Second, this incident and India’s likely response will put an end to a period of relative tranquility in Kashmir since 2019 and since 2021, when both parties agreed to a ceasefire along the Line of Control ( LOC ) in Kashmir. The BJP-led state wanted to use the Kashmir state elections, which were held in October 2024, as evidence of the state’s close to widespread violence and terrorism, and the Pahalgam strike upended the notion of “normalcy” having returned to the Kashmir valley.
Second, given the potential retaliation from Pakistan, an increase, and international pressure, India may be concerned about how to evaluate it despite the enormous pressure to react physically. The dangers of such an increase were demonstrated in the 2019 event.
While India would prefer to halt the hostilities, it is in Pakistan’s best interest to allow things to rise and use the threat of nuclear weapons to stifle third-party treatment, to a limited extent. Pakistan has previously attempted to internationalize the Kashmir conflict, but India has regularly argued that it must be resolved solely by the two nations.
Pakistan has previously reaffirmed that it would be “act of war” to block or divert allocated liquid, and it has “reacted with full force across the entire range of national power.”
The United States has always urged both edges to be cautious in order to stop the conflict from escalating. The Trump administration has supported India in the wake of the harm this period, but it has not criticized Pakistan.
Pakistan’s request for an independent foreign investigation into the Pahalgam attacks has been supported by China, which has urged restriction on both sides. Pakistan denies any involvement in the attacks. An American military strike, under the leadership of Pakistan and China, could increase international pressure on it, especially if hostilities do not stop right away.