Overview / Overvie w
- The Kiel Start for the World Economy (Institut für Weltwirtschaft, IfW), Germany’s the majority of influential economic think tank, runs the Ukraine Support System. The IfW reviews that “newly dedicated aid for Ukraine dropped to nearly zero in This summer. ”
- Commenting at the announcement that gas pipeline Nord Stream 1 would be power down for three days of upkeep, Bundesbank (German central bank) head Joachim Nagel said that German inflation could exceed 10% this drop.
- The price of natural gas strike an all-time high of US$310, over 17 times the 2003-2020 average of $18. Putin now gathers the same amount of money with regard to only 1/17 th the 2020 volume sold. The Russian current account, says Bloomberg, is strong enough with regard to Moscow to shut Europe off from the gas for a season.
- Ukrainian armed forces Commander-in-Chief General Valery Zaluzhny said that “nearly nine, 000” Ukrainian soldiers had died in the war so far. In early June, Oleksii Arestovych of the Office of the President of Ukraine said that the Ukrainian Army had experienced 10, 000 killed in action (KIA).
- US think tank ISW (Institute for the Research of War) and Britain’s MI6 continue to keep predict “culmination” plus “exhaustion” of the Russian offensive in the Donbas. The evidence? Slow progress.
- The slow yet steady advance of Russian ground troops alternating with huge artillery barrages (now outgunning Ukrainian pushes by at least 5 rounds to one along the 1200-kilometer frontline) is definitely evident from Ukrainian General Staff reviews.
- Newsweek reports a good estimate by upon the market US Marine Corps Colonel Mark Cancian that the supply of HIMARS missiles provided by the US to Ukraine will be depleted within the next three to four months. Cancian is really a senior adviser with all the Center for Proper and International Research.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on August 24 (Ukrainian Independence Day) that this coming offensive – by his own phrases coming since May and winning by September – will liberate the Donbas and Crimea. This particular latest announcement failed to contain a date associated with completion.
Center / East
Of the 1, 200-kilometer-long front line achieving from Kharkov in the northeast to the Kherson region in the southwest, the most active events over the past several months happen to be from Izium and Sloviansk down to Bakhmut and farther south near Avdivka, west of the city of Donetsk.
More recently, Russian forward action has picked up together a line through Marinka south of Donetsk through Vuhledar to the Dnepr River south of the town Zaporizhia.
In the area southeast of Izium toward Sloviansk plus farther east close to Siversk, company-size Ruskies ground forces are usually probing dozens of villages on a daily basis, only to escape again and hit the area with heavy artillery fire.
Farther southern, Russian forces are usually pressing into Soledar and the edges associated with Bakhmut. Around Donetsk, Russian forces are slowly pushing away from Pisky heading southwest to Pervomaiske together highway M-04.
Farther to the south west, there’s activity all of the along the line of contact from Vuhledar in order to Velyka Novosilka. The patterns are identical: small unit probes followed by targeted artillery massed fire
South
In the southern part of Kherson region, to be liberated by September according to President Zelensky, there is still simply no evidence of an Ukrainian offensive.
Russian forces executed probes in the direction of Mykolaiv, followed by artillery fireplace. Artillery and air strikes continued towards Ukrainian positions in the bridgehead across the Inhulets River (about 72 kilometers northeast associated with Kherson).
Ukrainian forces continue to perform long-range artillery attacks (primarily HIMARS) against Russian lines associated with communication and again struck the Kakhovka Bridge across the Dnepr River.
Assessment
The basis for the culmination argument tirelessly innovative by the British Ministry of Defense, MI6 and US think tank ISW is situated mainly in the gradual movement of the Russians after their successes in taking Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk.
Why have got Siversk, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Bakhmut still not fallen? How about the Ukrainian fortified positions at Avdivka?
An American military intelligence officer points to historical precedents for such odd hesitation by Ruskies forces over the past 8 weeks.
He cites the observation by BH Liddell Hart of the puzzling behavior of the Russians in World War II after the critical victory on Kursk: Advance of Russian forces has been very slow and never able to decisively exploit obvious holes within the German line. But the successes kept coming and the Red Army leadership never risked or incurred a significant loss or a major flanking motion again as experienced happened at the outset of Germany’s Operation Barbarossa.
It’s a legitimate and important statement. The initial Russian rush in Kiev had been clearly based on faulty intelligence inspiring sloppy Blitzkrieg-type advances with out in-depth logistical back-up.
It was the opposite of the doctrine of “deep operations”, which had been produced by Russian Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky prior to WORLD WAR II and prior to their political purge simply by Joseph Stalin within 1937. Although Tukhachevsky did not survive, his doctrine did: Stalin to his credit allowed his top generals to implement it after the preliminary defeats in 1941.
In an offensive mode, “deep operations” demand assault actions over the very wide front side – underpinned by principle of simultaneity attained by developing the largest possible get in touch with area in order to force the enemy in order to forego tactical level. The Russian setting after Kursk had been to probe plus attack on a broad front with combined-arms force.
Probes would be exploratory but hard enough to be defended and to establish an advantageous attrition rate plus – at a provided moment – to attain local superiority. This could be the time and place to deploy the “shock army” so far held in reserve however inserted into the infringement for an operational discovery.
The Red-colored Army after Kursk enjoyed both manpower and firepower superiority but still lacked mobility to counter speedy tactical flanking moves by the enemy. Proceeding slowly and methodically was the appropriate technical answer.
It looks and sounds familiar. Importantly, and as opposed to the Red Army in 1943, Russian forces at present also enjoy virtual overall air superiority. Under these circumstances, a significant massing of forces by the Ukrainians for a breakthrough offensive will be a fool’s errand.
It would run into the same devastating heavy operations trap since did German generals Erich von Manstein and Guenther vonseiten Kluge.
Follow Uwe Parpart on Twitter at @uwe_parpart