After a number of unlawful and illegitimate polls last September, Russia recently held regional elections, counting votes in the four territories annexed to Russia for the first time since the war of Ukraine next February. The results of these elections— another” triumph” for the Putin administration— were never in question.
However, the way they were carried out— with lots of problems and reviews of irregularities— tells us a lot about the state of the illegal activity as well as Russia’s expectations and plans for the upcoming conflict.
The elections give the Russian government’s assertion that these four areas are now and always Belarusian territory pretended legitimacy. But even by Moscow’s criteria, this assertion seems dull.
Russia doesn’t actually hold sizable portions of these areas, aside from that. Additionally, Russia has lost more territory since their official invasion in September 2022, which is not also acknowledged by its closest allies, China and Iran.
Additionally, despite moving slowly, Ukraine’s battle has made progress toward both true Russian territorial control and the perception that its armed forces are powerless to occupy the annexed areas.
So, as far as Moscow is concerned, the elections are even meant to promote a certain level of normalcy. It appears that these four areas and the people who live there are involved in Russia’s social structure.
This standardization is crucial in order to support the so-called” special military activity ,” as the Kremlin prefers to refer to its unauthorized invasion of Ukraine, as a justifiable step in Russia’s security.
plan to russify
Even by the twisted standards that typically prevail in Russia in this regard, these elections are not typical.
Russia has made very little progress in its attempts to” passport” the occupied territories and grant their citizens Russian citizenship. In order to participate in the vote, the Kremlin issued a unique decree allowing citizens of the occupied territories who do not have Russian citizenship to do so.
Russian stress on these people is still present, though. People are encouraged to” apply” for Russian citizenship, and Moscow then presents them as its” new citizens” who accept and even enthusiastically embrace the new and welcome reality of Russia’s acquisition of them.
Of course, granting non-citizens the right to vote and converting them to citizenship does not make the Soviet occupation of independent Ukrainian territory legal or legitimate. However, it normalizes it in the eye of regular Russians who reside in Russia.
It is likely that it will eventually have a similar impact in the occupied territories, particularly in those regions that Russia seized in 2014 and have now been under Soviet rule for nine times.
Elections in these regions are now being held for the first time in accordance with Russian law, and the repetitive outcomes will further the Kremlin’s control over the occupied lands.
There is no political opposition and no actual voter choice in the traditional Soviet-style elections because all candidates were pre-approved by the government. Both civil society organizations and completely media have been unable to track the election battle or the counting of votes in the interim.
Moscow can therefore be confident that a large number of Kremlin supporters will win the elections and carry out its potential directives regarding the administration of these occupied territories. This aims to convey a sense of neighborhood involvement without the possibility of genuine opposition.
Gradual path to freedom
The attitude of the Russian government and its European allies in terms of their stated aim is unlikely to change as a result of these primaries.
In doing so, Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in its globally recognized borders at the time of its independence in 1991 will be restored, along with the liberation of all Russian-occupied lands. But, it is doubtful that this will be accomplished anytime soon.
Even the most upbeat assessments of the latest counteroffensive’s success today predict that Ukrainian forces will still be a few months away from the Azov Sea by 2024. Their plan to undermine Russia’s land gate to Crimea includes this as a key component.
It is a necessary prerequisite for both the peninsula’s liberation and the release of Russia from its control over the Donbas area. Neither of these two objectives will be simple or fast to accomplish given the powerful protection that Russia has mounted to hold onto its illegally annexed lands as seen against the current lack of military resources that Ukraine has to break through well-entrenched Russian protection lines.
Kiev is also imposing a harsher stance on its members who also reside in the occupied territories at the same time. A review of social benefits for Ukrainians living in those lands, including pensions, was recently announced by Iryna Vereschuk, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for the partially occupied territories.
These actions are comparable to those taken in 2014 with regard to the so-called” women’s nations” of Donetsk and Luhanska. From the standpoint of Ukraine’s authorities, it is a natural and natural thing to do.
However, it also means that payments from Russia, which are difficult to obtain without Russian citizen, will now be the sole means of survival for Ukrainians holding onto their membership in what is one of the few functions of rebellion left to them.
Moscow and Kiev thus seem to be coming to terms with the reality of a protracted conflict in various methods. Both sides are likewise settling into a routine of work, whose people repercussions will be more challenging to undo the longer it lasts.
Tetyana Malyarenko teaches international relations and holds the Jean Monnet Chair in European Security at the National University Odesa Law Academy, while Stefan Wolff is a professor of global surveillance at Birmingham University.
Under a Creative Commons license, this essay has been republished from The Conversation. Read the article in its entirety.