It is also improbable that ardent liberals who view the Red Shirt Movement and Thaksin as corrupting forces will suddenly change their minds. Thaksin’s profit and later pardon are unlikely to put an end to the social unrest that his exile caused.
In both political and street-level politics, Thaksin has served as the lightning rod for conflict between rival groups for more than ten years. The current changes, however, imply that the tension’s center is shifting away from Thaksin.
All indications point to the establishment of a new democratic fault line centered on the monarchy’s function.
After all, Pheu Thai just gained access to the executive branch after explicitly promising to exclude the MFP and abstain from implementing monarchy-related reforms. Progressives will gravitate toward the MFP rather than Pheu Thai because they believe it is the legitimate party to carry out common transformation.
Conservatives, on the other hand, must choose between accepting Thaksin and Pheu Thai as the lesser of two evils and adopting a decidedly liberal stance that not longer offers deaf allegiance to the monarchy in order to adapt to new social challenges.
A SMALL COALITION
In response to these escalating tensions, the current administration has taken a resolute stance and has gathered all interests — aside from those favored by the MFP — into one grand coalition.
However, this coalition’s fragility calls into question its” grand” status. A one party or faction’s defection would not endanger the whole alliance in a real grand coalition, as demonstrated by the Thai Rak Thai in 2001.
But, as things stand, the only thing that could dislodge Srettha, a prime minister without social position, whether in Pheu Thai or the larger coalition, would be if the Bhumjaithai Party withdrew its support during the no-confidence debate.