Southeast Asia (Page 62)

Nine of the 10 biggest arms importers in 2019–23 were countries in Asia (including the Middle East) and Oceania, according to a report on international arms transfers released Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Ukraine became the fourth biggest arms importer globally after it received transfers of major arms from over 30 states in 2022–23, the institute reported.

As for arms exporting countries, the United States, number one on the list, saw a rise of 17% between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while exports by Russia fell by more than half (53%). Arms exports from France grew by 47% and it supplanted Russia as number two on the global list.

Excerpts from the SIPRI report follow:

Asia-Pacific importers

Arms imports by states in East Asia (down 6.1%), Oceania (down 10%) and Southeast Asia (down 43%) decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

China’s arms imports fell by 44% and accounted for 2.9% of the global total in 2019–23. The vast majority of Chinese arms imports (77%) came from Russia. The drop in Chinese imports is due to China’s growing ability to design and produce its own major arms. Its arms imports will probably decrease further as it develops this capacity.

Japan and South Korea are expanding their military capabilities, mainly because of tensions with China and North Korea. Japan (up 155%) and South Korea (up 6.5%) increased their arms imports between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The USA is the main supplier to both states, accounting for 97 per cent of Japan’s arms imports and 72 per cent of South Korea’s.

The two states are investing heavily in long-range strike capabilities. The USA supplied 29 combat aircraft to Japan and 34 to South Korea in 2019–23.

In the category of land-attack missiles with a range of 1000 km or more, in 2023 Japan ordered 400 and planned to order 50 more. These will, for the first time, give Japan the capability to reach targets deep inside China or North Korea.

Taiwan’s arms imports dropped by 69% between 2014–18 and 2019–23 despite heightened tensions with China. However, major deliveries are planned to take place over the next five years, including deliveries of 66 combat aircraft, 108 tanks and 460 anti-ship missiles. All these planned deliveries are from the USA, which supplied over 99 per cent of Taiwanese arms imports in 2019–23.

Australia was the eighth largest arms importer in 2019–23. Despite an overall 21% decline in its overall arms imports during the period, in 2023 it reached an agreement with the UK and the USA to import at least six nuclear-powered submarines. Australia ordered over 300 long-range missiles from the US. (Outside the region, Finland ordered 200 or those and Germany 75. Canada and the Netherlands have also decided to acquire them.)

Arms imports by Southeast Asian states fell by 43% between 2014–18 and 2019–23. However, tensions, mainly with China, continue to drive arms acquisitions by many states in the subregion.

For example, arms imports by the Philippines (up 105%) and by Singapore (up 17%) increased between the two periods. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore all placed substantial orders for combat aircraft and ships in 2019–23.

Myanmar, which accounted for 10% of all South East Asian imports, used imported major arms in internal conflicts in 2019–23. Its arms imports in the period mainly came from Russia (38%), China (26%) and India (18%).

India’s tensions with Pakistan and China largely drive its arms imports. India’s arms imports increased by 4.7% between 2014–18 and 2019–23, making it the world’s biggest arms importer in 2019–23 with a 9.8% share of all arms imports.

Russia remained India’s main supplier, but its share of Indian arms imports has shrunk from 76% in 2009–13 to 58%in 2014–18 and then to 36% in 2019–23.

India has instead looked to Western suppliers, most notably France and the USA, and its own arms industry to meet its demand for major arms. This shift is also visible in India’s new orders, many of which are placed with Western suppliers, and its arms procurement plans, which seemingly do not include any Russian options.

Arms imports by Pakistan grew by 43% between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and accounted for 4.3% of the world total, making it the fifth largest arms importer globally. Pakistan continued to strengthen its arms procurement relations with China: 82% of its arms imports came from China in 2019–23, as against 69% in 2014–18, and 51% in 2009–13.

Arms imports by states in the Middle East were 12% lower in 2019–23 than in 2014–18. Three of the top 10 arms importers in 2019–23 were in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. The USA accounted for 52% of Middle Eastern arms imports. The next biggest suppliers were France (12%), Italy (10%) and Germany (7.1%).

Arms imports and the war in Ukraine

At least 30 states supplied major arms to Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, mostly as military aid, meaning that Ukraine was by some distance the world’s largest arms importer in the year 2023.

The USA supplied 39% of Ukrainian arms imports in 2019–23, followed by Germany (14%) and Poland (13%). To broaden Ukraine’s military capabilities, suppliers began to deliver long-range systems in 2023.

For example, Poland and Slovakia donated 27 surplus combat aircraft, and France and the UK supplied missiles with a range of 300 kilometers. During the year, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway also started to prepare for the delivery of over 50 surplus combat aircraft.

Russia relies primarily on its own industry for its major arms. However, in 2022–23 it imported flying bombs from Iran and ballistic missiles from North Korea, the latter in violation of a United Nations arms embargo on North Korea.

Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 increased the demand for arms in West and Central European states. For example, by the end of 2023 these states had a total of 791 combat aircraft and combat helicopters on order for import.

After it launched the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia began a campaign of missile attacks against Ukraine. In response, many West and Central European states supplied air defense systems to Ukraine and several placed new import orders for them or accelerated existing procurement processes.

In 2023 Poland ordered 12 air defense systems from the USA, and Germany ordered a single but particularly high-value system from Israel. In 2022–23 Austria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia ordered air defense systems from Germany, while Finland and Slovakia ordered Israeli systems, and Lithuania and the Netherlands ordered Norwegian systems.

In addition, some states ordered missiles for systems being produced domestically or to arm newly acquired imports or their existing systems. For example, in 2023 Poland and Norway ordered missiles from the UK and the USA, respectively, for their new systems, while Germany ordered 500 missiles and Romania 200, all from the USA, for their existing systems.

Read the full study here. Its authors: Pieter D. Wezeman (Netherlands/Sweden) is a senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Program. Katarina Djokic (Serbia) is a researcher, Mathew George (India) is the director, Zain Hussain (United Kingdom) is a researcher, and Siemon T. Wezeman (Netherlands) is a senior researcher with the program.

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Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong issued a stark warning to Southeast Asian leaders this week: the region could face a “devastating” conflict over the South China Sea unless it strengthens its diplomatic and legal safeguards.

Wong said the region was already experiencing “destabilizing, provocative and coercive actions”, in addition to “unsafe conduct” in the air and sea. These were not-quite-so-veiled references to China’s recent actions in the South China Sea.

Other countries in the region – especially Vietnam and the Philippines – share similar concerns about China’s maritime assertions. They question, for instance, what Beijing’s rejection of the 2016 South China Sea tribunal ruling might mean for upholding international maritime laws and keeping crucial sea trade routes open.

This week, Manila again called out China’s “dangerous maneuvers” in the South China Sea. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr vowed not to yield an “inch” to China in the contested waters.

Australia and the Philippines recently signed an agreement to deepen maritime cooperation. This may lead to more joint defense exercises and patrols in the South China Sea.

But not all regional leaders agree about the potential threat. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim issued a warning of his own at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit this week over the West’s “China phobia.” If the US and Australia have problems with China, he said, “they should not impose it” on Southeast Asia.

Beyond territorial disputes

There is no doubt the great power competition between the US and China sets the strategic backdrop for Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia.

But while maritime cooperation is increasing among regional states, this doesn’t mean they all agree on the central issues that affect the stability, safety and security of the region’s waters, specifically the South China Sea.

Southeast Asian countries have diverse interests, political systems and strategic priorities. And leaders in the region – like those of many other smaller and middle powers around the world – regularly say they do not want to have to choose between the US and China.

Not all countries are “hedging” to the same degree, but Australia should nevertheless focus its engagement on building genuine partnerships with Southeast Asian countries in their own right – not merely based on perceived external threats – and identifying and addressing shared issues of concern.

At this week’s ASEAN-Australia summit, for instance, Southeast Asian nations drove the idea of a dedicated maritime forum. While the forum did address security challenges such as “gray zone” activities, plenty of other challenges and opportunities were discussed. These included:

• the importance of the “blue economy” concept, focused on the sustainable use of maritime resources for development and prosperity
• improving maritime connectivity by ensuring free and open sea lanes of communication
• bolstering law enforcement and governance to ensure maritime order across the region
• better addressing environmental and climate change issues.

There was also a strong focus on understanding the local issues facing coastal and Indigenous communities in the region. An estimated 70% of Southeast Asia’s population lives by the coast, where they face increasing livability challenges due to climate change, economic uncertainty and the degradation of fishing stocks and natural resources.

This is not entirely new: ASEAN countries and Australia have been paying closer attention to shared maritime challenges beyond the sovereignty and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

For example, ASEAN recently released its maritime outlook. In particular, it noted the importance of the region for “global trade, food and energy security and marine biodiversity.”

Opportunities for cooperation

It is no surprise maritime security has reached this level of importance on a shared diplomatic agenda.

While the concerns over China’s activities are real, it’s important Australia and its neighbors to the north focus more attention on the vast range of other ocean-based issues that don’t get as much attention.

These priorities include:

• protecting open ocean supply chains
• reducing pollution, in particular plastics, and preventing coral bleaching
• supporting sustainable, legal and regulated fishing
• mitigating human, arms and drug trafficking
• addressing the very real challenges that climate change and rising sea levels present to maritime Asia.

These challenges are often less politically sensitive than strategic concerns, which enhances the prospects of cooperation. This is where science, research and development, knowledge sharing and expert networks can contribute to solving knotty problems. And many of these challenges are transnational, meaning they do not affect one state unilaterally, but often require collective responses.

The challenges are significant. So, too, are the opportunities for collaboration. Getting maritime cooperation right can support the human rights and livelihoods of millions of people across the region.

Rebecca Strating is Director, La Trobe Asia and Professor, La Trobe University, La Trobe University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Amid a growing terror threat in other parts of the world, Japan has been dealing with limited terrorist activity so far. A notorious case of the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo is a matter of the past, while homegrown jihadist radicalization is negligible. And yet, being an island of safety in a stormy sea is no less of a challenge for the Land of the Rising Sun.

Throughout the past decades, terrorist incidents affecting Japanese nationals or interests have occurred abroad. In a statement aired in 2003, Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, identified Japan as a potential target.

Twelve years later, at a time when the Islamic State gained global prominence, the nation faced a great tragedy. In 2015, ISIS militants took hostage and beheaded two Japanese nationals in Syria, one of whom, Kenji Goto, was a freelance journalist.

As of today, many experts believe that a protracted armed conflict between Israel and Hamas will play a pivotal role in shaping the terrorist threat landscape in 2024. The ongoing hostilities may fuel terrorist plots and assaults outside the area of conflict, encouraging small cells and lone wolf actors to attack targets associated with one of the sides. 

Just as important is a menace originating from ISIS. The Islamic State caliphate in Syria collapsed five years ago, but make no mistake: The group is still alive and active. To date, the jihadist organization has around 20 branches and networks operating in Africa, Southeast and Southwest Asia and in the Middle East. As for Asia, ISIS extremist ideology remains particularly entrenched in the Philippines and Indonesia. 

In a global fight against extremism, Japan stepped up to the plate by providing aid to international counterterrorism operations. Particularly, Tokyo supports, politically and financially, the US-led international coalition to fight ISIS.

Nonetheless, there is still more room for Japan to increase its counterterrorism cooperation, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, Tokyo has a lot to offer its neighbors, be it security equipment or intelligence sharing. For instance, according to a former FBI agent, nobody in the world is better at physical surveillance than Japan’s law enforcement. 

Now, a new tool has become available: an aid scheme termed Official Security Assistance (OSA). Established in April 2023, the program allows Tokyo to help developing countries raise their security capabilities.

“Over the past decade, Japan has not only strengthened its alliance with the United States but also deepened its military ties with countries such as Australia and its European allies,” Masaki Mizobuchi, associate professor of Middle East politics and international security at Hiroshima University, told this writer. He added:

Japan has expanded its military cooperation with developing countries in Southeast Asia and beyond, focusing on capacity-building support for the militaries of partner nations.

However, until recently, Japan lacked a framework for providing new equipment to the defense authorities of other countries. Additionally, Official Development Assistance [ODA, Japan’s English term for foreign aid], aimed at the socioeconomic development of recipient countries, cannot be used for military purposes.

This restriction has been a significant obstacle to Japan’s foreign assistance efforts. The establishment of the Official Security Assistance is understood to be a measure to overcome this issue.

Mizobuchi said the cooperation areas include such activities as vigilance monitoring, counterterrorism and counter-piracy, humanitarian efforts, and international peacekeeping operations. 

“Nevertheless, as a precaution, The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its associated operational guidelines will be enforced, thereby restricting cooperation to five specific types of logistical support: rescue operations, transportation, alert systems, surveillance, and minesweeping, as delineated in these guidelines,” Mizobuchi added.

Mizobuchi highlighted four aspects in which Japan’s OSA program can contribute to the fight against terrorism in Asia:

• equipment and technology transfer,
• humanitarian assistance,
• intelligence sharing and cooperation,
• maritime security.

In terms of technologies, OSA offers possibilities for “supplying non-lethal security equipment, surveillance technologies, and other critical assets that can bolster the counter-terrorism capabilities of partner countries,” Mizobuchi explained. Establishing intelligence-sharing frameworks could help “monitor and counteract terrorist movements, financing, and radicalization efforts across borders.”

“Japan’s advanced capabilities in disaster response can be leveraged to improve regional resilience,” he added. “Given Japan’s strategic interest in maintaining free and open Indo-Pacific sea lines of communication, its assistance could also extend to maritime security, helping to prevent piracy, smuggling, and terrorism at sea.”

Who will benefit most?

Since 2007, the Asia-Pacific region has suffered over 5,000 terrorist attacks. That is fewer than in the Middle East and Africa but considerably more compared with Europe and the United States. Today, terrorism is still a pressing challenge for Asia and needs to be addressed. 

“Countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand could benefit significantly, as they have faced various terrorism challenges, including threats from jihadist groups affiliated with ISIS and local separatist movements,” Mizobuchi said while elaborating on OSA’s advantages.

Especially worth noting is the Philippines, which ranks second most affected by terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region, following Myanmar. The country is attractive to ISIS as the group can make use of sectarianism for recruitment and propaganda. In December, Islamic State put itself back in the spotlight by carrying out a deadly bombing at a Catholic Mass in the southern city of Marawi. 

The first-ever transfer of aid under the OSA framework was agreed upon in November during the visit of Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to the Philippines. Under the deal, Manila receives US$4 million worth of coastal surveillance radars for the navy to enhance the nation’s maritime security.

Counterterrorism activities including joint operations are already on the security cooperation agenda between the two countries. OSA opens up new opportunities in this field and could potentially have an essential impact on the overall security of the region.

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