Sure A Not

The Russian activity in the Kursk region of Russia began in late July with many days of airstrikes before Kiev’s floor forces immediately advanced some miles into Russian territory on August 6, 2024.

Since therefore, according to various information, they have established an expanded hold of as much as 1, 000 square kilometers. Numerous pieces of Russian products have been destroyed, and Russian forces have suffered significant deaths as a result.

The Kremlin has deployed troops in the area, but it has so far failed to stop the Ukrainian progress from Russian land. Now, according to as yet unconfirmed but credible reports, Putin has appointed Alexei Dyumin to head up what it calls its” counter-terrorist” response to the Ukrainian incursion. In a number of methods, this is important.

First, there is the staff aspect. Dyumin is Putin’s past companion, but also served as deputy mind of the GRU military intelligence services, assistant defense minister and, until the end of May 2024, as governor of the Tula region, north of Moscow.

He was therefore appointed to the State Council as director. The president of Russia is a member of this system, which brings together all the regional governors in Russia. The choice of Dyumin, who is clearly outside the conventional martial order, is a sign of Putin’s lack of faith in his military leaders to accomplish his objectives.

Hence, Dyumin’s handling of this crisis may possibly promote or put an end to his ascendancy in the Russian social elite. If he is effective, it might make him a strong candidate to take over from Vladimir Putin.

Putin’s phrasing, referring to Ukraine’s function as a offense requiring a” counter-terrorist” reaction, is also important. It suggests that he is still reluctant to acknowledge that he has scuttled Russia against its cousin.

Instead, the counter-terrorist procedure now live in Russia sits next to what Putin has called the” specific military activity” being conducted in Ukraine.

Both help conceal the true nature of the issue Trump is currently facing. On the one hand, the Belarusian leader has to deal with an extremely expensive conflict in Ukraine. Moscow has had little choice but to stick to an ugly and difficult-to-manage ally with China, Iran, and North Korea due to the conflict’s fundamental changes to the global political landscape.

On the other hand, it further undermines the belief that Putin and his top martial figures are capable of safeguarding Russian national security. The fact that they could get as much as they have for as long as they did is an obvious failure even if they are finally able to contain and repel the Russian forces that are, for now, firmly rooted remarkably deep inside Russia.

Blame the West

Additionally, it is important to point out that Putin has doubled down on one of his strongest reasons for his anger against Ukraine, saying that the West is to blame for this.

Another implication that Putin’s war involves much more than Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO and the EU, is apparently that the claim that” the West is fighting us with the palms of the Ukrainians.” It serves as a useful guideline for what can be anticipated from Moscow in the long run when negotiating with Kiev about a possible end to the war.

What Moscow wants out of those is a strengthening of Ukraine and the West, as well as a relative strengthening of its own place, especially in the event of a potential conflict with NATO.

This will also be critical for Putin internally, including in terms of his reputation, which we know to be very crucial to him. Any like favorable outcome could increase Russia’s standing in any Chinese-led ally that threatens to defy US and its allies.

The risk is even raised considerably by Ukraine’s European allies as a result of Russia’s ongoing portrayal of the discord as one between Russia and the West. It has the potential to give Russia the chance to assert that NATO as a whole, or individual NATO members, have become co-belligerents and are therefore legitimate targets for Russian escalation of the conflict.

Moscow will undoubtedly view the UK’s repeated assertion that the UK can, with the exception of long-range Storm Shadow missiles, be using Ukrainian forces in its operation in the Kursk region as a case in point of Western powers acting as belligerents against his country.

Russia has repeatedly argued this argument over the past two and a half years, but it has never responded to any of its threats of escalation. It is unlikely to do so right now. On the one hand, it would require Putin to acknowledge a state of war – first with Ukraine, and then, by extension, with the West.

On the other hand, it is very likely that NATO will retaliate in terms of Article 5, which calls for member state collective defense, which will undoubtedly lead to a full-fledged military conflict.

Neither is in Putin’s interest. And the latter could not possibly accomplish for Russia what Putin might hope to accomplish through negotiations, especially if he enters them from a position of strength.

The Russian president is likely to lose this opportunity as a result of Ukraine’s actions in the Kursk region, which will likely favor Kiev even further ahead of any upcoming discussions. For that reason alone, the current Ukrainian offensive merits continued support from the West and calling Putin’s bluff.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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This edited version of Gareth Evans ‘ presentation to the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia Conference was delivered by the distinguished honourable professor at ANU and former Australian foreign minister.

Politicians played a major part in the beginning of AUKUS in Australia, and elections both here and in the United States may play a vital role in determining whether it lives or dies.

That is true, at least for its fundamental underwater aspect. The next pillar of the agreement, which deals with professional assistance on a number of new fronts, is both significantly less obvious in terms of its scope and ostensibly politically charged.

On the American part, partisan political opportunism was a factor in the initiation of the submarine deal, republican social support was a condition of US agreement to it, and maintenance of that republican support into the future probably will be a precondition of its continuance, at least when it comes to very delicate elements like the handover of three Virginia class submarines.

On the National side, perception of the US corporate advantage was the driving force behind Washington’s consent to the deal rather than any political issues domestically. However, continued strong cross-party support in Congress is required for its full distribution. And, at the even more crucial professional level, it cannot be assumed the offer is now Trump-proof.

We can simply reasonably assume that domestic politics are useless to AUKUS’s future in the United Kingdom. No one on any side of politics is always going to find the deal distasteful because it is so obviously a donation to the national Treasury and has so much impact on national defense and security objectives.

In Australia, local elections have been a component from the outset. It is difficult to dispute that political opportunism came in close second to the Morrison government’s decision, despite the fact that the majority of the AUKUS decision was undoubtedly driven by older Coalition ministers ‘ philosophical passions for everything American.

Morrison was acutely aware of the potential that the deal offered to sway the Labor criticism in the security and defense sectors, a region where the Labor Party has long been wrongly perceived as electorally resilient. That the nuclear aspect of the offer was bound to tickle some wings in Labor rates was an added social attraction.

I was no critical at the time, nor am I today, of the opponent’s first response in September 2021 when Morrison informed me of the upcoming news of the offer he had struck with the US and UK, predicated on Labor’s help.

The political imperative was clear: Had Labor been at all, there would have been a khaki election in 2022, with Albanese being accused of undermining the alliance and undermining US support for the region.

Moreover, the deal was at least prima facie defensible intellectually, with nuclear propulsion clearly superior in terms of speed, endurance and ( for now, at least ) detectability. Concerns about nuclear proliferation and waste issues were also satisfactorily addressed.

However, the Morrison government received harsh criticism for completely disregarding their split with the French, and very real questions needed to be resolvable before the submarine deal was finally settled.

Of particular concern was whether the force configuration proposed was really fully fit for Australia’s strategic purposes, and the implications of much greater enmeshment with the US military for the reality of our sovereign agency. However, Labor would have plenty of time to undergo revision, negotiation, and adaptation.

It is clear that no such thorough analysis of the entire AUKUS deal ever took place when Labor did take office in May 2022. Crucial questions were never seriously addressed, clearly articulated answers to them have never been given by the prime minister, defense minister or anyone else. The solutions that are actually emerging as time goes on are deeply troubling.

If the Albanese government were to launch a truly comprehensive and completely objective review right away, it would, in my opinion, have no other choice but to publish these significant findings.

One, there is zero certainty of the timely delivery of the eight AUKUS boats. We now know that both the US and the UK have explicit opt-out laws. Even in the utterly unlikely event that everything in the vastly complex enterprise is put in place smoothly, we will be waiting 40 years for the last boat, which will raise serious capability gaps.

Two, even acknowledging the superior capability of the submarines, the final fleet size – if its purpose really is the defense of Australia – appears hardly fit for that purpose. Given the typical operating constraints, which would in this case entail having only two boats deployable at once, how much intelligence gathering, archipelagic chokepoint protection, sea-lane protection, or even just “deterrence at a distance” will be possible?

Three, the eye-watering cost of the AUKUS submarine program, which is up to$ 368 billion, will make it difficult to acquire the other capabilities we will need if we want to be able to deal with an invasion threat in any way.

Those capabilities include, in particular, state-of-the-art missiles, aircraft and drones that are arguably even more critical than submarines for our defense in the event of such a crisis.

Four, the US is currently asking a very high price for granting us access to its nuclear propulsion technology. Not only is there a demand for what is now referred to as the “interchangeability” of our submarine fleets, but also the now-expanding expansion of Tindal as a US B52 base, the conversion of Stirling into a major base for a US Indian Ocean fleet, and the making of Perth join Pine Gap and the North West Cape as a nuclear target.

But also now the ever-clearer expectation on the US side that “integrated deterrence” means Australia will have no choice but to join the US in fighting any future war in which it chooses to engage anywhere in the Indo-Pacific, including in defense of Taiwan.

Without any doubt, it is impossible to imagine that the Virginia transfers will ever occur unless that last understanding is reached. In the event that serious tensions arise, the notion that we will retain any kind of sovereign agency in determining how all these assets are used is a joke in bad taste. I have had personal ministerial experience of being a junior allied partner of the US in a hot conflict situation – the first Gulf War in 1991 — and my recollections are not pretty.

Five, despite all of its exorbitance, the purchase price we are currently paying will never be sufficient to provide the level of protection that AUKUS supporters believe they are seeking. Even in the event of an existential attack, ZUS cannot be said too often that it does not bind the US to stand up for us.

And extended nuclear deterrence is as illusory for us as for ever other ally or partner believing itself to be sheltering under a US nuclear umbrella. It has always been absurd to think that the US would ever be willing to trade Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul for Perth.

If the US sees it in its own national interest, but not in any other way, we can rely on military support. Washington will no doubt shake a deterrent fist, and threaten and deliver retaliation if its own assets on Australian soil are threatened or attacked, but that’s as far as our expectations should extend.

In response to the Morrison decision in 2021, Jean-Yves Le Drian, the then-French foreign minister, presciently stated the following:

The Australians leave themselves entirely at the mercy of changes in American policy. I wish our Australian partner, who made the choice of security – justified by the escalation of tensions with China – to the detriment of sovereignty, will not discover later that it has sacrificed both.

It would not be impossible to change course once more if some of this political light did start to appear on the Albanese government and it did begin to look into a Plan B. The most appealing option would likely be the revival of the French contract, if Paris ever felt able to trust us once more.

This provided for the delivery of 12 conventionally powered, but very capable boats, at a reasonable cost and within a reasonable time frame. Additionally, it made it clear that a nuclear option could be pursued if we so desired.

There would be more time and expense involved in figuring out how to manage the LEU ( Low Uranium Enriched ) system’s nuclear refueling and maintenance needs, but it would also require significantly less baggage than continuing to use the AUKUS program.

All that said, it has to be acknowledged that the odds of any fundamental change of course are now very long indeed. The US making it clear that it was not going to give up any of its Virginias because of the pressures on its own replacement program would be the only external event that could completely derail the AUKUS program and force such change.

But it’s hard to imagine even a Trump administration doing that, given the extraordinary favorability of the deal the US has wrung out of Australia– not only financially, but because for all practical purposes the Americans will be able to treat these boats as an extension of their own fleet.

Even more troubling are the chances of a political change of heart in Australia. In the absence of the reincarnation of Malcolm Turnbull, on the part of the Coalition, they are nonexistent. And on the part of the ALP they are not much better.

The prime minister has never given much thought to the complexity of foreign and defense policy, and seems unlikely to change. He is still trying to avoid being seen as weak on security.

All of this is rather depressing for those of us who have long held the view that Australia is a fiercely independent nation that needs to collaborate constructively, creatively, and sensitively with our own Indo-Pacific neighborhood and a vibrant multicultural society that is more representative of the world around us.

A country that had come to terms at last with the reality that in the new century, our geography matters much more than our Anglophone history. And a nation that had abandoned the “fear of abandonment” that had been so important to our defense and diplomacy for a long time, acknowledging that we must find our security in Asia rather than Asia, as Paul Keating continues to do so eloquently claim.

Australia’s no-holds-barred embrace of AUKUS is more likely than not to prove one of our nation’s worst defense and foreign policy choices, putting in greater danger than reward for the nation’s own security, which it promises to protect.

I cannot imagine this decision being made by any of the Hawke-Keating governments of which I was part. Times have changed.

Former Australian National University professor and former head of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, is an honorary honorary professor.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.

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