As it has regularly done for decades, during the last few weeks the North Korean government reminded Washington, Seoul and Tokyo that it has unredressed grievances. Pyongyang signaled through several gestures that the long-running crisis on the Korean Peninsula will continue.
First, paramount leader Kim Jong Un reiterated in a September 9 speech that “there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons” even if the United States maintains economic sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Second, on the same occasion, Kim announced a standing order that DPRK commanders would launch nuclear weapons “automatically” if they lost communication with Kim. This was an answer to the South Korean government’s interest in developing a “decapitation” capability – preempting a DPRK missile launch by killing Kim to prevent him from giving the order.
Pyongyang is now saying that Kim’s assassination will cause the outcome Seoul hopes to avoid.
Third, Pyongyang said it would employ nuclear weapons if it expected an attack against an important DPRK strategic target or against the DPRK leadership, in effect announcing a nuclear first-use policy.
Fourth, North Korea fired off another barrage of ballistic missiles in what had already been its busiest year for missile tests. Pyongyang said the launches tested the “actual war capabilities” of “tactical nuclear operation units.”
An interest in building up a tactical nuclear weapons capability is frightening because it indicates Pyongyang sees nukes as a warfighting weapon rather than simply an insurance policy to deter an enemy invasion.
Fifth, the latest barrage included a ballistic missile that overflew Japan, an intentionally provocative act.
This new spate of ominous DPRK signals has brought a resurgence of calls for the United States to change its stagnant North Korea policy.
“North Korea has already won” and “The US should admit defeat,” says one representative article in the Financial Times published October 8.
The argument is as follows:
The core of US policy is pressuring Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Washington is willing to make a deal that would include economic and perhaps political benefits (such as diplomatic recognition) in exchange for the North Koreans trading away their nukes and missiles.
In the meantime, the United States refuses to officially recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state and maintains a collection of punitive restrictions on economic engagement with North Korea.
Current US policy, however, is a proven failure, the argument continues. Not only is Pyongyang keeping its nuclear weapons, but it is also improving, expanding and diversifying its delivery systems. The situation gets steadily more dangerous as Washington waits in vain for the Kim regime to relent.
The argument leads to the recommendation that Washington should drop the insistence on Kim getting rid of his nukes and missiles, accept the DPRK as a permanent nuclear weapons state and negotiate an arms control agreement with Pyongyang to lower the risk of conflict on the Peninsula.
This, by the way, is exactly the outcome Kim wants. For months he has broadcast that he aspires to international acceptance of the DPRK as a “responsible nuclear weapons state.” North Korean officials are reportedly encouraged by the experiences of India and Pakistan, which at first incurred US displeasure when they acquired nuclear weapons but later became US security partners.
Obviously, the US approach of offering economic and political rewards for de-nuclearization has not worked. It seems increasingly unlikely to work in the future as well.
The notion of seeking success through an arms control agreement with Pyongyang, however, has weaknesses that deserve serious consideration.
It is easy to uncritically assume that abandoning a bad policy will lead to success. Logically, this is not necessarily true. The new policy might prove just as bad or worse, even if in different ways.
Washington’s official stance of not recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state is a joint policy followed also by Seoul and Tokyo. These allies would see a US abrogation of this position as a minor betrayal, another reason to question US reliability, and the apparent end of the US commitment to eventual DPRK denuclearization.
Acquiescing to North Korea’s permanent possession of nuclear weapons not only would be a blow to nuclear non-proliferation; it would arguably be the worst instance of nuclear proliferation in human history, given the profound criminality of the Pyongyang regime.
Offering arms control talks would elevate Kim to a position of strength. Instead of an outlaw state seeking international respectability, North Korea would be a fellow member of the nuclear weapons club with the United States, buoyed by the victory of forcing Washington to back down from its previous refusal to reward Pyongyang’s violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Deciding to try for an arms control agreement is one thing; getting there is another.
Negotiations on a US-DPRK arms control agreement would likely be as difficult as were negotiations over de-nuclearization in 2018–2019. In 2018, Kim expressed willingness in principle to denuclearize.
By the time of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, however, it became clear that Kim was negotiating in bad faith, demanding sweeping sanctions relief while offering only the closure of obsolete nuclear research facilities in return.
Kim would still be pushing for an agreement in which he gains much of what he wants while giving the Americans little of what they want. Unquestionably, Kim would demand sanctions relief as a condition of any arms control agreement, immediately doing away with Washington’s strongest point of leverage.
Had denuclearization negotiations proceeded far enough, Pyongyang’s willingness to allow sufficient transparency and verification would have been gigantic hurdles. The same problems would arise in negotiations over an arms control agreement.
There is little reason to believe the DPRK would honor an arms control agreement. The Pyongyang government is notorious for cheating on and unilaterally repudiating its commitments.
It would be folly to assume that being officially recognized as a nuclear weapons state would somehow pacify the Kim regime and fundamentally transform its foreign policy.
Even with an arms control agreement, Pyongyang would still regularly accuse the United States of a “hostile” policy toward North Korea, using this as a justification for activities prohibited by the agreement. The accusation of aggressive intent and war-mongering by the USA would continue to be a useful domestic political tactic for a Kim regime that persistently fails to deliver prosperity at home.
In sum, it is very possible that tensions on the Peninsula would be no lower with an arms control agreement than they are now.
The idea that North Korea has “won” is dubious. Pyongyang has elected to build extraordinarily expensive weapons programs to counter a phantom threat (South Koreans are not hankering to absorb their impoverished cousins), diverting funds from economic development and isolating the country from trade and investment opportunities.
More accurately, no one is winning. The best that America’s current policy can promise is to maintain deterrence while the DPRK bolsters its arsenal, periodically tries to intimidate its adversaries and falls farther behind South Korea in economic and human development.
Alas, that might be the least bad option available.
Denny Roy ([email protected]) is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu. He specializes in strategic and international security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Follow him on Twitter: @Denny_Roy808.