Commentary: Why North Korean troops in Russia are raising concerns in South Korea

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THE NORTH KOREAN END OF THE BARGAIN

The North Korean end of the bargain is better, if it does get a technological assist from Russia. A lengthy stalemate also sends home a nice monthly “stipend”, paid to the government not the soldiers. They will likely receive fraction of their earnings, if they make it back at all.

Russia has used foreigners and prisoners for its human wave attacks, what the Ukrainians call “meat assaults”. Russia’s casualties in the war have been enormous; Western estimates suggest over 1,000 per day just this past September. Russian generals continue to treat the war as a question of quantity, which helped power the Soviet Union to victory in World War II.

The North Koreans are expected to be forced into this meat grinder, with grave consequences probably promised for those considering desertion or defection.

But this is likely irrelevant to Kim and Putin, who are ideologically alike. Both deeply resent Western power and America’s forward basing in their regions. Both are also wary of over-dependence on China, which does not fully support their revisionist, anti-Western goals. This is an alliance of convenience, but one that especially benefits North Korea, the weaker partner.

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Commentary: When everything is viewed from the lens of national security in China, even adoption isn’t safe

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ESCALATING CHINA-US Conflicts

A more plausible reason for China’s international adoption ban lies in the rising Sino-American geopolitical tensions and Beijing’s shift toward a security-centric policy model, as the Russian case suggests the social underpinnings of program termination.

In accordance with this interpretation, China’s choice to halt foreign adoptions is in line with its resistance to sharing genetic information and its efforts to replace European technology with private options.

The root of the issue is China’s rapidly declining diplomatic trust since about 2018; this is where it is at. The COVID-19 crisis only served to worsen this faith deficit, leading to efforts to oversecuritize, a practice that makes every policy issue an existential threat to national security, thus justifying extraordinary measures. This evolving craze has fostered a “looking-glass” result, wherein perceived securitisation in one region instills identical reactions from its rivals.

As the US moves to prevent its semiconductor industry, supply stores and biotech industry, China’s fear intensifies. This stress may convince China to securitise recently mild plan domains, such as foreign adoption, in an attempt to alleviate perceived vulnerabilities.

Prior to the adoption restrictions, countless stories on Chinese media praised the devotion and compassion of British families who adopted Chinese kids with special needs. The contrast between China’s perceived inability to care for disabled children and the success stories of these American-reached children could be used by Washington or “hostile causes” to criticize China’s structure and strengthen National delicate energy.

As an article published in Guancha.cn, a famous Chinese news site noted for its pro-government and West-skeptical opinions, observed when justifying the government’s decision, the instances of adopted children achieving success “are usually over-interpreted by those with hidden intentions, using them as material to compliment the United States”.

This oversecurization may also contribute to China’s rigid approach to international adoption. In the aftermath of Russia’s 2013 adoption ban, the US Department of State successfully negotiated for about 250 children, whose adoptions were already in progress, to join their prospective families. Despite fervent pleas from American families with pending adoptions in China, the Chinese government has not yet displayed this flexibility.

The discordant response from Chinese citizens underscores this issue: While many Chinese citizens express regret and incomprehension regarding their government’s decision, some observers and commentators, including those who have traditionally been critical of the Chinese government, tend to view it as a natural extension of the end of population control measures or as a crucial step in putting an end to a legalized form of child trafficking. Others highlight the difficulties that children face when they are reshaped into families and cultures that are profoundly different from their own.

A foreign journalist, herself an adoptee, described feeling” cathartic” upon seeing China’s international adoptions end.

There is a lack of concern for the fate of more than 50, 000 children in Chinese state orphanages because there is n’t a unified voice in the decision, and few American politicians are willing to speak out on behalf of adoptive families. This dispersed support further limits the ability of US Department of State officials to reach an agreement with Beijing to expedite the adoption process.

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Commentary: Possibility of Trump 2.0 should push China to recalibrate foreign policy

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NOT ALL DOOM AND GLOOM

Trump 2.0, which is currently at a traditional small, is widely believed by China watchers as a worsening of bilateral ties between the country’s two largest economies. If Trump is elected, he has previously stated in interviews that he would consider imposing yet higher tariffs on Chinese imports.

A prospective Trump administration may not be all doom and gloom from the perspective of China, but it is understandable.

First of all, the Taiwanese administration has long believed that whoever wins the White House, Trump or Kamala Harris, will likely not have a significant impact on relationships. When China wants to concentrate on strengthening its domestic market, the best they may wish for is stabilizing the relationship.

In many ways, Trump’s personal transactional approach to US management in foreign affairs could function in China’s behalf geopolitically. Trump reaffirmed his long-held reservations about protecting Taiwan in the event of an invasion from the Chinese mainland in a new interview.

Trump 2.0 might ease Beijing’s view on the Taiwan issue, which Beijing views as the most significant crimson line in diplomatic relations.

Trump’s risk to establish higher tariffs on Chinese imports may have a significant impact on China’s imports and production, but it should be understood that he would pursue everyone who has a trade deficit with the US, including the European Union.

Additionally, his repeated warnings to NATO allies to improve their defense spending, which Trump advisers have reportedly suggested may cause Washington and these European countries to grow more tense.

All of this could give China a much-needed opportunity to challenge Washington’s cobbled together effort to counteract Beijing’s alleged rising and forceful effect.

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Commentary: Can China really end the Russia-Ukraine war with one phone call?

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Because they are inexpensive and help its employees to concentrate on higher-end labor, speeding up production and lowering costs, Moscow imports Chinese products en masse. However, if China were to stop all dual-use exports to Russia, especially car parts, local production might take the place of the majority of them. It would undoubtedly cost money and cause pain, but it would n’t be enough to undermine its military.

In any case, China is no Russia’s even facilitator. The Kremlin may rely on Iran, North Korea, and even products that have been secretly imported from the West by third parties.

CHINA’S VESTED INTEREST IN RUSSIA

Given that China has no desire to stifle Russia, it is still up for discussion about possible Chinese pressure. Ukraine has been at war for far more than two decades.

If Mr. Xi had acted if he had come to the conclusion that the Russian invasion had really endangered China’s security or well-being. Beijing’s position on this conflict’s end is unavoidable.

To be clear, China has maintained that it is a natural party in the fight in Ukraine and that it will work to promote peace talks. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, claimed last month that Mr. Xi stated in a telephone call that he would not buy weapons to Russia.

Beijing, however, has a interest in Moscow’s victory over Ukraine.

First, Russia is the only world authority with close ties to China. Beijing may be left alone in its struggle with the United States and its fierce empire system in the event of a defeated and weakened Russia.

Likewise, a strong Russia may help balance Washington. If Mr. Xi, also, used force to resolve the Japanese conflict or another border conflicts, he would be grateful to have Vladimir Putin’s strong hand.

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