The US nuclear arsenal is at a juncture between essential development and strategic excess as prices soar and rivals advance.
The US Congressional Budget Office ( CBO ) reported this month that there has been a significant 25 % increase in the projected costs for maintaining and modernizing the US nuclear arsenal, which is now estimated at US$ 946 billion for 2025-2034.
The biennial report cites a shift in the covered time frame as well as higher costs for projects like the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) program, which has increased by 81 % over initial estimates.
The budget includes$ 370 billion for operations,$ 309 billion for distribution system industrialization,$ 72 billion for service upgrades,$ 79 billion for command and control development, and$ 29 billion to budget for cost overruns.
The DOE manages weapon upgrades while the DOD concentrates on distribution systems, while the DOD manages warhead upgrades through the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Strategic systems, such as submarines and ICBMs, are responsible for$ 454 billion, with the costs associated with nuclear command and control expected to be$ 15 billion. By 2031, the highest spending are anticipated to be more than 13.2 % of the DOD’s overall acquisition budget.
The report raises questions about finances sustainability and cost management while highlighting the growing economic burden of nuclear modernization in the face of proper imperatives.
As China’s ability to deter China effectively and maintain global stability is undermined by rising costs, aging arsenals, overburdened business bases, and a vague attitude toward limited nuclear war, the US’s present nuclear modernization strategy runs the risk of strategic overstretch.
A video was released this month by The Heritage Foundation, informing readers that US nuclear features may no longer be sufficient to stop China from occupying Taiwan.
It notes that the US has reduced its arsenal by 85 % since the end of the Cold War, leaving roughly 1,700 aging strategic warheads, the newest of which are 35 years old. These missiles and delivery systems remained in existence through Cold War-era life extension programs, immediately set to be replaced in the 1980s.
In stark contrast, Robert Peters points out in a statement from the Heritage Foundation in March 2025 that China is producing 100 nuclear weapons annually, which he describes as a “breathtaking” rate.
China’s 2024 China Military Power Report ( CMPR ), which highlights the point, estimates that it had 600 nuclear warheads as of 2024 and may have over 1, 000 by 2030.
According to the report, China’s expanding arsenal, which includes ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, hypersonic weapons, and fractional orbital bombardment ( FOB ) systems, could target more US cities, military installations, and leadership positions than it has ever before.
Although China claims to have a” no first use” nuclear policy, the documentary warns that gaps, such as high-altitude electromagnetic pulse ( HEMP ) strikes or limited nuclear attacks against Taiwan while claiming the self-governing island is its territory, leave that commitment ambiguous.
It also points out that China now has a local atomic advantage despite the US withdrawing its nuclear weapons from the Pacific following the Cold War. It warns that the US’s lack of tactical nuclear weapons limits its capacity to react if China strikes military targets in Taiwan, Guam, or at sea.
In a July 2023 Proceedings content, Paul Giarra asserts that the US risks becoming unyielding and vulnerable in a world where its opponents think of starting a minimal nuclear war by highlighting that capability gap.
A tactical nuclear weapons, the US is developing a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile ( SLCM-N), which will give the US senator more regional nuclear options on US ships and boats and give him more indicating alternatives in a problems.
In a 2025 article for Joint Force Quarterly, James Gifford mentions the distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, while the latter type is delivered using artillery, cruise missiles, short-to-medium range ballistic missiles ( SRBM/MRBM ) and other battlefield delivery techniques.
Additionally, the former type is regarded as a “war-winning” weapons that can end a fight by causing as much damage as the latter type, which is a low-yield weapon designed for targets whose destruction results in a military advantage as opposed to an absolute victory.
Gifford argues that even the most basic nuclear weapons have corporate effects that can achieve the highest levels of government, highlighting the problem with tactical nuclear weapons. He claims that if one or both edges overreact in a conflict between two nuclear-armed opponents, it is possible to go from a second nuclear attack to a minimal nuclear transfer to an all-out nuclear war.
Given the enormous costs, the diminishing US nuclear arsenal in comparison to China, and the risks of a nuclear increase in a Taiwan issue, it is difficult to say whether US nuclear development is on the right track.
In an article from August 2024, Geoff Wilson mentions difficulties and cost overruns related to the Sentinel ICBM, Columbia-class SSBN, and B-21 fighter, citing delays and cost overruns, that the US defence industry center has demonstrated itself capable of absorbing all the new, enormous costs associated with nuclear investing.
He claims that despite the US military industry base being able to cover these costs, rampant waste and production delays would still put a strain on the company’s ability to develop new weapons.
Wilson also warns against accidental nuclear escalation by using tactical nuclear weapons like the SLCM-N, which blurs the line between conventional and nuclear attacks.
Instead of pursuing destabilizing tactical nuclear weapons, he contends that the US should concentrate on enhancing secure second-strike capabilities through the development of ballistic missile submarines.
Instead, he points out that US lawmakers have chosen to simultaneously develop each leg of the US nuclear triad and allowed the development of completely unnecessary systems and missions ( i .e., limited nuclear strikes ) that have weakened global deterrence and cast doubt on the US’s commitment to nuclear arms control treaties.
If the US is unable to balance its nuclear ambitions with its strategic priorities and industrial realities, it might find itself outpaced by its own unsustainable choices rather than its own.