Xi Jinping is worried about the economy – what do Chinese people think?

The nervous leaders of China are pulling out all the halts to gurgling economies.

They have unveiled stimulus measures, offered rare cash handouts, held a surprise meeting to kickstart growth and tried to shake up an ailing property market with a raft of decisions – they did all of this in the last week.

Less obvious is how the downturn has affected regular Chinese people, whose anticipation and frustrations are frequently heavily censored.

However, two recent studies provide some information. The second, a study of Foreign attitudes toward the economy, revealed that people were becoming more optimistic and unsure about their futures. The second is a record of demonstrations, both real and online, that noted a surge in situations driven by economic problems.

Although the image is far from finished, it never ceases to give a unique insight into the country’s current economic climate and how Chinese people view the future.

Savings and investing have been negatively impacted by the rough public debt and rising poverty, aside from the real estate crisis. The nation’s second-largest economy properly miss its personal growth target- 5 %- this year.

The Chinese Communist Party is somber about that. A authoritarian regime that would never lose its grip on power offered the carrot of a repressive regime that had made China a world power as a result of violent progress.

The decline hit as the crisis ended, largely driven by three years of rapid and full lockdowns, which murdered economic activity.

The study by American faculty Martin Whyte of Harvard University and Scott Rozelle of Stanford University’s Center on China’s Economy demonstrates that there was a distinction between the ages before and after the crisis.

They conducted their studies in 2004 and 2009, before Xi Jinping became China’s chief, and during his law in 2014 and 2023. The trial sizes varied, ranging between 3, 000 and 7, 500.

Nearly 60 % of the respondents in 2004 reported that their families ‘ economic situation had improved over the previous five years, and that they were also optimistic about the upcoming five years.

The figures jumped in 2009 and 2014- with 72.4 % and 76.5 % respectively saying things had improved, while 68.8 % and 73 % were hopeful about the future.

But in 2023, only 38.8 % felt life had got much for their households. And less than half ( or about 47 % ) of respondents believed things would improve over the following five years.

Meanwhile, the proportion of those who felt pessimistic about the future rose, from just 2.3 % in 2004 to 16 % in 2023.

Although the studies were conducted on a nationwide representative sample of people between the ages of 20 and 60, getting access to a wide range of viewpoints is difficult in authoritarian China.

Respondents came from 29 provincial and operational areas in China, but Xinjiang and some of Tibet were exempt, according to Mr. Whyte, who argued that “extra costs are brought on by remoteness and political sensitivity” Home to ethnic minority, these tightly controlled places in the north-west have huge bristled under Beijing’s law.

The poll was not conducted by those who were unable to express their opinions, according to the experts. Those who did shared their opinions when they were told it was for educational purposes, and may be private.

Their anxieties are reflected in the choices that are being made by many young Chinese people. With unemployment on the rise, millions of college graduates have been forced to accept low-wage jobs, while others have embraced a “lie flat” attitude, pushing back against relentless work. Still others have opted to be “full-time children”, returning home to their parents because they cannot find a job, or are burnt out.

Experts believe China’s iron-fisted administration of Covid-19 played a major role in undoing people’s enthusiasm.

It served as a turning point for many because it demonstrated how totalitarian the state was in the eyes of anyone. Individuals felt policed like they had never when, according to Alfred Wu, an associate professor at Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

He continued, noting that the later pay cuts “exacerbated the trust crisis” and that many people were depressed.

Moxi, 38, was one of them. He left his job as a physician and relocated to Dali, a seaside town in southwest China that is now a favorite with young folks who want a break from demanding tasks.

” When I was still a psychiatrist, I did n’t even have the time or energy to think about where my life was heading”, he told the BBC. ” There was no place for enthusiasm or despair. It was just work”.

Job, however, no more seems to indicate a promising future, according to the poll.

In 2004, 2009 and 2014, more than six in 10 respondents agreed that “effort is often rewarded” in China. Those who disagreed amounted to 15 %.

Travel 2023, the mood flipped. Only 28.3 % believed that their hard work would pay off, while a third of them disagreed. The disagreement was strongest among lower-income families, who earned less than 50, 000 yuan ($ 6, 989, £5, 442 ) a year.

Chinese people are frequently told that the hard work and pursuit of degrees will pay off in economic success. A turbulent history has shaped a large portion of this desire, where individuals gritted their teeth through the suffering of war and hunger and plodded on.

Foreign leaders, too, have touted such a work ethics. Xi’s Taiwanese Dream, for example, echoes the American Dream, where hard work and skill give away. He has urged young persons to “eat bitterness”, a Taiwanese word for enduring pain.

However, the majority of the respondents to the Whyte and Rozelle review attributed the privileges enjoyed by their families and contacts to being wealthy in 2023. A decade before, interviewees had attributed success to ability, skills, a good education and hard work.

This is despite Xi’s signature “common prosperity” policy aimed at narrowing the wealth gap, although critics say it has only resulted in a crackdown on businesses.

According to the China Dissent Monitor ( CDM), there are other indicators of discontent, such as an 18 % increase in protests in the second quarter of 2024 in comparison to the same period last year.

The study defines protests as any instance when people voice grievances or advance their interests in ways that are in contention with authority – this could happen physically or online. Such episodes, however small, are still telling in China, where even lone protesters are swiftly tracked down and detained.

A least three in four instances are due to economic problems, said Kevin Slaten, one of the CDM article’s four readers.

Starting in June 2022, the team has documented nearly 6, 400 like events thus far.

They observed a rise in protests led by remote people and blue-collar employees against land catches and low wages, but they also observed middle-class citizens organizing due to the real estate crisis. In more than 370 cities, protests by people and building employees accounted for 44 % of the cases.

” This does not immediately think China’s market is imploding”, Mr Slaten was swift to stress.

Although, he added, “it is difficult to predict” how like “dissent does accelerate if the market keeps getting worse”.

Taiwanese officials are truly concerned.

Between August 2023 and Janaury 2024, Beijing stopped releasing youth unemployment figures after they hit a record high. At one point, Chinese officials coined the term “slow employment” to describe those who were taking time to find a job – a separate category, they said, from the jobless.

Censors have been cracking down on any source of financial frustration – vocal online posts are promptly scrubbed, while influencers have been blocked on social media for flaunting luxurious tastes. State media has defended the bans as part of the effort to create a “civilised, healthy and harmonious” environment. More alarming perhaps are reports last week that a top economist, Zhu Hengpeng, has been detained for critcising Xi’s handling of the economy.

According to Mr. Slaten, the Communist Party attempts to” shape what is perceived as bad” by” shaping what information people have access to or what is perceived as bad”

CDM’s study shows that, despite the level of state power, anger has fuelled demonstrations- and that will care Beijing.

In November 2022, a deadly fire – which killed at least 10 people who were not allowed to leave the building during a Covid lockdown – brought thousands onto the streets in different parts of China to protest against crushing zero-Covid policies.

Professors Whyte and Rozelle do n’t believe their findings suggest that “popular anger about… inequality is likely to explode in a social volcano of protest.”

However, they claim that the economic downturn has begun to “undermine” the legality the Party has cultivated through “decades of continual economic development and improved living requirements.”

The pandemic also haunts some Chinese citizens, said Yun Zhou, a sociology professor at the University of Michigan. Beijing’s” demanding already capricious responses” during the pandemic have heightened people’s uncertainty about the prospect.

And this is especially intense among marginalised groups, she added, quite as people caught in a” greatly biased” labour market and rural people who have long been excluded from welfare coverage.

Under China’s contentious “hukou” system of household registration, migrant workers in cities are not allowed to use public services, such as enrolling their children in government-run schools.

However, young people from cities have flocked to remote towns, drawn to low rents, picturesque landscapes, and greater freedom to pursue their dreams.

Moxi is relieved to have found a more leisurely pace in Dali. He said, quoting his previous work as a psychiatrist,” The number of patients who came to me for depression and anxiety disorders only increased as the economy boomed.”

” There’s a big difference between China doing well, and Chinese people doing well”.

Whyte, Rozelle and Alisky’s research is based on four sets of academic surveys conducted between 2004 and 2023.

In-person surveys were conducted together with colleagues at Peking University’s Research Center on Contemporary China (RCCC ) in 2004, 2009 and 2014. Participants ranged in age from 18-70 and came from 29 provinces. Tibet and Xingiang were excluded.

In 2023, three rounds of online surveys, at the end of the second, third and fourth quarters, were conducted by the Survey and Research Centre for China Household Finance ( CHFS ) at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in Chengdu, China. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 60.

In all surveys, the same questions were used. The researchers excluded participants aged 18-19 and 61-70 and reweighted all responses to be nationally representative in order to make responses comparable across all four years. A margin of error is included in all surveys.

The China Journal has accepted the study for publication, and it is anticipated to be published in 2025.

Since June 2022, researchers for the China Dissent Monitor ( CDM) have gathered data from a variety of non-government sources, including news reports, social media platforms that are active in China, and civil society organizations.

Dissident events are defined as those where a person or individuals use official and unofficial means of communication. Through physical repression or censorship, the government may react to any event that is highly visible and potentially dangerous.

These can include viral social media posts, demonstrations, banner drops and strikes, among others. Many events are challenging to independently verify.

Charts provided by Pilar Tomas of the BBC News Data Journalism Team.