The stunning Blitzkrieg of Operation 1027 in northern Shan state over the past two weeks will possibly go down as the most pivotal and daring feat of arms in Myanmar’s many decades of civil war.
In the early hours of October 27, combined forces of multiple ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and a handful of allies attacked Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) installations along the border with China and down the main highway linking Mandalay, Lashio and Muse.
The key border posts of Chin Swe Haw and Mong Ko were seized along with 80 military and police bases. More than 120 military bases have since been overrun and sizeable amounts of arms and ammunition seized, including reportedly a number of 14.5 heavy machine guns (HMGs) that can be operated in an anti-aircraft capacity, vital for countering MAF helicopter gunships and fighter jet attacks.
The operation was planned and spearheaded by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the ethnic Kokang Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA), along with allies the Bama Peoples Liberation Army (BPLA), the reformed Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (MNDF).
Planning such an operation with so many moving parts, players and logistical challenges and achieving the element of surprise makes 1027 an equal parts battlefield and wider psychological victory against the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.
The Brotherhood issued one of its ubiquitous statements (in Burmese and English) outlining the motivations for the operation.
“Our primary objective in launching this operation are multi-faceted and driven by the collective desire to safeguard the lives of civilians, assert our right to self-defense, maintain control over our territory, and respond resolutely to ongoing artillery and attacks and airstrikes… we are dedicated to eradicating the oppressive military dictatorship, a shared aspiration of the entire Myanmar population… (and) combating the widespread online gambling fraud that has plagued Myanmar.”
It is too early to assemble a clear picture of the multidimensional operation. The MAF is still sending resupply columns to the theater of operations, which the TNLA and MPDF are reportedly ambushing on the main road around Kyaukme close to Mandalay Region. Heavy use of air power and artillery, including Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), are harassing the alliance forces but ultimately ground troops must retake territory.
Does the MAF have the foot soldiers to retake over 100 bases, which assuming they existed prior to 1027 still hold some importance to the military? Resistance attacks in Karenni and Karen states, as well as major attacks in Sagaing Region including the capture of Kawlin by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) allied PDFs contribute to the cascade of bad battlefield news for the SAC.
Reaching for a mono-causal explanation for 1027 is misleading. It was not simply predicated on pleasing the Chinese and clearing call scam center dungeons full of foreign national captives. And it was not just a turf war over control of border casinos, a ridiculously reductionist argument that discards the intersections of the Brotherhood’s multiple motivations.
It was also not simply an attack on a long-term enemy as part of a 14-year-long conflict: the three main groups “came up together”, nurtured initially by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and over the past several years by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Nor was it predicated on taking tactical advantage of the SAC’s broader nationwide weaknesses fighting EAOs and PDFs in multiple locations in the Anya theater.
And what it manifestly was not is an offensive designed to buttress the National Unity Government (NUG) and establish some belated bona fides for the anti-coup “Spring Revolution” it claims to represent. It was all of these factors and much more.
The Brotherhood issued another statement on October 31 urging members of the MAGF and their allied Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and Pyithu Sit (People’s Militia) forces to surrender, following the surrender of Infantry Battalion 143 (IB143) in Kunlong Township.
“(1) We pledge to ensure the preservation of every surrendered soldier’s life, safety and dignity. (2) We are committed to preventing any form of torture or arrest. (3) We will exert our utmost effort to facilitate the swift reunification of surrendered soldiers with their families and relatives” along with pledging financial support and medical care,” the Brotherhood statement said.
The SAC National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) met on November 8 to discuss 1027, and it quickly turned into a verbose and embittered history lesson from SAC chairman and Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. All the blame was heaped onto the MNDAA, as befitting a long-term nemesis, and their motivations for drug dealing, seizing control of the border town of Laukkai and its “153 hotels.”
Min Aung Hlaing described the unfolding operation: “MNDAA made preparations in the Wa region and its main strengths were deployed to attack Chinshwehaw via Namtit Bridge on October 27. In the morning, they passed Namtit Creek and deployed excessive strength to attack Chinshwehaw… MNDAA used a large number of drones and dropped bombs in attacks… TNLA interrupted the communication route to Hsenwi and disturbed Lashio with firing. They interrupted the Mandalay-Lashio communication route near Nawnghkio.”
These are stunning top-level admissions of military intelligence failure and tactical incompetence. Possibly the most telling remark was at the end of the meeting: “President U Myint Swe said that if the government does not effectively manage the incidents happening in the border region, the country will be split into various parts.”
It’s too late for that. Inescapable from this narrative is one of protracted failure on the part of Min Aung Hlaing. It was he who commanded the operation against MNDAA founder Pheung Kya-shin in 2009, breaking a cease-fire. The MNDAA later regrouped and reengaged and in 2015 the Myanmar army lost several hundred troops in renewed fighting with the rebel group.
There has been routine armed conflict between the MAF and the Brotherhood since. Having led a campaign against insurgents 14 years ago only to see these three EAOs grow in considerable size and prowess in multiple states across Myanmar and to further nurture post-coup combatants such as the BPLA, PLA and MPDF is a legacy of MAF incompetence.
It must have been amusing for the Brotherhood to travel to the Mong La enclave on the Chinese border in early June to meet the SAC’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPCN) for “peace talks”: “friendly and cordially discussed matters in connexion (sic) with…working together for the peace and development of the Union, trust-building with ethnic armed organizations.”
The painstaking planning for 1027 must have been far advanced by then. The attendance at these “talks” had the sincerity of a sneer, like monotone karaoke with a detested business rival: only self-deceiving Western diplomats gave them any credibility. Operation 1027 serves as the terminal rebuke to the by now utterly discredited pre-coup peace processes.
Secretive machinations by Switzerland and Finland to generate negotiations between micro-EAOs and the SAC are doomed to fail, not least because the former is exhuming the totally discredited Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) as the vehicle to deliver humanitarian assistance.
The NUG rightly condemned these efforts as illegitimate: “These acts will not be recognized and accepted because they are actions aimed at prolonging the reign of the military dictatorship.”
The growing humanitarian crisis of the conflict as a result of Operation 1027 must be addressed. Some 30-40,000 civilians have been displaced in multiple locations while an unknown number have been killed.
International aid donors should respond with increased cash transfers to local aid workers in Lashio and elsewhere, including for Ta’ang, Shan and faith-based groups. To harbor any promise in the JMC as a vehicle for emergency aid delivery over support to local civil society groups would be an affront to humanitarian principles as much as common decency.
In light of recent fighting, these foreign-led attempts to broker a deal with the SAC leadership are simply jettisoning neutrality to artificially inflate a dictatorship.
The Brotherhood and their allies have dramatically underscored a reality evident to anyone looking honestly at the situation: the SAC is finished, and while the ending may be uncertain, the complex of armed actors ushering in ultimate victory is not simply under the NUG. Any future “peace” process must reflect that and planning for that complexity must start seriously now.
By any military management measure, Min Aung Hlaing will go down as the most clearly inept war commander in MAF history. He can huff and he can puff in front of his fellow generals, but it’s clear to most that Operation 1027 is blowing the SAC’s house down.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues in Myanmar