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A new record that exposes the ticking time bomb inside both US and Chinese missiles suggests that aging jet energy may be slowly crippling the nation’s nuclear arsenals.

South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported this month that Chinese rocket scientists have discovered that the solid fuel used in intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs) ages much more quickly than previously thought, potentially making hundreds of missiles unusable.

Major changes in the fuel columns that can happen within the next 30 years, making them unable to resist the loads during flight, were discovered in China’s National Key Laboratory of Solid Rocket Propulsion in Xian. This finding might explain the regular launch failures that some nuclear powers have experienced in recent years.

The older engineer Qin Pengju led the study, which revealed that while the aged propellant appeared stable during regular storage, it quickly became considerably more brittle when under high pressure. It mentions that the research focused on the solid fuel commonly used in ICBMs: ammonium perchlorate, aluminum powder and hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene ( HTPB) binder.

According to SCMP, the study’s results suggest that after just 27 years, the battery’s flexibility may be compromised, leading to potential fast fractures during launch. It notes that the topic has raised questions about the US’s declining nuclear deterrent capacity, which relies on Trident II weapons and Minuteman III weapons from the 1970s.

A Minuteman III ICBM check that went wrong in November 2023 may have heightened concerns about the US’s aging land-based nuclear army, perhaps as an example of the instability of aging ICBMs. According to an anomaly, the unarmed weapon was launched from Vandenberg Space Force Base.

While the Minuteman III as a whole is nonetheless considered a reliable arms structure, its subcomponents, such as the container, technology and weapon, are outdated and may have been neglected.

As delays and price shortfalls plague its next-generation LGM-35A Sentinel system, according to a report from Asia Times that the US is under increasing pressure to replace its aging Minuteman III ICBMs.

Budgeted first at US$ 95.8 billion, the Sentinel’s price has surged to an estimated$ 160 billion, forcing the Pentagon to support the raise under the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment. According to Covid-19 disruptions and prices, generation delays have postponed its implementation until 2029. As a result, the US Air Force has stretch Minuteman II I’s duration.

In addition to outdated delivery methods, Asia Times reported in January 2024 that the US’s proper barrier is severely hampered by the country’s aging of uranium mines in US nuclear arms. Despite plutonium’s 24, 000-year half-life, micro changes over time can impact the backup protection and violent yield of nuclear arms.

The US National Nuclear Security Administration ( NNSA ) has struggled to build new plutonium pits, with the goal of 80 pits per year unanticipated until 2030 or later. This gap is attributed to a post-Cold War tradition of apathy, a lack of skilled workers and limiting environmental rules.

Existing mines, designed for older arms, does not perform as required in newer techniques, raising concerns about the stability of the US nuclear arsenal.

Keeping the 1970s-era Minuteman III poses major problems. Lauren Caston and other authors claim that the aging equipment and components that require ongoing development are essential to keeping the aging Minuteman III in company in a February 2014 RAND statement.

Caston and others make the claim that while the Minuteman III Service Life Extension Program ( SLEP ) aims to replace crucial subsystems like guidance and propulsion with incremental modernization, the obsolescence of the original manufacturing processes and materials, which makes it necessary to rely on more expensive, contemporary alternatives.

Another major operational requirement is the monthly check firing charge, which accelerated after 2017, when the price increased from three to four tests per year, due to the depletion of missile inventory. Without boosting new production, they claim that America’s missile stockpile could fall below the required operational levels by 2030.

Parth Satam mentions in a July 2024 article for The Aviationist that it is much less expensive to extend the Minuteman II I’s life until 2050 because previous renovations cost only$ 7 billion for 450 missiles, as the US struggles to keep the Minuteman III in service while defending the Sentinel’s ballooning costs.

Satam points out that maintaining these outdated systems is technically challenging due to outdated documentation and a lack of skilled technicians. He contrasts that to the Sentinel program, despite its$ 140 billion price tag and cost overruns, promising a modern, cyber-defendable command and control system.

Satam says the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) projected lifetime for the Sentinel, set up to 2075, is arbitrary and inflates costs. He claims that a more flexible timeline could increase the viability of the Minuteman III extension. However, he cautions about the risks of not modernizing, citing the need to address emerging threats from nuclear-armed competitors like China and Russia.

However, he notes the Sentinel’s development could also strain budgets, potentially impacting other key defense programs such as the Next-Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) fighter and B-21 Raider stealth bomber.

In light of growing threats from nuclear rivals, reliability and deterrence are in doubt as a result of this situation. China and Russia have aggressively modernized their nuclear arsenals, further compounding the US’s strategic quandary as Russia exhibits nuclear brinkmanship in the Ukraine war and China ramps up fissile material production.

While liquid-fuel systems may avoid problems associated with solid fuel, they bring challenges such as difficult-to-store propellants, design complexity, which opens up more points of possible failure, and the need to be fueled before launch, unlike solid-fuel missiles.

To illustrate these problems, Sidharth Kaushal mentions in an October 2024 Royal United Services Institute ( RUSI) article that Russia’s efforts to replace the aging liquid-fuel R-36 Satan ICBM with the RS-28 Sarmat have faced significant challenges, highlighting issues within its missile production sector.

According to Kaushal, the recent catastrophic failure of the Sarmat test in September 2024 highlights these difficulties. He notes that the failure, likely due to propulsion issues, caused extensive damage to the Plesetsk Cosmodrome.

He points out that since its development in 2013 the Sarmat, which was meant to replace the Soviet-era R-36, has experienced numerous delays and technical issues. These setbacks are a result of the lighter structure and complexity of the new system’s propulsion system.

Additionally, he mentions that the collapse of Russia’s cooperation with Ukrainian contractors, who previously maintained the R-36, has exacerbated the situation. He claims that Russia’s reliance on its Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau for the Sarmat’s development has not completely resolved these issues.

Kaushal points out that the RS-28’s troubled history, including multiple failed tests and delays, raises concerns about the reliability of Russia’s silo-based ICBMs, which are crucial for its strategic deterrence. However, he says that despite these challenges, the Sarmat has been accepted into service, reflecting the urgency of replacing the R-36.

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The world was informed on Sunday ( December 8 ), suggesting that it had stopped believing that anything was possible. The violent government of Syria’s leader, Bashar al-Assad, is gone and the Syrian civil war may become coming to an end after 13 years of suffering.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS), an armed Islamist group with headquarters in Idlib in the north of Syria, seized the city of Damascus in just a few days, overrunning Aleppo and Homs and finally capturing Damascus. Assad, however, is reported to have fled with his home to Moscow.

The most positive observers see this as a chance for peace. Syria’s several armed factions are now finally being toppled, his main allies Russia and Iran are cooperating elsewhere, and a delicate calm is beginning to emerge between them.

Some warn that the subsequent vacuum could cause a continuation of erratic violence, similar to that which has plagued Libya since Muammar Gaddafi’s regime was overthrown and killed in 2011.

What did come last will depend just as much on the international rights as those in Syria. In 2013, I spent time in Syria chatting with members of the various organizations that merged into HTS, including the Palestinian al-Qaeda online. Armed groups like Units tend to listen when the global community tries to engage with them, as I learned from speaking with them.

A number of Islamist-backed organizations in northern Syria, including the Palestinian affiliates of al-Qaeda, known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, united in the formation of HTS in 2017. Units had previously been pushed into a spot in the Idlib area. Despite being attacked by a government supported by Russian warplanes and Hezbollah fighters, it endured tenacious resistance.

Syria is at a crossroads and has many options open up. Some folks point to HTS’s Islamic roots. The earth has been attempting to stop this terrible situation since 2011 by a radical Islamist party coming to power in Syria.

Some claim that the organization has shifted away from its more extreme roots. Al-Qaeda was disbanded in 2016 as a result of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham’s decision to merge with various organizations to shape HTS.

Additionally, HTS has recently attempted to promote a more reasonable image and even promote religious tolerance. If its promises are to be believed, it may attempt to create a secure and peaceful Syria.

The activities of various nations that seek to engage Units and its affiliates will be crucial in shaping Syria’s future. My studies suggests that, at times, they will utilize shifts as a result of such speech. Organizations that have previously abused the laws of war does respond to global pressure and alter their behavior.

They will also, at periods, respond favorably to relationship by taking part in discussions and conflict resolution. But when ostracised, isolated or ignored, these organizations may do the exact same.

I spoke with a number of the various rebel groups while I was in Syria, and one thing I noticed was how ignored they were by the global society. A common from the Free Syrian Army, which was a partnership of rebel rebels that the US supported, complained about the challenges of upholding international humanitarian law without international support.

Islamist group soldiers criticized the duplicity of international companies. When they attempted to talk to governments and organizations, they were forced to unite with more moderate parties. In an effort to foster stronger global ties, an Islamic State captain actually asked me to send positive messages to my friends and family.

It would be wrong to completely agree with armed parties when they asserted a need for peaceful coexistence. But by the same coin, ignoring them wholly is unlikely to stop the fighting.

Is harmony possible?

It may be simpler to explain how we got to this point than to predict what will happen next. Assad’s government has long been propped up by its friends. Units saw an opportunity and seized it as Hezbollah and Iran were both reeling from their fight with Israel and Russia.

Although some are expressing gratitude for the ineffectiveness of the Russian and Persian interventions in Syria, it is doubtful that either country’s effect there will end. New developments could also bring the two closer together in cooperation that might include markets of weapons technologies or interventions abroad.

No nation may merely abandon their goals in Syria. For example, Russia has geopolitical air and naval bases there that are essential for the Kremlin to establish influence in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Africa. Russia does certainly give up on these quickly.

Turkey, a long supporter of HTS, seems to be in a solid position to influence activities. This may include pressing its advantage in its continued assault against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF) in Syria’s northeast.

Although the SDF are merely National friends, it is doubtful that Donald Trump’s immediate foregoing of them in 2019 has been forgotten. Turkey used a power pump as justification for the US president’s decision to withdraw US military troops from Syria to launch an offensive against the Syrian Kurds.

The future of Kurdish freedom may, therefore, been in fear, though the battle-hardened SDF will likely not go down without a struggle.

How Syria’s HTS-controlled relationship with the Trump presidency is still a mystery. However, it’s difficult to imagine Trump becoming friends with Units, an armed party with historical links to Islamists, despite the fact that it’s unlikely that there will be more American involvement on the ground.

Meanwhile, Israel has seized temporary command of a demilitarized cushion zone in Syrian-controlled sections of the Golan Heights. Some apprehensions about a potential increase in fight there are expressed by some. Refugees living in five settlements close to the occupied places have been warned by the Israeli military to” remain home.” Additionally, some schools have switched to online groups in response to turmoil.

HTS is at the middle of these events in Syria, which have profound effects on the nation and the location. The group’s ability to hold onto power in Syria is still uncertain, and if so, what kind of program they will try to establish.

The regional and global powers ‘ responses may be crucial at this time, when partnering with HTS is crucial if the chance for peace is to be exploited.

William Plowright is associate professor in global stability, Durham University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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The Assad regime’s drop is a significant blow to Russia’s reputation and international policy. Not least of the difficulties are the possibility of having to deal with the loss of Syria’s even overseas naval base, which is located in the port of Tartus on the Mediterranean coast.

The base’s destiny is still a mystery. There is no denying that the Kremlin’s best officials will work closely with the new leaders of Damascus to establish their sole inventory and repair facility in the Mediterranean.

However, the fact that all Russian ships left the base last year suggests that events have overtaken the Russian army. At this stage, the possible result is that Moscow’s long-term exposure to this center will be at least compromised.

Since Peter the Great established the traditional Soviet army in 1696, Moscow’s diplomatic and military forces have made unwavering efforts to gain access to “warm waters.”

In fact, Russia’s exposure to the world’s communication channels is restricted by enclosed seas ( such as the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Sea of Japan ), which do not allow Russian ships to have unimpeded access to the world’s sea, or by unfriendly natural settings ( such as the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea ), where problems frequently make navigation dangerous.

One of Moscow’s most beloved benefits was having access to a naval hospital at Tartus for supporting the Assad government during the Syrian civil war that started in 2011.

Since 2013, Assad provided the Soviet army with a secure area for its medium-sized vessels operating in the Mediterranean. Its main objective is to maintain and repair Russia’s marine resources, enabling them to remain in the area for longer periods of time.

The work force has used Tartus as a foundation from which to carry naval exercises and operations to dark NATO troops in the Mediterranean, despite being frequently overlooked. The purpose of this, in the framework of global political tensions, has been to battle ( or at least check ) European dominance of the Mediterranean.

Greater political effects

If Russia loses Tartus for good, Moscow will suffer a number of losses as a result. Most notably, its everlasting naval task force in the Mediterranean would have to either embark on a lengthy, humiliating journey up to Russian installations or relocate to a new temporary base in the area.

In accordance with the Montreux protocol, Ankara closed the Greek Islands to Russian ships after Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Any warships operating in the Mediterranean are unable to travel via the Bosphorus to the Russian outposts in Sevastopol or Novorossiysk in the Black Sea.

In the longer word, Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean and, by extension, the Middle East may become diminished. Marine forces are crucial in shaping power and force prediction. In fact, American states’ military supremacy is based on their ability to deploy troops across the globe for extended periods of time.

Big carrier battle parties, for example, are frequently used as prepositioning causes. It’s a website in which&nbsp, Russia has typically lagged behind&nbsp, NATO and the West. This has generally hampered Russia’s skill to use its military might abroad.

Logistics is essential here. Russians ‘ loss of Tartus, in addition to the Turkish Straits ‘ enduring closure of its warships as long as the conflict in Ukraine persists, may significantly impair Moscow’s capability to install marine task forces and support operations on land in the area and beyond.

In addition, the naval forces ‘ duties include protecting one’s personal merchant marine and the world’s communication paths of communication. Moscow is significantly dependent on its ships of Russian-flagged boats to keep its supply chain as a result of American sanctions limiting commercial shipping businesses to and from Russia.

Any restriction placed on the Russian navy might have an impact on the security of its industrial and civil operations.

Russia’s ability to save its customer in Syria does have a significant impact on Moscow’s politics in Africa, Asia, and South America, where it won’t be able to work with the same convenience.

Aside from all of this, it is important to remember that the risk of a naval facility strikes at Russia’s international reputation. With the numerous failures Russia has suffered to its Black Sea fleet, this had now taken a hit.

Without a doubt, the loss of Tartus didn’t prevent Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In the past, Moscow has shown endurance to tactical flops. But it is a major blow to Moscow’s image as a great authority.

And in advance of a second Trump administration, the Kremlin is ill manage this.

Basil Germond is professor of global stability, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Professor David Steinberg, one of the most renowned Western spectators of contemporary Myanmar, passed away at the age of 96. Steinberg was a minister, development employee, professor and people academic who specialized in Myanmar, Korea and broader global relationships.

Before the Communist Revolution, Steinberg, one of the last American trade pupils to China, was from Dartmouth in the United States, where he studied before the Socialist revolution had expelled some immigrants. Before joining the Asia Foundation, he continued to study at Harvard University and the School of Oriental and African Studies ( SOAS ).

He served in Burma from 1958 to 1962, when General Ne Win’s defense coup forced the majority of Westerners to leave. Before joining the United States Agency for International Development ( USAID), where he was posted to Bangkok for three years, he was then stationed for the base in Hong Kong and South Korea.

After a long lack of over 50 years, Steinberg was instrumental in helping to reopen the Asia Foundation business in Yangon in 2013. He even generously donated his sizable Myanmar-related book series to the office in 2019, only two years before the 2021 revolution forced its closing.

Steinberg was a well-known Eastern studies teacher at Georgetown University for many years. His intellectual career spanned 14 novels, most on Myanmar, but some also on Korea, along with 150 books, information and book chapters, and some 300 commentaries and opinion pieces, including in Asia Times.

He continued to write for a number of papers until well into 2024, including Frontier Myanmar and The Irrawaddy. His approach to realizing Myanmar was generally multi-disciplinary, seeking a consolidation of political perspectives, scientific investigation and the practicalities of advancement work.

In a 2007 meeting, he said,” I would describe my job as trying to bridge the spaces between recognized plans, the scientific community, and the non-profit area. So those in each industry would likely criticize me for not being sufficiently committed to their strategy (either theory or practice ). I strongly believe that these three industries can benefit from one another and their initiatives.

Very presciently, given the state of civil conflict and common suffering in Myanmar presently, he provided guidance to younger scholars. Think about how your research and study does, either directly or indirectly, improve the understanding of the numerous issues the citizens of that nation face, and thus improve their internal and external capacities to ameliorate their miserable condition. There are great theoretical and philosophical justifications for studying Burma, but the requirements in that world don’t seem to bother me at this point.

Steinberg was a vehement critic of Myanmar’s Western economic sanctions policies, which sparked a lot of resentment from some activists. However, his opinions finally spanned liberal concerns about how sanctions affected ordinary people of Myanmar.

He also supported important engagement with Myanmar’s prior military regimes. His long-standing presence there as a representative of the Asia Foundation, which he remembered with wonderful kindness, was frequently obscured by his critics. These reviewers occasionally made up inaccurate statements about him, forgetting that he was a follower of the sanctions that were put in place following the coupd’etat of 1988.

Steinberg was listed as one of the” Enemies of the Burmese Revolution” in a checklist released by the National League for Democracy in 2006. He wrote about his listing in an article from late-2023 in The Irrawaddy:” ( m ) ost of the names had titles, military units and comments on their views. Although the majority of those present were in the military, there were numerous foreigners of various cultures. I was listed as range 320 because Steinberg’s letter neared the end of the word, and I indicated that I opposed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s punishment plan. That was appropriate. Despite my lack of power, I didn’t appear to suffer as a result of being included.

This analyst first met Professor Steinberg at a 1998 conference held by the Australian National University ( ANU) in Canberra about the Burma/Myanmar Update. He was always really supportive of emerging scholars, total of attention and guidance, and craved hearing a multitude of varied study and perspectives. At the age of 86, he attended the yearly Burma/Myanmar Studies Conference in Singapore every program and was always crowded with newcomers and old pals. And he never stopped speaking.

On the sites of Asia Times in 2011, I had a vocal discussion with Steinberg about issues of punishment and human rights transparency in Myanmar. It was a tag of his personality that he bore no prejudices and I constantly valued his compassion, information and guidance, yet when we disagreed.

As he once told me,” we can agree on 95 % of problems and that other 5 % we can continue to believe but always debate” he again told me in Washington. He had an unquestionable person researcher part, and this is what. He was constantly available to question, explain, and discuss ideas with grace and wit. When disputes in Washington DC turned, as they frequently did, become heated, yet his opponents had to acknowledge that he was a class act.

Up until immediately before his passing, we kept in touch regularly. Professor Steinberg often regaled me with many anecdotes, including reminiscing in an email last month about a meal at Harvard in 1956 with Henry Kissinger, while also offering suggestions on each other’s published articles. With his characteristic understatement, he said of Kissinger,” (w ) e all know that being intelligent does not necessarily result in better policies”.

It would be an understatement to say that Professor Steinberg was alarmed by the military’s repression of power in 2021. Only someone with 70 years of experience with Myanmar could possibly express such pain to him.

He was thrilled, and in some respects vindicated, by the early years of the post-2011″ transition”, which at first seemed to expand openings and possibilities more than anyone had predicted. He already had growing concerns about the military’s involuntary maneuverings and the country’s future under the National League for Democracy even before the coup.

His post-coup writings conveyed those concerns, but as always he thought and argued with independence, reason and, as ever, a sense of how to improve the dire conditions of the country and its people.

His analysis was markedly more thoughtful, understanding, and informed than commentators his age, and he decried those who are “bound in webs of self-deception or propaganda” from Myanmar opposition figures and their Western courtiers, which is propaganda that permeates political action in Myanmar.

In one of his pieces from earlier this year, he wrote of the challenges of “assembling” a new Myanmar. The current leadership of all conflicting parties has shown to be ineffective at best and ineffective at reaching agreements necessary for reassembly. A new generation of leaders from all political parties who are willing to think critically is urgently needed, but power is a corrosive force that frequently undermines reality and is rarely voluntarily discarded… The current chaos is unacceptable to all parties, and yet no group has sought viable alternatives. There is a need for dialogue, discussion and compromise”.

The legacy of Professor Steinberg will serve as invaluable markers for what has failed in the past as Myanmar reassembles for a challenging future. But most importantly will be how he approached thinking and writing: with clarity, honesty and commitment.

Independent analyst David Scott Mathieson is engaged in conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues in Myanmar.

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