistan’s negligible emissions do not absolve the world of its obligations, nor do they spare Balochistan its fate. Action, both local and global, is the only antidote to a crisis that threatens to swallow a region whole.

Without it, Balochistan’s cries will echo unanswered, a testament to a world that failed to balance the scales.

China-led anti-US tariff pact bruited as Trump 50% deadline looms – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: April 7, 2025

In: Asia

After US President Donald Trump threatened to impose an additional 50 % tariff on Chinese goods on April 9 if China didn’t meet his deadline and retracted its announced 34 % on American products by April 8, tensions between Beijing and Washington grew.

Trump said in a blog on his Truth Social bill on Monday that “if China does not remove its 34 % improve above their now long-term buying abuses by tomorrow, April 8, 2025, the US will impose more tariffs on China of 50 %, effective April 9”. Also, all discussions with China regarding their scheduled meetings with us will be ended!

Trump claimed in another article that China is the biggest state that evades tariffs. He criticized China for increasing its “long-term ridiculously high tariffs” by 34 % for American goods, as well as for failing to honor his warning to abusing nations to avoid retaliation.

Trump stated on April 2 that the US would establish a 34 % tax on Chinese goods, a similar tax having been applied to goods from China for the past few years. His mathematics is undoubtedly questionable. Trump has increased US tariffs on Chinese goods by 54 % since he stepped down as president on January 20 in addition to the 20 % tariff that was announced in February and March.

On April 4 night, China announced 11 punitive measures, including a 34 % tax on all British goods, sanctions against 11 US businesses, and rare earth export controls to the US.

A round-table discussion with representatives of more than 20 US companies, including Tesla, from China’s Ministry of Commerce on Monday urged them to “make moral voices and take rational actions to simultaneously maintain the stability of international production and supply chains and promote win-win assistance.”

Beijing also urged nations affected by Trump’s mutual taxes to unite and combat US unilateralism.

In a press briefing on Monday, Lin Jian, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that the United States ‘ arbitrary imposition of tariffs amounts to denying all nations, especially those in the Global South, their right to growth.

According to World Trade Organization data analysis, the US price increase will widen the gap between rich and poor countries, with less developed nations suffering a more considerable impact, according to he said. This is a typical example of economic bullying, isolationism, and unilateralism.

” Countries should uphold the rule of extensive discussion, joint commitment, and shared benefits, adhere to genuine globalism, jointly oppose all forms of unilateralism and protectionism, protect the international system with its core at the UN, and prevent the multilateral trading system with its core,” the WTO stated.

Lin’s remarks came as Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index, the benchmark stock market benchmark for the country, dropped 3, 021 points, or 13.2 %, to close at 19, 828 on Monday. Hong Kong experienced its biggest single-day decline since 1997.

On Monday, the Shanghai Composite index, the weighted index on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, dropped 245 points or 7.34 % to 3,096, while the Taiex, the weighted index, dropped 2 065 points or 9.8 % to 19, 232.

Within two days of Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs” announcement on April 2, the Dow Jones Index dropped 4, 010 points, or 9.4 %, to 38, 274.

Trump said on Sunday,” I don’t want anything to go down, but sometimes you have to take medicine to fix something,” when asked by a journalist to comment on the “pain threshold” and the decline in the US stock market.

He added that nations in Europe and Asia were “dying to make a deal” with the US.

Countries like Vietnam and Israel have vowed to revoke all tariffs that have been imposed on American goods since April 2. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, stated on Monday that the EU had offered the US a “zero-for-zero” deal to end tariffs on all industrial goods as part of the trade negotiations. &nbsp,

” Forming an alliance”

Chinese commentators also urged “victims of Trump’s tariffs” to come together and jointly reveal strong countermeasures.

” It’s true that some nations are attempting to reach a compromise with the US by imposing zero-for-zero tariffs. However, this is a foolish decision, according to Chinese economist Pan Helin in a piece. ” Zero-for-zero tariffs won’t help to reduce the United States ‘ trade deficit. The US only desires that the businesses in the countries cited relocate to America.

If the US still wants to confront China, Pan claims that China must form and lead an anti-US alliance to force the US to leave the world’s trade system.

According to Xiao Zhifu, a researcher at the Kunlunce Institute, a Chinese think tank, Trump’s tariffs appear unorganized but are actually precise attacks on China.

” The US saw its trade deficit significantly increase by 14 % to US$ 1.21 trillion in 2024. He claims that China came in first place in terms of trade surplus with the US, behind the EU and Mexico. Trump wants to earn$ 600 billion from the new tariffs, about a quarter of which will be imported from China.

He asserts that Beijing must form an alliance with as many nations as possible in order to combat the US, despite the fact that it’s unlikely that Washington will ease tariffs on China.

China can ally itself with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization members and the BRICS countries in opposition to Trump’s tariffs, claims Zhou Xiaoming, a Guancha.cn columnist. He asserts that China should strengthen trade ties with Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India. &nbsp,

‘ Map cannon ‘ versus’bathrooms’

Trump already imposed an average 20 % tariff on all Chinese goods during his first US-China trade war, which he started in 2018. Many Chinese manufacturers were forced to relocate their manufacturing facilities to Southeast Asian nations and Mexico, or to ship their goods from outside the US to the country via third countries.

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission ( USCC), an independent body of the US government, stated in a report to the Congress in November 2023 that” a growing number of suppliers in overseas markets are owned by Chinese entities who also seek to evade trade restrictions by setting up facilities overseas, particularly in other parts of Asia and Mexico. ” US exposure to China also increased as a result of transshipping goods through third countries.”

Chinese companies have successfully lowered the negative effects of the US trade war in 2018 on them by setting up “bathing bases” overseas to assemble their semi-finished goods or putting” Made in Vietnam” labels on them and re-export them to the US, according to Chinese media and commentators.

Trump introduced the “reciprocal tariffs” ( regional attacks ) in response to this, according to the Hong Kong media, on 180 nations, including some uninhabited volcanic islands close to Antarctica. &nbsp,

The term” Map cannon” refers to a situation in video games where a player strikes an enemy repeatedly within a given area of a map. Additionally, it is a slang term used to slam a netizen’s careless comments that stereotype a community.

The latest tariffs, according to Hong Kong newspapers, hit Washington’s military allies, including the EU and the UK ( 10 % ), technology partners, such as Japan ( 24 % ), South Korea ( 25 % ), and Taiwan ( 32 % ), as well as manufacturing goods suppliers, such as Cambodia ( 49 % ), Vietnam ( 46 % ), Thailand ( 36 % ), India ( 26 % ), Sri Lanka ( 44 % ), and Pakistan ( 29 % ).

Yong Jian contributes to the Asia Times. He is a journalist from China who has a focus on Chinese politics, technology, and politics. &nbsp,

Read: China claims to be prepared and able to fight Trump’s trade war.

Bolen C (Page 14)

Buddhist people and genocidity

retreats for prayer

Men and women’s ordination

Threading the strategic needle

Here comes China

What about those bad guys?

What happened next?

Now what?

Means what?

Interference dressed as control

Korea’s much history as a sovereign state

Not a status, but a culture

Korea’s independence was overshadowed by China’s.

Traditional revisionism as a coercive device

Autonomy cannot be renegotiated.

Turmoil and murder

Personal military organizations

Reintegration

” Forming an alliance”

‘ Map cannon ‘ versus’bathrooms’