The killing of the al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Kabul by an ALL OF US drone strike on July 31 raises some crucial queries. It appears the judgment Taliban were aware of, and gave their own blessing to, al-Zawahiri staying in one of the home areas in Kabul. But did somebody in their hierarchy change him in to the ALL OF US – and if so , who and why?
It’s worth thinking about what this means for that relationship between the 2 groups: one an ailing global terror network, the other an insurgent group trying to obtain international legitimacy for the takeover in Afghanistan.
A little latest history is enlightening. In February 2020, a peace deal signed in Doha, Qatar between your Islamic Emirate associated with Afghanistan (the Taliban) and the US opened the way for Washington to withdraw US soldiers from Afghanistan after 20 years.
The Us citizens were promised the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan which usually pledged not to “allow any of its members, other individuals or even groups, including al-Qaeda, to use the dirt of Afghanistan in order to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. ”
The US hoped to use the Taliban to counter ISIS-K’s growing threat in the area. Desperate for cash and international recognition, this sealed the deal on the Afghan part.
But even if these were publicly praised, the Doha accords were not accepted and honored by all . The pledge in order to sever ties along with al-Qaeda created rubbing inside the Taliban. This was largely a generational divide. On one part was a younger, a lot more technologically savvy plus English-speaking leadership group that saw a chance to rebuild the group’s image and attract vital funds to rebuild civil society. On the other side were older Taliban fighters.
A faction of these older fighters is certainly loyal to Abdul Ghani Baradar , who was appointed deputy chief after the Taliban takeover. The Mullah Siblings group mostly originate from the Taliban heartland around Kandahar within the south of Afghanistan and represent a hardline jihadist point of view.
Furthermore opposed to the Doha accords is the militant Haqqani network , that is thought to have been instrumental in installing al-Zawahiri in Kabul inside a house owned simply by Sirajuddin Haqqani, today the interior minister within the Taliban government within Kabul.
The particular Mullah Brothers as well as the Haqqani network represent a more militant side of the Taliban that will feel that the Doha agreement not to aid or support al-Qaeda sets them towards a group which is ideologically close to them, within breach of the Pashtun program code which forbids betrayal.
This instability within the Taliban surfaced even as the last US aircraft left the country within August 2021, as well as the various factions started to jockey for primacy in the new administration. Haqqani’s appointment because interior minister can be thought to have been a sop to his faction but it has not eased the tension, according to a high-ranking official of the disbanded Afghan Army, who seem to told me:
Sirajuddin Haqqani has never obeyed the Quetta Council of the Taliban, for he looks at himself the conqueror of Kabul. Therefore there is little doubt that created a safe haven for Ayman al-Zawahiri – remember, that was a Haqqani guesthouse.
Another Afghan cleverness officer told me: “The truth is, in spite of their own promise, the Taliban – and the Haqqani network in particular – have never really reduce ties with al-Qaeda, going against that which was agreed with the US. ”
Did the US have nearby help?
It is still too early to know what happened – and the whole truth may never emerge. The drone strike acquired reportedly been prepared for months.
It may well have been prepared and executed without any local assistance, plus might just have been right down to first-rate intelligence function. But the kind of surgical operation carried by an US drone within a heavily guarded region suggests at least a few help in tracking al-Zawahiri’s precise location.
And, in an area of the world torn by poverty, meals insecurity and rampant corruption, the US$25 mil reward to uncover al-Zawahiri’s secure house would have been a solid incentive.
Let us assume that someone will claim that reward just for assisting the US. There are two possible situations. Despite being near to al-Qaeda, the Mullah Brothers group acquired much to gain simply by revealing al-Zawahiri’s place. In addition to the rewards, they can advance their own influence by dealing a blow to Haqqani’s credibility while improving their own political placement.
The second situation deals with regional characteristics. Traditionally, members of the Pakistani Inter-Services Cleverness (ISI) have loved fairly strong ties with the Afghan Taliban . These connections are usually reportedly still solid – particularly with all the Haqqani network.
Both of the Afghan officers who spoke with me said that Pakistaner intelligence would have come under strong politics pressure to cooperate with the US. The intelligence officer told me that not only do Islamabad give Wa permission to use the airspace to carry out the particular attack, but “members of the ISI might have disclosed and/or confirmed al-Zawahiri’s location to prevent economic collapse in some areas. ”
Bracing for the fallout
Regardless of all of this, al-Qaeda has suffered a tremendous blow. Al-Zawahiri was there from the beginning – the most important figure after Osama bin Laden, inspiring and galvanizing jihadists around the globe. He or she was considered a tactical genius, instrumental in planning spectacular attacks – including 9/11 – in addition to in the identification plus infiltration of new cinemas of operation.
It will not be easy to replace an element of their caliber. But al-Qaeda has previously demonstrated a strong capacity for regrouping, and al-Zawahiri’s reduction could represent a chance to bring in a younger and more technologically experienced leader who can speak to the next generation of aspiring jihadists around the world.
As for Afghanistan, al-Zawahiri’s death might have dire implications. Claims of cooperating with the Americans will impact the already divided Taliban leadership – which could lead to bitter internecine fighting within this.
As well as the presence of a terrorist as prominent since al-Zawahiri supposedly beneath the protection of older Taliban cadres will never help US-Taliban relationships. It is a direct infringement of the Doha accords.
Any rift at the top of the Taliban would also permit other terror groupings operating in Afghanistan, such as ISIS-K , in order to expand their influence and operations, with terrible consequences regarding ordinary Afghans.
Michele Groppi is Teaching Other in Challenges to the International Order, Protection Studies Department, King’s University London
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