Commentary: Anwar’s PKR leadership race won’t be a race at all – and that’s the point

CALCULATED Goes

The lieutenant administration has always been a conflict zone for PKR.

In the” Sheraton Walk” in February 2020, next deputy leader Azmin Ali, along with about a dozen different PKR MPs, defected from the group, leading to the decline of the Pakatan Harapan state. Following Mr Azmin’s withdrawal, Mr Rafizi beat Mr Saifuddin to get the deputy president place in the 2022 group vote.

If Mr Rafizi, 47, were to be challenged in the upcoming election and lose, he had certainly lose his government.

Given his age and background as Selangor’s general secretary, 45-year-old PKR vice president Amirudin Shari appears to be the only real contender to succeed Mr. Rafizi.

Both people face a problem. To battle risks losing their current jobs, to abstain from doing so would stifle their political passions, and to challenge one’s present position.

Mr. Anwar could replace Mr. Rafizi in the government if Mr. Amirudin were to face off against him, successfully dethroning him.

For Mr Amirudin, nevertheless, the stakes are high. Selangor is Malaysia’s most powerful state in terms of economics, and his position as general secretary gives him a lot of fat. If Mr. Amirudin were to gain, it might cost him both his party control and his position as chief minister.

In light of this circumstance, Mr. Anwar might be able to employ Tengku Zafrul Aziz, a minister of trade and investment, who is close to the original prince. There is a growing rumor that Mr. Zafrul, who is currently employed by the United Malays National Organization ( UMNO ), is considering joining PKR in an apparent bid to become Selangor’s next chief minister.

His relationships to Malaysia’s nobility, whose family is a member of the royal family, may assist Mr. Anwar strengthen his relations to the Sultan of Pahang, whose marriage has been strained by the Najib clause story.

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Commentary: The real costs of Indonesia’s free school lunch programme can’t be ignored

NOT A Cure

Given that the program involves thousands of restaurants and other service companies in transportation and logistics, good governance (especially food safety ) would be a must. &nbsp,

Additionally, it is crucial to understand the responsibilities of numerous federal bodies, including the National Nutrition Agency, the Coordinating Ministry of Food Affairs, the Ministry of Health, and the local institutions. The widespread use of the military and the centralized home method could also stifle local micro and small businesses, which the government intended to support. &nbsp,

The president’s free school meals program is not a cure for addressing Indonesia’s triple burden of health issues. &nbsp,

Additionally, it might not be the only program that may address the problem. Stunting, for instance, is an irreversible malnutrition issue after the age of two years old, which is already being addressed under the National Strategy to Accelerate Stunting Prevention ( Stranas ). It is caused by factors beyond foods supply. Free school meals programs are not a program to stop stunting, but they can help reduce the long-term effects of malnutrition. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

Indonesia’s completely school lunch program would be more successful if it was coordinated with other complementing programs. These include behavioral modification, improved diet habits, and monitoring children’s health standing at college both at the baseline and throughout the program. &nbsp,

Another needed comparable programmes include actual actions, deworming programmes and food fortress.

Besides more targeted treatments, there are other programs to handle Indonesian children’s health status that might be easier to implement and more cost-efficient. This includes intended subsidies to full-day school, which has been proven to positively impact children’s advancement including demographic status. &nbsp,

In short, there is no such thing as a free meal. The potential consequences and coverage gaps should be addressed by the state.

Maria Monica Wihardja is an alternative associate professor at the National University of Singapore and a visiting brother and co-coordinator of the Media, Technology, and Society Programme at the ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute. She oversaw the meal plan changes and stunting protection plan at the Executive Office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 2017. Arianto Patunru is a fellow of ANU Indonesia Project, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, &nbsp, Australian National University and the president of Center of Indonesian Policy Studies. This remark first appeared on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s site, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Be careful about predicting downfall of Myanmar’s ‘failed junta’ as it enters fifth year in power

False THINKING

Needless to say, those statements proved to be quite early. More than any goal analysis, it most reflected hopeful thinking. Even then, 12 weeks later, some observers are insisting that the coup is “in end drop”.

Despite its countless difficulties, the junta has proven remarkably resilient. It also controls Myanmar’s financial heartland and the bulk of the population. It is supported by China and Russia, both of whom are providing hands and political defense. The junta enjoys major export revenues and is able to dodge the majority of its sanctions. It has also demonstrated that, when required, it can be flexible, and may affect ceasefire talks with its competitors.

The criticism movement has made significant defense gains, but it still has squabbled over strategic goals. Although the tribal armed groups and NUG have a common objective, little has been agreed on other issues. Despite military successes, the opposition also suffers from a lack of sources. The NUG has been unable to secure destructive assistance or official recognition from any international institutions.

What will happen in 2025 is a challenge to foresee. Myanmar has always been able to surprise spectators. One important factor to observe, however, will be the continuing devotion and unity of the armed forces, which holds the key to the regime’s success. There are obviously deep holes in the Tatmadaw but, to time, it has maintained its domestic discipline and, so-called “defectors” away, obeyed the regime’s purchases.

In that respect, however, the detection last year of a latent recruitment law constitutes a major gamble. Great care has been taken for years to shape and influence the thinking of the armed troops rank and file. Therefore, the introduction of more than 20 000 angry and possibly mutinous men and women, who are probably all trained and armed, must be seen as a real threat. It suggests that the military’s workforce shortfall is still a significant issue.

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Commentary: Najib Razak’s new bid for house arrest leaves Malaysia in a political funk

CAPITALISING ON UNCERTAINTY

As Malaysia watches this political crisis unfold, did Najib, who when stood at the height of authority, engineer a return that reshapes the region’s political landscape? Or does his request for home arrest turn out to be his most successful campaign on the political stage in Malaysia?

Najib appears to be capitalising on the confusion. Najib is aware that chaotic elections can make for the ideal setting for biblical returns, especially during times of crisis.

During the COVID-19 crisis, Najib carefully orchestrated his common picture, steering discussions on financial issues on social media platforms. He blasted the current government for downplaying the effects of the pandemic and dismissing a potential financial downturn while riding on hatred on the ground.

He was praised for” committed to contributing his day, strength, and thoughts as a team for the sake of the Malaysian Family” during a meeting with then-prime secretary Ismail Sabri Yaakob.

Despite his constitutional issues, many still view his career as a period of relative wealth.

While Malaysia’s economic indicators have been improving- improve estimates on Friday ( Jan 17 ) show GDP rose 5.1 per share in 2024 over 2023’s 3.6 per share- stagnant wages, poverty and a lack of high-paying work reflect development considerations.

Although not exclusive to Malaysia, there are numerous instances of officials regaining power in a time of conflict and discord.

The election in November in the United States is yet another illustration of how, despite doubt, people frequently gravitate toward well-known characters who have a stronger past, whether real or imagined.

For Najib, this worldwide tendency toward nostalgia may prove to be a potent tool in his campaign for democratic rebirth, possible allowing for a dramatic comeback to Malaysian politics.

Dr. Sophie Lemiere, a political anthropologist with a focus on South Asian and Indonesian politics, has worked as a researcher and educator at leading universities in Europe, the United States, and Southeast Asia. She is now a Research Fellow at College de France in Paris as well as an Complement Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in Washington.

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Commentary: The report card for Prabowo’s first 100 days? A confused one

Prabowo’s finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, had been talking up the plan for decades. After serving in former senator Joko” Jokowi” Widodo’s government, she stayed on as a sign of stability to the business group. The VAT boost would have been like a stability, as laid out by a 2021 rules.

Prabowo gave in to critics, reversing the entire VAT increase and shifting its focus to luxury goods. Similar to a shift from the Jokowi case, Sri Mulyani and Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto voted in favor of the program, saying that they would support the meals.

PRABOWO’S NEXT 100 DAYS

It’s an interesting comparison to the former president’s personal experiences with premature controversial economic measures.

Only months after his 2014 opening, Jokowi cut the gas payment. Although Jokowi wore it simply despite low-level demonstrations and annual inflation higher than current levels, it was a move that predated him and was introduced during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono time.

Prabowo’s initial 100 days could be less significant than his future. He suggested last month that provincial primary elections be abolished and that a program be put in place where these positions are chosen by local legislatures.

The idea sparked fears among those who support democracy and those who oppose it, believing that Prabowo’s strongman ambitions are just beginning. Prabowo-aligned parties have already confirmed they would at least” consider” the plan. It may require a revision of the election law, which is already scheduled to be discussed this time.

Erin Cook is a blogger who writes about politics in Southeast Asia and writes the regular Dari Mulut untuk Mulut newsletter. &nbsp, This remark initially appeared on the Lowy Institute’s site, Interpreter.

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Commentary: Vietnam’s high-speed rail hits the brakes on foreign funding

Some experts wonder if a job like this can be funded solely by public funding. Given General Secretary To Lam’s plans to merge and remove some state and gathering agencies, as well as operational paralysis brought on by the powerful crackdown on corruption, these concerns are not false.

Vietnam is identify the US$ 13.38 billion Long Thanh Airport as a victory history in its emerging, separate approach to network. What will be the biggest airports in Vietnam, serving as a local cargo and passenger hub, is the main buyer, according to the state-owned Airports Corporation of Vietnam. Almost a year earlier than expected, the project is on schedule to be finished.

Should there be a need for international support, the door is open for the high-speed rail project, with safeguards in place to prevent giving up too many autonomy. Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh is in charge of issuing government bonds and mobilizing ODA and international money in case of delays under the investment strategy.

To ensure Asian hands continue to control the high-speed rail’s operations, preservation, and long-term management, foreign bids may include commitments to technology transfer and human resource education. Hanoi has previously requested that Vietnamese citizens receive scholarships for studying railroad executive there.

To ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

It is too early to determine the president’s method. May it adopt a hybrid technique that combines domestic and foreign sources, or will it only rely on local sourcing? The protections, however, suggest that the project is being prioritized over foreign investors and businesses.

Infrastructure projects are seen as a catalyst for the Vietnamese Communist Party’s plan to become a high-income state by 2045. Vietnam invests almost 6 % of GDP, the highest percentage in Southeast Asia, in system development, including the optimistic upgrade of its 1, 290 miles of federal highway to 5, 000 kilometres by 2030.

The benefits of high-speed bridge are self-evident. It is anticipated to contribute an additional 0.97 % to GDP growth and provide members with safe, effective ways to travel the nation. Vietnam may follow a similar strategy to maintain its level of corporate autonomy over the task.

Vietnam’s involvement with high-speed rail may also contribute to facilitating a stronger local railroad link between the Greater Mekong Subregion. Regional companions might try to emulate its self-sustainable design.

Vietnam’s high-speed road job represents more than just facilities development- it signals a fundamental change in the nation’s financial strategy. Vietnam is taking a bold new path toward real financial independence after three years of properly balancing foreign affects.

Whether this ambitious self-funding type proves responsible for a US$ 67 billion project remains an open question, and achievement is far from guaranteed.

However, if Vietnam does well, its strategy may change the way developing countries approach major infrastructure projects, giving them a fresh way to achieve proper freedom that deviates from the traditional constraints of foreign funding.

Nicholas Chapman is a Researcher at Tohoku University, Japan. This remark initially appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: PAS saw an opening and turned to Najib, but now is left alone to dry

WHAT’S BEHIND PAS ‘ SUPPORT FOR NAJIB?

First, PAS ‘ support for Najib could be seen as another military move to cut the unity state. The opposition had a great opportunity to learn from the different viewpoints within UMNO, as well as among UMNO and other unity government people.

By raising the issue regularly, to the point of making a parliamentary motion, PAS could cause further internal disagreements in the government. There is a distinction between effectively using this issue to divide your rivals and really showing up at a unity rally in droves in support of Najib, though. The latter is a possibly difficult move that most events, including PAS ‘ coalition partner Bersatu, have deliberately avoided.

The potential benefits of making such a shift has undoubtedly outweigh the costs. The reward for going all-in may be significant enough for PAS to do. It must be so important for PAS to hazard risking its political views on corruption, its alliance with Bersatu, and even the belief that it has backed down in its past hostility with UMNO.

The main explanation is possible that PAS saw this as a chance to meet the government.

As the largest bloc in parliament, PAS, which has 43 seats, still has potential to join the government ( rumors of PAS possibly joining have been around for a while ), and the party is unlikely to miss an opportunity to do so.

If the imperial memorandum controversy is properly destructive to the authorities and a change is proposed in favor of UMNO and Najib’s faction, PAS, as the main supporter, would undoubtedly take the place of DAP.

For restructuring would also aid PAS in resolving a second scuffle that it has with Bersatu, where domestic disagreements usually seem to be on the verge of severance. The departure of PAS vice-president Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar as the coalition manager next month is a telling indication of the latest rift.

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Commentary: South China Sea tensions more likely to go up than down

IN 2025, WHAT OTHER REASONS TO ATTEND

What about South China Sea counterparts?

The CCG may continue to harass fishing boats, review boats, and drilling programs in the EEZs of the other plaintiff state. However, they won’t succumb to Chinese pressure to back up their nine-dash range states.

Nor did they engage in serious conversations with China over mutual enhancement of assets, perhaps though Malaysia, Brunei, and in 2024 for the first time, Vietnam and Indonesia, have all hung China along by intimating they may. After all, there is little reason for them to discuss what legitimately belongs to them with China, whose nine-dash range a United Nations-backed constitutional court ruled in 2016 was unconstitutional.

In 2025, it’s interesting to watch whether China will rebel against Vietnam’s substantial land restoration in the Spratlys, which presently cover roughly half the landmass that China itself reclaimed from Vietnam to construct its seven artificial archipelago in 2013 to 2016. If Vietnam constructs landing strips based on those attributes, it will be able to launch air energy much further into the South China Sea.

So far, China has remained motionless, at least officially. That may be due to its desire to maintain diplomatic ties with Vietnam, which have been progressing very favorably. Or it might be that at a time when it has a lot to do with the Philippines, it doesn’t want to battle Vietnam. Or perhaps because Vietnam is never a US supporter, it has been spared from China’s anger. Time will tell whether Beijing’s standoff with Hanoi may continue.

The ASEAN and China agreements for a Code of Conduct will probably be the least important thing to see in the South China Sea this time.

Since 2014, discussions have been dragging on. The two parties have read three readings of the draft code, with each reading presenting a thorough analysis of the text from beginning to end, as well as the relationship between the upcoming COC and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ( DOC).

As such, ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn’s forecast that the script will get finalised in 2025 is absolutely impossible.

Absent any kind of reputable conflict management systems, what we can expect to observe this year in the South China Sea is more driving, water cannoning, abuse, military posturing, arms buying and terraforming.

In other words, business as usual.

Ian Storey is Older Fellow at ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute. This remark initially appeared on ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute’s website, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Manmohan Singh, India’s quiet reformer who taught a generation to dream

Singh and his colleagues were able to persuade us that in a post-socialist, market-led&nbsp, business, we, too, may be free to fight our&nbsp, dreams. With learning and hard labor, our lives, too, may be significantly better than our parents’, upward mobility may no longer be an exclusive preserve of the wealthy.

The transformation job stayed on course throughout the 1990s despite changes in institutions. However, Singh’s second word as prime minister saw the deterioration of the claim.

The ungainly Congress-led&nbsp, partnership government he ran from 2009 was besieged, from one side, by crony entrepreneurs gorging on loan from state-owned lenders just to siphon off funds into&nbsp, their Swiss bank accounts. From the other side, it was under attack by a political opposition that blamed Singh’s indecisive leadership for rampant corruption, high inflation, slowing growth and a falling rupee.

” I do not believe that I have been a weak prime minister”, Singh said in one of his last press conferences, just a few months before the Hindu right-wing leader Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party swept the 2014 election. I sincerely believe that history will benefit me more than the current media or, for that matter, the opposition in parliament.

That prediction didn’t take too long to get&nbsp, tested. In November 2016, Prime Minister Modi&nbsp, banned 86 per cent of India’s currency overnight. Singh, who described the move as “organised loot and legalised plunder” &nbsp, said it would crush&nbsp, economic growth. He was right.

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Commentary: Should Selangor take Kuala Lumpur back?

The Selangor state government could use the concept of subsidiarity, which delegates power to the person or organization who is most in charge of the urban planning and services, to address these issues more efficiently.

Reintroducing local government elections, a trigger ruling coalition Pakatan Harapan after championed, may further enhance accountability. Planning policies to minimize overlap between Selangor and Kuala Lumpur in a synergistic way may also reduce effort redundancy.

For example, coordination between the state and federal governments has been a challenge in cleansing and rejuvenating the Klang River, which flows through both Selangor and Kuala Lumpur. When both companies are no politically aligned, decision-making is complicated. Uniting governance may simplify such initiatives.

Investors may find it appealing to keep Kuala Lumpur as a natural, state-free operational hotspot. In order to meet Selangor’s needs, Shah Alam may continue to serve as the management capital.

Managing Kuala Lumpur’s massive budget perhaps stress Selangor’s administrative power, and solutions may be allocated towards industrial rather than rural locations.

But, Kuala Lumpur’s high home value would mean that Selangor can derive higher revenue from the property tax ( also known as quit book ) charged on the state’s properties. Additionally, transferring assets, which could increase state government income, may be necessary in order to reintegrate Kuala Lumpur into Selangor.

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