Waking up from the Japanese debt dream

Waking up from the Japanese debt dream

Affordability matters for government debt because the burden is eventually passed onto current and future taxpayers through tax hikes or inflation. Japan’s general government gross debt was 263% of GDP at the end of 2021.

Borrowing may seem affordable as long as the average yield is close to zero, but low interest rates are no longer sustainable as Japan falls behind global monetary tightening trends.

Japanese sovereign debt relative to GDP has been the largest among G7 countries since 1998. It is double that of the United States (133%) and far larger than second-place Italy (151%). The Bank of Japan (BOJ) held 43% of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) at the end of March 2022, raising concerns about just how affordable the national debt really is.

JGBs amounted to 71% or 526 trillion yen (US$3.8 trillion) of the BOJ’s entire assets at the end of March 2022. The bank’s liabilities were 732 trillion yen ($5.3 trillion), including 563 trillion yen (US$4.1 trillion) of current deposits — liabilities owed to depositors through financial intermediaries.

In 2012, some argued that the JGB rates could rise if the amount of debt outstripped the financial assets of the domestic private sector. They simulated the ceiling breach occurring within the next ten years.

Based on the flow of funds at the end of 2021, the net financial assets of the non-financial private sector amounted to 188% of GDP while general government liabilities reached 218% of GDP.

The JGB landscape has changed dramatically, with the BOJ’s assets now four times larger than in 2012. This suggests that the simulation would have materialized in the absence of BOJ’s prolonged purchase of JGBs.

The current global monetary tightening environment has not changed BOJ’s easing stance. Japan’s low interest rates continue to diverge from rising levels in the United States, Europe and some emerging economies. The yen has fallen to a 24-year low, putting pressure on domestic prices already affected by global commodity price hikes.

Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda speaks during a press conference in Tokyo on December 20, 2018. Photo: JIJI Press

Economics tells us that exchange rate management, monetary autonomy and free capital mobility are incompatible — “the impossible trinity.”

Policymakers must give up one of these goals. Japan cannot maintain a stable yen, keep interest rates low and keep up free capital flows simultaneously. A rise in interest rates will soon become inevitable unless people tolerate price hikes or prefer capital control.

In April 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its annual Article IV Consultation warned of the risks associated with a long-term rise in public debt. The IMF suggested that the current interest–growth differentials may not continue without the BOJ’s accommodative monetary policy and domestic investors’ home bias.

Academic discussions on the implications of an end to quantitative easing have long been muted. Political motives have weakened any sense of urgency and prolonged the affordability illusion. Policymakers seem to be buying time either for fiscal consolidation or for their much-anticipated economic revitalization.

The Japanese government’s balance sheet shows a negative net worth of 592 trillion yen ($4.3 trillion), with their authority to collect taxes existing conceptually as an invisible asset. The population’s ability to pay taxes depends on its wealth and income levels. Japan’s national wealth was 3.67 quadrillion yen ($26.8 trillion) at the end of 2020 and nominal gross national income (GNI) was 563 trillion yen ($4.1 trillion) in 2021.

Focusing on investment from savings may strengthen the nation’s assets quality and income generation capacity in the long term. But changes in the investment–savings balance may have a short-term impact on borrowers’ funding costs. Japan’s aging demographic also depresses income growth and shrinks the tax base while spending on healthcare and pensions increases.

Tokyo is inclined to present optimistic growth prospects. In 2013, the “Japan Revitalization Strategy” aimed for an average of 3% nominal GDP growth over the next ten years in order to increase nominal GNI per capita by 1.5 million yen ($10,949). Yet the nominal GNI peaked at 580 trillion yen ($4.2 trillion) in 2019, a meager rise from 526 trillion yen (US$3.8 trillion) in 2013.

On the other hand, general government gross debt has nearly doubled since 2000, when it sat at 136% of GDP. Unaccomplished economic revitalization aspirations have trapped policymakers in a time-buying mode full of repetitive rhetoric.

Political compromise removed the deadline for the primary balance goal outlined in the “Basic Policy’”— the annual fiscal and economic policy guidelines released on June 7, 2022. Politically driven narratives of extravagant spending dominated debates during the Upper House election campaign.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s initiative to reform the Japanese economy through a “new form of capitalism” is another revitalization trial. But peer pressure toned down his redistribution policy and investor backlash shelved the capital gains tax debate.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida points to his party’s strong performance at recent polls. Photo: Screengrab

The domestic and international environments are now significantly less favorable than ten years ago, when limits for JGBs were suggested. Japan’s efforts to “defy gravity” are already transitioning to a sharp descent.

Meanwhile, Kishida said on May 27, 2022, that his government continues to debate the capital gains tax. He also stated on June 19, 2022, that “we need to continue raising the banner of fiscal reconstruction.”

The landslide Upper House victory seems to have given the prime minister the political capital necessary for a “golden three years” to revive the Japanese economy. But it will all be an illusion without a serious discussion on debt affordability and a resolute goal for fiscal health.

Toshiro Nishizawa is Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo.

This article was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. It is republished under a Creative Commons license.