Troubled automaker Nissan has a new CEO – but can he do the job? – Asia Times

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Nissan faces a challenging road ahead, including questions about whether its mostly non-automotive board of directors is even remotely qualified to lead the disturbed automaker and whether its new CEO, Ivan Espinosa, is capable of leading the troubled automaker.

As things stand now, a week after the 46-year-old professional actually replaced Makoto Uchida, much is still known about Espinosa other than that he is Mexican-born, one of the youngest CEOs in Chinese vehicle business background, the second-youngest stranger, and worked in product preparing for most of his career at Nissan including the last eight years in Japan.

He appeared friendly and talented in a late-March meeting with Automotive News, but his begin didn’t much help. To job, he uses a Z-car. He’s married with two children, plays tennis and golf, but gave little indication about what his duties were as chief preparing officer, a position he held between April 2024 and April 2025, or why Nissan’s post-Carlos Ghosn restructuring program, Nissan NEXT, failed but significantly.

When Uchida made the announcement in May 2000, he had fiscal 2023 goals for a 5 % operating profit margin, a 6 % global market share, and 4.3 million in global revenue.

Additionally, he established a million electrical and electric vehicle revenue goal.

One year after the program ended, Nissan’s operating&nbsp, profit margin through December had fallen to 0.5 %. Global market share decreased below 4 %. In historical terms, the global market share for Carlos Ghos n’s final full year at Nissan stood at 6.2 % in fiscal 2017.

While Nissan succeeded in cutting manufacturing capability by to 5.4 million products, it failed drastically, by more than a million units, to reach its sales goal. Utilization at the Fiscal plant in 2024 was 60 %, not the goal’s goal of 80 %.

Only one of Nissan’s 15 major crops was operating at 80 % of capacity in governmental 2023, the last year of the Nissan NEXT program, according to former Tokyo scientist Koji Endo.

It is not clear what part Espinosa played in the unsuccessful restructuring program — Ashwani Gupta, Nissan’s past COO, served equally as general planning officer — but his titles since 2017 as a top executive in Nissan’s international product strategy and product planning division indicate that he would have been involved.

One former Nissan executive who has followed Espinosa’s career said,” It’s not clear whether he’s been blocked by others in the organization.” However, it is obvious that he failed to deliver.

Gupta would be caught up in a scandal reportedly involving a female employee and forced to resign in June 2023.

Other important members of the restructuring team are being fired. Asako Hoshino, Kunio Nakaguro, and Hideyuki Sakamoto are just a few of them. Hoshino was Nissan’s chief brand and customer officer, a position she has held since April 2020. Sakamoto was the chief monozukuri ( roughly, manufacturing and supply chain ), and Nagoro was the chief technology officer. &nbsp,

Nakaguro and Sakamoto joined the executive committee with Hoshino in June 2019. In charge of manufacturing and supply chain management, Sakamoto was elevated in 2020 to the board.

People who know the trio have been extremely critical of their performance, despite the automaker’s insistence that they are to blame for Nissan’s failures in the marketplace.

Uchida and Sakamoto will formally leave the board at the automaker’s June general shareholders meeting on June 20 to be replaced by Espinosa and some still-to-be-disclosed others.

Who might take Sakamoto’s place on Nissan’s board is still a mystery. According to rumors, Guillaume Cartier, Nissan’s newly appointed chief performance officer, will be one of those chosen to fill a board vacancy. Others, given Nissan’s weak performance globally, will be more difficult to choose.

Can the new team recover from five years of lost time?

Carlos Ghosn. Photo: ABC News

Nissan’s global market share for fiscal 2018 was 6.0 % on yearly sales of 5.5 million units, the year Carlos Ghosn was removed from management and imprisoned in November.

Since then, sales have decreased to 3.2 million and market share has fallen to less than 4 %, with the US, China, and Europe all experiencing significant volume and share losses.

” They’ve had five to six years to fix the problem”, said Chris Richter, managing director in Tokyo at CLSA.

” They can’t say that Carlos Ghosn is to blame for the problems we have today. Too long has passed.

Meanwhile, the three largest credit rating agencies — Fitch, Moody’s and S&amp, P Global — have downgraded Nissan’s credit rating to junk status. &nbsp,

S&P Global Ratings dropped its long-term credit rating for Nissan to’BB’ on March 7, falling short of every major automaker outside of China, including Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi Motors, Hyundai, Kia, General Motors, Ford, Stellantis, BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen, and Renault. Toyota received an A rating, Honda, Hyundai and Kia A-, Mitsubishi Motors and Renault BB .

” Prospects for a quick improvement in Nissan’s automotive business are now unknown,” S&amp, P Global, said. Our assessment of the company’s creditworthiness may continue to decline as a challenging operating environment prevents the company’s profitability improvement and free cash flow losses.

” We expect it will take about two years before Nissan can reap the full cost-savings from restructuring. From fiscal 2025 to fiscal 2026, the 400 billion yen cost reduction measures will be in effect. In fiscal 2026, some plant closures and job cuts will be made.

S&amp, P Global&nbsp, expects the competitive environment to remain challenging, costs from inflation to rise. It anticipates pressure on profitability as EV sales rise. Even if cost reduction initiatives are carried out as planned, we do not anticipate the company’s EBITDA margin to increase to 6 % in the next one to two years.

The forecast did not include the impact of US tariffs on Nissan’s Mexican holdings, where the automaker operates two vehicle plants and a large transmission plant.

It did account for the additional$ 5 billion in debt due in 2026.

Could Honda still be a business partner? Not likely, according to our sources. Although discussions between the two automakers were widely reported in December, there was never a feasible way to implement a merger without Nissan shutting down factories and production lines. Their model lineups are overly duplicative, in my opinion. &nbsp,

With only two auto executives on its 12-member board, Nissan has had to have two auto executives. There is also a large gap between the management groups ‘ compositions. Six Honda employees work for Honda on average for 37 years. One of Honda’s outside directors is a former public prosecutor. &nbsp,

They might be able to work together on electric cars, where both are trailing behind industry rivals. Or there might be small projects such as joint truck production in Mississippi and Alabama, where both have assembly plants.

Integrating their global operations is a non-starter because both are virtual non-players in Europe and both are experiencing sales declines in China over the past five years.

We are unsure what a merger of Honda and Nissan would accomplish because both companies appear to be sinking ships, warns Richter. We do not see scale as the solution to their problems in China.”

Given the steep decline in both manufacturers ‘ sales volumes, we wonder if Honda and Nissan might be among the first to consider folding the company in the towel.

On paper, Nissan’s new management team appears to be more effective than it was in the past. Then again, none of them are Carlos Ghosn. None, in fact, have had success in any marketplace. &nbsp,

Christian Meunier, &nbsp, who&nbsp, quit Nissan in April 2019 and was part of the brain drain leaving Nissan after Ghos n’s ouster, joined Jeep as president and CEO of the brand in May 2019. Jeep sales in the US had dropped 30 % by the time he left, in October 2023. In 2024, they dropped another 9 %.

Meunier rejoined Nissan as chairperson of the management committee for the Americas in January. If US President Donald Trump does not reverse his decision to impose 25 % tariffs on Mexican and other foreign-built vehicles, including Japanese ones, there can be no benefit to the automaker’s business. &nbsp,

Of Nissan’s fiscal 2024 sales total in the US, more than 40 % – an estimated 413, 500 units– were imports, two-thirds from Mexico. Sentras, Versas, and Kicks were the most common compact and subcompact vehicles made in Mexico. They will require a lot of time and money to move them to the US.

Nissan earlier had announced plans to cut 9, 000 jobs from its global workforce, including 2, 000 in the US. According to media reports, those plans have now been put off. Additionally, it is unclear how tariffs might affect the timing of Nissan’s new and updated model lineup, which was unveiled in late March.

Jérémie Papin, who became the executive committee’s chief financial officer, was in charge of the US market crash in terms of sales and market share. Nissan’s share in the North American market was 6.9 %, and in the US market, 6.2 %, when Papin was appointed president of Nissan North America Inc. and chairperson of the management committee for the Americas. &nbsp,

Stephen Ma, who will lead Nissan’s China unit, previously held the position of CFO at Dongfeng Motor Corporation, but has little marketing or sales experience.

And Espinosa does not have any practical experience, according to his critics. And there is no one on Nissan’s board who has. &nbsp,

Espinosa wasn’t chosen to succeed Uchida, according to Shukan Diamond, a weekly business magazine, and his nomination was split by the Nissan’s nomination panel.

METI Car Company: Is Nissan’s non-automotive board up to the task?

Nissan might not have any solutions if not for an outside automaker with big pockets that steps in and takes control. This is simpler to say than to do, and it is thought to be one of the reasons Honda backed out of a proposed merger in February.

Talks with Foxconn, reportedly another potential partner, should only be taken seriously if Nissan is making a full-throated move into electric vehicles ( it can’t ) or if it wants to bring back Jun Seki in some capacity. &nbsp,

On November 1, 2019, Nissan announced that Makoto Uchida would lead the company, and Ashwani Gupta would become its CEO. The automaker also named Seki as its deputy COO. Seki left Nissan in December as the odd man out in the post-Carlos Ghosn board restructuring. He is currently 64 years old and head of Hon Hai Technology Group, a Taiwanese electronics company.

There is only one major media article about Nissan’s board, which voted unanimously to promote Uchida in October 2019 and then, with many of the same members, voted unanimously to elevate Espinosa, a largely untested executive, in March of this year, in spite of all the reporting about Uchida’s firing and Ivan Espinosa’s hiring. &nbsp,

If the article in Shukan Diamond is accurate, Nissan’s board is split on how to proceed, including whether to try to form a Honda subsidiary. Yasushi Kimura, a retired executive in the energy sector, is one of at least three directors who appear willing to take the action.

Roger Schreffler is a veteran Japan automotive writer and a former president of the Foreign Correspondents ‘ Club of Japan.

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Big question: Can China or the US endure greater trade war pain? – Asia Times

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China continues to fight back against US tariffs, challenging the US to start a complete trade war that was stagnate both of its economies. Which country may experience greater pain, in your opinion?

Contrary to the US, China does not face elections from the president or completely property markets. This enables Beijing to endure months or years of constant pressure, making socioeconomic difficulties the result of American hostility.

In contrast, President Donald Trump’s guidelines could receive probable local support.

China is making a strategic move to protect itself, putting a bet on the US’s unpreparedness for a serious business issue that threatens international commerce. Beijing anticipates that America will struggle to deal with a potential business collapse, rising prices, and recession, which will weaken Trump’s most important technique against China, which is financial decoupling.

The Taiwanese economy is” an sea, not a lake,” according to President Xi Jinping. Premier Li Qiang also asserted that China is prepared to weather the trade war and won’t fall prey to US taxes during a conference with EU President Ursula von der Leyen.

China has been working on a subtle plan B for years that resembles North Korea’s self-sufficiency model. Stopping imports of US soybeans or maize, which are important creature supply, is a part of this strategy, which includes demonstrating willingness to avoid these commodities, at least partially, that some US strategists deemed crucial for China.

complicated web

Additionally, the political landscape is complex. Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict is reportedly being strained by China’s sending of individuals, which could complicate any possible partnerships between President Vladimir Putin and the US.

Because its soldiers haven’t seen combat in 45 years, China’s role in Ukraine gives them valuable combat experience.

Because of political efforts, these tough decisions come with a variety of options. Trump could benefit from an Iranian nuclear deal, which would give him a diplomatic advantage, though one that might strain his ties with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who might reject any deal with Tehran.

China presents a défendable place on a global scale. Although tariffs are a response to the country’s trade surplus, Beijing has taken the lead in terms of international perceptions as a result of the US’s extreme tariff policies, which have changed that perception.

Given Putin’s reticence for peace, what are the crucial issues still to be resolved: Is the US willing to support Ukraine? Does China be resisted by an inflationary crisis? Does the US have a long-term plan for navigating this complex geopolitical landscape, which includes both economic and military conflicts, aside from business?

Without preparation, the US could suffer possible disgrace and unexpected consequences, necessitating a prompt reassessment of its position on China.

A chaotic outcome is good if Trump is never prepared. If he is, the ground will be set for a protracted and difficult deal cold war.

China has unwavering policies, but is the West prepared? What course of action does the US intend to take? Was Trump prepared for a shootout, simply carrying a carrot?

Home patterns

This political chess match features important home dynamics. My 30- to 40-year profession, if I had been an assistant to Xi Jinping, may have taught me two points: to defend my place and to second-guess my better.

Also, the group method essentially favors intellectual bias: supporting too far left with a traditional Leninist and anti-American strategy results in few or no penalties.

Leaning too far to the right, with democratic and pro-American perspectives, on the other hand, has risks because it conflicts with the party’s intellectual adversary, the Western capitalist system.

What guidance may I give the Chinese president regarding how to deal with a near-confrontation with the US? Suggesting gentle, right-leaning alternatives carries many risks. In contrast, putting forth difficult, left-leaning solutions may offer a number of advantages.

If my right-leaning plan were to be put to the test, it would be deemed a failure because it posed a threat to my job and was later adopted. In contrast, a left-leaning proposal could also show strength and tenacity for the nation if it were to fail.

An assistant is more likely to recommend robust measures and left-leaning suggestions in these circumstances as opposed to soft ones.

Additionally, if I were in the lower echelons and my communist guidance was successful, I may say credit. If it failed and Xi was in trouble as a result of internal criticism, it does offer the chance to reshape power dynamics.

Mafia economy

Trump has been accused of using a “mob manager” strategy in world markets, according to Gideon Rachman, according to Gideon Rachman. Trump, a bourgeois, was elected with the aid of tycoons who paraded at his opening, in contrast to the crowd manager, who lacks an unruly Congress, an independent press, an independent judiciary, and votes.

The royal mafia struggled to reintegrate into a bourgeois completely market system. Its main strategy involves dividing the place, levying taxes on firms, and imposing royal rules on a market-based program. When a business expands, place and taxes does become burdens rather than producing substantial profits. Capitalists are often tempted to cut corners, part the business, and become aristocratic lords, but capitalism works better than feudalism.

America’s problem lies in having much held the reins of the capitalist system and been in charge of all financial activities. Without adequate tenacity and perseverance in an attempt to cut corners and reform the market, one could lose widespread power and have it transferred to another fingers, like China’s.

As an alternative to SWIFT, China recently introduced a new economic transfer system with nations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Re-industrialization and managing loan are the genuine problems facing America. Although some taxes does have a purpose, a general requirement that nations negotiate with the US is misplaced because businesses operate autonomously of any bourgeois world’s power.

The strength of Wall Street is good for the US unless a would-be expert misinterprets the industry. The US has the authority to impose a significant financial and commercial reform, but it also needs a strategy to avoid going through discomfort for a while. Without it, we might be in the dark when the ancient order is no longer in effect but the novel is also possible.

Francesco Sisci, an Italian researcher and political commentator with over 30 years of practice in China and Asia, is the director of the Appia Institute, which was the source of this article’s original publication. With agreement, it can be republished.

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Lack of trust looms over high-stakes Iran-US nuclear negotiations – Asia Times

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The US and Iran’s prepared discussions in Oman come as a significant development, especially given their history of distrust and hostility that has characterized their interactions.

Whether the discussions about Iran’s nuclear capability creation will be direct or indirect will be in the air. Steve Witkoff, the US’s Middle East minister, may meet with Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, according to the US. If the discussions fail, Donald Trump has made it known that Iran will be in “great harm.”

Iran has in the past stated that discussions may be conducted through an entity. It is” because many an opportunity as a analyze,” aghchi said. The game is in America’s hands.

Even with the risk of US or Israeli military activity hovering over Iran, this apparent conflict in messaging before the deals have also begun is not the best sign of their success. On April 8, members from Iran, China, and Russia reportedly met in Moscow.

China’s foreign ministry reiterated to the world that the US was the one who unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear package or joint comprehensive plan of action and” caused the current condition.” It emphasized the need for Washington to” present political honesty, work in the nature of mutual regard, engage in dialogue and conversation, and put a stop to the threat of force and maximum stress.”

This was in response to messages from Washington that were largely focused on the possibility of power and maximum pressure. Trump addressed the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons in a press conference after meeting with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying:” If the discussions aren’t successful, I really think it will be a very bad time for Iran if that’s the case.”

The US government’s frequently debated transactional approach to politics, as represented by Witkoff, a former real estate developer, is likely to have a significant impact on how discussions turn out. Trump’s Middle Eastern political goals include extending the Abraham Accords. Those deals aimed to restore normalcy between Israel and several Muslim nations, including the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

The drafting of the treaties in 2020 was viewed as a significant accomplishment of Trump’s first administration’s foreign coverage, particularly in light of America’s commitment to halt Iran in the region.

Saudi Arabia is currently being constantly incorporated by the US. In that regard, acknowledging that local geopolitics would undergo a radical change as a result of Riyadh’s participation. Trump also intends to use significant investment initiatives and trade agreements to make financial dependencies that promote diplomatic normalization.

Iran, on the other hand, is having serious financial issues. High inflation, a degrading currency, and widespread poverty are the hallmarks of the nation’s current crisis-ridden economy. These circumstances have been made worse by private policy failures and foreign sanctions. In consequence, Iran is in desperate need of monetary compromises, which could be a major source of liquidity for the US.

Over the past 18 times, Tehran’s political influence has significantly decreased. In addition to the demise of crucial allies and leaders in organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, military setbacks in 2024 have weakened Iran’s ability to assert its position in its area.

Iran’s negotiating position will be affected by this weakened place. Instead of pursuing intense policies, it might increase the likelihood that Iran’s negotiators will seek financial assistance and diplomatic solutions. However, if concessions are not forthcoming, force from hardliners within Iran may lead to a more dramatic strategy.

Rocky street awaits you.

The lower level of trust between the two events is a major factor in the discussions. Relations between the United States and the Gaza turmoil have become more disturbed, including Trump’s controversial plan to clear the area of Palestinian territory to allow for a potential redevelopment. The new US attack on Yemen’s Houthi separatists, supported by Iran, has done the same.

Iran is likely to view additional threats of this kind as being aggressive and aggressive, and Trump’s most recent rhetoric didn’t have helped. This may unavoidably lower the likelihood of trust between the parties.

Iranian parliamentarians are interested in the prospect of nuclear talks with the US, according to https ://www.youtube .com/embed/62hN3E5ZCwA ?wmode=transparent&amp ,start=0.

Iran’s suspicion is a result of past events where financial aid vows were broken. Trump’s decision to withdraw from the US atomic deal from 2015 in 2018 serves as an illustration. Iran has grown hesitant to enter new treaties without receiving specific assurances as a result of this perceived breach of trust.

The talks are given a new layer of complexity thanks to the local perspective. The actions of Israel in Gaza are likely to be hampered by American aid. The populations of the majority of the Gulf states are firmly in favor of Arab self-determination, and they are scandalized by the US president’s apparent approval of Israel’s resumption of warfare.

Iran’s approach to the discussions is likely to be heavily influenced by its domestic politics. The “hardliners,” spearheaded by high chief Ali Khamenei, and the “reformists,” who are comparatively more diplomatic toward the US and Europe, are at a major political polarization in the nation. Hopes that Iran may be open to negotiations with Washington immediately faltered after last year’s surprise election of liberal Masoud Pezeshkian when he realigned his place to correspond with Khamenei’s immediately faltered.

The hardliner-dominated congress forced Pezeshkian to remove two significant reformists from the government in March 2025, including the vice-president Mohammad Javad Zarif and the market minister Abdolnaser Hemmati. This partisan politicking will make it more difficult for Iran to make a united front of the table in negotiations, which could be a significant boon for the US. However, it also strengthens the desire of hardliners to demand things that the US finds unacceptable.

Loughborough University professor of Middle Eastern and foreign relations Ali Bilgic.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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Trump’s tariffs won’t ever restore US manufacturing glory – Asia Times

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The “Liberation Day” tariffs announced by US president Donald Trump have one thing in common – they are being applied to goods only.

Trade in services between the US and its partners is not affected. This is the perfect example of Trump’s peculiar focus on trade in goods and, by extension, his nostalgic but outdated obsession with manufacturing.

The fallout from Liberation Day continues, with markets down around the world. The decision to apply tariffs on a country-by-country basis means that rules about where a product is deemed to come from are now of central importance.

The stakes for getting it wrong could be high. Trump has threatened that anyone seeking to avoid tariffs by shifting the supposed origin of a product to a country with lower rates could face a ten-year jail term.

The White House initially refused to specify how it came up with the tariff levels. But it appears that each country’s rate was arrived at by taking the US goods trade deficit with that country, dividing it by the value of that country’s goods exports to the US and then halving it, with 10% set as the minimum.

It has been noted that this is effectively the approach suggested by AI platforms like ChatGPT, Claude and Grok when asked how to create “an even playing field.”

Economically, Trump’s fixation on goods makes no sense. This view is not unique to the president (though he feels it unusually strongly). There is a broader fetishization of manufacturing in many countries. One theory is that it is potentially ingrained in human thinking by pre-historic experiences of finding food, fuel and shelter dominating all other activities.

But for Trump, the thinking is likely related to a combination of nostalgia for a bygone (somewhat imagined) age of manufacturing and concern over the loss of quality jobs that provide a solid standard of living for blue-collar workers – a core part of his political base.

Nostalgia is not a sensible basis for forming economic policy. But the role emotions play in international affairs has been receiving more attention. It has been identified as an “emotional turn” (where the importance of emotion is recognised) in the discipline of international relations.

Of course, that’s not to say that the concern over jobs and the unequal effects of globalzsation is misplaced. It is clear that blue-collar workers have suffered in the US (and elsewhere) for the last 40 to 50 years, with governments paying little attention to the decline.

Man in a cowboy hat holding a sign saying 'UAW on strike'.
Many blue-collar workers, like these GM car plant employees in Missouri, have paid a high price for globalisation. Jon Rehg/Shutterstock

Data on weekly earnings in the US split by educational level show that wages for those without a degree have declined or stagnated since around 1973, particularly among men. This is the cohort that disproportionately voted for Trump. Globalization has created many benefits, not least to the United States, but these tend to be concentrated among the better educated.

All too often, the service-sector jobs that have filled the gap left by declining manufacturing have been precarious. That means low wages, low security, lack of union representation and few opportunities for moving up the ladder. It is unsurprising that there has been a backlash.

Can’t turn back the clock

So will Trump’s tariffs plan address this? The great tragedy is that there is little reason to think that they will.

The loss of manufacturing jobs is partly about globalisation, which Trump is seeking to reverse. But research shows that trade and globalisation are often more of a scapegoat than a driving force, responsible for only a small chunk of job losses (typically said to be about 10%).

The main cause of manufacturing’s decline is rising productivity. Today it simply requires fewer people to make goods due to the relentless increase in automation and the associated rise in how much each worker produces.

If the whole US trade deficit were rebalanced through expanding domestic industries, this would increase the share of manufacturing employment within the US by about one percentage point, from about 8% today to 9% according to US Bureau of Labor Statistics figures. This is not going to be transformative.

The effects of tariffs are also double-edged. They will probably shift some manufacturing back to the US – but this could be self-defeating. More US steel production is good for workers, but the higher cost of US steel feeds through to higher prices for the products manufactured with it.

This includes the cars Trump obsesses about. Less competitive prices means lower exports and a loss of jobs.

The 1950s were a unique time. By the end of the Second World War, the US was a manufacturing powerhouse, accounting for one-third of the world’s exports while taking only around a tenth of its imports.

There were few other industrialised countries at the time, and these had been flattened by the war. The US alone had avoided this, creating a world of massive demand for US exports since nowhere else had a significant manufacturing base. That was never going to last forever.

The other point about that time in history is that the economic system had been shaped by colonialism. European powers had used their position of power to prevent the rest of the world from industrialising. As those empires were dismantled and the shackles came off, those newly independent countries began their own processes of industrialization.

As for the US today, President Trump is mistaken if he really believes that tariffs will bring a new golden age of manufacturing. The world has changed.

James Scott is reader in international politics, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Neither US nor China ready for once-in-a-lifetime trade war – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s trade war with China is producing one of the most tantalizing split screens in the history of global economics.

On one, the US president is going full bore against China and threatening a 104% tariff. This includes Vice President JD Vance dismissing the 1.4 billion-plus people generating the gross domestic product of Asia’s biggest economy as “Chinese peasants.”

On the other is Trump’s apparent willingness to talk to Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and other nations cowering in fear over reciprocal tariffs.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba rushed key economic ministers, including Finance Minister Katsunobu Kato, to Washington to try to talk Trump out of tariffs sure to deal a huge blow to Japan’s export-heavy economy. 

As US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News, “Japan is a very important military ally. They’re a very important economic ally, and the US has a lot of history with them. So I would expect that Japan is going to get priority just because they came forward very quickly.”

South Korea is doing the same. On Tuesday, Korea’s acting President Han Duck-soo said he and Trump had a “great call” about tariffs — Trump slapped a 25% tax on Seoul — and potential deals in energy and shipbuilding.

“We have the confines and probability of a great deal for both countries,” Han says. On social media, Trump said, “things are looking good.”

Trouble is, these two split-screen dramas will collide in short order as the “Tariff Man” attempts to knock China, the center of Asian trade, off its economic axis.

At least one thing seems certain: the odds of a giant US-China “grand bargain” trade deal are falling even faster than Trump’s approval rating.

Trump threatening to add another 50% to China’s already crushing 54% tariff level is the last thing Asia needs.

So far, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is pushing back against the Trumpian onslaught. Along with responding in kind to Trump adding a 34% tariff to the earlier 20% — imposing a 34% tax on US goods — Xi is signaling there will be no backing down.

Xi’s China is calling Trump’s bluff in ways Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Green clearly didn’t expect. And upping the odds that a clash of the titans in Washington and Beijing might lay waste to the global financial system.

Here, the US should be careful about what it wishes for. Neither nation is as ready for this economic brawl as their respective policymakers seem to project.

A Fitch Ratings downgrade last week reminded investors that China isn’t in a state-of-the-art financial position. Fitch downgraded China’s sovereign rating to ‘A’ from ‘A+’ amid concerns about shaky public finances.

“The downgrade reflects our expectations of a continued weakening of China’s public finances and a rapidly rising public debt trajectory during the country’s economic transition,” says Fitch analyst Jeremy Zook.

Zook adds that “in our view, sustained fiscal stimulus will be deployed to support growth, amid subdued domestic demand, rising tariffs and deflationary pressures. This support, along with a structural erosion in the revenue base, will likely keep fiscal deficits high.”

At the same time, Zook notes, “we expect the government debt/GDP to continue its sharp upward trend over the next few years, driven by these high deficits, ongoing crystallization of contingent liabilities and subdued nominal GDP growth.”

In other words, China has fiscal space to protect its 5% growth. But it’s not unlimited and deploying the stimulus “bazooka” yet again could come at a high cost in the long run.

The US, meanwhile, is carrying a US$36 trillion-plus national debt into this fight as recession talk heats up. Even worse is the self-inflicted nature of the US reckoning to come, one punctuated by a $10 trillion stock market loss so far.

As Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, notes, it “feels like we’re being pushed into recession – it’s recession by design.”

Hedge fund manager Bill Ackman, meanwhile, warns of a self-inflicted “economic nuclear winter” in Trump’s America.

“By placing massive and disproportionate tariffs on our friends and our enemies alike and thereby launching a global economic war against the whole world at once, we’re in the process of destroying confidence in our country as a trading partner,” says the Trump-supporting billionaire founder of Pershing Square.

Ackman adds that “business is a confidence game. The president is losing the confidence of business leaders around the globe. The consequences for our country and the millions of our citizens who have supported the president — in particular low-income consumers who are already under a huge amount of economic stress — are going to be severely negative. This is not what we voted for.”

Larry Fink, head of BlackRock, the globe’s largest asset manager, notes that “most CEOs I talk to would say we are probably in a recession right now.”

Over the weekend, economists at Goldman Sachs assigned a 45% probability of the US falling into a formal recession within the year, up from 35% a week earlier.

Nobel economics prize laureate, Paul Krugman, observes that “Donald Trump burned it all down,” adding that “Trump isn’t really trying to accomplish economic goals. This should all be seen as a dominance display, intended to shock and awe people and make them grovel.”

Only China is not bending the knee, much to Trump’s surprise. The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s official newspaper, reports that Beijing is no longer “clinging to illusions” of striking a giant trade deal with the US.

Ray Dalio, the billionaire founder of Bridgewater Associates, warned that investors are too narrowly fixated on tariffs and not paying enough attention to the bigger “once-in-a-lifetime” breakdown occurring in major monetary, political and geopolitical orders.

“It is obviously incongruous to have both large trade imbalances and large capital imbalances in a deglobalizing world in which the major players can’t trust that the other major players won’t cut them off from the items they need (which is an American worry) or pay them the money they are owed (which is a Chinese worry),” he wrote on X.

On Tuesday (April 8), China’s commerce ministry criticized the “blackmail nature of the US” trade war and vowed Beijing will “fight till the end.” It called Trump’s threat to layer another 50% tariff on China “a mistake on top of a mistake.”

Hong Kong’s leader John Lee calls Trump’s trade war “reckless” and representative of “ruthless behavior” that’s imperiling the city’s economy.

“The reckless imposition of tariffs affects many countries and regions around the world with huge tax rate increases and covering a wide range of goods, disrupting the world’s economic and trade order, bringing great risks and uncertainties to the world,” Lee says.

These provocations, he adds, have Hong Kong pivoting toward increasing trade with Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

All this has President Xi ramping up moves to bolster the domestic economy. The People’s Bank of China has been cautious about rate cuts this year amid concerns about yuan weakness.

The PBOC has latitude to ease amid weak pricing power in the $18 trillion economy. Especially with China suffering from deflationary forces and fending off rampant “Japanification” talk as China lowers its inflation target to 2% from 3% in 2024.

Fears of sending the yuan tumbling have dominated PBOC discussions. The central bank also wants to safeguard the progress Beijing has made in deleveraging the financial system in recent years. PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng worries that cutting rates might incentivize bad lending and borrowing decisions.

At the same time, a weaker yuan might trigger defaults among property developers as it becomes more expensive to make bond payments on offshore debt. Already, global investors are keeping close tabs on liquidity problems at major Chinese developers.

Putting yuan internationalization in jeopardy is another concern. For nearly a decade now, Xi’s government has been working to increase the yuan’s use in trade and finance.

Beijing stepped up cooperation with the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa — and Global South nations to pivot away from the dollar-centric world order.

Pivoting back to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the past might alarm international funds and tarnish the yuan’s chances of securing global reserve currency status.

A weaker yuan might have Japan, South Korea and other top Asian economies believing they have a green light to weaken exchange rates, too.

That would not go unnoticed by the Trump White House, which is escalating the biggest trade war in world history. If the White House concludes Beijing is manipulating the exchange rate, Trump might target China with even bigger tariffs.

Japan also is in Trumpian harm’s way. Corporate Japan was already reeling over Trump’s 25% import tax on all foreign-made automobiles when he hit the nation with a 24% import tax.

Hence Ishiba dispatching a trade negotiation team to Washington to secure a lower levy or buy Japan some time. Korea, too.

For Seoul, “it’s clear that major export products such as automobiles will be hit hard, and exports to the US through production bases in Vietnam will also be hit hard,” says Park Sang-hyun, an economist at iM Securities.

Late last month, trade ministers for China, Japan and Korea met for the first high-level economic dialogue in five years. The theme: beefing up regional trade as Trump’s White House supersizes its tariffs regime.

The nations’ trade ministers pledged to “closely cooperate for a comprehensive and high-level” process to create a three-way free trade agreement centered on “regional and global trade.”

Trump tossing new tariffs at the global trading system has officials in Seoul and Tokyo so worried that they’re talking despite historical enmities. 

Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party is turning to Beijing as the US, once Japan’s most reliable partner, becomes wildly unpredictable. Ditto for Seoul, which has had a decidedly rocky relationship with the Xi era.

Yet Trump’s apparent determination to hit China Inc harder and harder will send shockwaves through Tokyo, Seoul and beyond. In Asia, the collateral damage zone is growing as we speak.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Why of all days is Xi visiting Cambodia on April 17? – Asia Times

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Was Xi Jinping, the president of China, have chosen a more awkward time to fly into Cambodia than April 17? The 1975 march by the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge into the investment, Phnom Penh, is also commemorated.

Cambodia’s biggest and most divine national holiday, Khmer New Year, occurs when the cities are completely clear for the entire year ( although technically it’s only a vacation between April 13 and April 16 ), and the inhabitants presumably heads to the provinces.

Anyone who has spent more than two years in Cambodia is aware of the rule of silence during the Khmer New Time. The towns are deserted. The stores have been closed. Authorities are taking vacations. The authorities are off to statewide karaoke bars to spend their “tea money.”

Many bureaucrats have complained to me that they will now be working next week, and that they will have to travel back to the capital shortly to control the state visit.

But, the schedule seems to have been made very carefully. The meaning of the Khmer New Season is well known in Beijing. It is aware of how the ASEAN institutions handle their schedules. Cambodia and China both rarely make state visits during the Lunar New Year, and I have trouble remembering when they did during the trip.

So why would an “ironclad friend” decide to ruin your most significant getaway of the year? A demonstration of the energy imbalance, or a show of force? Cambodia’s plan of action was unknown. Politly decline the attend? ” We’re too hectic that week, Mr. Xi, sad. ” How about another time,”

Nevertheless, the visit was planned months in advance, so Beijing’s attitude may not have been the same as it is now. Let’s say the day was chosen in January or February. Beijing was especially angry with Southeast Asian governments at the time for reasons that are too numerous to address.

In January, when news broke that the Chinese artist Wang Xing had been abducted and forced to work in a fraud element in Myanmar, that was particularly true. The Chinese government, which had just launched a glitzy anti-scam advertising campaign, was immediately facing queries it didn’t like.

Therefore, it is possible that Beijing, as a passive-aggressive stretch, chose April 17 as the visitation time a few months ago. It’s not known whether Xi arrives in Phnom Penh in a bad feelings. One can only speculate that Xi will have some heartfelt words to say to the Big Man ( Hun Sen) and the Big Boy ( Hun Manet ) about the Cambodian authorities ‘ continued efforts to stop cyberscamming.

However, international politics have changed. The majority of Donald Trump’s actions since January have probably improved China’s standing in Southeast Asia, not least of which because the White House has confirmed all of Southeast Asia’s worst concerns about Trump 2.0. The environment has been particularly altered by the rough 49 % tariffs applied to Cambodia.

According to one viewpoint, America is now in a solid place to press on Phnom Penh to break its ties with China or to weaken them. Well, but. Yes, it has a solid position, but only if Phnom Penh believes the condition is worse than the cure.

The main lesson I learned from talking to a few people in Phnom Penh in recent days was that Trump’s taxes are more likely to bring Cambodia yet closer to China.

First of all, at the moment, Chinese ideologues aren’t required to do a lot of concoctions. They are absolutely correct when they say that Beijing presently appears much more trustworthy than Washington.

Trump is bullying as well as being unstable. In the unlikely event that Phnom Penh goes to war right away and offers Washington the majority of its needs in exchange for tariff relief, Trump won’t put in even more requirements in six months or a month. Just put, there is no way that Phnom Penh, nor any other country, will ever really believe in Trump.

Next, this isn’t primarily an economic issue. Phnom Penh would ( surely ) have offered much more and concessions to America than it currently does if it were just economic. The nation that purchases more than a third of your imports is nothing more crucial to the business.

However, it’s also social. One can speculate that Beijing is urging Phnom Penh never to “give in” to Washington. In fact, Beijing will likely view this as the best time to break even more relations between Cambodia and the US.

In terms of Phnom Penh, for decades, its reaction to any significant opposition from a foreign government has been to create a fantastic claim, wait for the heat to subside, and then do very small. Discuss loudly, and leave nothing.

Beijing is enraged, however, over Phnom Penh’s failing to combat its connivanced business. Washington is upset about Phnom Penh’s unwavering disregard for its commitment to reconciliation. Trump also has an unusual passion for trade deficits, making him angry.

Cambodia should be damned if it does, and should be damned if it doesn’t, so I don’t see how it can get out of this particular circumstance. ( Maybe, though, the Trump administration will accept the financial/trade reforms Phnom Penh has proposed, but that seems unlikely. )

And when you’re stuck, the natural inclination is to look for the simplest way to get free, which is China for Phnom Penh. According to one cause, at least Xi is showing up, but Trump don’t point to Cambodia on a chart.

This content was originally published on David Hutt’s Cambodia Unfiltered Substack, and it has since been republished. Subscribe to Cambodia Unfiltered right away below.

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Japan’s delicate surge of top-tier Chinese workers – Asia Times

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The Japanese landscape is changing regarding Foreign movement. Toyo Keizai, a business magazine, recently covered the sensation of Taiwanese children joining in some of Tokyo’s best secondary schools.

The post series focused on Tokyo’s Bunkyo-ku, house to the University of Tokyo and some of the city’s top public schools, noting that the number of non-Japanese children living in the area has more than doubled since 2019. According to the post, Chinese made up half of the increase.

The number of Foreign residents living in Japan, which is on the rise, reached a record high of 873, 000 at the end of 2024 from 761, 600 in 2022, with a new perspective. &nbsp,

But much more important, the content of Chinese immigrants has changed dramatically over the past few years. Chinese render up 23 % of Japan’s 3.76 million international citizens, but they now make up a significant and growing portion.

Chinese workers now dominate the most highly skilled categories in the Japanese visa system, namely the” Management and Administration” ( 51.3 % in 2023, 50.3 % in 2022 ) and” Highly Qualified Professionals” ( 65.7 % in 2023, 63.9 % in 2022 ).

In contrast, there has been a steady decline in the number of Chinese citizens who are” Technical Trainee” card holders, which forbids the holder from bringing community members. More than 38, 000, or 43 % of the full, were the Chinese, who were the largest population of these employees as late as 2015, making up the majority of the full. However, by the previous year, the Chinese had dropped to fourth position, just making up 7.4 %. &nbsp,

It is no wonder that there is a corresponding increase in Chinese kids when you factor in the increase in the number of permanent people, scientific experts, and other types of long-term white-collar practitioners among Chinese people in Japan.

The Chinese are increasingly viewed as travellers, university students, and unskilled laborers who work in companies.

Foreign residents in Japan are extremely sharing the same physical spaces with “regular” Chinese people, competing for the same minimal resources such as high-quality pre-college knowledge instead of just spending money and then going home or concentrated on far-flung university campuses, farms, and factories.

Recipe for a backlash

It’s unlikely that the Chinese will like them even more because of the change in their composition in Japan. A survey survey results released in December 2024 revealed that 89 % of Japanese people have a negative outlook on China, which undoubtedly influences how they perceive the Chinese people they encounter there as well.

A quick look at the extensive coverage of China by Toyo Keizai, including those of Chinese immigrants in Japan, reveals that the majority of them are calling for the Chinese to leave and stop enriching themselves by stealing Japanese technology, despite the fact that it is statistically unrepresentative. &nbsp,

Such vitriol will only get worse with the zero-sum nature of education. The lack of elite education, as shown by the limited number of places available in Bunkyo-ku’s top elementary schools and the fierce admissions battles that face China because of their presence, which is thought to excite more deserving Japanese students, will increase grievances toward the Chinese.

The fact that the Chinese are looking for cheap public school spots rather than paying for private education that the majority of the Japanese population can’t afford will unavoidably sputter more nationalistic sentiments as Japan’s average real income continues to decline. &nbsp,

A number of factors that are beyond the control of both countries and their peoples will also contribute to the Chinese’s continued growth in population in Japan, at the risk of locals treating them with more hostility.

With Japan’s stricter visa laws and labor market conditions, Trump’s growing tendency to view Chinese STEM talent as a threat to national security will result in the displacement of many of them.

Additionally, Chinese companies’ increasing competitiveness has frequently come at the expense of Japanese pride, not to mention traditional automakers, as most recently demonstrated by its surge in electric vehicle exports. More of them will likely flood Japanese markets as the Trump tariffs create a barrier to Chinese goods.

Hedging hostility

Japan’s efforts to embrace multiculturalism in response to Japan’s long-standing issues of labor shortage, aging, and population decline are causing a problem because of the increasingly wealthy, competitive, and ubiquitous Chinese immigrants.

The government has made it clear that it intends to increase the number of highly skilled foreign workers over the coming years, but the nation may become less and less interested in having to compete for limited resources with these highly skilled workers, the majority of whom are Chinese.

The government has not yet shown a clear direction in juggling practical needs and hostile feelings. The government’s decision to begin issuing 10-year multiple-entry tourist visas to wealthy Chinese people in the late last year has sparked even more hostility toward them from Liberal Democrats, who are currently in power.

The government will need to first clarify its stance and formulate a concerted plan to address the public’s concerns while highlighting the positive contributions Chinese citizens are making to the nation for the Japanese to form more lucid opinions on the presence of China in their midst.

Although it would be unpalatable for any politician to speak out and defend the benefits of a greater foreign presence, especially from the Chinese, in a traditionally homogenous nation like Japan.

A lack of clarity among officials will only lead Japan down the same path as the West, where anti-immigrant rhetoric has risen on the assumption that the government has lost control over national borders, given the undeniable reality of an ever-increasing foreign population in the nation.

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What SE Asia does and doesn’t want from Trump – Asia Times

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US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stressed the need for Japan to increase military vigor in mild of China’s growing confidence and the looming threat of a Taiwan emergency during his first official visit to Asia.

From Manila to Hanoi, local leaders have publicly welcomed reassurances of the US’s security appearance, viewing America’s “robust, ready and reliable” approach to China – as described by Hegseth – as a needed barrier that their own militaries cannot support only.

But beneath the hushes of strategic approval is a quieter undercurrent of worry: May America’s Indo-Pacific ultimately cause the region to become unstable rather than recover equilibrium?

US protection concerns have been shown to function more as economic leverage than as corporate interests in new upheaval involving Canada, Panama, Greenland, and Yemen.

” If the US properly restores freedom of navigation ( for shipping roads around the Middle East ) at great cost, there needs to be some additional economic get extracted in profit”, wrote S. M., according to leaked Signal messages reported by various media outlets. Stephen Miller, the White House’s deputy chief of staff, is reportedly the subject of a S. M. theory.

The logic of” America First” extends beyond economics to the realm of security, as articulated by Defense Undersecretary-nominee Elbridge Colby.

America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is clear: deny China regional hegemony through forward military posturing, strengthened alliances and assertive naval operations.

That approach has appeal to many ASEAN states, of course. China’s rise, after all, hasn’t just harmed the security of trade routes; it has militarized the South China Sea and exacerbated regional asymmetries. The US’s focus on deterrence thus presents a timely hedge.

Risk of overreach

However, that deterrent logic is fragile. Consider Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical tripwire. Through continued high-profile arms deals and repeated rhetorical affirmations, President Donald Trump’s administration has encouraged Taipei.

The US State Department removed the phrase” we do not support Taiwan independence” as part of what it described as a routine update in February.

While these moves boost morale in Taiwan and draw praise in Tokyo and Manila, they simultaneously narrow China’s strategic options.

The People’s Liberation Army’s most recent live-fire demonstrations around the self-governing island highlight a sombering truth: Beijing views US actions as a prelude to a permanent separation. China is more likely to test its resolve the more the US resolute it becomes.

This feedback loop raises the specter of strategic overreach.

Tokyo established the Japan Joint Operations Command, a new body tasked with coordinating its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, in conjunction with Hegseth’s Asia tour. This is a significant step toward enhancing Japan’s ability to respond to regional emergencies and enhancing operational cooperation with US forces.

There are currently 55, 000 US soldiers stationed in Japan, 28, 500 in South Korea, and a growing rotational presence in the Philippines. Add AUKUS nuclear submarine deployments and increased intelligence-sharing under the Quad, and the region increasingly resembles a Cold War-era containment arc.

Trump’s strategy, however, lacks the broad-spectrum diplomacy that once supported credible deterrence. His strategy heavily relies on trade coercion without providing a corresponding vision for regional development. His strategy is unsupported by an effective economic program for ASEAN.

The” Liberation Day” tariffs, announced on April 2, 2025, threaten to deliver a sharp economic blow to all ASEAN states, including strategic ally Singapore, despite its Free Trade Agreement with the US and existing trade deficit, not surplus.

Cambodia is the country with the highest tariff, at 49 %, followed by Laos at 48 %, Vietnam at 46 %, and Myanmar at 44 %, despite the country’s trade with the US remaining sluggish because of current sanctions.

Thailand and Indonesia are subject to tariffs of 36 % and 32 %, respectively, while Brunei and Malaysia are each subject to tariffs of 24 %. The Philippines fares slightly better at 17 %, while both Timor-Leste and Singapore face the baseline 10 %.

Trump’s punitive trade measures come without meaningful investment or assistance, further erodering regional goodwill, in contrast to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which continues to position Beijing as the region’s leading infrastructure partner.

There is also a more in-depth historical irony at play. In Washington, Japan’s growing military assertiveness is widely seen as a success of US security leadership. However, Taiwan’s reputation as being essential to Japan’s own national security is revived by its Southeast Asian neighbors, who have bitter memories.

The echoes are obvious: In 1931, Japan justified its invasion of Manchuria in response to the staged Mukden Incident on strikingly similar grounds, shielding important interests from a perceived Chinese encroachment.

Without a meaningful reckoning with this past, Japan’s shift away from postwar pacifism, however US-encouraged, risks alienating ASEAN rather than uniting it under the American banner.

The US “doctrine of denial” is set up for theater-specific flashpoints like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands, which poses the greatest risk of overreaching.

However, important ASEAN nations like Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia are not eager to join these permanent alliances. Southeast Asia seeks deterrence without entrapment.

Trump, however, doesn’t offer much nuance. His current zero-sum worldview, where failing to align with America is seen as siding with China, risks alienating the very middle powers whose support is essential to maintaining US power and influence in the area.

As Singapore’s Foreign Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan reminded Parliament at last month’s Committee of Supply debate,” We must maintain an omnidirectional balance and a constructive engagement with all partners”.

China’s charm reset

China is waging a parallel campaign to reshape perceptions and re-anchor Southeast Asia in its orbit, even as the US restores deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Long gone is China’s snarling rhetoric of “wolf warrior” diplomacy from 2017. A strategic reset is positioned in its place, surrounded by charm, trade, and respect for ASEAN centrality.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is now using the phrase “multipolar world” to advocate for Southeast Asia’s “right to choose,” echoing the language of regional autonomy.

Beijing’s statecraft appears to have shifted from confrontation to courtship. It has also strengthened its position as ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years.

President Xi Jinping’s upcoming travels to Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam this month reflect China’s deeper, concerted push for personal diplomacy and economic pragmatism.

Even Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS and strengthen digital and green cooperation with China underlines a wider regional trend: hedging against American volatility by embracing Chinese steadfastness.

China’s multilateral rhetoric, which promotes regional comprehensive economic partnerships like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and promotes minilateral initiatives like” Security Belt 2025,” gives it even more legitimacy as a partner invested in peace rather than provocation.

To be clear, China’s charm offensive has its own flaws. Take its tense relationship with the Philippines as an example. The Philippines remains a crucial node in America’s first island chain of forward defense.

Hegseth made the announcement during his recent visit to Manila that the US would use more sophisticated military capabilities for joint training, improve interoperability for “high-end operations,” and prioritize cooperation with the Philippines from the defense industry.

Manila has strengthened its security ties to Washington under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., including welcoming more US troop rotations, participating in expanded trilateral exercises with Japan and Australia, and publicly deny Chinese harassment of Filipino vessels close to the Second Thomas Shoal and other disputed sea features.

Meanwhile, China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea has grown more calibrated – aggressive enough to assert red lines, yet measured enough to avoid outright conflict. However, this delicate balance act demonstrates Beijing’s soft-power reset’s limits.

China may outsource and outsource the United States ‘ infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia, but it is unable to quickly address the deep concerns it has caused as a result of its territorial assertiveness. ASEAN nations may engage with Beijing’s diplomacy, but many remain wary of its gray-zone tactics.

In essence, Southeast Asia is balancing, hedging, and gaming both Washington and Beijing. The danger lies in mistaking polite nods for alignment. Trump’s administration must be aware that regional nations favor dialogue over ultimatums and options over dominance.

American abandonment

Critics may argue that Trump’s tough talk has at least reawakened America’s strategic muscle. However, history encourages skepticism.

His first term was marked by erratic diplomacy, with his party wooing Kim Jong Un of North Korea while reneging on crucial multilateral agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement.

For all its bluster – from a Ukraine ceasefire that has failed to hold, to hostages still held by Hamas, to Houthi rebels continuing to menace shipping lanes near Yemen – Trump’s brand of deterrence so far feels more performative than institutionalized.

In fact, Indo-Pacific allies and partners are left to wonder whether US support has a time limit. In” Strategy of Denial,” US Defense Undersecretary-nominee Colby recommends putting together a cohesive coalition to combat Chinese hegemony.

But ASEAN doesn’t just want a wall. Partner who are willing to build bridges are necessary given the country’s young populations, emerging industries, growing infrastructure needs, and desire for investment, whether it be financially, technological, or developmentally.

ASEAN wants a US that can stifle China while also reassuring the area. It wants an America that upholds international rules without provoking war. It desires a US that makes investments in shared prosperity that are supported by an equilibrium-creating security architecture.

Southeast Asia, which has long been a hub for powerful rivalries, is acutely aware that diplomacy without deterrence is a risky move.

Living in permanent proximity to China, and mindful of America’s history of strategic withdrawals, the region understands that US overreach today could lead to hemispheric abandonment tomorrow.

Marcus Loh serves as the director of Temus, a Singapore-based company that offers digital transformation services, where he leads public affairs, marketing, and strategic communication.

He previously served as the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore’s President, and he is currently a member of SG Tech’s executive committee for the digital transformation chapter.

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FULRO: a war of their own in Cambodia – Asia Times

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A strange piece of information was discovered by Reuters Phnom Penh Bureau Chief Mark Dodd in the middle of August 1992. &nbsp,

There was a little army in the distant forests of northern Cambodia, according to a UNTAC Aussie Signals commander, and they had contacted the UN in search of weapons to combat the Asian.

Who the devil were these men, given that the authority of UNTAC was to destroy all foreign causes in Cambodia? They allegedly belong to a Montagnard movement that was started in the 1950s called FULRO, a European abbreviation that means the United Front for the Emancipation of Oppressed Races.

FULRO’s original intention was to establish a separate country for racial minorities like the Jarai, Rhade, Behnar, Mnong, and occasionally even the Chams. FULRO organized two mini-rebellions in the hills in 1964 and 1965 to combat the South Vietnamese, which immediately ran away.

Ten thousand FULRO individuals emigrated from Vietnam’s Central Highlands to Cambodia in 1975 after North Vietnam defeated the South. Only a few hundred were still intact seventeen years after.

Dodd scooped up the Phnom Penh hit army with a report that appeared on television on September 1, 1992, which perhaps sounded the alarm in Washington, DC because the Montagnards had worked closely with American Special Forces during the Vietnam War and had bravely fought alongside them.

Some, particularly soldiers, felt that” the Miles” were cruelly abandoned to an uncertain death when the US pulled out, and there are still many of them.

On the day of the retreat, Fulro and UNTAC engage in negotiations. 4, 1992. Photo: Supplied/Michael Hayes

Nate Thayer, a journalist for The Far Eastern Economic Review in Phnom Penh, likewise became aware of the story. Nate was residing above the Phnom Penh Post practices, which I co-founded only two months prior.

Running sources in Washington, Nate, had our telephone equipment spewing hundreds of pages, day and night, on FULRO’s record, a phone bill that ultimately rang up to US$ 8, 000.

It was so interesting as a greenhorn publisher to witness a skilled journalist scurry into drive on what was undoubtedly a very big story, despite Nate’s swearing to secrecy. In the Mondulkiri woods, Nate made the decision to join Fulrou. He inquired if I wanted to join in. How had I not avoid?

We flew to Stung Treng on the Mekong, and he spattered on the UNTAC Uruguayan Battalion’s chief for two days. Eventually, the UN agreed to let us travel with them to a frontier town to start FULRO’s future negotiations.

We flew over dense, unspoiled jungle for two hours before making a quick stop in Khao Nhiek, a city money, to land in a small clearing about 25 kilometers from the Asian borders. When we left the helicopter, I can still recall. We made it, Nate said to me as she turned round and yelled” We made it” with a big, shit-eating smiles!

Include account for Nate Thayer’s High Eastern Economic Review on FULRO.

Nate spent four days on his own, leaving Steung Treng that day without any clue about how he was going to get out. I flew up that day with the UN people.

At the time, and still are, there were lots of possibilities about FULRO. However, many of those have just been examined, dissected, and explained in a brand-new reserve by William Chickering.

The Additional National Liberation Front, Vietnam 1955-1975 is a thoroughly investigated, well-written, and exciting book. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

In 1968, Chickering, a previous US Special Forces commander who collaborated with Montagnards in the mountains, spent 16 times interviewing more than 100 people in Asia, Europe, and the US.

He sifted through numerous libraries, leaving his duplicate with a delightful footnote. He followed the true accounts of many of the important players in FULRO, like a seasoned inspector.

Chickering weaves the existence of four important FULRO members through his history, including the head, a man by the name of Y-Bham Enoul, whom he met in Phnom Penh in 1973. He records their struggles, their first training in Vietnam, and their lives.

On April 17, he places a particularly interesting emphasis on the approximately 150 FULRO men who ended up in the French Embassy seeking shelter before being forced to leave presumably for the Khmer Rouge’s murder.

I could go on and on about how much I enjoyed Chickering’s guide. Chickering’s text is a truly valuable addition to the puzzle for those of us who are deeply invested in the country’s history, particularly the wars that destroyed Vietnam and Cambodia for decades.

Chickering neglected to mention the FULRO times from 1975 to 1992 in his book. He claimed in an email to the author that he “lacked sufficient distinct knowledge to do so both effectively and courageously.” It’s possible that the octogenarian’s next useful project will be based on his strong health and joie de vivre.

For Bangkok users, William Chickering did publish his book on April 10 at 7 PM at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand. Previous Reuters Phnom Penh Bureau Chief Mark Dodd may speak as a guest.

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‘The White Lotus’ version of Thai Buddhism gets some things right – Asia Times

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The White Lotus returns to a luxurious hotel on Koh Samui, Thailand, in the new year. This comedy-drama collection that addresses rich tourists has a plotline that emphasizes foreigners visiting Thailand who are interested in learning about its Buddhist customs.

Yet though Thai churches do not provide such plans, the image depicts a young American woman who wants to enroll in a year-long yoga course at a Buddhist temple. It also incorrectly describes the Buddhist perspective of the future and depicts a church environment where many foreigners stay there for a long time, not dressed in traditional attire for temple residents – which is unusual in Thailand.

I have spent more than ten years studying Buddhism in Thailand, and I have seen how many different ways Indian Monks practice their faith. There are many genuine ways to engage greatly with Buddhism, from offering donations to little meditation retreats to ordination as a monastery, although the Thai Buddhism depicted in The White Lotus is not entirely reasonable.

Buddhist people and genocidity

Without donations, religious institutions and Buddhist temples may not exist.

In exchange for the moral coin of significance, which is thought to produce great guilt, the lay group provides priests and temples. According to some, this great fate leads to advantageous outcomes in both the present and future, such as wealth and rebirth in a wealthy family.

Some laymen may provide meals to priests as they walk on their day alms, while others may only go to the temple on the majority of Buddhist holidays. The main goal when you interact with a priest or visit a sanctuary is to earn money. Each church has payment boxes for specific needs, such as paying the electric bill, finishing restoration projects, providing schooling for young monks, and funding the health care of the religious community.

In exchange for a small contribution, people may take home blessed items like a happy candle or little necklace. A monk’s work in some temples is to wait until the people arrives to receive the offerings and grant blessings by sitting inside one of the major halls.

retreats for prayer

Churches that have meditation centers typically provide short-term yoga retreats. Individuals can also sign up for a 21-day system in the northeast of Thailand, where they will aim to spend their days in 10-15 periods of meditation and reduce any other activities, including sleep. Some companies offer 10-day resorts.

The 21-day program’s participants hope to complete the first of Thai Theravada Buddhism’s four stages of enlightenment. According to Buddhists, those who pass the first stage have “enter the stream” of enlightenment and are certain to do so in their lifetimes.

Contrary to popular belief in Western culture regarding Buddhist meditation, it is not seen as a secular practice. Buddhists in Thailand believe that meditation is a meritorious practice that aids them in both the end of the cycle of rebirth and the accumulation of merit and good karma along the way, both in this life and in the future.

Every moment is spent in mindful of every action at a meditation center, along with periods of formal sitting or walking meditation. Each meditation center has a set schedule and program that participants must follow either individually or in small groups during periods of meditation, typically dressed in white pants and a top.

Men and women’s ordination

Ordination is a significant component of the Buddhist path. Thai Buddhists frequently enter the monastery for brief periods of time, temporarily ordained as nuns or monks. The entry process is straightforward, and it typically doesn’t cause any regrets or disappointments for those who enter for life and then choose to leave the monastic life. However, if a monk was well-known for his instruction, his followers would probably be upset.

There are two levels of ordination in Theravada Buddhism, the type of Buddhism practiced in Thailand: full” bhikkhu” or novice, which describes a fully ordained male. Males under the age of 20 may only pursue novice ordination, while those over 20 can become fully ordained monks.

A male being ordained at some point in his life is frequently regarded as a rite of passage, or at least a sign of discipline and maturity. Temporary ordination is thought to be a way for men to earn merit for their parents, especially their mothers, who gave so much for their existence.

Women are typically prohibited from being ordained in Thai Buddhism, but some have received ordination in Sri Lanka, where they are permitted to practice monastic rites, and have established popular Thai communities there. These female monastic practice centers have started” bhikkhuni” (temporary ordination ) programs.

Once or twice a year, these centers offer special programs where up to 100 women at once, including foreign visitors, can ordain as novice female monks for brief periods. They also learn about receiving offerings, wearing robes, and studying Buddhist texts during this period.

Many women find this opportunity meaningful because it allows them to offer merit to their parents, which only males could have previously done.

There are 625 Thai women attempting to become ordained at https ://www.youtube .com/embed/TXdyclB9I7A?wmode=transparent&start=625.

In Thailand, a woman can also ordain temporarily or permanently as a mae chi, or precept nun. They typically dress in white, robe their hair, and adhere to the Eight Precepts, including celibacy. Although more popular than bhikkhuni in Thailand today, this type of ordination was not initiated by the Buddha. Precept nuns are thought to have been around for centuries, but the origins of the practice are not well known.

These are some typical practices that Thai Buddhists follow, frequently with the intention of achieving greater prosperity in this life and a better rebirth. According to Buddhists, these practices may also lead to their attainment of the ultimate aspiration of enlightenment.

At Rhodes College, Brooke Schedneck is an associate professor of religious studies.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.

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